JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. On 16.9.83 I had disposed of the writ petition by the following order: For the reasons to be recorded later, the writ petition is dismissed. The interim order, if any, is vacated. There will, be, however, no order as to costs. 3. I now proceed to give my reasons. 4. One Musharraf Ali was the original tenure holder to whom a notice under Section 10 (2) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') was issued, by which he was required the show cause why an area of 5.452 acres (in terms of irrigated land) be not declared as surplus. Musharraf Ali filed objection in which it was, inter alia, pleaded that an area of 18. 122 acres of land, which was recorded in the name of Smt. Hashmatun Nisa, could not be clubbed with the land standing in his name as she was no longer his wife, she having been divorced by him in the year 1970. 5. An objection of a similar nature was also filed separately by Smt. Hashmatun Nisa,. She pleaded that the land, which was recorded in her name was in her exclusive possession. She also pleaded that she had been divorced by her husband, Musharraf Ali, in the year 1970, and, therefore, the land standing in her name, had been wrongly included in the holding of Musharraf Ali. 6. Musharraf Ali and Smt. Hashmatun Nisa produced oral evidence before the Prescribed Authority. They also filed the original deed of divorce dated 7270. 7. The Prescribed Authority rejecte the objection by his order dated 27975 (Annexure1). 8. Musharraf Ali and Smt. Hashmatun Nisa challenged the order of the Prescribed Authority in appeal before the District Judge, who dismissed the appeal by his judgment and order dated 19776. 9. Musharraf Ali, then, filed writ petition No. 2269 of 1976, in this Court. Readied during the pendency of the writ petition and was substituted by the present petitioner sons 1 to 3. The writ petition was allowed by this Court on 15th July, 1981. The judgment passed by the District Judge, was quashed with a direction to decide the appeal afresh. The operative portion of the above judgment may be reproduced below: In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The writ petition was allowed by this Court on 15th July, 1981. The judgment passed by the District Judge, was quashed with a direction to decide the appeal afresh. The operative portion of the above judgment may be reproduced below: In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the District Judge dated 19776 (Annexure 6) is quashed. He is directed to restore the appeal to its original number and decide the question as to whether Hashmatun Nisa was divorced by Musharraf Ali before the relevant date. It is only after deciding this question that he may decide the question of law involved in this case. After remand, the District Judge heard the appeal afresh and decided it by the impugned, judgment dated 11281 which is contained in Annexure 8. The appeal was dismissed with a finding that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa, who is petitioner No. 4 in the present petition, was not divorced by Musharraf Ali on the alleged date. 10. The petitioners have now filed the present writ petition. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 12. The only point that has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa had been validly divorced by her husband Musharraf Ali by a pronouncement of Talaq in writing and, therefore, on 7th February, 1970, the date on which the deed of divorce was written, Smt. Hashmatun Nisa (Petitioner No. 4) ceased to be the wife pf Musharraf Ali. The land standing in the name of Smt. Hashmatun Nisa, could not, therefore, have been legally included in the holding of Musharraf Ali particularly as, after the pronouncement of divorce, she had ceased to be the member of Musharraf Ali's family. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the manner in which the divorce was pronounced, was permissible under the Mohammedan Law and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority as also the District Judge were bound to give effect to that divorce. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the manner in which the divorce was pronounced, was permissible under the Mohammedan Law and, therefore, the Prescribed Authority as also the District Judge were bound to give effect to that divorce. 13. There are two facets of the argument raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, (i) the findings of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority as also by the District Judge are erroneous and that it should be held by this court that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa was divorced by her husband, Musharraf Ali, on 7th February, 1970, (ii) Smt. Hashmatun Nisa will have to be treated to be a judicially separated wife, as the manner in which she was divorced by her husband is one of the recognised modes of divorce under Mohammedan Law. 14. The finding whether Smt. Hashmatun Nisa was divorced Musharraf Ali on 7.2.70 is a finding of fact. This finding of fact cannot legally assailed in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently contended that the. finding is perverse and, therefore, this Court can reexamine the question of fact decided by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge. 15. It appears that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa and her husband Musharraf Ali, in support of their objections, had examined a number of witnesses before the Prescribed Authority and the original deed of divorce said to have bees executed on 7.2.70 was also filed. Annexures 2 to 5 are the copies of the statements of Puttu Lal (Lekhpal), Musharraf Ali, Mohd. Zaheer and Ishaq. The District Judge has considered those statements as also the deed of divorce and has then recorded a positive finding of fact that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa had not been divorced by Musharraf Ali on 7th February, 1970 and that the document (deed of divorce) had been prepared for the purposes of the ceiling case to save 18. 122 acres of land. It may be stated that inrecording this finding the District Judge had relied upon two other documents which were on record. The first of these documents is a sale deed dated 27.5.74 which was executed by Smt. Hashmatun Nisa Tin which she had described herself as the wife of Musharraf Ali. 122 acres of land. It may be stated that inrecording this finding the District Judge had relied upon two other documents which were on record. The first of these documents is a sale deed dated 27.5.74 which was executed by Smt. Hashmatun Nisa Tin which she had described herself as the wife of Musharraf Ali. It may be stated that this sale deed was executed by her in respect of a plot of land in favour of Munir Ahmad (minor) son of Mohammad Siddique. It is mentioned by the District Judge in his judgment that Mohammad Siddique was examined as a witness on behalf of Smt. Hashmatun Nisa. 16. The other document is the certified copy of the extract of Khatauni for the year 1378 Fasli1380 Fasli corresponding to the period from 1.7.70 to 30.6.73. In this document also, Smt. Hashmatun Nisa has been described as the wife of Musharraf Ali. The District Judge, therefore, appears to be justified in coming to a conclusion that if Smt. Hashmatun Nisa stood divorced on 7th February, 1970, she would not have described herself as the wife of Musharraf Ali on 27th May, 1974 when she had executed the sale deed in favour of Munir Ahmad (Minor). She would also not have been described as wife of Musharraf Ali in the Khatauni extract pertaining to 1378 Fasli to 1380 Fasli (1.7.70 to 30.6.73). The explanation which the petitioner has offered in respect of these two documents in paras 18 and 20 of the writ petition is ridiculous and on that basis the finding of fact recorded by the authorities below cannot be interfered with. 17. There is also a glaring contradiction on the question of source of Hashmatun Nisa's title concerning the land which stands in her exclusive name. It has been stated in para 4 of the petition that the land recorded exclusively in the name of Hashmatun Nisa which was also in her exclusive possession, had come down to her from her father. There is, on the contrary, the statement of Musharraf Ali (Annexure3) in which he has stated that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa had obtained the lease of the aforesaid land from the Kapurthala Estate. He also stated that the land was her selfacquired property although at the time of obtaining the leave from the Kapurthala Estate, Smt. Hashmatun Nisa was living with him as his wife. He also stated that the land was her selfacquired property although at the time of obtaining the leave from the Kapurthala Estate, Smt. Hashmatun Nisa was living with him as his wife. In view of the above discussion, I am not inclined to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge. The finding does not appear to be perverse as it is fully borne out by the evidence on record, 18. Smt. Hashmatun Nisa having not been divorced by Musharraf Ali on the date alleged by him, she continued to be his wife and, therefore, a member of his family on the relevant date (8.7. 1973). The Prescribed Authority was, therefore, fully justified in the above situation to include the land standing in the name of Smt. Hashmatun Nisa in the holding of Musharraf Ali. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that since Musharraf Ali had pleaded before the Prescribed Authority, in his objections filed under section 10 (2) of the 'Act', that the marriage between him and Smt. Hashmatun Nisa did not subsist, it was not open to the Prescribed Authority or the District Judge to hold otherwise. 20. The argument is without substance. The pleadings of the parties cannot legally oust the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act to investigate the question whether the facts pleaded by the objectors were; correct or not. In the instant case, the husband and the wife both pleaded divorce. They also set up a specific date on which the divorce was said to have been pronounced. It was, therefore, well within the jurisdiction of the Prescribed Authority to scrutinise, investigate and decide whether the divorce had actually been pronounced on the date alleged or it had been set up only to save the land standing in the name of wife from the clutches the 'Act' by pleading falsely that she was not the member of the family. 21. What then is the effect of the recital made by Musharraf Ali his objections that he had divorced Smt. Hashmatun Nisa on 7th February 1970 particularly when the divorce on the said date has not been fount proved? The answer is simple. Smt. Hashmatun Nisa shall be treated to have been divorced by Musharraf Ali on the date on which he made a statement to that effect in his objection. The answer is simple. Smt. Hashmatun Nisa shall be treated to have been divorced by Musharraf Ali on the date on which he made a statement to that effect in his objection. The Bombay High Court in the case Chandbi v. Bandesha AIR 1961 Bom. 121 ) has held, that where in ref to an application for maintenance under section 488 Cr.P.C. 1898, by Mohammadan wife, the husband files a written statement that he had divorced the wife earlier, then, even if the fact of such earlier divorce is not proved, the written statement would operate as a declaration of divorce as from the date on which it was filed. To the same effect is the view expressed by the Patna High Court in the case of Enamul Haque v. Bibi Taimunnisa (AIR 1967 Patna 344) and by this Court in the case of Asmat Ullah v. Khatun Nisa (AIR 1939 All.592). See also the case of Wahab Ali v. Qamro Bi (AIR 1951 Hyderabad 117). I had an occasion to consider these decisions and follow them in the case of Smt. Ajmerylussan v. Moin Ahmad (1983 All LJ. 1332) The relevant date is 8.6.73. Notices were issued to the tenureholders including Musharraf Ali after the aforesaid date. Musharraf Ali had filed his objections sometime in the year 1974. The fictional divorce based on the above decisions would, therefore, also be of no avail. 21. In view of the finding that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa was not divorced by Musharraf Ali on 7th February, 1970 and that she was a member of his family on the relevant date (8.6.73), the question whether a wife has been divorced by her husband without intervention of the court, as is permissible under Mohammedan Law, shall be treated to be a judicially separated wife within the meaning of the definition family contained in section 3 (7) of the Act, does not arise in this case. 23. However, since I have heard the arguments on the above question, I proceed to decide this controversy also. 24. The word family has been defined in section 3 (7) of the Act. The definition contains an exception by providing that a judicially separated s. wife would not be included in the family of a tenure holder. The question open is what is the meaning of the word judicially separated wife? 25. 24. The word family has been defined in section 3 (7) of the Act. The definition contains an exception by providing that a judicially separated s. wife would not be included in the family of a tenure holder. The question open is what is the meaning of the word judicially separated wife? 25. In Words and Phrases Legally Defined, Second Edition, Volume3, the word Judicial has been defined as under: The word 'Judicial' has two meanings. It may refer to the discharge of duties exercisable by a Judge or by Justices in Court, or to administrative duties which need not be performed in Court, but in respect of which it is necessary to bring to bear a judicial mindthat is, a mind to determine what is fair and just in respect of the matters under consideration (1892 1 Q.B. 431). It also provides that the term 'judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matter of law, but for the purposes of this question a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of fact and circumstances, and imposing liability or affecting the rights of others. 26. According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, the word Judicial separation means a separation of husband and wife sanctioned by an order of a court: a divorce a mensa et thorocalled also legal separation. 27. A division Bench of this Court in the case of Sarju Prasad v. IVth Add/.District Judge & others, 1980 ALJ 515 has held as under: The Legislature explicitly qualified the words separated wife by the use of the expression Judicially. In view of the dictionary meaning of the word 'judicial', the expression 'judicial separation' must of necessity be brought about through the intervention of a judicial act as a consequence of legal proceedings in a competent Court of law. The, employment of the word 'judicial' rules out the idea of a legal separation through the intervention of a panchayat etc. according to the custom, if any, prevalent in a community. For the purposes of section 3(7), the expression 'judicially separated wife' does not embrace within its ambit the idea of a separation between husband and wife by mere custom. The provisions of sections 4(a), 10 and 29 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 o strengthen the above conclusion. according to the custom, if any, prevalent in a community. For the purposes of section 3(7), the expression 'judicially separated wife' does not embrace within its ambit the idea of a separation between husband and wife by mere custom. The provisions of sections 4(a), 10 and 29 (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 o strengthen the above conclusion. The expression 'judicially separated wife' in section 3 (7) of the Ceiling Act has been used not only to cover; cases of Hindu tenureholders but is equally applicable to parties professing other religious beliefs. 28. A similar view was expressed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Jeet Singh v. State of U.P. and others (1980 ALJ (NOC) 115). 29. It is not disputed that the 'Act' is a special Act. The provisions of the 'Act' have to be given effect to notwithstanding the provisions of the Mohammadan Law. Since the 'Act' in clear terms makes an exception in favour of a judicially separated wife, a woman who has been divorced by act of parties, though in accordance with the provisions of Mohammadan Law, would not cease to be a member of the tenureholder's family. 30. The word 'family' came to be considered by the Supreme Court in D.G. Mahajan v State of Maharastra ( AIR 1977 SC 915 ) in which it was held that the definition (sic.) Bhagwati J. observed as under: But the Act has created an artificial 'family unit' and person and his spouse and their minor sons and minor unmarried daughters are clubbed together for the purpose of constituting a family unit and all lands held by each member of the family unit, whether jointly or separately are aggregated together and by a fiction of law deemed to be held by the family unit. We have described the family unit as contemplated in the Act, as an artificial legal conception because in quite a few cases, it would be different from family as known in ordinary parlance; the latter would include each major son and unmarried daughters which the former by its definition does not. We have described the family unit as contemplated in the Act, as an artificial legal conception because in quite a few cases, it would be different from family as known in ordinary parlance; the latter would include each major son and unmarried daughters which the former by its definition does not. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking separately, observed as under: Likewise, the artificiality imputed to 'family unit' and 'family' in the two statutes and the anomalies and injustices which may possibily flow from them also do not arise for consideration since we have taken the scope of Article 31B to be wider than contended for...... The new order claims a high price from the old and pragmatic strategies to organise land reforms may involve definitional unorthodoxy if the target group is to be reached. Socioeconomic legislation is social realism in action not bookish perfection, as, social scientists will attest. 31. In view of the above and in view of the basic fact that Smt. Hashmatun Nisa was not divorced by her husband, Musharraf Ali, on. 7th February, 1970, and that her status on the relevant date was that of allegedly wedded wife of Musharraf Ali, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 32. Before parting with the case I would, however, like to say a few words to bring out an anomaly which requires the attention of the Legislature. 33. The Supreme Court decision in D.G. Mahajan's case (supra) in which the artificial concept of the definition of 'family' was laid down is a decision of unquestionable wisdom. There is, however, no artificiality in the exclusion of a divorced or judicially separated wife from the definition of family as under all systems of law such a woman is not considered to be a member of her husband's family. 34. In the Allahabad decision in Sarju Prasad's case (supra) which is a division Bench decision and is binding on me, the court was primarily concerned with a customary divorce through the intervention of Panchayat. The position under Mohammadan Law is altogether different. The marriage under Mohammadan Law is a contract, not a sacrement. The husband can divorce his wife unilaterally by the pronouncement of Talaq' and the marriage stands dissolved without the intervention of the Court. The position under Mohammadan Law is altogether different. The marriage under Mohammadan Law is a contract, not a sacrement. The husband can divorce his wife unilaterally by the pronouncement of Talaq' and the marriage stands dissolved without the intervention of the Court. The wife has also a right to obtain divorce from her husband through a court of law under the provisions of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. In such a case, the marriage comes to an end on a decree of divorce being passed in favour of the wife. There is thus an obvious anomaly. If a husband divorces his wife by an oral pronouncement of Talaq, she, for purposes of Ceiling Act, would still be a.member of his family. But a wife who obtains divorce through a court under the provisions of the above Act of 1939, will be excluded from her husbands family on account of her being a judicially separated wife. If the definition of family is left as it is and the legislature does not intervene to amend, the definition so as to cover the genuine cases of divorce by 'Talaq' as permissible under Mohammadan Law, a wife who has been divorced orally would still be subject to the principle of clubbing of her land with that her husband although after divorce, she otherwise would be entitled to her property independently of her husband. In the above situation the salutary purpose of the Act which is to help the weaker section of the society to which a woman and that too, a divorced woman, definitely belongs, would stand defeated unless the woman divorced by 'Talaq under the Mohammadan Law is also brought within the ambit of the exception to the definition of the 'Family'. 35. In view of the above the writ petition is dismissed. The interim order, if any, is vacated. There will be, however, no order are to costs. (Petition dismissed)