By Court This appeal by the tenant arises out of an appellate Judgment confirming the decree of the trial court for his eviction from the suit premises. 2. The title suit in question was instituted on 1.12.1976 for eviction of the ground floor of a building situate at Nivin Mitra Road, in the town of Ranchi, which is in occupation of the appellant. Various pleas of defence were set up to contest the suit for his eviction by the respondent, but the questions, which have fallen for our consideration in the second appeal, do not necessitate mentioning any of those facts. 3. The trial court decreed the suit applying the provisions of the Bihar Buildings. (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. The appellant preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court and one of the questions that were raised, was that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was defective and that there was no personal necessity of the premises in question. The necessity of the question of validity of notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (briefly the Act) was raised in view of the fact that the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. 1947 had expired and on the date, when the suit was instituted, the 1977 Act had not come into force. In that situation, one of the points that was argued in the lower appellate court as well as to this Court was as to whether a suit would be governed by the general law or by the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1977 (briefly 'the 1977 Act'). 4. Before entering into this discussion, it may be mentioned that when the 1947 Act had been promulgated, the premises fell within Kotwali police station of Ranchi, which was subsequently bifurcated and Lalpur police station was also carved out of that within the jurisdiction of which the building came to situate and in the Schedule mentioning the local areas notified under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the 1977 Act. Lalpur police station was not included, perhaps, for the reason that the local areas of the town of Ranchi were taken from the preceding Act without taking notice of the geographical alterations in the boundaries of the police station. Lalpur police station was not included, perhaps, for the reason that the local areas of the town of Ranchi were taken from the preceding Act without taking notice of the geographical alterations in the boundaries of the police station. It is also worthwhile mentioning that when an application under section 13 of the 1977 Act was filed by the plaintiff respondent, a plea was taken by the appellant that the 1977 Act had no application in view of the fact that the premises did not situate within the local areas mentioned in the Schedule. The trial court had, however, passed an order against the tenant, but a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Revision No. 14 of 1978(R) by his order dated 31.8.1978, On consideration of all the above facts and the various provisions of the past and the present Act, recorded a finding that the provisions of the 1977 Act had no application to the suit premises and accordingly set aside the order of the trial court. It may also be mentioned that later on by notification dated 10.4.1980, the local area of Lalpur police station has also been brought in under the Schedule of the 1977 Act giving it retrospective effect from 1.4.1976, but at the time when the learned Single Judge had decided the issue, the notification was not there. The correctness of the view of the learned Single Judge was examined by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Harinandan Singh Vs. Sri Ranjit Kr. Samanta. In paragraph 12 of the report, it was observed that the learned Judge had rightly held that the new Act did not govern the suit for eviction in question. The effect of the Ordinance or of the notification dated 30.4.1980 from the retrospective effect, however, was not decided. It is on the basis of this authority that it was argued on behalf of the landlord that it would operate as resjudicta and the suit would be governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It was, however, contended on behalf of the tenant that the finding; recorded in the interlocutory orders were tentative in nature and, therefore, this finding would not operate as resjudicata. 5. It was, however, contended on behalf of the tenant that the finding; recorded in the interlocutory orders were tentative in nature and, therefore, this finding would not operate as resjudicata. 5. The further argument, which was advanced before us, was that clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 1 of 1977 Act entitled the plaintiff to enforce the liability that was incurred by the tenant during the subsistence of 1947 Act or the interregnum which lapses in between the expiry of 1947 Act and coming into force of the 1977 Act and, therefore, it was contended that the suit would be governed by the 1947 Act, inasmuch as the area in question was comprised within Kotwali police station of the town of Ranchi. This argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the tenant mast be rejected only on two simple grounds, firstly, that the suit Was instituted after the areas comprising of Lalpur police station were carved out of the Kotwali police station and, secondly, that the suit was instituted after the 1947 Act had expired. The notification giving it retrospective effect could not also ensure to the benefit of the tenant because no retrospective effect could be given by an executive authority enjoying a delegated power without any authority in this regard under sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Act to make it retrospective, as retrospective effect cannot be given in absence of any specific authority in this regard by a superior legislative authority. This principle is well settled and, therefore, we do not cite authorities on this proposition. 6. There is yet another aspect of looking at the matter, i.e., the doctrine of estoppel. The appellant had taken advantage of avoiding an order under section 13 of the 1977 Act by raising a plea that the suit was not governed by the 1977 Act, and, therefore, having Once taken advantage of this proposition, he could not be permitted to blow hot and cold. The court would, therefore, not permit him to shift his stand at a later stage of the same proceeding and to defend the suit under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. Similar view has been taken by a learned Judge of this Court in (M/s. Uppal & Sons VS. Kishore Kumar Chauhan ). 7. The court would, therefore, not permit him to shift his stand at a later stage of the same proceeding and to defend the suit under the provisions of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act. Similar view has been taken by a learned Judge of this Court in (M/s. Uppal & Sons VS. Kishore Kumar Chauhan ). 7. For the reasons discussed above, we find no merit in this appeal and it is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances, we shall make no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.