JUDGMENT K.P. Singh, J. - Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the petitioners are transferees from the tenure holder named Lokhan through a sale deed dated 12/13-8-1968 whereas the contesting opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition is the transferee of the disputed land from the original tenure-holder named Lokban through a sale deed dated 13-8.1967. The aforesaid tenure-holder deposited ten times rent for acquisition of Bhumidhari right in the disputed land on 3-8-1967 and executed a sale deed in favour of opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition but that application was dismissed. Later on tenure holder again deposited the requisite amount on 12/13-8-1968 and executed a sale deed in favour of the petitioners on the same date regarding the disputed land. It is note-worthy that Bhumidhari Sanad was granted to the tenure-holder on 21-7-1969 which would confer Bhumidhari right upon the tenure holder from 12/13-8-1968. Due to such a circumstance the opposite party no. 1 brought a suit for declaration of his title and possession over the disputed land under Section 229-B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 2. The claim of the opposite party was contested by the petitioners on the ground that the sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. I was bad in law and did not confer any title upon the opposite party no. 1 and that the petitioners were Bhumidhar in possession over the disputed land and various other pleas were raised by the petitioners is evident from the issues framed by the trial court and mentioned in Annexure I attached with the writ petition. 3. The trial court through its judgment dated 26-10-1970 accepted the claim of the opposite party No. 1. The petitioners appeal against the judgment of the trial court failed as is evident from Annexure II attached with the writ petition. Thereafter the petitioners also remained unsuccessful in second appeal as is evident from Annexure III attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the judgments of the revenue courts the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the opposite party no. Thereafter the petitioners also remained unsuccessful in second appeal as is evident from Annexure III attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by the judgments of the revenue courts the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition had not pleaded in the plaint that the tenure-holder had professed to be Bhumidhar of the disputed land when he executed sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. 1 nor had he pleaded that the tenure holder had fraudulently and erroneously represented to him that he had transferable rights in the disputed land and that the sale deed in favour of the petitioners was not a bona fide transaction or in good faith hence the revenue courts have patently erred in giving decree to the opposite party no. 1 placing reliance upon the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 5. During the course of arguments the learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance upon a number of rulings in support of his contention that if a plea had not been raised in the plaint, the courts could not entertain such a plea unless a specific issue was framed and the attention of the parties was invited. In this connection one of the cases mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioners is reported in Girja Shankar and others v. Jagannath and others, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 301. 6. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition was regarding Sirdari plots of the transferor, hence it was bad in law and did not confer any title upon the opposite party no. 1. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the rulings reported in Inayat Ali v. State of U.P., 1967 A.L.J. 790, Ram Deo v. Deputy Director, of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow, camp at Deoria and others, 1968 R.C. 99, Ram Swat up v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, U.P. Lucknow, camp, at Aligarh and others, 1971 R.D. 8 and Ram Sabodh and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation. U.P. Faizabad and others, 1982 A.L.J. 1952 7. U.P. Faizabad and others, 1982 A.L.J. 1952 7. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the opposite party no. 1, had purchased the disputed land on representation by the tenure-holder that he (the tenure-holder) was Bhumidhar of the disputed land and he had parted with money on that representation, hence the revenue courts were fully justified in granting the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition the benefits of Section 45 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to him the rulings reported in Pramanand v. Champa Lal and others, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 225. Desh Rai and others v. Lalsahai Singh and others, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 847 (1) : 1974 R.C. 92 and Ishtiak Ahmad v. Commissioner Varanasi Division, 1974 R.D. 94 support the claim put forward by the opposite party no. 1 and in the circumstances of the present case the judgments of the revenue courts are in quite consonance with the rulings cited by him, hence the petition should be dismissed. 8. Secondly, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 that relevant facts were before revenue courts and that the parties know their stands, hence technicality cannot stand and the revenue courts were fully justified in granting relief to the contesting opposite party no. 1. He cited a largo number of cases, such as Siddik Mohomed Shah v. Mt. Saran and others, 1930 P.C. 57 Kedar Lal Seal and another v. Hari Lal Seal, 1952 S.C. 47 Juma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah & others, Ibid. Bhagwati Prasad v. Chandramaul, 1966 S.C. 735 M/s. Kakoo Shah Uttam Chand and others v. Kamla Wati and others, A.I.R. 1969 Delhi 120 Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, 1972 Alld. 273 M/s. Ganesh Trading Company v. Moji Ram, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 484 Union of India v. M/s. Khas Karanpura Colliery Co.Ltd., A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 125. 9. Third submission made on behalf of the opposite party is to the effect that this Court is not required to exercise appellate powers, hence the present case is not a fit case where powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 9. Third submission made on behalf of the opposite party is to the effect that this Court is not required to exercise appellate powers, hence the present case is not a fit case where powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can be exercised. The learned counsel for the opposite party no. 1 placed reliance upon the rulings reported in Shaikh Mohamad Umarsahab v. Kadalashkar Hashatn Maritruisab and others (Head note (D), A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 477 (1) A.L.R. 1970 S.C. 61 Beant Singh v. Union of India and others and various other cases, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 388. 10. Lastly, he has submitted that substantial justice has been done between the parties in the present case and his sale deed being prior in time has been rightly accepted by the revenue courts. He has emphasised that on the date of sale in favour of the petitioners also, the tenure-holder was only sirdar of the disputed land, hence his sale deed was also bad in law and upon no question of Bhumidhari right by the tenure-holder, the title passed to the opposite party no. 1 in view of the provisions of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and the revenue courts have correctly recognised his claim. In this connection also a large number of cases have been cited by the learned counsel for the Syed Yaqoob v. K.S. Radhakyishnan and others, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 143. opposite party no. 1 such as Pratap Singh v. Shri Krishna Gupta and others, 1964 A.L.J. 230. Rarahu and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation U.P. at Gorakhpur and others, A.L.R. 1972 All. 184. Kundan Kishan Lal v. Board of Revenue, U.P. at Allahabad and others, 1980 M.O.C. 73(1) and other cases also. 11. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. The copy of the plaint (Annexure 1 attached with the writ petition) indicates that the opposite party no. 1 had not pleaded that the tenure-holder had fraudulently and erroneously represented to him that he had transferable rights and that the sale deed in favour of the petitioners was not bona fide and in good faith but this is a matter of inference in the circumstances of the present case. 1 had not pleaded that the tenure-holder had fraudulently and erroneously represented to him that he had transferable rights and that the sale deed in favour of the petitioners was not bona fide and in good faith but this is a matter of inference in the circumstances of the present case. In the plaint it has been alleged that the tenure-holder was Sirdar and had become Bhumidhar of the disputed land and had executed sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. 1. on 3-8-1967 for a sum of Rs. 2,500 and that the opposite party no. 1 had come into possession over the disputed land. The perusal of the sale deed would also indicate that the tenure-holder had sold Bhumidhari right to the opposite party no. 1. In such a circumstance the plea raised on behalf of the petitioners and contained in paragraph 3 of the writ petition appears to me a technical plea. The contents of paragraph 3 of the writ petition have been denied by the opposite party no. 1 in paragraph 4 of his counter affidavit. The perusal of Annexure 1 (the sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. 1 attached with the supplementary counter affidavit) would indicate that the tenure-holder had represented to the opposite party no. 1 in the present writ petition that he was Bhumidhar in possession of the disputed land. In Jumma Masjid Mercara v. Kodimandra Devi ah and others, A.I.R. 1678 S.C. 847 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed regarding Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act as below : "That section embodies, as already stated a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as against a person who acts on that representation. It is immaterial whether the transferor act bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. It is immaterial whether the transferor act bona fide or fraudulently in making the representation. It is only material to find out whether in fact the transferee has been misled. It is to be noted that when the decision under consideration was given, the relevant words of Section 43 were "where a person erroneously represents", and now, as amended by Act 20 of 1929, they are "where a person fraudulently or erroneously represents", and that emphasises that for the purpose of the Section it matters not whether the transfer or acted fraudulently or innocently in making the representation, and that what is material is that he did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it". 12. In the present case I am satisfied on a perusal of the sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. 1 that the tenure-holder of the disputed land had represented to the opposite party no. 1 that he had bhumidhari right in the disputed land which he intended to transfer to the opposite party no 1. The technical plea raised on behalf of the petitioners as contained in paragraph 3 of the writ petition is not enough to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In Krishna Singh v. Mathura Ahir and others, A.I.R. 1972 Alld. 273 a learned Singe Judge of this Court is of the opinion; "where the issue upon which the parties went to trial fully and adequately covered all the material points in the case and the parties were fully conscious of the same even if the plaint suffered from omission of necessary averments or lack of particulars, the defendant would not be permitted to raise objection to a finding on that question". 13. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in M/s. Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji Ram, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 484 have observed as below :- "Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the course of substantive justice. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine that is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take." 14. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine that is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take." 14. In view of the above extracts of the reported cases I am of the view that in the present case parties knew the stand taken by the other side and they have led evidence in the case knowing the real issues involved in controversy. Moreover, Parmanand v. Champa Lal and others, A.I.R. 1956 Alld. 225 Head Note `H' reads as below : "One of the doctrine of equity is that equity creates a personal obligation which compels the transferor to perform his contract when he is able to do so on the acquisition of the subsequent interest. In the application of this doctrine of equity it is immaterial that the promisee or transferee knew the truth, namely that the promiser or the transferor had no authority to transfer the interest which he purported to transfer. In the application of this equity it has been sometimes said that this equity applies when there is no representation and if there is a Representation then Section 43 will apply. This view is erroneous. Even where there is no representation by the transferor that he had authority to transfer the interest which be purported to transfer, such a representation is under Section 55 (2) implied when nothing is said to the contrary in The deed of transfer. The knowledge of the buyer in such a case is immaterial. Even if the buyer knew that the seller has no power to transfer the interest, he is entitled to the benefit of the contract and to enforce the sale according to its terms and may hold the seller responsible in damages. Head note `1' reads as below :- "The representation mentioned in Section 43 may be either express or implied it will be implied when the law makes it an implied term of the transfer." 15. In my opinion, the opposite party no. 1 has succeeded in proving the essential ingredients of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act with a view to get benefit of that Section. In my opinion, the opposite party no. 1 has succeeded in proving the essential ingredients of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act with a view to get benefit of that Section. When the tenure-holder succeeded in getting Bhumidhari right in the disputed land ; the sale deed in favour of opposite party no. 1, being prior in point of time, was rightly accepted by the revenue courts. On the finding that the opposite party no. 1 had got possession over the land sold to him the petitioners cannot be termed as bona fide purchasers and in good faith. Due to a registered document in favour of the opposite party no. 1 and the fact that the opposite party no. 1 was in possession over the share sold to him by the tenure-holder, a heavy burden lay upon the petitioners to make requisite enquiry about his possession over the disputed land as to establish their claim of being purchasers in good faith. I have a feeling the petitioners are not purchasers in good faith, hence they are not entitled to Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. 16. The rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners reported in 1968 RD 99 and in 1982 Allahabad Law Journal 1252 are inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In the aforesaid two rulings the tenure-holder had died before the grant of Bhumidhari Sanad, hence the transferee could not invoke the provisions to Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the present case the tenure-holder who acted erroneously and fraudulently in getting the first application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad rejected and thereafter in acquiring Bhumidhari right in the disputed land and transferring the same to the petitioners, the petitioner's case is distinguishable and different from the facts mentioned in the above mentioned two rulings and the petitioners cannot derive any benefit out of the aforesaid rulings. 17. Regarding second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners I think that the claim of the opposite party has been rightly accepted by the revenue courts and their conclusions are quite in consonance with the reported decisions of this Court in 1974 RD at Pages 92 and 94. The ruling reported in 1971 RD 84 supports the claim of opposite party no. 1 in the circumstances of the present case. The ruling reported in 1971 RD 84 supports the claim of opposite party no. 1 in the circumstances of the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point out to me how the aforesaid ruling helps the claim of the petitioners. Rather on the facts and circumstances mentioned above the aforesaid ruling supports the claim put forward by the opposite party no. 1. 18. Since the sale deed in favour of the opposite party no. 1 is prior in point of time it confers valid title upon the opposite party no. 1 as soon as the tenure holder succeeds in obtaining Bhumidhari right in the disputed land. The petitioners being subsequent transferees at least not in good faith, hence their claim has been rightly negatived by the revenue court. Tilak Dhari and another v. Khedan Lal and others, A.I.R. 1921 P.C. 112. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have observed at page 118 as below : "This principle of law, which is sometimes referred to as feeding the grant by estoppel, is well established in this country if a man who has no title whatever to property grants it by a conveyance which in form would carry the legal estate, and he subsequently acquires an interest sufficient to satisfy the instability passes. In such a case there is nothing on which the second grant could operate in prejudice to the first." 19. To me it appears that equity and law both are in favour of the opposite party no. 1 and the petitioners are not entitled to take shelter behind technical plea so as to invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In view of my above conclusions it is not necessary to deal with the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party about the scope of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the cases cited by him in this connection. 20. In the result, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs.