ORDER 1. In this application under Article 226 of the Constitution the grievance of the petitioner is that the Contai Municipality, the respondent no.2 has not, in spite of repeated demands, paid him the sum of Rs. 57,254/- which he is entitled to get as balance payment for construction of certain dwelling, houses of the Municipality. He, accordingly, prays for the following reliefs:- "(a) Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents particularly the respondents no.2 and 3 the Municipality and/or the Chairman and the Commissioner, Contai Municipality, District Midnapore to pay the balance amount of Rs. 57,254/- to your petitioner. (b) A writ in the nature of Certiorari directing the respondents to certify and to bring the entire records of this case before the Hon'ble Court within such time as may be fixed by this Hon'ble Court so that the conscionable justice may be administered." 2. At the time of hearing of this writ application the Municipality raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the application on the ground that the remedy of the petitioner was in a Money Suit, as in the writ jurisdiction this Court had no power to issue a writ of mandamus for a breach of contract. Mr. Bhuina, appearing for the petitioner on the other hand, contended that a writ application was maintainable for such a relief, as the breach was committed by a statutory body. In support of his contention Mr. Bhuina first relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D.F.O., South Kheri vs. Ram Sanehi, AIR 1973 SC 205 which laid down the proposition that where an action of a public authority inverted with statutory powers was challenged, a writ petition was maintainable even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract. Since the facts of that case arc clearly distinguishable from the present one the principle laid down therein is of no avail to the petitioner. In that case the Divisional Forest Officer (D.F.O.), South Kheri Division cancelled an order earlier passed by the Sub-ordinate Forest Authority, under which the writ petitioner was entitled to cut timbers from a forest. Since the facts of that case arc clearly distinguishable from the present one the principle laid down therein is of no avail to the petitioner. In that case the Divisional Forest Officer (D.F.O.), South Kheri Division cancelled an order earlier passed by the Sub-ordinate Forest Authority, under which the writ petitioner was entitled to cut timbers from a forest. In repelling the contention of D.F.O. in that case, that since the dispute arose out of the terms of the contract and the Divisional Forest Officer under the terms of the contract had authority to modify any action taken by any Sub-ordinate Authority the remedy of the writ petitioner was to institute an action in the Civil Court and that the writ petit ion was not maintainable, the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "But in the present case the order is passed by a public authority modifying the order or proceeding of subordinate forest authority. By that order he has deprived the respondent of a valuable right. We are unable to hold that merely because the source of the right which the respondent claims was initially in a contract for obtaining relief against any arbitrary and unlawful action on the part of a public authority he must resort to a suit and not to a petition by way of a writ. In view of the judgment of this Court in K.N. Guruswamy's case, (1955) 1 SCR 305 ( AIR 1954 SC 592 ) there can be no doubt that the petition was maintainab1e, even if the right to relief arose out of an alleged breach of contract, where the action challenged was of a pubic authority invested with statutory power." 3. In the instant case the claim of the petitioner is a monetory one, solely based upon a breach of contract and no question of any breach of statutory obligation by the Municipal authorities arises. 4. In this connection, a reference may be made to the later decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kulchhinder Singh vs. Hardyal Singh, 1976 SC 2216 wherein Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court, observed as under :- "The writ petition, stripped of embroidery and legalistic, stands naked as a simple contract between the staff and the Society, agreeing upon a certain percentage of promotions of various posts or an omnibus, all embracing promise to give a quota to the existing employees. At its best, the writ petition seeks enforcement of a binding contract but the neat and necessary repellant is that the remedy of Article 226 is unavailable to enforce a contract quo contract. We fail to see how a supplier of chalk to a government school or cheese to government hospital can ask for a constitutional remedy under Article 226 in the event of a breach of a contract, by passing the normal channels of civil litigation. We are not convinced that a mere contract agreeing to a quota of promotions can be exalted into a service rule or statutory duty. What is immediately relevant is not whether the respondent is State or public authority but whether what is enforced 'is a statutory duty or sovereign obligation or public function of a public authority. Private law may involve a State, a statutory body, or a public body in contractual or tortious actions. But they cannot be siphoned off into the writ jurisdiction." 5. The same principle was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Divisional Forest Officer vs. Biswanath Dutt & Co., AIR 1981 SC 1368 . In that case the Divisional Forest Officer, Darrang Division of Assam recovered a sum of Rs. 7,069.37 p. as royalty for cutting and felling trees from the writ petitioner. Aggrieved thereby the petitioner, namely, Biswanath Dutta & Co. Ltd. filed a writ application challenging such action of the D.F.O. and praying for a mandamus directing the said Officer to issue permits to the petitioner without insisting upon payment of royalty for the trees cut and felled from the area under lease. The Assam High Court granted the reliefs prayed for by the petitioner and aggrieved thereby the Divisional Forest Officer preferred tile appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the rights and obligations between the parties were governed by the terms of the lease executed between them and observed that ordinarily where a breach of contract was complained of a party complaining of such breach might sue for specific performance of a contract, if the contract was capable of being specifically performed, or the party might sue for damages and such a suit ordinarily would be cognizable by a Civil Court. It further observed that a right to relief flowing from a contract had to be claimed in Civil Court where a suit for specific performance of contract or for damages could be filed and that the principle was so well settled that no authority was needed. 6. In the present case the grievance of the petitioner is that the Municipality has not paid him all his legal dues which he is entitled to get under a contract for constructing buildings and the reliefs claimed by him as quoted above can only be granted in a Money Suit. 7. Mr. Bhuina also relied upon the decisions in the cases of Monindra Mohan Sarkar vs. Income-tax Officer, reported in 81 Calcutta Weekly Notes 876, Dabur Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of West Bengal & other, reported in 82 CWN page 384 ( 1978 CHN 138 ) and Trustees for the Improvement of Calcutta vs. S. Ghose, 1983 (1) CWN 1, have gone through these cases and I must confess that I have not been able to understand their relevancy to the question involved in this case and I feel that any discussion thereon will be an exercise in futility. 8. For the foregoing discussions, the application fails and the same is hereby rejected. There will however be no order for costs. Application rejected.