JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - This writ petition is directed against concurrent orders passed by the courts below declaring the disputed accommodation which is situated in Nainital vacant under section 12 (3-A) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and allotting the same to the respondent No. 3. 2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner was a tenant on the said accommodation since 1975. In December, 1976 he was transferred to Lucknow. It appears that upon his transfer the disputed accommodation was sought to be declared vacant under section 12(3-A) of the said Act and eventually by an order passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer the house was declared vacant on 6-9-1979 and by another order dated 17-11-1979 it was allotted to the respondent No. 2. The objections filed by the petitioner against declaration of vacancy were disposed of earlier by an order dated 9-11-1979. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders the petitioner filed a revision under section 18 of the Act which has been dismissed by the impugned order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the authorities below committed a patent error of law in declaring vacancy under section 12(3-A). It was urged that the ingredients laid down in sub-section (3-A) or Section 12 were not present in the present case, inasmuch as the petitioner has not been allotted any accommodation either under this Act or was provided any official accommodation by the Government at the place of his transfer, namely, Lucknow. In support, learned counsel placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1980 Alld. Weekly Cases page 292. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in the above contention. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel section 12(3-A) may be extracted here :- "12(3-A). In support, learned counsel placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in 1980 Alld. Weekly Cases page 292. 5. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no merit in the above contention. In order to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel section 12(3-A) may be extracted here :- "12(3-A). If the tenant of a residential building holding a transferable post under any Government of local authority or a public sector corporation or under any other employer has been transferred to some other city, Municipality, notified area or town area, then such tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy such building with effect from the thirtieth day of June following the date of such transfer or from the date of allotment to him of any residential accommodation (whether any accommodation be allotted under this Act or any official accommodation is provided by the employer) in the city, municipality, notified area or town area to which he has been so transferred, whichever is later." 6. In the Full Bench decision cited by the learned counsel it has been ruled that in order to attract the application of section 12(3-A) both the events referred to in sub-section (3-A) ought to be present, namely, the occurrence of thirtieth June following the date of transfer as well as the allotment of 'a house under the Act or provision by the employer of a residential accommodation at the place of transfer. In the present case it is not disputed that thirtieth June following the date of transfer had elapsed. The dispute is whether the other condition was also present in the instant case. 7. In my opinion, the latter condition referred to above was also present in the instant case. It is not disputed that an official accommodation was allotted to the petitioner by the Government by an order passed by the Government Estates Officer dated 19th July, 1979. In the objection filed by the petitioner, however, ,before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer against the declaration of vacancy the petitioner stated that the accommodation which was allotted to him was quite far from the main city of Lucknow and for that reason the petitioner did not occupy the same. This objection was filed on 11-9-1979. In the objection filed by the petitioner, however, ,before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer against the declaration of vacancy the petitioner stated that the accommodation which was allotted to him was quite far from the main city of Lucknow and for that reason the petitioner did not occupy the same. This objection was filed on 11-9-1979. The order of allotment, as mentioned above, was passed on 17-11-1979 by which the date though an official accommodation was allotted to the petitioner in Lucknow, he did not occupy the same on grounds of unsuitability. The result was that as things stood on the date of allotment orders, section 12(3-A) applied in terms as the petitioner had been provided with an official accommodation by the Government in Lucknow. 8. The petitioner has, however, filed a copy of the order passed by the Government Estate Officer dated 4-12-1979 by which the previous order of allotment passed in favour of the petitioner had been cancelled. But the petitioner has not stated in what circumstances the order cancelling the allotment order dated 19th July, 1979 was cancelled. The reason is, however, not far to seek. Both in his objection referred to above as well as in his affidavit filed before the learned District judge in revision, the ground stated by the petitioner for not occupying the official accommodation allotted to him in Lucknow was that the same was not quite suitable from various points of view and therefore the petitioner did not occupy the same. Instead he asked the Government to provide him with another house convenient to him. Be that as it may, the fact remains that an official accommodation was made available to the petitioner by his employer at the place of his transfer which he failed to occupy. 9. In my view, on the aforesaid facts section 12(3-A) became clearly attracted to the cage. The subsequent cancellation of the accommodation allotted to the petitioner would not, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, exclude the application of section 12(3-A). What is material for the application of sub-section (3-A) of section 12 is the fact that an official accommodation was made available to the petitioner by his employer at the place of his transfer. What is material for the application of sub-section (3-A) of section 12 is the fact that an official accommodation was made available to the petitioner by his employer at the place of his transfer. If the petitioner did not choose to avail himself of that official accommodation on the ground that the same was not fully satisfactory, that would not, I do venture to think, exclude the application of section 12(3-A), The vacancy duly arising under section 12 (3-A) cannot be held in abeyance until the tenant gets an accommodation which conforms absolutely and fully to his expectations. 10. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the fact that the allotment order was cancelled subsequently, in the eye of law there did not exist any order of allotment. 11. I find it difficult to accept the above contention. On the facts of the present case and in view of the further fact that the petitioner did not deliberately occupy the accommodation on the ground merely of unsuitability and made a request to the authorities to allot to him another accommodation, the subsequent cancellation of the order of allotment would be of no avail to the petitioner as the same cannot detract from the position that an official accommodation was in fact made available to the petitioner, which the petitioner refused to occupy. 12. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that the revisional court has disposed of the revision filed by the petitioner on the short ground that the absence of allotment of an accommodation at the place of transfer was not essential to the application of section 12(3.A), relying on a decision which has been specifically overruled by the Full Bench referred to above. Consequently, the case should be remanded. 13. I am unable to accept this contention. On the facts referred to above, about which there is no dispute, I see no ground for sending the case back to the revisional court. The ultimate conclusion reached by the revisional court can be sustained on the undisputed facts even applying the dictum of the Full Bench decision cited above. 14. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed but I make no order as to costs.