JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondent No. 3 is the landlord of an accommodation which was let out to the petitioner. A suit was instituted in the court of Judge Small Causes, Shahjahanpur, respondent No. 2 by respondent No. 3 against the petitioner for his ejectment and arrears of rent etc. on the ground that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent inasmuch as the rent with effect from 1st March, 1968 to 28th February 1971 was due against him and he had not paid the same notwithstanding a notice of demand having been served upon him. The suit was contested by the petitioner, inter alia, on the grounds that he had already paid rent for the period ending December, 1970 and consequently he was not a defaulter in payment of rent. It further appears that rent for the months of January, 1971 onwards was deposited by the petitioner in Court. The case of the petitioner further was that with the permission of respondent No. 3 he had spent a sum of Rs. 100/- towards repairs of the accommodation in question and was entitled to adjust the same towards rent. The validity of the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was also challenged by the petitioner. 2. The trial court framed five issues. Issue No. 3 was to the effect whether the defendant had spent Rs. 100/- in the repairs of the suit accommodation with the consent of the plaintiff and is entitled to its adjustment. 3. The Judge, Small Causes after taking into consideration the evidence produced by the parties accepted the pleas raised by the petitioner in his defence. He held that the petitioner had paid rent upto December, 1970 and that he had also spent Rs. 100/- towards repairs of the accommodation in question with the consent of respondent No. 3 and was entitled to adjust the same towards rent and consequently he was not a defaulter in payment of rent. He also found that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had not been proved to have been served on the petitioner. On these findings the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the decree of the Judge, Small Causes, respondent No. 3 filed a revision before the District Judge under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. On these findings the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved by the decree of the Judge, Small Causes, respondent No. 3 filed a revision before the District Judge under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. This revision was allowed by the District Judge on 19th August, 1976. It is this order of the District Judge which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. The District Judge has held that the petitioner was not entitled to adjust the sum of Rs. 100/- said to have been spent towards repairs of the accommodation in question and the finding in this behalf recorded by the Judge, Small Causes was illegal inasmuch as there was no specific plea in this behalf raised by the petitioner in his written statement. In regard to the question as to whether the petitioner had succeeded in proving payment of rent till December, 1970, the District Judge took the view that the finding of the Judge, Small Causes was not sustainable inasmuch as he had placed the burden of proof wrongly on the landlord respondent No. 3. He further held that the notice under section 106 of the 'Transfer of Property Act was proved to have been served on the petitioner by refusal. It is on these findings that the decree of the Judge, Small Causes was reversed by the District Judge. 4. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the District judge had no jurisdiction in a revision tinder section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to reverse the findings of fact recorded by the trial court on the various issues and consequently the order of the District Judge was liable to be quashed. Having heard counsel for the parties I find sub- stance in the submission made by counsel for the petitioner. In regard to the finding recorded by the District Judge that the Judge, Small Causes acted illegally in holding that the petitioner had spent Rs. 100/- towards repairs of the accommodation in question with the consent of the landlord-respondent and was entitled to adjust the same towards the rent inasmuch as no such plea had been raised by the petitioner in his written statement it may be pointed out that the trial court had specifically framed an issue on this point being issue No. 3 which has been quoted above. 5. 5. In Nagubai v. B. Shama Rao, AIR 1956 Supreme Court 593. it was held that evidence let in on issues on which the parties actually went to trial should not be made the foundation for decision of another and different issue, which was not present to the minds of the parties and on which they had no opportunity of adducing evidence. But that rule has no application to a case where parties go to trial with knowledge that a particular question is in issue, though no specific issue has been framed thereon and adduce evidence relating thereto. 6. In the case of Nagubai (supra) although no specific plea that the sale in favour of the defendants was affected by the doctrine of its pendens was raised in pleading of the plaintiff and no specific issue was directed to that question the defendants went to trial with full knowledge that the question of lis pendens was in issue, had ample opportunity to adduce their evidence thereon, and fully availed themselves of the same. It was held that, in the circumstances, the absence of a specific pleading on the question was a mere irregularity, which resulted in no prejudice to them. In Nagubai's case (supra) not only there was no specific plea on the point of lis pendens but even no issue had been framed. In the instant case, as already seen above, an issue had specifically been framed on the point and both the parties there after were permitted to lead evidence on that issue and they did lead evidence which was considered by the Judge, Small Causes. The view taken in Nagubai's case was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Kameshwaramma v. Subba Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 884. It was held that where the parties went to trial fully knowing the rival case and led all the evidence not only in support of their contentions but in refutation of those of the other side, it cannot be said that the absence of an issue was fatal to the case, or that there was that mistrial which vitiates proceedings. The suit could not he dismissed on this narrow ground, and also there is no need for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach the right conclusion and neither party claimed that it had any further evidence to offer. 7. The suit could not he dismissed on this narrow ground, and also there is no need for a remit, as the evidence which has been led in the case is sufficient to reach the right conclusion and neither party claimed that it had any further evidence to offer. 7. In Bhagwati v. Chandramaul, AIR 1966 Supreme Court 735, it was held that if a plea is not specifically made and yet it is covered by an issue by implication and the parties knew that the said plea was involved in the trial, then the mere fact that the plea was not expressly taken in the pleadings would not necessarily disentitle a party from relying upon if it is satisfactorily proved by evidence. The general rule no doubt is that the relief should he founded on pleadings made by the parties. But where the substantial matters relating to the, title of both parties to the suit are touched, though indirectly or even obscurely in the issues, and evidence has been led about them, then the argument that a particular matter was not expressly taken in the pleadings would be purely formal and technical and cannot succeed in every case. What the Court has to consider in dealing with such an objection is did the parties know that the matter in question was involved in the trial and did they lead evidence about it ? 8. In Laxmi Kishore v. H.P. Shukla, 1979 A.W.C. 746, it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that the District Judge has no jurisdiction in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act to reverse the finding of fact recorded by the Judge, Small Causes. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the District Judge in the instant case was not competent to reverse the finding of the Judge, Small Causes decking issue No. 3 in favour of the petitioner to the effect that he had spent a sum of Rs. 100/- towards repairs of the accommodation in question with the consent of the landlord- respondent and was entitled to adjust it in the rent. 9. The other finding recorded by the Judge, Small Causes that the petitioner had paid rent upto December, 1970 to the landlord-respondent was again a finding of fact. 100/- towards repairs of the accommodation in question with the consent of the landlord- respondent and was entitled to adjust it in the rent. 9. The other finding recorded by the Judge, Small Causes that the petitioner had paid rent upto December, 1970 to the landlord-respondent was again a finding of fact. The District Judge has tried to over come the said finding of fact by observing that the Judge, Small Cases placed the burden of proof wrongly on the landlord-respondent. Issue No. 2 framed by the trial court was to the effect whether the defendant had paid rent upto December, 1970. Both the parties produced evidence in support of their respective cases in regard to this issue and it was after consideration of that evidence that the Judge, Small Causes recorded a finding in favour of the petitioner on issue No. 2. I am of opinion, that the said finding could not be reversed by the District Judge in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act on the ground that in his opinion the Judge, Small Causes had placed the burden of proof wrongly on the landlord-respondent. It is settled law that after the parties have produced evidence on a particular issue the question of burden of proof becomes academic and loses its significance. If authority were needed for this proposition, reference may be made to Paras Nath v. Mohani Dasi, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 1204. M.M.B. Catholicos v. T. Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 Supreme Court 31. Narayan v. Gopal, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 100 Abdul Shukoor v. Abji Papa Rao, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 626. and Smt. Prem Lata v. Arhant Kumar, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 1150. This view taken by the District Judge on this point also cannot, therefore, be sustained. 10. On the aforesaid findings of fact recorded by the Judge, Small Causes which could not be reversed by the District Judge in a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, it is apparent that the petitioner was not a defaulter in payment of rent and the suit filed by respondent No. 3 for his ejectment was liable to be dismissed and had rightly been dismissed by the Judge, Small Causes. 11. 11. The question as to whether notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act had or had not been served on the petitioner, in the circumstances pointed out above, becomes only academic inasmuch as once the petitioner is held not to be defaulter in payment of rent the suit for his ejectment could not be decreed even if it is found that such a notice was actually served on him. As such, I do not find it necessary to go into that question. 12. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the impugned order dated 19th August, 1976 passed by the District Judge is quashed. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.