ORDER V.K. Mehrotra, J. - M/s Hanuman Oil Industries, which is the applicant in this Court in the present revision under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, filed a suit in the court of Civil Judge, Kanpur in which it claimed a relief for perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, its officers, servants. employees and agents from disconnecting the electric connection of the applicant bearing installation Nos. 8/2787 and 8/2788 in premises No. 81/99 Cooperganj, Kanpur. The defendant in the suit, which is the opposite party in this Court, is the Kanpur Electric Supply Administration. 2. The question whether the court-fee. paid by the applicant on the relief sought by it was considered by the court below, which came to the conclusion in its order dated Oct, 17, 1977 that the applicant was liable to pay court-fee on the footing that it was seeking a declaration to the effect that some sum of money claimed by the defendant was not payable by it towards electric charges and as such it was not liable to pay the same nor was it's electrical supply liable to be disconnected on that account. The trial Court called upon the applicant to amend the plaint and pay the court-fee on that basis. The applicant had paid court-fee on the basis of the market value given by it to the aforesaid installations (Rs. 6000)/. The amount paid was Rs. 201-50 P on ?th of the aforesaid value given to the installations by the applicant. It is how the applicant came to this Court in the present revision. 3. The applicant sought the relief of injunction on the allegations, contained in the plaint, that it was regularly paying the amount of the bills sent to it and that in respect of the aforesaid installations all the dues had stood paid. The defendant had erroneously sent bills for a sum of Rs. 27306-80 P. and was threatening to disconnect the electric supply of the applicant unless the amount was paid. In effect, the case set up in the plaint is that the defendant was threatening to disconnect the electric supply to the applicant's premises illegally even though nothing was due from the applicant. 4. The relief sought by the applicant is purely one of injunction. It is not seeking any declaration about its liability for payment or otherwise of any amount to the defendant-opposite party. 4. The relief sought by the applicant is purely one of injunction. It is not seeking any declaration about its liability for payment or otherwise of any amount to the defendant-opposite party. For the relief to be granted to the applicant, the Court may incidentally have to look into the question whether any amount, as claimed by the defendant, was due from the applicant or not. But, on the averments of the fact made by it in the plaint, the sole relief claimed by the applicant is one of injunction. 5. The Court-fees Act, as applicable in this State. provides for payment of the amount of court-fee in a suit, where injunction alone is the relief sought, in section 7(iv-B) (b). That provision runs thus : In suits; (a) For easement, (b) For an injunction, to obtain an injunction; (c) ............. (d) ............... (e) ............... According to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint; (Provided that such amount shall not be less than one-fifth of the market value of the property involved in or affected by the relief sought or Rs. 200/- whichever is greater; Provided further, that in the case of suits falling under clauses (a) and (b), the amount of court-fee leviable shall in no case exceed Rs. 500). That this provision would be attracted for calculating the amount of court-fee payable in a suit like the present is hardly in doubt. In Murli Dhar v. Bansidhar, AIR 1963 All. 86 a Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case where one of the reliefs sought was that the defendants may be restrained by a decree for perpetual injunction from interfering with the plaintiff in any manner whatsoever as acting managing partner of the firm constituted by the plaintiff and the defendant and was as occupier and employer of the factory. The Bench observed that the allegations in the plaint revealed that the plaintiff was basically asking for the relief of injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his carrying on the management of the business. The Bench observed that the allegations in the plaint revealed that the plaintiff was basically asking for the relief of injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his carrying on the management of the business. The relief was to be valued under section 7(iv-B)(b) of the Court-fees Act, Following this decision a learned single Judge in Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P. Allahabad v. N.A. Gazder, AIR 1963 All 89 held that where a relief for injunction is claimed because of certain illegal act on the part of the defendant, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to claim any declaration about their right as such, but they could seek an injunction in which case the court fee payable by them was to be in accordance with section 7(iv-B)(b) of the Court-fees Act. 6. Whatever little scope may have been therefor a contrary view was clearly negatived by the Supreme Court in its decision in the case of Vishnu Pratap Sugar Works (P.) Ltd. v. Chief Inspector of Stamps, U.P., AIR 1968 SC 102 , in which the decision of this Court was reversed. In that case the plaintiff Sugar Works had gone to court with the allegation that for the various reasons mentioned in the plaint, the provisions of the U.P. Sugar Cane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Sugar Cane Cess Act, 1956 read with the U.P. Sugar Cane Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 and the U.P. Sugar Cane Purchase Tax Act IX of 1961 were void in so far as they permitted the defendant-State of U.P. to realise sugar cane cess. It was asserted that the defendant-State was not entitled to realise any amount it was seeking to recover from the plaintiff and that it be restrained by an injunction from doing so. The view taken by this Court was that in effect the plaintiff was seeking a declaration about the void character of the aforesaid Acts, which were instruments securing money -within the meaning of that term under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act, and they were liable, therefore, to pay court-fee on the footing that they were seeking a declaration coupled with a consequential relief. The Supreme Court took the view that for the relief sought by the Sugar Works, court-fee payable was to be calculated in accordance with clause (b) of sub-section (iv-B) of S. 7. The Supreme Court took the view that for the relief sought by the Sugar Works, court-fee payable was to be calculated in accordance with clause (b) of sub-section (iv-B) of S. 7. What the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 4 was : "It is true that for purposes of the Court- fees Act, it is the substance and not the form which has to be considered while deciding which particular provision of the Act applies. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that the actual relief prayed for in the plaint was an injunction restraining the State and its authorities to realise from the appellant- company the aforesaid cess and the purchase tax. It is clear from the plaint when read as a whole that though the appellant company alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The plaint proceeds on the footing that the said Acts were void and that therefore the State of U.P. or its authorities had no power to realise the said tax and the said cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts. But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction all suits where injunction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under Cl. (a) of sub-s. (iv) of S. 7 and in that view Cl.(b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of section 7 would be superfluous." 7. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the provision under which the plaintiff was liable to pay court-fee was S. 7(iv-B)(b) of the Court-fees Act, as applicable in the State, and it is under this provision that the court-fee had been paid by the plaintiff. The order holding the amount paid to be insufficient, is, therefore. liable to be set aside. 8. The revision is allowed. The order holding the amount paid to be insufficient, is, therefore. liable to be set aside. 8. The revision is allowed. The decision of the learned Civil Judge on Issue No. 1 holding that the suit was undervalued and the court-fee paid was insufficient is set aside. The court below shall proceed to try the suit on the basis that the valuation of the suit and, the amount of the court-fee paid thereon were in accordance with law. Since no one has appeared to oppose this revision. parties are left to bear their own costs.