J. S. VERMA, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner No. 2 is a society registered under the m. P. Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. It runs a school, the primary school section of which was established in the year 1940 and the middle school section in 1957. The petitioner No. 1 Asbestos Cement Ltd. Kymore is a company registered under the Companies Act which had initially established the school and its Works Manager is the Chairman of the governing body of Everest Education Society, petitioner No. 2. Respondent No. 1 hanuman Prasad Pandey was employed as a teaeher in this school. A domestic enquiry was held against him on charges of misconduct and thereafter by order (Annexure 4) dated 28-4-1978 passed by the Works Manager of the petitioner No. 1 Company, the service of respondent No. 1 Hanuman Prasad pandey was terminated. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the termination of service the respondent No. 1 Hanuman Prasad pandey made an application to the District Education Officer, jabalpur (respondent No. 4) on 12-5-1978. After this application was filed, the M. P. Act No. 20 of 1978 came into force w. e. f. 1-8-1978. The District education Officer, respondent No. 4, then gave a notice on 1-1-1979 to the education Society (petitioner No. 2) requiring it to appear on 8-1-1979 in connection with the termination of service of the respondent No. 1, Hanuman prasad Pandey. Authorised representative of the Education Society appeared before the D. E. O. with the entire record of the enquiry. Thereafter by order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979 the D. E. O. acting under Section 6 (b) of the Act no. 20 of 1978 declared the termination of service of respondent No. 1, hanuman Prasad Pandey, to be void. ( 3 ) THE Education Society made a grievance against this order to the deo on 9-3-1979. The DEO on 24-3-1979 sent a reply to the Education society rejecting the grievance made by the Education Society. Thereafter on 5-4-1979 the Education Society reiterated its grievance adding some more grounds to it. The DEO then by his order (Annexure 10) dated 2-5-1979 set aside the earlier order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979. ( 4 ) THE respondent No. 1 Hanuman Prasad Pandey, then approached the divisional Superintendent of Education, Jabalpur, respondent No. 3, who stayed operation of the DEO's order dated 2-5-1979. on 19-5-1979. The DEO then by his order (Annexure 10) dated 2-5-1979 set aside the earlier order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979. ( 4 ) THE respondent No. 1 Hanuman Prasad Pandey, then approached the divisional Superintendent of Education, Jabalpur, respondent No. 3, who stayed operation of the DEO's order dated 2-5-1979. on 19-5-1979. It appears that the matter also went to the Director of Public Instruction, M. P. Bhopal, respondent No. 2 who ultimately directed the DSE respondent No. 3 to decide the appeal of respondent No. 1, Hanuman Prasad Pandey, against the order of the DEO dated 2-5-1979. The DSE after issuing notice to the parties for their appearance on 29-2-1980, vacated the stay granted by him earlier on 19-5-1979. An endorsement dated 4-3-1980 made by the DEO, respondent No. 4, below the order of the DSE restores his earlier order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979 declaring the termination of service of the respondent no. 1, Hanuman Prasad Pandey to be void. It is as a result of this ultimate position that the petitioners are aggrieved. This petition has, therefore, been filed for quashing the order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979 passed by the DEO, respondent No. 4, which came to be restored in the above manner by the DEO's order made on 4-3-1980. ( 5 ) THE argument advanced by Shri Y. S. Dharmadhikari, learned counsel for the petitioners, are several. They are enumerated as under : (i) Section 6 (b) of Act No. 20 of 1978 is ultra vires because it makes the Act retrospective to cover cases of termination of services from 17-11-1977 and thereby also takes away a vested right which had accrued in favour of the employer before the Act came into force on 1-8-1978. (ii) The institution in the present case is not covered by definition of the word 'institution' in Section 2 (e) of Act No. 20 of 1978 inasmuch as the education Society (petitioner No. 2) was registered under the M. P. Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam 1973 on 1-8-1977 whereas the primary section of the school which it runs was established in the year 1946 and its middle school section in the year 1957. In other words, unless the school was established after registration of the Society, the definition of 'institution' in section 2 (e) is not satisfied. In other words, unless the school was established after registration of the Society, the definition of 'institution' in section 2 (e) is not satisfied. In this connection it is also contended that the definition of 'teacher' in Section 2 (i) of the Act does not include a 'teacher' whose service was terminated prior to commencement of the Act. (iii) No application was made by the respondent No. 1 Hanuman prasad Pandey, after coming into force of the Act within 30 days thereof as required by Section 6 (b) of the Act. His application made on 22-8-1978 being premature could not be acted upon. (iv) No opportunity was given by the DEO while acting under Section 6 (b) of the Act to the Education Society inasmuch as even a copy of the application made by the respondent No. 1 Hanuman prasad Pandey, to him was not supplied, and (v) The impugned order dated 3-2-1979 (Annexure 6) passed by the deo under Section 6 (b) of the Act is not a speaking order and gives no reasons in support of the conclusion on account of which it is invalid. We shall consider these arguments hereafter in the same order. ( 6 ) FIRST question relates to the validity of Clause (b) of Section 6 of the madhya Pradesh Ashaskiya Sikshan Sanstha (Adhyapakon Tatha Anya karmachariyon Ke Vetano Ka Sandaya) Adhiniyam, 1978 (The M. P. Act no. 20 of 1978) which came into force w. e. f. 1-8-1978. It enables the competent authority (The District Education Officer) on an application made within 30 days from the appointed date, namely, 1-8-1978 by a teacher or an employee of an institution to which the Act applies, who has been dismissed or removed from service or whose service has been terminated by the management of and institution at any time on or after 17th November 1977 to declare the dismissal, removal or termination, as the case may be, to be void and direct his reinstatement, after giving the management as well as the persons affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard during such enquiry as the competent authority may deem fit. In the present case the termination of service of respondent No. 1 Hanuman Prasad Pandey, was made by an order dated 28-4-1978 and therefore, this provision is attracted, giving rise to this argument. In the present case the termination of service of respondent No. 1 Hanuman Prasad Pandey, was made by an order dated 28-4-1978 and therefore, this provision is attracted, giving rise to this argument. The validity of several provisions of this enactment including Section 6 (b) was upheld by this Court in Siddhi Bala Bose Library association and others v. State of M. P. and others, [1979 M. P. L. J. 379]. It was only in respect of the educational institutions run by minorities that some provisions were held to be violative of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, we are, in the present case not concerned with an institution managed by a minority and, therefore, that part of the earlier decision is not relevant for the present purpose. The validity of Section 6 (b) was expressly upheld except in its applicability to institutions established and administered by religious and linguistic minorities. The relevant part of that decision for the purpose of this argument is as under :"clause (b) of Section 6 enables the competent authority to set aside the dismissal, removal or termination of service of a teacher or other employee of such an institution who has been dismissed or removed from service or whose service has been terminated by the management at any time on or after 17th November 1977 and to direct his reinstatement in service. Clause (c) empowers the competentauthority to review all cases of appointment of teachers and other employees made during the period commencing from 17th November 1977 and ending on the date of commencement of this Act (1-8-1978)and disapprove such appointments. The provisions in Clauses (b)and (c) which enable the competent authority to review all cases of teachers and other employees who have been removed from or taken in service after the 17th November 1977 and reverse the management's decision, have been made to undo the acts which may have been done in anticipation of this legislation because it was on the 17th November 1977 that the State Government declared that the teachers of non-Government educational institutions shall be paid salary through treasury. This is the significance of the date 17th November 1977 mentioned in these clauses. 28. This is the significance of the date 17th November 1977 mentioned in these clauses. 28. The cumulative effect of the provisions contained in sub-clauses (iii) and (iv) of clause (a) and clauses (b) and (c) of Section 6 is that after commencement of the impugned Act no teacher or employee can be suspended by the management for more than ninety days without prior approval of the competent authority ; or removed from services without prior approval of the competent authority ; the aggrieved teacher or employee can prefer an appeal before an appellate authority constituted by the State government ; and the competent authority has been empowered to review all cases of teachers and employees taken in service or removed from service after the 17th November 1977 upto the date of enforcement of the Act and to set aside the management's action. In short, in respect of choice of such personal and their removal from service on or after the 17th November 1977, by these provisions the right of management has been destroyed by conferring the power of veto on the competent authority or the appellate authority, as the case may be, both nominees of the state Government. " ( 7 ) ORDINARILY, reference to the earlier decision upholding validity of section 6 (b) of the Act would be sufficient to reject the first argument advanced in support of this petition. However, we shall also briefly refer to the particular basis on which the provision has been assailed in this petition. Shri dharmadhikari contended that the date 17th November 1977 specified clause (b) has no reasonable nexus and the provision takes away a vested right accruing to the management prior to enforcement of the Act. The nexus of the date 17th November 1977 in the provision was indicated even in the earlier decision, it being the date on which the State Government declared its intention of enacting such legislation. So far as the argument of taking away of vested right is concerned, even assuming it be a vested right, the same could undoubtedly be taken away by an express provision as is contained in Section 6 (b ). This argument does not, therefore, merit any further consideration and is rejected. ( 8 ) THE second contention of learned counsel for the petitioners also does not have any merit. This argument does not, therefore, merit any further consideration and is rejected. ( 8 ) THE second contention of learned counsel for the petitioners also does not have any merit. The contention that the definition of 'teacher' under Section 2 (i) of the Act does not include a 'teacher' whose service has been terminated and, therefore, the word 'teacher' occurring in Section 6 (b)can not be construed to mean a teacher whose service has been terminated, is without any merit. Section 6 (b) itself speaks of a 'teacher who has been dismissed or removed from the service or whose service has been terminated by the management of an institution at any time on or after the 17th november, 1977. Even if the definition of 'teacher' in Section 2 (i) does not include a dismissed teacher, there is no ambiguity in Section 6 (b) which clearly applies and is meant only for a teacher who has been dismissed or removed from service or whose service has been terminated after the specified date. This argument does not, therefore, carry the petitioners' case any further. Similarly, the argument based on the definition of the word institution in Section 2 (e) also does not merit any serious consideration. 'institution' has been defined in Section 2 (e) to mean a non-Government School or non-Government Educational Institution for the time being receiving maintenance grant from the State Government or from the M. P. Uchcha shiksha Anudan Ayog as the case may be, which is being run by a society registered or deemed to be registered under the M. P. Society Registrikaran adhiniyam, 1973. Admittedly maintenance grant is being received by the petitioners and the school is being run by the petitioner Society registered under the M. P. Society Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. In order to satisfy this definition, it is not necessary that school or educational institution must have been established subsequent to registration of the Society. All that is necessary is that it should be run by a registered society receiving the maintenance grant and both these essentials are satisfied in the present case. The mere fact that the school was established prior to registration of the society which is running it does not take it out of the definition of the word 'institution' occurring in Section 2 (e ). The mere fact that the school was established prior to registration of the society which is running it does not take it out of the definition of the word 'institution' occurring in Section 2 (e ). The expression 'established, administered and managed' merely mean an educational institution being run by such a society and no more. The second contention is also, therefore, rejected. ( 9 ) THE third contention is equally devoid of any merit. The application was made by respondent No. 1, Hanuman Prasad Pandey, on 12-5-1978 and was pending with the DEO when the Act came into force on 1-8-1978. Such a pending application was, therefore, a valid application under Section 6 (n)of the Act which only requires the application to be filed within 30 days of the appointed date and it being pending on that date was a valid application made within the prescribed limitation. There is no merit in the contention that it could not be acted upon and should have been dismissed as premature even though it was pending when the Act came into force. This contention is also, therefore, rejected. ( 10 ) THE fourth contention also must be rejected. The material present indicates that the DEO while acting under Section 6 (b) gave full opportunity to the petitioners and the case on their behalf was duly represented. It was expressly stated by the DEO that the application of respondent No. 1, hanuman Prasad Pandey, was also see by the welfare officer who appeared on behalf of the petitioners. This assertion of the DEO was not controverted by the petitioners. This contention is also, therefore, rejected. ( 11 ) THE last contention now remains for consideration. The petitioners grievance is that the impugned order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979 is not a speaking order and does not give any reason. In our opinion, this contention has to be upheld. Even though full hearing was given to the petitioners before making the order, but the order gives no reason and merely says that the termination of service of respondent No. 1, Hanuman Prasad Pandey is not approved and that he should be reinstated. The requirement of giving an opportunity of being heard and conducting such enquiry as may be necessary while exercising the powers under Section 6 (b) clearly contemplate a reasoned order at the end of the enquiry. The requirement of giving an opportunity of being heard and conducting such enquiry as may be necessary while exercising the powers under Section 6 (b) clearly contemplate a reasoned order at the end of the enquiry. The points raised by the parties must be considered and reasons given for the conclusion reached by the competent authority. It is too well settled by now that giving of reasons for the exercise of such powers is a necessary requirement for its valid exercise and to ensure that the action is not arbitrary. It is unnecessary to elaborate this requirement to support the validity of such an order. In fairness to learned counsel for the respondents, it must be stated that this position was not even disputed by him. This contention alone of the petitioners must, therefore, be upheld. ( 12 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion the petition is allowed only on the last grouad urged in support of the petition while rejecting the other contentions. The impugned order (Annexure 6) dated 3-2-1979 passed by the District Education Officer, Jabalpur, respondent No. 4, is quashed he is directed to re-hear the parties and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. The outstanding amount of security shall be. refunded to the petitioners. Petition partly allowed. .