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Allahabad High Court · body

1983 DIGILAW 635 (ALL)

MUSHTAQUE AHMED v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

1983-09-09

R.B.LAL

body1983
R. B. LAL, J. ( 1 ) THIS is second bail application on behalf of Mushtaq Ahmed against whom there is a case under sections 302/307/ 324 I. P. C. from P. S. Shahganj, Allahabad. This bail application has been moved on technical grounds. The first bail application of this applicant was rejected by this Court on merits on 4-7-1983. ( 2 ) THE complainant opposite party has put in appearance through a counsel and has opposed the bail application. ( 3 ) THE first contention of the learned counsel for the applicant is that the Chief Judicial Magistrate had passed a committal order against the applicant on 16-4-1983 without complying with the mandatory provisions of Section 207, Cr. P. C. inasmuch as he had not supplied copies of all the relevant documents to the applicant and, therefore, the committal order was illegal and the order remanding the applicant to judicial custody in pursuance of that committal order also became illegal. Because the custody of the applicant was illegal, he was entitled to be released on bail. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel has urged that in the decision State of U. P. v. Laxmi Braloman1, the Supreme Court had clearly laid down that the provisions of Section 207 Cr. P. C. were cast in a mandatory language, and there was an obligation upon the Magistrate to perform the judicial obligation of supplying all the necessary copies to the accused free of cost and it was after satisfying himself that the copies had been furnished to the accused, that the Magistrate could proceed to commit the accused, for trial to the court of session. The learned counsel has pointed out that in the decision Ram Narain Singh v. State of Delhi2, the Supreme Court had observed that; Those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law. The learned counsel has pointed out that in the decision Ram Narain Singh v. State of Delhi2, the Supreme Court had observed that; Those who feel called upon to deprive other persons of their personal liberty in the discharge of what they conceive to be their duty, must strictly and scrupulously observe the forms and rules of the law. He has also referred to the decision Maneka Gandhi v. The Union of India3, and added that a person could be deprived of his personal liberty by a legal procedure which was fair reasonable and just; committal of the applicant to the court of session to stand his trial without supplying copies of all the relevant documents could not be regarded as a fair, reasonable and just procedure and it amounted to a violation of the mandatory provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) BEFORE examining the above legal submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant, the facts may be ascertained. The learned counsel for the applicant has filed certain certified copies and the learned counsel for the complainant opposite party has filed certified copy of the order of committal dated 16-4-1983. The lower court record was also summoned before this Court on 26-8-1983 to ascertain certain facts. The committal order inter alia says: The copies of relevant documents have been furnished to the accused. On the margin of the Hindi order sheet below the order dated 2-4-1983 the following endorsement in Hindi existed: AAudy ikjkr fh;k eqrkd vgen** It has not been disputed before me that this endorsement was made by the applicant. It seems that the word ikjkr has been wrongly written and really means izklr. Though no date appears in this endorsement, it appears it was made on 16-4-1983. A certified copy of paper No. 18-B on the file of the lower court shows that copies of four documents, namely, charge sheet, First Information Report, the site plan and fards were prepared. Certified copy of the application dated 18-4-1983 shows that the counsel for the applicant had made an application to the Chief Judicial Magistrate saying that the copies of the statements of the witnesses recorded under section 161, Cr. P. C. and copies of the injury report and the postmortem examination report had not been furnished to the accused and the same may be furnished. P. C. and copies of the injury report and the postmortem examination report had not been furnished to the accused and the same may be furnished. After hearing the Assistant Public Prosecutor and the counsel for the applicant, the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed an order on 19-4-1983 directing that all the copies be prepared and supplied by 22-4-1983. The certified copy of the Hindi Order Sheet dated 18-8-1983 filed by the learned counsel for the applicants shows that on 18-8-1983 the counsel for the accused moved an application saying that copies had not been supplied to him and the Additional Sessions Judge directed the District Government Counsel, Criminal, to furnish the copies. The hearing of the case was adjourned to 19-8-1983. In view of this material, it may safely be said that on 16-4-1983, in fact, copies of some documents alone were given to the applicant and copies of statements under Section 161, Cr. P. C. injury report and the post mortem examination report were not furnished to the applicant. The recital in the committal order that the copies of relevant documents have been furnished to the accused, however, indicates that at the time of passing the committal order somehow the Magistrate was under the impression, though an erroneous one, that copies of relevant documents had been furnished to the accused. ( 6 ) IN the decision Laxmi Brahman v. State of Uttar Pradesh4 a Division Bench of this Court was posed with the question whether after submission of charge sheet by the police the Magistrate had authority to remand the accused to custody before passing the committal order. The Division Bench was of the opinion that since after the enactment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1973 the proceedings before the Magistrate from the time of the submission of the charge sheet till the time of passing the order of committal would not be an enquiry within the meaning of the expression in Section 2 (g) of the Code: the Magistrate had no jurisdiction, power or authority to remand the accused to custody after the charge-sheet is submitted and before the commitment order is made. This view of the Division Bench was challenged by the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Courts decision is State of U. P. v. Laxmi Brahman (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant. This view of the Division Bench was challenged by the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Courts decision is State of U. P. v. Laxmi Brahman (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant. While considering the question whether the period from the time of submission of the charge sheet till the time of passing the order of committal would be an enquiry under Section 2 (g) Cr. P. C. their lordships of the Supreme Court observed: Section 207 as it then stood made it obligatory for the Magistrate to supply free of costs, copies of the documents set out in the section. The duty cast on the Magistrate by Section 207 had to be performed in a judicial manner. To comply with Section 207 which is cast in a mandatory language, when the accused is produced before the Magistrate, he has to enquire from the accused by recording his statement whether the copies of the various documents set out in Section 207 have been supplied to him or not. No order committing the accused to the Court of Session can be made under Section 209 unless the Magistrate fully complies with the provisions of Section 207. And if it is shown that the copies of relevant documents or some of them are not supplied, the matter will have to be adjourned to get the copies prepared and supplied to the accused. This is implicit in Section 207 and Section 209 provides that on being satisfied that the requisite copies have been supplied to the accused, the Magistrate may proceed to commit the accused to the Court of Session to stand his trial. The statutory obligation imposed by Section 207 read with Section 209 on the Magistrate to furnish free of costs copies of documents is a judicial obligation. It is not an administrative function. It is a judicial function, which is to be discharged in a judicial manner. It is distinctly possible that the copies may not be ready. That makes it necessary to adjourn the matter for some time, which may be spent in preparing the copies and supplying the same to the accused. The Magistrate can proceed to commit the accused for trial to the Court of Session only after he judicially discharges the function imposed upon him by Section 207. That makes it necessary to adjourn the matter for some time, which may be spent in preparing the copies and supplying the same to the accused. The Magistrate can proceed to commit the accused for trial to the Court of Session only after he judicially discharges the function imposed upon him by Section 207. Their Lordships concluded by saying: Now, if under Section 207, the Magistrate is performing a judicial function of ascertaining whether copies have been supplied or not, it would undoubtedly be an inquiry for the purpose of satisfying himself that Section 207 has been complied with in letter and spirit. That satisfaction has to be judicial satisfaction. It is not a trial but something other than a trial and being judicial function it would necessarily be an enquiry. The above observations were made by the Supreme Court to emphasise the importance of the interregnum since the receipt of the charge sheet till the passing of the order of committal. The Supreme Court held that this period had its own legal and judicial importance and, therefore, it was to be treated as an enquiry under Section 2 (g) Cr. P. C. In that case, the Supreme Court was not considering the question whether an order of committal passed without fully complying with the provision regarding the supply of copies of documents to the accused, would be a legal and valid order. In my view, it will not be correct to deduce from the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court that an order of committal passed without fully complying with the provision for supply of copies of documents to the accused, would be illegal and vitiated. Such an omission would be at the best of an irregularity and nothing more. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the complainant opposite party has referred to the decision Narain Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh5 and urged that non-compliance with the provision of supply of copies to the accused would at the most be an irregularity and nothing more. That was a case under the provisions of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure (1898 ). Subsection (4) of Section 173 of the Old Code required that- the Police Officer shall supply copies of all relevant documents to the accused before the commencement of the enquiry. That was a case under the provisions of the Old Code of Criminal Procedure (1898 ). Subsection (4) of Section 173 of the Old Code required that- the Police Officer shall supply copies of all relevant documents to the accused before the commencement of the enquiry. Sub-section (3) of Section 207-A required that at the commencement of the enquiry the Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in Section 173 have been furnished to the accused. In Naran Raos case the convict appellant challenged his conviction inter alia on the ground that there was no compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 173 (4) and Section 207-A (3) of the Code. Their lordships proceeded on the assumption that there was an enquiry omission to carry out the provisions of these sections. Their lordships observed that Magistrates have to be circumspect while conducting proceedings, to see to it that accused persons are not handicapped in their defence by any omission on the part of police officers concerned, to supply the necessary copies. But on the question whether the omission would necessarily render the entire proceedings and the trial null and void, they held that the noncompliance would not necessarily have the result of vitiating the proceedings and subsequent trial. Their lordships observed that the word Tshallt occurring both in sub-section (4) of Section 173 and sub-section (3) of Section 207-A is not mandatory, but only directory. Their lordships further observed that certainly if it is shown in a particular case on behalf of the accused that the omission on the part of the police officers concerned or of the Magistrate before whom the committal proceedings had pended, has caused prejudice to the accused, in the interest of justice the court may reopen the proceedings by insisting upon full compliance with the provisions of the Code. The provisions of Sections 173 (4) and 207-A (3) of the Old Code have been omitted in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973, and the duty of supplying copies of documents has been cast on the Magistrate under Section 207, Cr. P. C. (New ). In view of the legislative, amendment to the decision in Narain Raos case may not have direct application; still, it affords valuable guidance because the deleted provisions and the new provisions under Section 207 Cr. P. C. have basically the same object. P. C. (New ). In view of the legislative, amendment to the decision in Narain Raos case may not have direct application; still, it affords valuable guidance because the deleted provisions and the new provisions under Section 207 Cr. P. C. have basically the same object. ( 8 ) FOR the above reasons, I am clearly of the view that the order of committal dated 16-4-1983 passed without furnishing copies of all the relevant documents to the applicant is not illegal and the remand of the applicant to custody in pursuance of that order is not rendered illegal. The failure to supply all the copies before passing the order of committal at the best amounts to an irregularity. ( 9 ) IT is not necessary to discuss the decisions of Ram Narain Singh and Maneka Gandhi (supra), because the points urged do not really arise after what has been held in the preceding paragraph. ( 10 ) THE first contention has no merit and is accordingly repelled. ( 11 ) THE second and the last contention of the learned counsel is that there was no compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 50 (1) Cr. P. C. and clause (1) of Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The applicant was arrested on 21-12-1982 and was taken to the police station. He was not informed of the cause of his arrest. He has urged that for this reason, as well the detention of the applicant in custody became illegal. In support of his submission the learned counsel has placed reliance on the decisions Vimal Kishore Mehrotra v. The State of U. P. 6 In Re Madhu Limaye ( AIR 1969 SC 1014 ) and Ram Chandra v. The Superintendent, Central Jail Naini7 The above legal position cannot help the appellant in the instant case because there is no material on the record to prove that in fact full particulars of the offence for which he was arrested were not communicated to him by the person who had arrested him, or by the police. In this case, the appellant was caught red handed by the complainant and others at the time of the occurrence and was taken to the police station where the complainant lodged a report of the occurrence and handed over the applicant. to the police. In this case, the appellant was caught red handed by the complainant and others at the time of the occurrence and was taken to the police station where the complainant lodged a report of the occurrence and handed over the applicant. to the police. In these circumstances, it can not be accepted that the applicant was not informed of the particulars of the offence for which he was arrested. Paragraph 3 of the affidavit annexed to the bail application relates to the factual aspect of the legal submission. This affidavit was sworn by the father of the applicant who was admittedly not present at the time of the arrest of the applicant or when he was handed over to the police at the police station. The father has not verified the contents of paragraph 3 on personal knowledge. The verification clause shows that part of paragraph 3 is based on perusal of the paperst and another part of this paragraph is based on legal advice. In the General Diary Report no. 5 dated 21-12-1982 (Annexure A), it has not been mentioned that the particulars of the offence for which the applicant was arrested were conveyed to him. This alone is not sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the particulars of the offence were not conveyed to the applicant and there was no compliance with the provisions of section 50 (1) Cr. P. C. and Article 22 (1) of the Constitution of India. There can be no presumption that the particulars of the offence or the grounds for which the applicant was arrested were not conveyed to him by the person who arrested him, or by the police. This fact is to be proved positively by the person who alleges non-compliance with these provisions. This has not been done by the applicant in the instant case. The case of Ram Chandra (supra) cannot help the applicant on this point. In that case, an averment was made in the affidavit on personal knowledge that there was no compliance with the aforesaid provisions. The police had not rebutted the assertion effectively. In these circumstances, the Division Bench accepted the assertion of the petitioner and held that there was no compliance with the aforesaid provisions. This is not the case here. ( 12 ) FOR the above reasons the second contention too has no merit and fails. The police had not rebutted the assertion effectively. In these circumstances, the Division Bench accepted the assertion of the petitioner and held that there was no compliance with the aforesaid provisions. This is not the case here. ( 12 ) FOR the above reasons the second contention too has no merit and fails. ( 13 ) THE applicant Mushtaq Ahmed is not entitled to grant of bail on any of the legal grounds, which have been urged on his behalf. This bail application has no merit and is accordingly rejected. Shri DS. Misra, learned counsel for the applicant, orally prays for grant of a certificate of fitness for appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that failure to comply with the provisions of Section 207 Cr P. C. by not supplying the copies of all the relevant documents to the accused before passing the order of committal of the accused to the Court of Sessions to stand his trial, vitiates the order of committal and renders it null and void. This renders the detention of the accused in judicial custody in pursuance of such a committal order, illegal and entitles him to grant of bail. For this, he strongly placed reliance on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the decision of State of U. P. v. Laxmi Brahman8 On a careful consideration, I feel that the question raised is a substantial question of law of general importance which merits consideration of the Supreme Court and, therefore, the certificate of fitness is granted. Petition allowed. .