ORDER Gopi Nath, J. - This is a defendant's application in revision directed against an order passed by the Civil Judge, Mirzapur dated 2-8-1982 allowing an application of the plaintiff for permission to file certain papers after the framing of the issues in the case. The impugned order reads as follows :- "37C/ By the plaintiff for permission to file 31 papers per list 38C. Admit on Rs. 25/- as costs. plaintiff counsel examined P. W. 2 Ravi Kumar Agrawal. His statement could not be concluded as the defdt's counsel wants to prepare the case on the basis of the papers filed today. So adjourned. Put up 5-8-82 for further evidence." The order has been challenged on the ground that the papers could not be received in evidence after the framing of the issues without good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the court for the non- production of the same before the settlement of issues. 2. The plaintiff prayed for permission to file the documents by application No. 37-C. The application was allowed. It can, therefore, be assumed that the court below was satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the papers. It is true that the court has not recorded its reasons for according the permission prayed for. The question is whether interference is called for in the impugned order. 3. It seems to me that the order does not amount to a `case decided' nor does it call for an interference in exercise of this Court's power under S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the word `case' as occurring in S. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, is of a wide and comprehensive import, and includes even a part of it. Reliance has been placed on Sadhu Ram Bali Ram v. Ghansham Dass Madan Lal, AIR 1975 Punj and Hary 174 (FB), Rama Shanker Tiwari v. Mahadeo, 1968 All LJ 109, Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 , Narayan Sonaji Sagne v. Sheshrao Vithoba, AIR 1948 Nag 258 (FB), and Chattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram, 1885 ILR 7 All 661. Learned counsel has further placed reliance on Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Nazira v. Ganesh Prasad Singh, AIR 1983 Gauh. Learned counsel has further placed reliance on Oil & Natural Gas Commission, Nazira v. Ganesh Prasad Singh, AIR 1983 Gauh. 8, Mahanth Som Prakash Das v. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akhara Bara, AIR 1983 Pat 35 , Ranajit Kanungo v. Ibcon Pvt. Ltd. Bombay, AIR 1982 Kant 219, Harish v. Som Nath, AIR 1982 Raj 77 , Raja Ramakaran v. B. Ramula, AIR 1982 Andh. Pra. 256, Smt. Karti v. Rattia, AIR 1981 Punj & Hary 185, Mangal Chand Chauhan v. Ratan Lal Nahata, AIR 1981 Gauh `93, Sobha v. Behari Lal, AIR 1981 Him Pra 18, Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhar, AIR 1978 Cal 264 and Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. Rajarishi Exports (P.) Ltd., AIR 1978 Orissa 179, to submit that the scope of the word `case' has been widened by the amendment made in S. 115, Civil P.C. The real question, however, is what is the meaning of the expression `case decided'. That question is concluded against the applicant by the decisions rendered by me in British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. G.S. Nigam Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18-4-1983, reported in 1983 All LJ 1001 and Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 . In Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 406 it was held (at p. 410) : "......... A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy, every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." In British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. G.S. Nigam Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18-4-1983, reported in 1983 All LJ 1001, I, after a consideration of most of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the applicant, held that the words `case decided' mean the adjudication of a controversy as to the rights and obligations of the parties in the suit, and it must necessarily touch on the right and obligation in controversy in order to constitute the decision of deciding a case. See also Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 , Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 and K. Balasubramania Chetty v. N.M. Sambandamoorthy Chetty, AIR 1975 SC 818 . Orders passed merely for the progress of a proceeding are not orders, deciding a case, and would accordingly not fall within the meaning of the expression `case decided'. They are only steps towards the final adjudication of the case, and only regulate the procedure, and do not affect any right or obligation of the parties. Discovery or production of documents accordingly is not a matter relating to the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy in a suit, and hence an order in that regard does not amount to `case decided' see The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799 . An order regarding admission of evidence was also held not an order relating to the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy in a suit in Smt. Shanti Kaur v. Smt. Haeen Jehan Begum, 1976-2 All LR 694. Further, an interlocutory order, in order to amount to a `case decided', has to be on a substantial question arising in regard to the rights and obligations of the parties in controversy (see Badrinath Gupta v. Estates Officer (Controller of Aerodromes), AIR 1977 J & K 38. I have further held in Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 and British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. G.S. Nigam, Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18-4-1983, reported in 1983 All LJ 1001 that by the amendment made in S. 115, Civil P.C., the scope of the word `case' has not been widened. It has only been explained. The word `case' always includes the whole or a part of the case and an interlocutory order passed in a suit can also amount to a `case decided' provided it satisfies the test discussed above, as regards the decision of a case. 5. It has only been explained. The word `case' always includes the whole or a part of the case and an interlocutory order passed in a suit can also amount to a `case decided' provided it satisfies the test discussed above, as regards the decision of a case. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant then has placed strong reliance on Mahanth Som Prakash Das v. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akahara Bara, AIR 1983 Pat 35 , Ram Nath Singh v. Brij Kishore Singh, AIR 1980 Pat 160 , Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhar, AIR 1978 Cal 264 , and Nenu Ram v. Vardichand, AIR 1978 Raj 138 , to submit that an order passed not strictly in accordance with the provisions of O. XIII, Rules 1 and 2. Civil P.C., calls for an interference under S. 115 of the Code. In Mahanth Som Prakash Das v. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akhara Bara, AIR 1983 Pat 35 , the court below refused to entertain certain documents filed by the plaintiff. That order was reversed by the High Court, and it was held that the Explanation added to sub-s. (2) of S. 115 CPC widened the scope of the word `case' as occurring in that section with great respect to the learned Judge, I have, in the cases of Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 and British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. G.S. Nigam, Civil Revision No. 7 of 1981 decided on 18-4-1983, Reported in 1983 All LJ 1001 taken the view that the Explanation added to sub-s. (2) of S. 115, Civil P.C., has not enlarged the scope of the word `case', and the meaning of that word as explained by the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above has not undergone any change by the amendment made in S. 115. The decisions in Parsuram Dubey v. Mahanth Laxman Das, AIR 1974 Pat 278 and Ramgulam Choudhary v. Nawin Choudhary, AIR 1972 Pat 499 which have been dissented from in Som Prakash Dass's case (supra) have accordingly not been affected by the amendment made in S. 115. The decisions in Parsuram Dubey v. Mahanth Laxman Das, AIR 1974 Pat 278 and Ramgulam Choudhary v. Nawin Choudhary, AIR 1972 Pat 499 which have been dissented from in Som Prakash Dass's case (supra) have accordingly not been affected by the amendment made in S. 115. I have also taken the same view in the cases of Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 and British India Corporation Ltd., Kanpur v. G.S. Nigam, Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18-4-1983 as has been taken by the Patna High Court in Ramgulam Choudhary v. Nawin Choudhary, AIR 1972 Pat 499 and Parsuram Dubey v. Mahanth Laxman Das, AIR 1974 Pat 278 . The decision in Ram Nath Singh v. Brij Kishore Singh, AIR 1980 Pat 160 does not touch upon the question of `case decided'. It deals with the question of admission of documents and lays down that the admission of documents is a matter of discretion of the court, and that discretion ought to be exercised judiciously. The case, instead of helping the applicant, goes against him in that, the order refusing to admit the documents was set aside by the High Court on the ground that the provisions of O. XIII do not lay down any absolute bar to the admission of the documents after the framing of the issues. In Food Corporation of India v. Virendra Nath Dhar, AIR 1978 Cal 264 it was held that by virtue of the explanation added to sub-s. (2) of S. 115 by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976, the scope of word `case' has been widened, and hence an order directing production of documents will amount to `case decided'. With great respect, I have not been able to persuade myself to agree to this view and my detailed reasonings are contained in the decisions rendered in Manohar Lal v. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1980 All 327 and in British India Corporation Ltd. Kanpur v. G.S. Nigam, Civil Revision No. 7 of 1982, decided on 18-4-1983), reported in 1983 All LJ 1001. Nanu Ram v. Vardichand, AIR 1978 Raj 138 does not deal with the question of `case decided' and in a way goes against the applicant in that, the order of refusal to admit the documents was set aside by the High Court on the ground that there was no absolute bar to the admission of documents after the framing of issues. In Kanda v. Waghu, AIR 1950 PC 68 it was held that in the matter of admitting documents, "The Court has a discretion and while generally speaking it will be a wise exercise of the discretion to admit such evidence the question must be decided in each case in the light of the particular circumstances..... 6. The court below has, in the exercise of its discretion, admitted the documents on payment of Rs. 25/- by way of costs. The order does not call for any interference. The revision is accordingly dismissed. Although the opposite party has entered appearance but as the revision is being dismissed at the admission stage, I make no order as to costs.