ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. The facts, in brief, are these. The petitioner Smt. Mithlesh Kumari was treated as the tenure-holder and she was issued the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act on 16-1-1974. She filed her objections and the Prescribed Authority decided the same by his order dated 31-10-1974. Against the said order an appeal was filed by the tenure- holder and the appellate court by its judgment dated 31-3-1975 partly allowed the appeal. The area of the surplus land was decreased from 41.90 to 27.06 acres of irrigated land. It seems that thereafter a Writ Petition was filed in this Court against the aforesaid orders but during the pendency of the writ petition, a fresh notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner for redetermination of the surplus land and this notice was issued on 20-10- 1975. The petitioner filed her objections and they were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 24-5-1979. By the said order a total area of 29.43 acres was treated as the surplus land and it was directed that as 27.06 acres had already been declared as surplus land in the earlier ceiling proceedings therefore, 2.37 acres of irrigated land would now be additionally declared as surplus land. A certified copy of the said order of the Prescribed Authority dated 24-5-1979 is Annexure Al to the petition. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed an appeal against the said older and the same was dismissed by the appellate court by its judgment dated 11-8-1980, a certified copy of which is Annexure A2 to the petition. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant writ petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri Triloki Nath learned counsel for the petitioner. In opposition, the learned Standing Counsel has made his submissions. 4. Various contentions have been raised in the petition but the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed only one, viz, that the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 24-5-1979 should be held to be bad in law because it was passed beyond the period of two years which is prescribed in S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. Various contentions have been raised in the petition but the learned counsel for the petitioner pressed only one, viz, that the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 24-5-1979 should be held to be bad in law because it was passed beyond the period of two years which is prescribed in S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. It will be necessary here to refer to certain legislative developments which took place in the Ceiling law during the relevant period. The U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act was passed in 1960 and it came into force (except with certain exceptions) on 3rd January, 1961. Major amendments in the Act were made by the U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973. Subsequently certain amendments were made by the U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 which came into force on 17-1-1975. Thereafter, the U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975 was passed making certain amendments. This ordinance came into force on 10-10-75. This Ordinance No. 31 of 1975 was repealed by the U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1976 and the latter Ordinance was replaced by the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. The first notice under S. 10(2) of the Act had been issued on 16-1-1974 and that was under the parent Act as amended by the U.P. Act No. 18 of. 1973. I have already stated above that major amendments had been made to the parent Act under the said Amending Act being the U.P. Act No. 18 of 1973. The Prescribed Authority's order was passed in the said proceedings on 31-10-1974 as already stated above and the appellate order was passed on 31-3-1975 as also stated above. The aforementioned amending Act viz. U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 in its section 9 made a transitory provision in the following words :- "9. Transitory provision- Where an order determining the surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the principal Act, before the commencement of this Act, the Prescribed Authority may, at any time within a period of two years from the commencement of this Act, re-determine the surplus land in accordance with the principal Act as amended by this Act." S. 31 of U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 is reproduced below. It may be stated that it corresponds to section 30 of the U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1976 and to section 27 of the U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975. "31.Transitory Provisions- (1) All proceedings under sub-ss. (3) to (7) of S. 14 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, pending before any Court or authority immediately before the date of such commencement shall be deemed to have abated on such date. (2) Where an order determining the surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the principal Act before Jan. 17, 1975 and the Prescribed `Authority is required to redetermine the surplus land under S. 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974, then notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 19 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972, every appeal under S. 13 of the principal Act or other proceedings in relation to such appeal, preferred against the said order, and pending immediately before the tenth day of Oct. 1975, shall be deemed to have abated on the said date. (3) Where an order determining surplus land in relation to a tenure-holder has been made under the principal Act before the tenth day of Oct. 1975, the Prescribed Authority (as defined in the principal Act) may, at any time within a period of two years from the said date, redetermine the surplus land in accordance with the principal Act as amended by this Act whether or not any appeal was filed against such order and notwithstanding any appeal (whether pending or decided) against the original order of determination of surplus land. (4) The provisions of S. 13 of the principal Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every order redetermining surplus land under sub-s. (3) of this section or S. 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974; Provided that the period of thirty days shall, in the case of an appeal against the order referred to in S. 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974, be computed from the date of such order or Oct. 10, 1975, whichever is later. 10, 1975, whichever is later. (5) The provisions of S. 13-A of the principal Act shall mutatis mutandis apply to every redetermination of surplus land under this section or under S. 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974. (6) Where any assessment Roll has become final under sub-s.(4) of S. 21 before the sixteenth day of Feb. 1976, the same shall not be reopened, notwithstanding any amendment made in Chap.III of the principal Act read with the Schedule thereof by this Act." 5. U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 in S. 1 (2) provides that the said Act shall be deemed to have come into force on 10-10-1975. This deeming provision was inserted because the U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975 came into force on 10-10-1975, and I have already stated above that the amendments were made by the said Ordinance, which were broadly speaking incorporated in the U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1976 which repealed the earlier U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975 and the later Ordinance viz. U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1976 was replaced by the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976, which broadly speaking, incorporated the amendments in the Act which were originally made by the U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975. Therefore, the transitory provisions in U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975, U.P. Ordinance No. 11 of 1976 and U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 are almost identical and it is not necessary to refer to the Ordinances now and I can conveniently refer to S. 31 of U.P. Act No. 30 of 1976. I should like to make it clear that I am aware that there is some difference in the transitory provision contained in sub-s. (2) of S. 27 of the U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975 and that contained in S. 31(2) of U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 but the same has no materiality so far as the controversy involved in the present petition is concerned and it may be conveniently omitted in the present discussion. 6. Now the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on S. 31(3). 6. Now the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on S. 31(3). He contended that even though the second notice under section 10(2) of the Act was issued to the petitioner on 20-10-1975 within a period of two years (computing the same from 10-10-1975), still, the redetermination of the surplus land by the Prescribed Authority took place on 24-5-1979 and the same was beyond the period of two years and, as such, the said order of re- determination was hit by the rule of limitation contained in the said sub-section 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. 7. Before deciding the said controversy in the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the sides, I should like to clear up two points with a view that no ambiguity may remain. It is not very clear whether the said second notice dated 20-10-1975 should be held to have been issued in accordance with the provisions contained in S. 9 of the U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 or in compliance with S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. However, the said aspect will have no relevance because if the period of two years were to be calculated on the basis of S. 9 of U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975, then the same will expire on 17-1-1977. It may be stated that S. 9 of the said U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 came into force on 17-1-1975, and therefore, the period of two years prescribed under S. 9 would come to an end on 17-1-1977. The said date would be earlier than the date laid down under S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 and therefore, in case the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner be held to be correct with reference to the subsequent date prescribed in S. 31(3), then a portion (sic) the said contention has to be upheld with reference to the earlier date prescribed in S. 9 of the U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975. Therefore hereafter I shall not make any reference to S. 9 of the U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 and shall confine myself only to S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. 8. Therefore hereafter I shall not make any reference to S. 9 of the U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975 and shall confine myself only to S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. 8. The second aspect which I consider to have no relevance in the present case is as to whether the expression two years from the said date' occurring in sub-s. (3) of S. 31 refers to 10th October, 1975 or it refers to a date when the Prescribed Authority passed his order or the date on which the appellate court decided the appeal against the said order. There has been some controversy on the said aspect of the matter, but in the instant case, that controversy will be again unavailable. I have already stated above that the Prescribed Authority's earlier order was passed on 31-10-1974 and the appellate order against the said order dated 31-10-1974 was passed on 31-3-1975. Both these dates are earlier to 10-10-1975. Therefore, it again follows that if the learned counsel for the petitioner's contention be held to be correct with reference to 10-10-1975, then a portion (sic) it has to be upheld with reference to the earlier dates of the said orders of the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court. Therefore, it is not necessary to go into the said aspect of the matter as to whether the expression "two years from the said date" really relates to the dates of the orders of the authorities concerned or to 10-10-1975. 9. Having clarified the aforesaid position, I shall now consider the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the rival submission which has been made by the learned standing Counsel. 10. The learned Standing Counsel made two submissions in this connection. Firstly, he contended that the subsequent ceiling proceedings which were started with the issuance of the notice on 20-10-1975, should be held to be proceedings under S. 29 of the parent Act and no period of limitation is prescribed in S. 29 such as may be said to be prescribed in S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. The second contention of the learned Standing Counsel is that in case S. 31(3) be held to be applicable, then sufficient compliance was made with the rule of limitation laid down in the said provision because the subsequent notice dated 20-10-1975 was issued within a period of two years' whether the said period be computed from the dates of the earlier orders passed in the ceiling proceedings or in the appeal therefrom or whether the said period be computed from 10-10-1975. The learned Standing Counsel amplified that when the parent Act itself lays down no time limit within which the ceiling proceedings are to be finalised, it would not be a correct rule of interpretation to hold that such a period of limitation for the finalisation of the ceiling proceedings has been provided for in section 31 (3). 11. I shall first deal with the first submission of the learned Standing Counsel. S. 29 of the Act is as follows :- "29. 11. I shall first deal with the first submission of the learned Standing Counsel. S. 29 of the Act is as follows :- "29. Subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land.- Where after the date of enforcement of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1972- (a) any land has come to be held by a tenure-holder under a decree or order of any court, or as a result of succession or transfer, or by prescription in consequence of adverse possession, and such land together with the land already held by him exceeds the ceiling area applicable to him, or (b) any un-irrigated land becomes irrigated land as a result of irrigation from a state irrigation work, or any grove-land loses its character as grove-land or any land exempted under this Act ceases to fall under any of the categories exempted:- the ceiling area shall be liable to be redetermined, (and accordingly, the provisions of this Act, except S. 16, shall mutatis mutandis apply)." This section is headed as "Subsequent declaration of further land as surplus land." It is well known that the framers of the Act wanted the process of the determination of the ceiling and surplus land to be a continuous process in the sense that it was thought that if after the determination of the surplus land in ceiling proceedings, due to subsequent events, a tenure-holder again comes to be in possession of land beyond the ceiling limit, then he should not be allowed to retain such excess land and the same should be taken over by the State as surplus land. Certain eventualities were provided for in S. 29. Now in the instant case Cl. (a) of Section 27 obviously cannot be said to be applicable. Cl. (b) refers to a situation where any un-irrigated land becomes subsequently irrigated land as a result of irrigation from State Irrigation work or any grove-land loses its character as grove-land or land exempted under this Act ceases to fall under any of the categories exempted : then a re-determination can take place under S. 29. It has to be emphasised that in the instant case, the State never came out with the suggestion that the subsequent ceiling proceedings were necessitated on account of the eventualities or events mentioned in S. 29. It has to be emphasised that in the instant case, the State never came out with the suggestion that the subsequent ceiling proceedings were necessitated on account of the eventualities or events mentioned in S. 29. Such a suggestion has been made for the first time at the stage of arguments and, therefore, it cannot be accepted. The learned Standing Counsel made a reference to some land which was declared by the Sub-Divisional Officer as non-agricultural under S. 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. In my view, this contention is not tenable. It was the tenure- holder, who was placing reliance on the said aspect of the matter and not the State. The tenure-holder's contention before the Prescribed Authority and the appellate court was that some land which had been declared as non-agricultural under S. 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. should not have been included in the holding of the tenure- holder. This contention was partly accepted by the Prescribed Authority and the lower appellate court felt that even that part- acceptance was not valid in law because the declaration by the Sub-Divisional Officer had been made after the relevant date i.e. 8- 6-1973. However, the appellate court did not interfere with the order of the Prescribed Authority presumably because there was no appeal from the side of the State. A declaration under S. 143 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act is not contemplated under S. 29. I have already stated that what is contemplated under S. 29 is the State's anxiety that some further land should be taken as surplus. This situation will arise where some unirrigated land becomes irrigated because it is well known that the ratio of unirrigated land to the irrigated land as given in S. 4 of the Act causes excess land being available when the same is irrigated compared to the land which is unirrigated. The same is the position regarding grove- land. Again, under S. 4, land, which is grove- land, is treated more leniently as compared to the land which is irrigated land or unirrigated land. This is clear from S. 4(1) of the Act. Similar is the position in respect of the land which stands exempted under the Act and where exemption is lost then obviously the tenure-holder's holding gets increased. Such exemptions are provided for under S. 5(2) and under S. 6 of the Act. This is clear from S. 4(1) of the Act. Similar is the position in respect of the land which stands exempted under the Act and where exemption is lost then obviously the tenure-holder's holding gets increased. Such exemptions are provided for under S. 5(2) and under S. 6 of the Act. Various clauses of section 6(1) can be usefully looked into in this connection. Taking as an example, we may refer to cl. (d) of S. 6(1) which relates to the land used for tea, coffee, or rubber plantations and to the extent prescribed, land required for purposes ancillary thereto and for development of such plantations. Such land is exempted from the imposition of ceiling. Now if some such land, which is initially exempted from the Imposition of ceiling, ceases to be so used for the purposes of tea, coffee or rubber plantations and has begun to be used for growing other crops, then obviously S. 29(b) will come into play and the tenure-holder will come to have more land which will become liable to be taken over as surplus land. This discussion will make it clear that the learned Standing Counsel cannot place any reliance on the declaration of some land as non-agricultural under S. 143 of the U.P. Z. A. & LR Act as supporting his contention that the subsequent ceiling proceedings in the instant case were necessitated by S. 29 of the Act. 12. Lastly, I would like to point out that in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State not only it has not been suggested that the subsequent ceiling proceedings were necessitated on account of S. 29 but, on the other hand, in para 6 of the said counter- affidavit. it has been stated as follows. "That the contents of paragraph 10 of the writ petition are admitted to this extent that the second notice was issued after the amendment made in the year 1975." It is obvious that here there is a clear specific admission that the second notice -under S. 10(2) which was issued on 20-10-1975, was necessitated on account of the amendments made in the ceiling law and this squarely means that it was done in accordance with S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. I have already pointed out above that the amendments had been earlier made by the U.P. Ordinance No. 31 of 1975 and that is why in the said para 6, the State has stated that the notice was issued after the amendment made in the year 1975. This is with reference to the amendments made by the said Ordinance. In this view, in the aforesaid circumstances, the learned Standing Counsel is not correct in contending that the rule of limitation should not be held to be applicable to the instant case because the proceedings allegedly started under S. 29 of the Act. 13. Now I go on to deal with the second (SIC) learned Standing Counsel. As stated above, he made a point that what S. 31(3) requires by laying down the rule of two years is that the fresh proceedings should be initiated within a period of two years and it is not necessary that they should be completed also within a period of two years. In support of this contention as I have already said above, he placed reliance on the parent Act which nowhere lays down any time-limit within which the ceiling proceedings have to be completed. It may be seen that the mere fact that in the parent Act no such time limit has been laid down, can have no relevance to decide whether such a time limit has been placed for the subsequent proceedings taken for redetermination of the surplus land. It is quite possible to think that the Legislature in its wisdom did not think it necessary to lay down any rule of limitation for the original proceedings but thought it necessary that when a revision was called for, that should be accomplished in an expeditious manner within a time limit. In any case, the controversy will have to be decided with reference to the rule contained in the Amending Act viz, under S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. There can be no denying the fact that it does lay down a rule of limitation. In any case, the controversy will have to be decided with reference to the rule contained in the Amending Act viz, under S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. There can be no denying the fact that it does lay down a rule of limitation. It should be seen that if one were to accept the contention of the learned Standing Counsel then there should have been no rule of limitation at all in this sub- section because under S. 10 of the parent Act no time limit has been laid down for the issuance of the notice under the said provision of the Act. In the same manner there is no time limit laid down under S. 9(1) or Section 9(2) including its proviso in respect of the general notice issued under the said provision. Where was the justification for laying down any rule of limitation under S. 31(3) of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976 when none existed in Sections 9 and 10 of the parent Act? Even on the basis of the contention raised by the learned Standing Counsel he has conceded that the rule of two years' limitation must be held to be applicable at least to the issuance of the subsequent notice under S. 10(2) of the Act. Therefore, in my view, nothing hinges on the fact that in the parent Act there is no rule of limitation laid down for the completion and finalisation of the ceiling proceedings. Therefore, the only point which remains to be considered is whether when the said provision contained under S. 31(3) of the Act says that the redetermination of the surplus land in accordance with the principal Act as amended by this Act, is to be done within a period of two years, then does it mean merely issuance of the subsequent notice under S. 10(2) of the Act within a period of two years or does it prescribe that the order by the Prescribed Authority must be passed within a period of two years. In my view, looking to the scheme of the Act the order itself of the Prescribed Authority must be passed within two years from the relevant date and a mere issuance of the notice under S. 10(2) within a period of two years will not suffice. In my view, looking to the scheme of the Act the order itself of the Prescribed Authority must be passed within two years from the relevant date and a mere issuance of the notice under S. 10(2) within a period of two years will not suffice. In this connection a reference may be made to S. 10 of the Act which is headed as under : "Notice to tenure-holders failing to submit a statement or submitting an incomplete or incorrect statement." Briefly this section refers to earlier section 9 which provides for general notice to tenure-holders holding land in excess of ceiling area for submission of statement in respect thereof. By the general notice under section 9(1) which has reference to the Ceiling Act as it stood before its amendment by Act No. 18 of 1973 and the identical notice under sub-s. (2) of section 9 which has to be issued after the amendment effected by the said U.P. Act No.. 18 of 1973, such tenure- holders who hold land in excess of the ceiling area, are required to submit their statements. When such statements are not submitted then the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act is issued to such individual tenure- holders and along with the said notice a copy of the statement prepared in respect of such tenure-holder under S. 10(1) of the Act is also sent to him to enable him to file objections. The Rules prescribe the form in which such statement is prepared and the same is C. L. H. Form 3. The. tenure-holder is called upon to show cause within a period specified in the notice why the statement be not taken as correct. If the tenure-holder does not submit his objections then the Prescribed Authority proceeds to determine the surplus land under S. 11 which is headed `Determination of surplus land where no objection is filed'. In sub-s. (1) of S. 11 it is laid down that if no objection is filed by the tenure-holder within the specified period then the Prescribed Authority shall accordingly determine the surplus land of the tenure-holder. S. 12 provides for a situation where the tenure-holder has filed his objections under S. 10(2). Again this section is headed as `Determination of the surplus land by the Prescribed Authority where an objection is filed". S. 12 provides for a situation where the tenure-holder has filed his objections under S. 10(2). Again this section is headed as `Determination of the surplus land by the Prescribed Authority where an objection is filed". The words contained in S. 12(1) are :- "the Prescribed Authority shall, after affording the parties reasonable opportunity of being heard and of producing evidence, decide the objections after recording his reasons and determine the surplus land." In S. 12-A again the language used is in determining the surplus land under section I1 or section 12 : it is significant that no reference is made to section 10 because really there is no determination of surplus land under section 10 which is basically in the form of a tentative proposal made to the tenure-holder. The determination comes after the said proposal has been made and, in case, the tenure-holder accepts the same, the determination is made on the basis of his acceptance and if the tenure-holder objects, then the determination comes after decidings objections. Some useful light may also be obtained from sub-s. (4) and sub- s. (5) of S. 31 of the U.P. Act No. 20 of 1976. It has to be emphasised that sub-s. (4) and sub-s. (5) come immediately after sub-s. (3) of S. 31. Sub-s. (4) lays down that the provisions of S. 13 of the Act, shall mutatis mutandis apply to every order redetermining surplus land under sub-s. (3) of this section or S. 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings (Amendment) Act, 1974. Now S. 13 of the principal Act provides for an appeal against an order passed under S. 11(2) or under section 12 of the Act. We may leave apart S. 11(2) which is not relevant in the present controversy. It is the order passed under S. 12 against which the appeal is preferred. S. 12, I have' already emphasised above, provides for determination of surplus land in a case where objections have been filed by the tenure-holder. No appeal under section 13 can be filed against the mere issuance of the notice under S. 10. It is the order passed under S. 12 against which the appeal is preferred. S. 12, I have' already emphasised above, provides for determination of surplus land in a case where objections have been filed by the tenure-holder. No appeal under section 13 can be filed against the mere issuance of the notice under S. 10. Sub-s. (5) of S. 31 again points to the same position namely that what is contemplated by redetermination under S. 31(3) is the passing of the order by the Prescribed Authority under S. 12 and not merely issuance of the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act as contended for by the learned Standing Counsel. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, in my view, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct that the impugned order in the instant case dated 24-5-1979 must be held to be bad as being time- barred, in view of the provisions contained as well as the appellate judgment dismissing the petitioner's appeal, is liable to be quashed in the instant petition and I accordingly quash them. There will be no order as to costs.