Hansaria, J.:- The petitioner approached the District Magistrate, Kamrup, who is the Licensing Authority under the Assam Cinemas ( Regulation ) Act, 1953 ( hereinafter, the Act) for obtaining a "No objection" certificate to construct a permanent cinema house at Maligoan. This was on 1.8.79. Before that, the petitioners had applied to the Commissioner, Gauhati Municipal Corporation seeking his sanction for the aforesaid construction. That permission came to be accorded on 11.4.80; and thereafter a 'No-objection certificate, was also granted by the District Magis­trate on 4.6.80. It may be stated that under Rule 4(11) of the Assam Cinema (Regulation) Rules, 1960, hereinafter the Rules, the 'No-objection' certificate, can be granted by the Licensing Authority only after the Executive Engineer had finally approved the plans, and the State Government had given its prior appro­val. It is the case of the petitioner, which has not been denied, that in the present case as well the 'No-objection' certificate has been issued after the State Government had given its prior approval which was following a detailed enquiry into the matter. The certificate is required by the Rules to be given in Form A which states that the certificate shall be valid for a period of one year from the date of issue and "if within this period the proposed cinema house is not constructed, a fresh no objection certificate should be applied for." The petitioner put in such an application on 8th March, 81 as the period of the earlier certificate was going to expire on 3.6.81. By the petition praying for extension, one year's more time was sought for, i.e. exten­sion was prayed up to 4.6.82. The District Magistrate however refused to grant extension or fresh certificate because he felt that if any license were to be granted to the petitioner, the same shall be violative of Rule 6(2) of the Rules. This view was taken because from the reports submitted by the Executive Engineer as well as by the Sub-Deputy Collector and the L. R. staff it had appeared to him "that there is a Maszid within the radius of one furlong and the Secretary of the said Maligoan Maszid committee objected to the construction and grant of a license." This order was passed on 6.6.81 and the petitioner obtained the Rule on 26.6.81. Though this Court had desired to hear the matter in 1981 itself, somehow or other the petition could be finally heard only on 21st and 22nd April/83. 2. As the prayer of the petitioner was to grant extension till 4.6.82, the learned Senior Govt. Advocate contends that the petition has become infructous, and we may not enter into the merits of the grievences put forward by the petitioner. We do not however think that the contention is sound inasmuch as the prayer for extension up to 4.6.82 had bees made because Form A has somehow prescribed a period of one year for the grant of such a certificate. It may be that if the construction would not have been completed within 4.6.82, the petitioner might have sought for further extension. It may also be that if extension was granted as prayed for, the cons­truction would have been over by 4.6.82 and the petitioner would have become entitled to apply for a license. In any view of the matter, the reason assigned for refusal to grant the 'No-objection' certificate has to be gone into as the same may again stand in the way of the petitioner if she were to ask for further extension of the period of the certificate. In such a situation, the expiry of the earlier period cannot be regarded as enough to send back the petitioner empty handed. Reference may be made in this connection to Bhola Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1982 Pat. 412 which case dealt with a direction to instal an air-conditioning plant within certain period as a pre­requisite for renewal of cinema license. A contention was advanced that as the period had expired, the petition had become infructuous. That contention was not accepted as a good ground not to enunciate the law as the threat to impose the condition of air-conditioning was there. Reliance was placed on K. N. Guruswamy vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 wherein the ' Supreme Court had examined the merit of the controversy though the period of the contract was expiring after a fortnight because of which no writ was issued but the position in law was clarified. Reliance was placed on K. N. Guruswamy vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1954 SC 592 wherein the ' Supreme Court had examined the merit of the controversy though the period of the contract was expiring after a fortnight because of which no writ was issued but the position in law was clarified. It would be apposite to refer to Suresh Chandra vs. Slate of U. P., AIR 1977 Allahabad 541, a Full Bench deci­sion, where despite the Control Order having ceased to be in force, the Court did pronounce its decision on its validity to provide guidance to the State Government in case it were to issue similar Control Orders in future. In Sudhir Kumar vs. State Transport Authority, AIR 1963 Assam-1, a Division Bench of this Court had felt that the expiry of the period of the temporary permits did not disentitle the petitioner to a decision by the Court whether the order complained of was legal or not. 3. In view of the above, we do not think if we would be justified, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in not pronouncing upon the validity of the impugned order merely because the period of extension as prayed for has expired. The learned Senior Govt. Advocate raises another objection to the maintainability of the petition. According to him an appeal lay to the State Government under section 9 of the Act, and by not preferring the same the petitioner has become disentitled to invoke the extra-ordinary power of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. That section has provided for appeals and reviews from "the decision of the Licensing Authority under any provision of the Act except an order passed under section 4". A reference to the provisions of the Act shows that it does not deal really with granting of 'No-objection' certificate which is in the nature of a prelude or preliminary step for obtaining of a license under the Act, whose provisions specify who is the licensing authority, what are its powers and when can a license be revoked etc. It would therefore appear that section 9 has not provided for any appeal from the order of the type which we are concerned. Be that as it may, there is no rule of law that where an appeal is provided for, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. It would therefore appear that section 9 has not provided for any appeal from the order of the type which we are concerned. Be that as it may, there is no rule of law that where an appeal is provided for, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked. Availability of an alternative remedy is only a matter to be taken into consideration by the writ court to decide whether it would like to exercise its discretionary power or not. Where an order is on the face of it erroneous or raises question of jurisdiction, a writ court may interfere despite provision of appeal, as stated in Champalal vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, AIR 1970 SC 645 . Reference may also be made to Baburam vs. Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 which has laid down that there are two well recog­nised exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies these being (1) where the law under which the proceedings have been initiated is ultra vires and (2) where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. We do not propose to dialate on this point in view of our deci­sion in Civil Rule No. 203/79, Birendra Kr. Bhattacharjee vs. General Manager N.F. Railway disposed of on 11.4.80) where one of us (Singh, J.) had after noting the English and Indian decisions on the point, stated that in general "the existence of alternative remedy is no bar to an application under Article 226 where the order is a nullity being ex-fade without jurisdiction, arising either from jurisdictional error or error apparent on the face of the record or non-compliance with the provision of the Act or Rules and essential principles of natural justice-----".As in the present case the order was in violation of the prin­ciples of natural justice and also erroneous on the face of it, as would appear from what is being stated later, the bar of alternative remedy (even if such a remedy was available) cannot stand in the way of the petitioner. 4. Let the merits of the controversy be now examined. 4. Let the merits of the controversy be now examined. The validity of the impugned order has been assailed by Shri Bhattacharjee first by contending that it was in violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the reports on the basis of which the decision was taken were not made available to the petitioner and the enquiry itself was at the back of the petitioner. Secondly, it is urged that the Licencing Authority took into con­sideration a non-existent rule in refusing the certificate. Thirdly, the submission is that the Rule 6(2) of the Rules as it had stood at the relevant time had left it to the State Government to decide as to whether "having regard to the surrounding cir­cumstances" license for a permanent cinema house should "be granted or not within proximity inter alia of a place of worship and the Licensing Authority therefore acted without jurisdiction in substituting its view of the matter. Finally, it is urged that the fact of existence of a mosque nearby the site was known to the authority when the first 'No-objection' certificate was granted and obviously the same was not regarded as an impediment to the grant of the certificate and as such that ground cannot now be used against the petitioner to refuse the extension after the peti­tioner has invested a huge sum of money in the construction of the cinema house in pursuance of the earlier permission. 5. The first contention is apparently well founded inasmuch as it is not the case of the Licensing Authority that the reports were made available to the petitioner or that the enquiry was conducted in her presence. The second contention is also factu­ally correct because Rule 6(2) as it existed at the relevant time did not place any embargo on granting of cinema license if there be a mosque within the radius of one furlong. That was how­ever the position before Rule 6(2) had undergone amendment on 11th September, 1963 by notification No. GCN. 8/59Pt/120. By that amendment Rule, 6(2) was made to read as below from 11.9.63- "No permanent Cinema House shall be allowed within such a distance as the State Government considers reaso­nable having regard to the surrounding circumstances, from the existing Hospitals, Educational Institutions, place of worship, cremation ground, graveyard, cemetry, or other permanent Cinema House. 8/59Pt/120. By that amendment Rule, 6(2) was made to read as below from 11.9.63- "No permanent Cinema House shall be allowed within such a distance as the State Government considers reaso­nable having regard to the surrounding circumstances, from the existing Hospitals, Educational Institutions, place of worship, cremation ground, graveyard, cemetry, or other permanent Cinema House. Of course, before 11.9.63 this Rule had provided that no permanent cinema house shall be allowed within a radius of one fur­long from any existing place of worship. This distance was put at two furlongs when the Rules were first enacted in 1960-the amendment of 1962 having reduced it to one furlong. It is thus apparent that the District Magistrate had taken into considera­tion a non-existent provision while passing the impugned order. 6. Further, Rule 6(2) as it exists on and from 11.9.63 has left it to the State Government to decide as to whether a license for permanent cinema house should be granted or not within such a distance from a mosque etc. as it considers reasonable having regard to the surrounding circumstances. It was therefore not open to the Licensing Authority to come to any conclusion in this regard. There is nothing before us to show that the matter had gone to the State Government to decide this aspect. Indeed from the affidavit of the District Magistrate it appears that he himself had been the architect of the order and was guided by the old Rule. As such the third submission of Sri Bhattacharjee also merits acceptance. 7. There is also sufficient force in the last contention of the learned counsel. We have perused the records made available to us by the learned Senior Govt. Advocate and these amply show that the existence of the maszid in question was very much known to the authorities when the petitioner had first approached them. The SDC in his report (which is at p. 49 of the record) clearly Stated that the mosque was about 300 feet away from the site of the cinema house and was near a railway quarter on the opposite side of the A. T. Road. In the objection filed on 30.5.70 (p. 34 of the record) the question of existence of this mosque was raised and the signatory had included the Secretary of the mosque. In the objection filed on 30.5.70 (p. 34 of the record) the question of existence of this mosque was raised and the signatory had included the Secretary of the mosque. The location of the mosque was even indicated in the Trace map submitted by the S.D.C. Despite all these the State Government did not apparently consi­der the fact of existence of such a mosque as an impediment in the way of granting the certificate. We do not think if in such a situation the authorities can now turn round and pass an order to the prejudice of the petitioner who had invested a huge sum of money in pursuance of the order passed by the authority, which order cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity or being without any authority of law. While saying so we are conscious of the decision of the Supreme Court in Jit Ram Shiv Kumar vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1980 SC 1285 which has dissented from certain observations in Motilal Padmapat vs. State of U.P., AIR 1979 SC 621 relating to operation of the doctrine of promissory-estoppel in such a matter. But on the ratio of Jit Kumar as well, the present would be a case where the Licensing Authority would be estopped from refusing the certificate on the ground of the existence of the mosque in the vicinity inasmuch as the impugned order has nothing to do with the exercise of legislative function of the State, nor by agreeing with this submission of the learned counsel, we would be preventing the Government from discharging its functions under the law, nor can it be said that by granting the certificate earlier, the Licen­sing Authority had acted outside the scope of its authority. (See points (1) to (3) of paragraph 30 wherein their Lordships have summed up the law relating to the scope of the plea of pro­missory estopped against the Government.) Indeed the case squa­rely attracts what has been stated under sub-para (4). This is so, because the "No-objection" certificate was issued by the Licensing authority acting within the scope of his power and the petitioner acting of the representation made in the order has invested a huge sum of money which would be almost totally lost if she were to be left in the lurch now. This is so, because the "No-objection" certificate was issued by the Licensing authority acting within the scope of his power and the petitioner acting of the representation made in the order has invested a huge sum of money which would be almost totally lost if she were to be left in the lurch now. In such a case, an officer "cannot arbitrarily act on his mere whim and ignore his promises on some undefined and undisclosed grounds of nece­ssity" as observed in Jit Ram itself. Let it also be said that the refusal to grant certificate has nothing to do with the general interest of the State which may provide justification for changing the terms of the order even to the prejudice of the other party as mentioned under point No. (5). So pro­missory estopped did prevent the learned District Magistrate to pass the prejudicial order in question. 8. In view of all the above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and is quashed. The respondents are directed to consider the prayer of the petitioner for fresh 'No-Objection Certificate, not only for the period up to 4 6.82, but foe further extension, it' applied for, in accordance with law and keeping in view the observation made above.