JUDGMENT K.M Goyal, J. - The petitioner was an officer of the Food Corporation of India and he is aggrieved by an order of dismissal dated 38 83 passed against him, vide annexure 17 to the petition. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the Corporation to the maintainability of the petition. It was pointed out that the order of dismissal was appealable under the relevant service regulations and in view of the existence of this alternative remedy, the petition should not be entertained. The petitioner has countered this argument by contending that he was complaining of violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as a copy of the inquiry report in respect of charges against the petitioner was not supplied to him before the dismissal order was passed. The report was taken into consideration without an opportunity to the petitioner of meeting the same. In a case of violation of principles of natural justice, the order should be treated as one without jurisdiction and as such, the existence of alternative remedy should not stand in the way of entertainment of the writ petition. It has further been contended that this ground is not open to the petitioner before the appellate authority. It has also been contended that regulation 39 (3) of the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971 is violative of the principles of natural justice, as also against the guarantee contained in Article 311 as well as in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as it does not provide for furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report to the aggrieved employee prior to the passing of order of punishment. 2. We have heard Sri Z. Jilani, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his submissions. Sri Jilani has relied on a number of rulings insupport of his contention that the aggrieved employee should have an opportunity of making representations against the inquiry, report, before an order of punishment is passed. They are as follows: M. P. Naik v. State of Karnataka, 1981 (3) Serv. LR 22 (para 17), a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court, Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing federation v. Radhey Shyam, 1983 (2) Serv. LR. 65 (para 7), a decision of learned Single Judge of the Punjab arid Harjana High Court. Vrat Pa/Gupta v. The Chairman, Board of Governors. IIT, 1982 (1) Serv. LR 22 (para 17), a Division Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court, Punjab State Cooperative Supply and Marketing federation v. Radhey Shyam, 1983 (2) Serv. LR. 65 (para 7), a decision of learned Single Judge of the Punjab arid Harjana High Court. Vrat Pa/Gupta v. The Chairman, Board of Governors. IIT, 1982 (1) Serv. LR. 633 (para 11); a decision of learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. 3. In the Punjab and Haryana case the Karnataka decision, cited first, has been relied on for the view that giving of an opportunity for showing cause at the stage of passing of order of punishment is a necessary requirement of the rules of natural justice. The Karnataka decision mentioned above has relied on two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely 'Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 S.C. 364 , and State of Maharashtra v. B.A. Joshi, AIR 1969 SC 1302 . Both these Supreme Court decisions related to the legal position as it prevailed prior to amendment of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. 4. Article 311 (2) of the Constitution originally did require that after conclusion of the inquiry the punishing authority should take a tentative decision and if it is of the view that action by way of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is to be taken, then opportunity against that proposed action should also be given. As a necessary part of this Constitutional opportunity jt was, no doubt, laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a copy of the inquiry report should also be given to the delinquent or the charged Government servant so that he may know what findings were recorded against him and represent against them even while representing against the severity, of the penalty proposed. Now this opportunity has been done away with by a Constitutional amendment, so far as Government servant are concerned. The petitioner was never a Government servant and the reference to Article 311 made in para 26A of the petition is clearly misconceived. His case is governed by the Regulations made by the Food Corporation. Now this opportunity has been done away with by a Constitutional amendment, so far as Government servant are concerned. The petitioner was never a Government servant and the reference to Article 311 made in para 26A of the petition is clearly misconceived. His case is governed by the Regulations made by the Food Corporation. If the Regulations do not provide for a second show cause notice, just as in the case of Government servants, Article 311 (2) as amended does not sot provide, there seems no justification for furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report to the charged official at the conclusion of the inquiry. The Regulations do provide for furnishing of a copy of the inquiry report along with the order of punishment. That is in the fitness of things because if the punishing authority has merely agreed with the inquiry officer, the report would show the reason on the basis of which order of dismissal has been passed. If the punishing authority disagrees and such disagreement is to the prejudice of the charged official, then the reasons for disagreement should also be recorded and furnishes; to the charged official along with a copy of the inquiry report at the time a copy of the dismissal order is served on him. But when there is no provision for a second show cause notice or for an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action at the conclusion of the inquiry, what possible purpose could the furnishing of an inquiry report serve at that time? 5. It has been contended that the report is one of the materials which is taken into account by the punishing authority and if any material has to be taken into Account, it should be furnished to the charged official, for it is a requirement of natural justice that the authority should not take any material into account which has not been furnished to the charged official or in respect of which he has not been given an opportunity of showing cause. This line of reasoning though, no doubt, ingenuous and seemingly attractive, does not bear scrutiny. The inquiry report is, no doubt, a material, but it is not a piece of evidence. It is part of the decision making process. It contains only the opinion of the authority, namely, the inquiry officer. This line of reasoning though, no doubt, ingenuous and seemingly attractive, does not bear scrutiny. The inquiry report is, no doubt, a material, but it is not a piece of evidence. It is part of the decision making process. It contains only the opinion of the authority, namely, the inquiry officer. The inquiry officer and the punishing authority are two limbs of the same disciplinary apparatus which is required to take a decision in respect of charges and punishment. Decisionmaking process is divided into two stages. To insist on furnishing of the report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent before a final decision against him is taken would amount to giving him a second opportunity of showing cause, which the statute does not require. In the case of a Government servant the extention of the line of reasoning canvassed by the petitioner would indirectly have the effect of reintroducing the provision for a second show cause notice which has been deleted by the Fortysecond amendment, it is.only about those materials which are in the nature of pieces of evidence that it is required by the rules of natural justice that they should not be relied on unless an opportunity of explanation is given to the person against whom proceedings are being taken. The principle cannot be extended to any materiel which is merely part of the decisionmaking process. 6. In de Smith's 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' Fourth Edition, at page 203 the learned author has laid down as follows: If relevant evidential material is not disclosed at all to a party who is potentially prejudiced by it, there is prima facie a breach of natural justice, irrespective of whether the material in question arose before, during or after the hearing. 7. At pages 207212 op. cit., institutional decisions have been dealt with, and at page 210 It has been noted in connection with he decision of the government, based on Inspector's report as follows: But there is still no duty to disclose the inspector's report till after the Secretary of State's decision is announced. ' 8. That a second notice of showing cause is not a necessary part of the principles of natural justice has been expressly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several decisions. ' 8. That a second notice of showing cause is not a necessary part of the principles of natural justice has been expressly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in several decisions. In Suresh Koshi v. University of Kerala, AIR 1969 SC 198 , (para 15) their Lordships observed as follows: There seems to be an erroneous impression in certain quarters evidently influenced by the provisions in Art. 311 of the Constitution particularly as they stood before the amendment of that Article that every disciplinary proceeding must consist of two inquiries, one before issuing the show cause notice, to be followed by another inquiry thereafter. Such is not the requirement of the principles of natural justice. Law may or may not prescribe such a course. Even if a show cause notice is provided by law from that it does not follow that a copy of the report on the basis of which the show cause notice is issued should be made available to the person proceeded against or that another inquiry should be held thereafter. 9. In Shadi Lal Gupta v. State of Punjab, AIR 1973 SCI 124, a case of minor penalty, the decision ip Suresh Koshi (supra) was followed in para 11 of the report. 10. These decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court do not appear to have been brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judges of the Karnataka and Punjab High Courts in the case of M.P. Naik and Punjab State Co operative Supply and Marketing Federation (supra). The Karnataka High Court has relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court which related to the unamended article 311 (2) of the Constitution, namely, the decision in 6, A. Joshi and H.C. Goel (supra) respectively. The teamed single Judge of the Delhi High Court has also relied on in para 9 of the report, those decisions jof various High Courts and of the Supreme Court which related to the preFortyseeond Amendment wording of article 311 (2). With due respect to the learned Judges who decided these cases, we are unable to agree with the view taken therein to the effect that furnishing of copy of inquiry report is a necessary part of the principles of natural justice. 11. We thus find no invalidity in the provisions contained in regulation 59 (3). 12. With due respect to the learned Judges who decided these cases, we are unable to agree with the view taken therein to the effect that furnishing of copy of inquiry report is a necessary part of the principles of natural justice. 11. We thus find no invalidity in the provisions contained in regulation 59 (3). 12. We do not dispute the proposition that the existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition. Indeed in a case of violation of natural justice a writ petition may well be entertained even though the alternative remedy of appeal etc be available to the aggrieved person. But it is not normally expedient to entertain such a writ petition because we are of the opinion that an appellate authority can deal more fully with all the points involved, including the merits of the charges, the sufficiency of evidence, the Severity of the punishment and even any question about inadequacy of opportunity. We, therefore, do not think it a fit exercise of discretion to entertain the writ petition and would prefer to relegate the petitioner to his remedy of departmental appeal, 13. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed in limine. (Petition dismissed)