JUDGMENT R.M. Sahai, J. - Sri Devi Dyal Vyas, at present member of Income-Tax Tribunal, Ahmadabad was allotted house in Model Town, Ghaziabad in official capacity as Civil Judge in 1969 at a rent of Rs. 35/- only. In 1971 he was transferred as Additional District Judge, Sultanpur. Within few months he was selected as Judicial Member Income-Tax Tribunal and was posted at Calcutta From Calcutta he was transferred to Jaipur. On his selection as Member of Income Tax Tribunal he resigned from Judicial Service of the State. But he did not vacate the house at Ghaziabad. The landlady who is also wife of an I.A.S. Officer, probably grew apprehensive that the house may be lost for ever on nominal rent, and not very wrongly, as petitioner has admitted in affidavit filed, that he has no house and intended to settle in it permanently after his retirement. Therefore, in March, 1974 she made her first effort for release of the house by taking recourse not only to proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act XIII of 1976 as she needed it for her husband who was likely to be posted in Delhi after contemplating his training in Goa and also for her brother who was an Advocate and intended to settle at Ghaziabad but also under Section 21(1)(b) for demolition and construction as the house was dilapidated. On the allegations the house obviously could not be released under Section 21(1)(a) and the Prescribed Authority rightly held that the provisions could not be invoked by landlady for convenient and comfortable living. He was further right in observing that necessity of brother could not be covered in expression bonafide requirement of the landlord. Nor did he find any merit in claim of opposite party that the house was dilapidated. Apart from these aspects it was also claimed that due to transfer of petitioner vacancy arose as a matter of law under Section 12 of the Act. The Prescribed Authority did not decide it as this aspect could not be examined the proceedings under Section 21. This additional plea was raised because of addition of sub-section (3-A) to Section 12 in 1976 raising presumption of vacancy on transfer of a Government servant on fulfilment of conditions mentioned therein. The Prescribed Authority did not decide it as this aspect could not be examined the proceedings under Section 21. This additional plea was raised because of addition of sub-section (3-A) to Section 12 in 1976 raising presumption of vacancy on transfer of a Government servant on fulfilment of conditions mentioned therein. Faced with this opposite party while challenging the order of Prescribed Authority in appeal initiated proceedings under Section 16(1)(b) read with Section 12(3-A) of the Act for release of the house as it has fallen vacant. On inspection it was found that petitioner had been transferred and the house was locked. While these proceedings were pending appeal was dismissed and the finding of Prescribed Authority on bonafide need was affirmed as it could not be believed that opposite party's husband who was an I.A.S. Officer of Delhi cadre shall not get a house in Delhi and shall have to live at Ghaziabad. The appellate authority decided the controversy of deemed vacancy as well and held that petitioner having substantial removed his effects from the house in dispute, he shall be deemed to have vacated the house. He examined comparative hardship also, and found that by vacating the house petitioner shall not suffer as he was bound to be allotted a house at place of his posting, and his sons were also settled, one of them being M.B.B.S. The opposite party was, obviously satisfied as although the appeal was dismissed by the finding on deemed vacancy and comparative hardship were in favour. She immediately intimated the finding of vacancy recoded by appellate authority to Prescribed Authority and claimed that the house was vacant. And on next day that is 22nd October, 1980, she moved another application for release as she needed the house for her husband and children. On it fresh inspection was made. It was found that petitioner's wife along with a servant was found residing in the house. This report was damaging therefore, she filed third application on 3rd November, 1980 refuting its correctness and alleging that it was unbelievable that petitioner's ailing wife would remain all alone at Ghaziabad. It was also claimed on strength of finding recorded by appellate authority that petitioner having removed his effects substantially the premises were vacant and it be released in her favour. It was also claimed on strength of finding recorded by appellate authority that petitioner having removed his effects substantially the premises were vacant and it be released in her favour. On 12th November, 1980 petitioner filed an application stating that he was approaching this Court against finding of appellate authority that deemed vacancy has arisen therefore, proceedings under Section 16 be stayed. It was also asserted that substantially all his effects were in the house at Ghaziabad. Another application was filed on 18th November for making local inspection. Details of house hold effects which were in the house namely, fridge, television Dressing and Dining tables, Sofasets, double-beds, Office table etc. were also mentioned. On 21st November, 1980 petitioner filed writ petition against finding of deemed vacancy recorded by appellate authority but it was dismissed summarily with observation that order being in favour of petitioner finding of deemed vacancy recorded against him could not operate as res judicata. Petitioner then filed his detailed objection to release application on 4th December, 1982. The Prescribed Authority (R.C. & E.O.) declared vacancy under Section 12(4) of the Act on 29.1.1981. He held that petitioner having been transferred it could not be delivered that he was residing at Ghaziabad. But as Section 12(3-A) was not applicable to this date there was no question of its allotment. And he rejected allotment applications of certain other applicants and dismissed the application of opposite party filed in 1979 and October, 1980. He, thereafter, took up the last application dated 3.11.1980 for declaration of vacancy due to substantial removal of effects and held that even if the wife of petitioner or his relations lived in the house and for that purposes retained certain goods it would not mean that substantial effects were not removed particularly when petitioner was transferred and admitted to have taken a house on rent in Jaipur. Revision against this order was dismissed on 19.9.81 as not maintainable. On 5.2.1981 petitioner filed another objection running in eighty two paragraphs to the release application. The Prescribed Authority (R.C. & E.O) on 2nd Nov., 1981 released the premises considering opposite party's husband did not have any houses to reside in Delhi. This order was ex parte. Revision against this order was dismissed on 19.9.81 as not maintainable. On 5.2.1981 petitioner filed another objection running in eighty two paragraphs to the release application. The Prescribed Authority (R.C. & E.O) on 2nd Nov., 1981 released the premises considering opposite party's husband did not have any houses to reside in Delhi. This order was ex parte. In revision it was held that absence of petitioner did not vitiate the proceedings as proceedings for release under Section 16(1)(b) are between the District Magistrate and the landlord to which outgoing tenant was not necessary party. In this view of the matter, he did not examine if petitioner did not appear despite direction by the revising authority while dismissing revision against order declaring vacancy. On merits he did not agree that he was debarred from examining correctness of the order declaring vacancy. But instead of deciding whether the order was in accordance with law he held that opposite party's husband having been transferred to Delhi the circumstances changed and no accommodation having been allotted to him it was not in interest of Justice to interfere with orders of Prescribed Authority specially when petitioner was posted at Ahmadabad, his two children were living far away from Ghaziabad and his ailing wife was normally expected to live with him at place of his posting. 2. In order to substantiate its case of not vacating the premises by not removing substantial effects within meaning of Section 12(1)(a), petitioner had filed affidavits of as many as six lawyers, Sarvsri Jai Prakash Tyagi, Fateh Chand Goel, Rajpal Singh, Jog Ram Singh Tomar, Shyam Sunder Sharma and Puran Chand stating that the house was never vacated by petitioner. Affidavits of Jogendra Pal Bage, Press Correspondent of Milap, Dr. Rama Nand Sharma Smt. Bhagwati devi, Vice Principal (U.P. Pradhan) Mahanand Mission Harijan Dalika Vidyalaya and Sheo Charan, Scavenger, were also filed. In this objection filed before Rent Control Officer it was stated that on his transfer to Sultanpur, then his appointment at Calcutta and subsequent transfer to Jaipur, he never charged and travelling allowance etc. as he had not removed his effects and was residing temporarily here and there. He further alleged that electricity bills and water tax was paid by him. In support of it he filed paper Nos. 1 to 10 electricity bills showing consumption and its payment. as he had not removed his effects and was residing temporarily here and there. He further alleged that electricity bills and water tax was paid by him. In support of it he filed paper Nos. 1 to 10 electricity bills showing consumption and its payment. Papers were filed to show payment of water and house-tax till March, 1977 and 1979 in pursuance of notice issued by Municipal Board under Section 149 of U.P. Municipalities Act. Number of other documents for instance cash memos for species purchased by his wife, bill for newspaper, bill of Milkman etc. were either filed or were stated to have been filed in Section 21 proceedings. 3. None of these were adverted to by Prescribed Authority (R.C. & E.O) while declaring vacancy under Section 12. Vacancy was declared as a matter of law. Inference was drawn against petitioner because he had been transferred. It was not found that petitioner had removed his effects substantially. Even if this finding can be said to have been recorded then it was not based on any material but on assumption. Order of release is equally bad. It is violative of natural justice. Petitioner was not informed of date of hearing. Even if it is assumed that revising authority had intimated the date of appearance before Rent Control Officer the order suffers from the same error as the order declaring vacancy. Argument that evidence filed in Section 21 proceedings or in proceedings for declaration of vacancy could not be looked into, cannot be accepted for two reasons one in the objection filed in those proceedings and it may be looked into, second the revising authority while deciding release application was empowered to examine the correctness of order declaring vacancy. 4. Number of decisions were relied by learned counsel for parties on interpretation of expression of substantial removal of effects. For petitioner it was urged that it is not partial but substantial removal which is covered in this expression. According to learned counsel mere locking of premises was not sufficient. It had to be found if petitioner has substantially removed his effects. The interference could not be drawn either by petitioner's transfer or his sons studying outside Ghaziabad or his wife's ailment. It is not living at Ghaziabad which was material but if the petitioner had removed his effects. According to learned counsel mere locking of premises was not sufficient. It had to be found if petitioner has substantially removed his effects. The interference could not be drawn either by petitioner's transfer or his sons studying outside Ghaziabad or his wife's ailment. It is not living at Ghaziabad which was material but if the petitioner had removed his effects. On the other hand learned counsel for opposite party urged that accepting petitioner's case that he was residing in Government hostel etc. during his stay at Sultanpur and Calcutta but once it was admitted that he was residing in a house at Jaipur after his transfer there in 1973 it should be taken to have removed his effects. According to him intention was immaterial for declaration of vacancy under Section 12. It was not semblance of possession which could defeat the Legislature intent of assuming vacancy. The learned counsel urged that residing of petitioner's wife at time of inspection had nothing to do with removal of substantial effects except to frustrate the provision of deemed vacancy. According to learned counsel even though Section 3-A of Section 12 was not retrospective yet in cases of transfer the construction of provision should be same. It is unnecessary to refer to decision as very use of expression indicates that its construction has to vary from case to case. What may amount to substantial removal in one may not be acceptable in another. It is not the locking of premises, or absence for sometime, or relating some movables which may, clinch the matter either way. Nor can it be inferred as a matter of law except in cases covered under sub-section (3-A) of Section 12 after of 1976. It was, therefore, incumbent on the authorities to examine this aspect on material on record. Unfortunately this has not been done either while declaring vacancy or while allowing release application. 5. Much argument was advanced on opportunity of hearing to the outgoing tenant under Section 16(1)(b) and violation of Rule 8(2), that is failure to make local inspection. Latter was no substance as Rent Control Inspector had visited the spot twice. This was compliance of the rule which empowers District Magistrate to get the building inspected before passing any order under Section 12 or 16 of the Act. Latter was no substance as Rent Control Inspector had visited the spot twice. This was compliance of the rule which empowers District Magistrate to get the building inspected before passing any order under Section 12 or 16 of the Act. On opportunity of hearing the petitioner in release proceeding it was very vehemently argued by the learned counsel for opposite party that an outgoing tenant is not entitled to participate in release proceedings under Section 16(1)(b). According to him, Legislature having deliberately omitted any opportunity of hearing as is provided to a landlord or tenant against proceedings under Section 16(1)(a) it should be held that satisfaction of bonafide requirement of landlord under sub-section (b) is between landlord and District Magistrate. Remedy of tenant, the learned counsel urged, was under sub-section (5) of Section 16 by filing review application only. 6. Allotment order under Rent Control Act confers certain rights and benefit on allottee. It may be taken away or effected as provided under the Act. He may be declared to have vacated the premises or he may be evicted or premises may be released in favour of landlord. In either case it entails consequence which effect his civil rights. It is by now settled in our legal system that such rights cannot be curtailed or effected without hearing. Except by bar created under the statute. Prior to 1977 sub-rule (4) of the Rule 13 specifically prohibited a tenant from filing an objection to release application under Section 16. It was deleted in 1977. If this is any indication of the Legislature's intent manifested through rule making authority then it removes the bar and entitles tenant to file objection. Even otherwise tenant should not be deprived of appearing in these proceedings. After declaration of vacancy under Section 12 he ceases to be tenant. But the order is not subject to any appeal or revision. If he is not permitted to participate in release proceedings he is deprived of his rights summarily. Order under Section 12 cannot be challenged and release he cannot participate. This would be contrary to basic principle of natural justice developed and shaped by our Courts for our judicial system. 7. Yet the question is whether this Court should interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction with these orders only because they are erroneous. Equity between a landlord and tenant is a times difficult to adjust. This would be contrary to basic principle of natural justice developed and shaped by our Courts for our judicial system. 7. Yet the question is whether this Court should interfere in its extraordinary jurisdiction with these orders only because they are erroneous. Equity between a landlord and tenant is a times difficult to adjust. More so because of ever rising price index coupled with absence of any statutory provision for automatic revision of rate of rent after certain period. If a tenant of an allotted house on rent determined a decade or decades ago feels wronged in demand for enhancement of rent on prevailing rates even though such rent may have become negligible and insufficient even for maintenance of the house the landlord fells cheated and deprived off what he considers legitimately due. But it is an aspect which needs Legislatures attention. The Act is no doubt a piece of social legislation to save the tenant from undue harassment and exploitation by unscrupulous house-owners. But while attempting to achieve this objective the Legislature has not been oblivious to genuine and bonafide needs of house-owners as well. Obviously because in last thirty or forty years housing activity in cities has been mostly confined to middle class persons. Colonies have sprang upon loan advanced by Insurance Corporation, Housing Societies, Co-operative Societies or Housing building advance from Offices etc. Letting is at times undertaken more to balance the economy. Very often income from portion of a house let out on rent is the only source of livelihood. The Legislature was surely aware of it. Unlike Act III of 1947 which contemplated to provide for the continuance during a limited period of powers to control the letting and rent of residential and non-residential accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom this Act was enacted, to provide, in the interest of general public, for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants from, certain classes of buildings situated in Urban areas, and for matters connected therewith. While construing these provisions, therefore, and finding out if substantial justice has been done it cannot be decided on touchstone of feudalistic concept of landlord. In fact its use in our Act is unfortunate. It must inaccurately describes a house-owner. As is apparent it is formed of two words 'lands' and 'lord'. While construing these provisions, therefore, and finding out if substantial justice has been done it cannot be decided on touchstone of feudalistic concept of landlord. In fact its use in our Act is unfortunate. It must inaccurately describes a house-owner. As is apparent it is formed of two words 'lands' and 'lord'. Although both words are simple and common but they do not correctly convey the person they intend to describe. A house is neither land nor its owner a lord. Landlord is defined in Blacks legal dictionary as owner of tenaments. In England it is understood in this sense also it appears when our rent control Acts were enacted in forties it was borrowed from English statutes and engrafted therein. Unfortunately it was contained even after fifties when ours became a Socialist Republic and such words were deleted even from Land tenure Legislations the place of their origin. In dictionary Landlord defined as 'ruler', 'baron' 'master' etc. When used in relation to tenant it creates an impression of two persons with wide gulf one a lord, a very rich person and the other poor and helpless. Nothing is further then truth and reality. Present day house-owners are usually from middle class. The expression may be justifiably used to describe few house-owners in Bombay and Delhi. In a State like ours, however, there are no landlords but only house-owners. 8. A house at Rs. 35/- in any part of the country what to say of Ghaziabad, is virtually a gift rent of entire year may not be sufficient even for white-washing. Yet it is urged that petitioner is only a tenant. And none of the authorities have been just and fair to him. The argument stems from same misconception and attempts to project as petitioner is being harassed and exploited. To invoke justice because petitioner is a poor tenant, therefore, exploited is ignoring harsh realities. Both petitioner and opposite party are from same strata of society. Petitioner is a member of Income-tax Tribunal. One of his sons is a doctor. Another son has either completed education or is about to complete it. He was allotted this house because he was posted as Civil Judge. At that time probably opposite party was not married. She got this house from her father. Petitioner is a member of Income-tax Tribunal. One of his sons is a doctor. Another son has either completed education or is about to complete it. He was allotted this house because he was posted as Civil Judge. At that time probably opposite party was not married. She got this house from her father. After her marriage to an I.A.S. Officer with two children she too must be feeling the pinch of high cost of living. She may be keen to get the house vacated may be because it could fetch better rent which may supplement her husband's income. It may not be legally justified and the authorities while deciding these proceedings might have committed error of law but can there be any doubt about genuine hardship to which she is being put due to the attitude adopted by petitioner. He is sticking to this house and intends making it permanent abode, may be generation after generation, as tenancy under Act XIII of 1972 is hereditary, only because its rent is nominal. And how did he get the house. Because he was Civil Judge. Having taken advantage of his position he is not willing to square it up even after twelve years of his transfer. Can there be any doubt in circumstances that it is not the petitioner but the house-owner who is being exploited. Therefore, the authorities might have committed error of law but they certainly did substantial justice to the parties. 9. In the result this petition fails and is dismissed. But there shall be no order as to costs. The petitioner is granted time to vacate the premises in dispute on or before 31st December, 1983.