JUDGMENT The short question that arises for consideration in this appeal against acquittal is whether the prosecution of the respondent for offences under sections 184 and 185 and section 336 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1965, is barred by limitation. 2. The following facts which are not disputed become material. The respondent owns agricultural land in S. No. 219 of 1981 Rayadurg Municipality. He sold a site measuring 49 ½ feet x 60 feet situated in the middle of that survey number on 4th February, 1981 under a registered document in favour of one Lakshmidevamma, The petitioner-municipality came to know about these alienations on information Exhibit P-1 furnished to it by the Sub Registrar. Rayadurg. P.W. 1 Revenue Inspector working in that Municipality visited the area and found that Lakshmidevamma erected a hut. The Municipality issued the notice Exhibit P-2 dated 8th May, 1931 to the respondent, informing him that he has contravened sections 184 and185 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act and called upon him to submit an application for sanction of a lay out within 7 days. The respondent sent the belated reply under Exhibit A-3 dated 4th February, 1982 expressing his willingness to form a lay out and the roads and that as nobody was readily available for preparing the necessary blue points, he may be granted 40 days time. As no such lay out was applied for the 1st respondent, the charge-sheet dated 20th September, 1981, was filed into Court on 22nd September, 1981. The learned Magistrate acquitted the respondent being of the view that it is barred by limitation under section 366 of the Act. In support of that conclusion he relied on the decision in Madurai Municipality v. Abdul Razak Saheb Madurai Municipality v. Abdul Razak Saheb (1962) 1 MLJ. 47 , which considered an analogous provision in section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Ac. 3. In support of the appeal, Mr. Venkat Reddi the learned Standing Counsel submitted that the said decision on facts is distinguishable and that to cases of this type, the proviso to section 336 is applicable and that even otherwise, this is a fit case where the Magistrate ought, in exercise of the powers under section 366 of the Municipalities Act, to have taken cognizance of the offence which is brought to his notice and should have convicted the respondent Mr. Bali Reddy learned Counsel for the respondent supported the acquittal and placed reliance on Palaniappan v. Commissioner of Salem Municipality Palaniappan v. Commissioner of Salem Municipality (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 595 : (1977) 2 An.W.R. 167; (1977) 1 A.P.L.J. 120 : (1977) MLJ. (Crl.) 372; Tripurasundari v. Vijayawada Municipality Tripurasundari v. Vijayawada Municipality (1982) 1 A.P.L.J. 445 and Surya Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh Crl.R.C. No. 278 of 1979 dated 9th October, 1980. 4. Section 184 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Ac) provides for the owner's obligation to make a lay out and to form a street or road when disposing of lands as building sites. The section requires the owner of any agricultural land who intends to sell such land for building purposes to pay the council some conversion fee It obligates on the owner of that land to make a layout and form a street or road giving access to sites and connecting them with an existing public or privated street except in the cases where the site abuts on an existing public or private street. It prohibits the owner from selling any portion of his land unless he complied with the condition of his land unless he complied with the conditions aforesaid. Section 185 of the Act provides for the making of a layout and forming of new private street or road. Section 336 of the Act makes general provision regarding penalties Contraventions of sections 184 and185 are also punishable with the penalties mentioned therein. Section 366 provides for three months period of limitation for contraventions of any provision of the Act. At the same time it empowers Magistrates to take cognizance of offences upon information received in which event, the bar of limitation does not apply. Section 366 provides for three months period of limitation for contraventions of any provision of the Act. At the same time it empowers Magistrates to take cognizance of offences upon information received in which event, the bar of limitation does not apply. The proviso to section 366 which becomes material and around which the question of limitation raised in this appeal falls for consideration, reads as under : “Provided that failure to take out a licence, obtain permission or secure registration under this Act shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed a continuing offence until the expiration of the period if any, for which the licence permission or registration is required and if no period is specified, complaint may be made at any time within 12 months from the commencement of the offence,” Section 184 of the Act does not contemplate any application to be made by the owner to the Municipality for permitting him to sell his agricultural land. The said section provides only for permission to be obtained for the construction of buildings in such land or portion thereof. The period of limitation applicable to prosecution under section 184 of the Act is, therefore, clearly three months. Unless of course, the Magistrate chose by himself to take cognizance of the offence. The Municipality cannot have a valid grievance if the Magistrate did not, in his discretion take cognizance of the offence in exercise of the power available to him under section 366 of the Act. The contravention of section 184 took place 4th February, 1981.It has come to the knowledge of the municipality some time before the municipality issued the notice under Exhibit A-2 dated 8th May, 1981. The charge-sheet filed into Court on 22nd September, 1981 is clearly barred and the acquittal of the respondent for the offence under section 184 does not merit any interference. 5. The more important question which arises in this appeal is whether the acquittal of the respondent under section 185 of the Act is also barred by limitation. The proviso provides that failure to obtain permission shall be deemed a continuing offence for the purposes of section 366 in which case complaint may be made at any time within 12 months from the commencement of the offence. The charge-sheet is filed within one year from the date of sale. 6. The proviso provides that failure to obtain permission shall be deemed a continuing offence for the purposes of section 366 in which case complaint may be made at any time within 12 months from the commencement of the offence. The charge-sheet is filed within one year from the date of sale. 6. A plain reading of section 185 of the Act brings to prominence the procedure to be observed for obtaining sanction of the lay out from the Municipal Counsel. Once the lay out is sanctioned, It enures for all time. The sanction is not restricted to any period. The sanction contemplated under section 185 of the Act is the permission granted by the Municipal Council to the owner who thereafter is free to sell the plots so laid out. If there is a contravention of section 185, the Municipal Council, is therefore, clearly entitled to prosecute the offender within 12 months from the commencement of the offence which, in this case, is either 4th February, 1981, the date on which the respondent sold a plot situated middle in the of his land or atleast on the expiry of 7 days from 8th May, 1981, the date of Exhibit P-2 notice. In either case, the complaint which is filed into Court on 22nd September, 1983 is within the limitation of 12 months and the complaint, is therefore, not barred by limitation. 7. It will be convenient first refer to (1962) 1 MLJ 47 .and test whether on facts the said decision can support the acquittal. Section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Act considered in that case is in pari materia with section 366 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act, Abdul Razack Sahib, the accused in that case, purported to sell his land on 11th September, 1958 and the prosecution itself was launched on 29th July, 1959 alleging an offence falling under sections 175 and313 of the Madras District Municipalities Act. Section 175 of the Madras District Municipalities Act is in pari materia with section 184 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act is in pari materia with section 185 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act. Section 175 of the Madras District Municipalities Act is in pari materia with section 184 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act is in pari materia with section 185 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act. Srinivasan, J. in upholding the learned Counsel for the Municipality and answered it in the following manner: “The learned Counsel for the Municipality claims that before a person could sell any portions of his land as sites for the construction of buildings, he has to plot them out and lay out the streets in conformity with the provisions of section 175. When a person makes new private streets of that description, he has to comply with the requirements of section 176 of the Act which lays down that the owner laying out a new private street shall make a written application to the Municipality with plans and other full particulars and obtain the sanction of the Municipality for the making of such a street. According to the Counsel therefore, the permission of the Municipality is required and when such permission has not been obtained, that should be sufficient to attract the application of the proviso to section 347 , which gives an extended period of limitation to an offence constituted by a failure to obtain permission, I do not propose to enter into a discussion of the validity of this argument for the simple reason that there is no charge against the accused for failure to obtain any permission for any particular purpose The only complaint that was made against the accused and was entertained by the lower Court was that he failed to comply with the provisions of section 175, that is to say, that he had sold portions of the land as sites for the construction of the buildings without making any provision for the streets. It is not necessary for me now in this particular case to consider whether if an owner of land and sold portion of the land as sites for construction of buildings having made due provision for the streets, but had failed to obtain the permission of the Municipality under section 176, whether, even in such an even the would be liable for prosecution and if so, under what provision of law. Here is a simple case where the only charge that the accused was called upon to meet was that he had sold the land as building site without making due provisions for roads. That is obviously not an offence which comes within the scope of any of the three categories of offences for which the provision to section 347 appears to hate been enacted. That apart, if the sale, under those circumstances is the offence complained of, I can hardly see how it can be treated as a continuing offence if the offence is completed the moment the sale takes effect. There is no meaning in saying that if the sale is the offence, it can still be a continuing offence after the sale itself had been effected. But for the specific purpose of coming within the scope of the proviso to section 347, it is not every continuing offence that can be so brought within that provision. It is only such of those offences which are listed in this proviso that are deemed to be continuing offences for the purpose of that proviso. The present case is not one such”. It is thus clear that (1962) 1 MLJ. 47 , is an authority on the question of limitation for a prosecution under section 175 of the Madras District Municipalities Act which is in pari materia with section 184 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act. The said case has not dicided the period of limitation which would have been applicable, bad the prosecution there been for an offence under section 176 of the Madras District Municipalities Act analogous to section 185 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act. The learned Magistrate is not, therefore, correct in relying upon (1962) 1 MLJ. 47 , in support of the acquittal. 8. The other cases relied upon by Mr. Bali Reddy can now be noticed. In (1966) MLJ. (Crl) 595, the accused a Palaniappan had not up in unauthorised construction without obtaining the permission of the Municipal Council. A provisional notice was issued on 31st May, 1963 under the corresponding provision of the Madras District Municipalities Act which required him to remove the offending construction. After giving an opportunity to show case, the executive authority confirmed the provisional order on 1st August, 1964 and directed Palaniappan to remove the offending construction within three days of the receipt of the notice. After giving an opportunity to show case, the executive authority confirmed the provisional order on 1st August, 1964 and directed Palaniappan to remove the offending construction within three days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was served on Palaniappan on 11th August, 1964, informing him that if he fails to do so, he would be prosecuted for an offence under section 317 of the Act which is analogous to section 340 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act for the contravention of section 317. The complaint was filed on 3rd December, 1964 which was beyond three months after the offence had been committed. Clearly there is no scope for the applicability of the proviso to section 347 of the Madras District Municipalities Act and that is why (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 595, was decided on the basis that the period of limitation applicable was only three months after the offence had been committed. 9. The facts in (1977) 1 A.P.L.J. 120 , can now be noticed. The accused Krishnamurthy demolished an old building and constructed a shop room without obtaining the permission as provided under section 211 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act. He was prosecuted for the offence under section 340 and was convicted and fined once As still Krishnamurthy did not remove the unlawful construction, he was again prosecuted for the same offence and the question which arose for consideration was whether the offence committed by him in making the unauthorised construction continues so long as the unauthorised construction was not removed Ramachandra Raju, J. held: ‘‘There is nothing in the provisions of the Act which renders the continuance of unauthorised construction an offence until it is removed. Once the construction is made without the necessary permission, the offence is computed once and for all. The offence committed for construction or reconstruction without applying for the necessary permission as provided under section 211 of the Act is completed as soon as the unauthorised construction is made. The respondent was already prosecuted for the offence or constructing the shop room without permission and he was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50. It is provided under section 300, Criminal Procedure Code, that if a person is once convicted or acquitted, he shall not be tried for the same offence.” The facts in (1977) 1 A.P.L.J. 120 , are somewhat analogous to the facts in (1966) MLJ. 50. It is provided under section 300, Criminal Procedure Code, that if a person is once convicted or acquitted, he shall not be tried for the same offence.” The facts in (1977) 1 A.P.L.J. 120 , are somewhat analogous to the facts in (1966) MLJ. (Crl.) 595, with the further circumstance that Katta Krishnamurthy was proviously tried for the same offence and convicted (1977) 1 A.P.L.J. 120 :(1977) 2 An.W.R. 167 is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. 10. In (1982) 1 A.P.L.J. 445 , the accused Tripurasundari was prosecuted under section 336 of the Act lor contravening the provisions of sections 263 and264 of the Act. She was found to run the workshop at a notified place without obtaining the necessary municipal licence. He convicted for the said offence was not questioned in this Court. She was also convicted under section 336 of the Act for violating section 264 of the Act for having installed a drilling machine and grinder without obtaining the requisite permission to instal the said machinery. The municipality gave the notice on 16th November, 1976 giving her a weeks’ time to remove the electric moter and the machinery. The machinery would appear to have been installed as far back as in about July, 1974. The prosecution was launched on 25th June, 1977. Chennakesav Reddi, J., held that as three months period had elapsed from the date allowed to her for removing the offending machinery by the time the prosecution was filed the prosecution is barred by limitation The decision of this Court in (1977) 1 A.P.L.J 120 :(1977) 2 An.W.R. 167 was followed. On facts therefore (1982) 1 A.P.L.J. 445 also stands to be distinguished. Surtya Rao's case Crl.R.C. No. 278 of 1979 dated 9th October, 1980 on facts, is similar to (1982) 1 A.P.L.J. 445 , There also, the conviction for the offence under section 263 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act was not questioned, but Surya Rao questioned the correctness of his conviction under section 264 of the Municipalities Act. The building Inspector noticed and detected the existance of the machinery on 2nd November, 1976 and the complaing about the same was filed in 25th June, 1977 which was even beyond six months from the date of knowledge by the Municipality of the commission of offence by Surya Rao. For the same reasons as given above, the facts in Surya Rao's case Crl. For the same reasons as given above, the facts in Surya Rao's case Crl. R. C. No. 278 of 1979, dated 9th October, 1980 also are clearly distinguishable. 11. The offence under section 185 read with section 336 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act has been clearly established. There is no bar of limitation as contended for by Mr. Bali Reddy would arise. 12. The offences under sections 184 and185 appear in the first coloum of Schedule VI. In respect of such offences, the sentence to be awarded is Rs. 1,000 provided that the fine imposed shall in no case be less than 1/3rd of the said amount. The appeal is accordingly allowed in part, convicting the respondent under section 185 read with section 336 of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 400 in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one month. Time for payment of the fine is granted till the end of January, 1984. R.S.R. ----- Appeal allowed.