JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This First Appeal by the husband is directed against the dismissal of his petition for divorce under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The ground, on which divorce was sought, is that the respondent, his wife, has had voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than him. That other person was not named but on application (27-Ga) made under Rule 6 (d) of the Hindu Marriage Rule 1956, supported by an affidavit (28-Ga), the petitioner was permitted file the petition without impleading the alleged adulterer. 2. There is a vague and general allegation that the respondent was am sexually satisfied with the petitioner and that she had illicit connection with persons other than him. There is no specific allegation of any fact or occasion when the respondent might have had sexual intercourse with any person other than the petitioner. The only basis, on which divorce was claimed on the aforesaid grounds, was the receipt of information is February 1980, that the respondent had given birth to a son in the second week of January, 1980, although there was no sexual intercourse between the petitioner and the respondent after November, 1978, when he had left for training at Polytechnic, Roorkee. It was added that the petitioner returned home from the training at Roorkee in the month of June, 1979, but there was no sexual intercourse or bodily contact between him and the respondent from June, 1979 to August, 1979, when the respondent the petitioner's home, on discovery by the petitioner's mother that the respondent was pregnant. 3. I might add that although the petitioner's counsel first stated in the 20th August, 1981 that the first hearing of the suit, that is, the day on which issues were framed, that "divorce is sought on the ground of cruelty and adultery" in his subsequent statement made the same day, it was stated that "divorce is also sought on the ground that the respondent had sexual intercourse voluntarily with some other person and not on the ground that she is living in adultery." 4. The defence was that the petitioner used to come home off and on, and the child born to the respondent was begotten by the petitioner on the respondent by sexual intercourse in the month of Jeth of the Samvat year 2036 or thereabout. 5. The defence was that the petitioner used to come home off and on, and the child born to the respondent was begotten by the petitioner on the respondent by sexual intercourse in the month of Jeth of the Samvat year 2036 or thereabout. 5. The petitioner had also complained of cruelty against the respondent. and the only allegation in the petition in support of it was that the respondent's complaint against him was that he was not fully developed and was unable to give her physical happiness and that complaint of the respondent against the petitioner has continued, with the result that the petitioner was living under great mental torture. An issue was also framed raising the question whether the respondent has treated the petitioner with cruelty as alleged but was answered against him in the negative with the observation that he had utterly failed to prove that the respondent ever treated him cruelty. On the other hand, the trial Court found that it was the petitioner who had treated the respondent with cruelty. Be that as it may, since the respondent has not asked for any relief, the finding is of no consequence so far as this case is concerned. 6. Thus the only ground for claiming divorce was whether the child horn to the respondent in January, February, 1980, had been begotten upon her by the petitioner. It is strange that although the child born to the respondent was a daughter, the petitioner, rather naively, stated in the petition that he had received information in February, 1980 that a son had been born to the respondent in the second week of January, 1980. The petitioner's statement on the point was equally intriguing. In his examination-in-chief, he first stated that in February, 1980, he came to know that it son was born to the respondent in January, 1980. He then stated that the son horn to the respondent in January, 1980 was not his son because he had no sexual intercourse with her after November, 1978. 7. It was only thereafter that he stated that, in fact, a daughter was born to the respondent, but the information received by him was of the- birth of a son. A person in the position of the petitioner ought to have known whether the child born to his wife was a girl or a boy. 7. It was only thereafter that he stated that, in fact, a daughter was born to the respondent, but the information received by him was of the- birth of a son. A person in the position of the petitioner ought to have known whether the child born to his wife was a girl or a boy. The fact that the petitioner alleged that he had received information in February, 1980 that a son had been horn to his wife in the second week of January 1980 when, in fact the child born to the respondent was a daughter, shows that the information received by the petitioner, on which he had based his entire case, was incorrect. The strongest part of it is that instead of explaining this discrepancy as the first thing in his statement on oath, the petitioner went on to state on oath that the son born to the respondent in January, 1980, was not begotten by him. The subsequent explanation that, in fact, a daughter was born to the respondent, but he had received information of the birth of it son, would be of little avail because inspite of having known the correct fact before he made his statement on oath on the 8th December, 1981, the petitioner did not state on oath that the daughter born to his wife in January, 1980, was not begotten upon her by him. 8. The trial Court has, on a detailed appraisal of the evidence on the record, arrived at the finding that the petitioner has utterly failed to prove that the respondent has after the solemnization of the marriage had voluntary sexual intercourse with a person other than him. I need not discuss the evidence again. I have only to add that a child admittedly born in mid-January, 1980, could have been conceived in June 1979. It is not necessary to refer to any medical text book for this purpose, inasmuch as the formula of computing of the time for delivery of a viable child is discussed in extenso in Mahendra v. Sushil, A.I.R. 1963 S.C 364 in the light of expert evidence led in that case. Computation is made from the date of the commencement of the menstrual cycle before the intercourse if known otherwise a period of fourteen days is added to the date of conception of the date of intercourse, whichever is known. Computation is made from the date of the commencement of the menstrual cycle before the intercourse if known otherwise a period of fourteen days is added to the date of conception of the date of intercourse, whichever is known. According to Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, the fact that the child was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between the petitioner and the respondent who was the child's mother, is conclusive proof of the fact that the child is the legitimate child of the petitioner, "unless it can be shown that the parties had no access to each other at any time when" the child could have been begotten. According to section 4 of the Evidence Act the Court has, no proof of the fact of the birth of the child during the continuance of a valid marriage between the parties to regard it as proved that the child of the petitioner and not to allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it. The only evidence, that could he led by the petitioner for gating over this conclusive presumption of law, was that which showed that the parties had `no access' to each other at any time. when the child could have been begotten. The petitioner's evidence that he did not have sexual intercourse with the respondent after November, 1978, was barred because `access' means existence of an opportunity of marital intercourse, and non-access would mean non-existence of an opportunity for marital intercourse. See Venkateswarulu v. Venkatanaryana, A.I.R. 1954 S.C 176 and Karapaya v. Mayaddi, A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 49. The respondent stated that the petitioner visited his home frequently while living at Roorkee. It was elicited in cross-examination that there was a gap of about a week after the completion of the theory paper before the practicals during which period the petitioner could have visited his home in April, 1979. His denial of the suggestion of having visited his home during that period is of no avail. The fact remains that he could have visited his home during the week and he has not proved it by an unimpeachable evidence that he was continuously present at Roorki during April and May 1979. His denial of the suggestion of having visited his home during that period is of no avail. The fact remains that he could have visited his home during the week and he has not proved it by an unimpeachable evidence that he was continuously present at Roorki during April and May 1979. Be that as it may, it being admitted that the petitioner went back home in July, 1979, and it being feasible in the course of nature that a child conceived in June, 1979, could be born alive in mid-January, 1980 and could survive, it cannot be said that the petitioner has proved the only fact, which he could have proved to displace the conclusive presumption of law under Section 112 of the Evidence Act, namely, that the parties had no access' to each other at any time, when the child could have been begotten. 9. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. As to costs the respondent has already been paid her expenses in this Court under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act by this Court's order dated 21st July, 1983.