This appeal arises from the judgment passed by the Assistant District & Sessions Judge, Dibrugarh in Title Appeal No. 15 of 1975 dismissing the appeal on the ground that the plaintiff-appellant had other statutory remedies and that without exhaust­ing those remedies he could not take recourse to the Civil Court. In other words- he found that the Civil Court had no jurisdic­tion to entertain the suit in view of sub-section (3) oi section-40 of the Assam Elementary Education Act, 1968 (for short, the Act of 1968. These provisions lay down that an appeal against the decision of the Regional Board by a person aggrieved inclu­ding a teacher or any other employee of the elementary schools shall lie to the Executive Committee constituted under section 14 of the Act of 1968 in the manner prescribed and that a second appeal shall lie to the State Government whose decision in this behalf shall be final. The suit was instituted on 6.5.72 and so the bearing of the suit will be guided by the provisions of the Act of 1968. 2. The case of the plaintiff in Suit No. 84 of 1972 filed before the learned Munsiff, Dibrugarh is that the plaintiff was appointed on 11.5.57 as Assistant Teacher in the Hindi Section of the Ganpatrai Rosiwasia M. E. School, Tinsukia run by the Managing Committee of the School. He was confirmed in the same post on 27.8.57.' In 1959 the school was taken over by the State School Board and the plaintiff was appointed as an additional teacher in the Hindi section. In the meantime, the plaintiff was deputed for All Assam Junior Basic Teachers Tra­ining Course and after completion of the said training he rejoined in the post and continued to serve there. As per the Act of 1968, the said school was under the State Board of Elementary Education, Assam. Subsequently, the school was under the control of Regional Board of Elementary Education, Tinsukia. The plain­tiff was a member of the Executive Committee of the Primary School Teachers' Association in connection with which he had to make various representations before defendant No. 3, Secre­tary Regional Board for Elementary Education and other autho­rities regarding the grievances of the teachers. According to the plaintiff this raised some hostile attitude towards him by defen­dant No. 3 and other authorities. According to the plaintiff this raised some hostile attitude towards him by defen­dant No. 3 and other authorities. Later, defendant No. 3 transferred him on 26.5.70 as Head Pandit of Tangona Hindi L. P. School about 60 Kms. away from his home town. The plain­tiff's case is that he was suffering from acute Asthma and was under medical treatment. The transfer put him in difficulty regard­ing medical treatment etc. However, in obedience of the order of transfer he joined the Tangona Hindi L. P. School on 16.7.70. Shri Ramadhar Shah, Head Pandit of the said school was transferred to and joined at Ganpatrai Junior Basic L. P. School, Tinsukia in place of the plaintiff. On 15.2.71 the pla­intiff and Ramadhar Shah made a joint petition to the Chai­rman of the Regional Board of Elementary Education, Tinsukia for their mutual transfer. This prayer was not responded to. Then the plaintiff made several representations to defendant No. 3 for his re-transfer to his former school on account of his medical treatment and convenience of his family life. But defend­ant No. 3 made no favorable gesture. Thereafter, the plaintiff was compelled to make a petition which he did on 21. 4. 71 to the Secretary, State Board of Elementary Education, Assam sta­ting his difficulties. At this defendant No. 3 suspended the plain­tiff from service with immediate effect by his order dated 12 .5.71. On 26.6.71 charges were framed against him for discipli­nary action. On 30.6.71 the plaintiff showed cause against the char­ges. But defendant No. 3 by his letter dated 11. 10.71 informed the plaintiff that in a meeting of the Regional Board of Elemen­tary Education held on 7. 10. 71 the plaintiff was found guilty of the charges. It was also informed to him that if he apologised for the guilt his case may be considered sympathetically. The plaintiff did not apologise and asked for supply of the findings on the charges. However, defendant No. 3 did not furnish him with the findings and insisted that he was guilty of the charges. Defendant No. 3 ultimately dismissed the plaintiff from service by his order dated 15. 3. 72. The plaintiff was not given any opportunity to defend himself and according to him the findi­ngs, and the order of dismissal were arbitrary and malafide. 3. Defendant No. 3 ultimately dismissed the plaintiff from service by his order dated 15. 3. 72. The plaintiff was not given any opportunity to defend himself and according to him the findi­ngs, and the order of dismissal were arbitrary and malafide. 3. On behalf of the defendants written statement was filed and on the pleadings of both sides learned Munsiff struck as many as 6 issues and on the trial he dismissed the suit. The plaintiff thereafter preferred an appeal and the learned appellate court dismissed the appeal as said above on the sole ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted the statutory remedies provided in the Act of 1968. 4. It is the finding of the learned appellate Court that the suit in the Civil Court is barred due to provisions of sub­section (3) of Section 40 of the Act of 1968. Learned counsel Shri Sen on behalf of the appellant pointed out that the provi­sions of sub-section (3) as said above only enable filing of an appeal against the decision of the Regional Board by a person aggrieved against the decision of the Secretary of the State Board for Elementary Education and that it does not bar the jurisdication of the Civil Court. Learned Counsel referred to the provisions of Section 54 of the Act of 1965 which provides- ''No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings for anything done in good faith under this Act shall lie without the previous sanction of the State Government in this behalf." Two conditions emerge from these provisions. One is that if anything be done in good faith under this Act, an appeal by a aggrieved person will require previous sanction of the State Government. The second condition is that in case of bad faith in connection with anything done under the Act no previous sanction of the State Government will be required. Section 54 is clear that one can go to the Civil Court in a suit-which can be done without the previous sanction of the State Govern­ment in case there be bad faith in anything done under the Act. It also indicates without any ambiguity that in that case no previous sanction of the State Government will be required. So Section 54 gives jurisdiction to a Civil Court in connection with anything done under the Act of 1968. It also indicates without any ambiguity that in that case no previous sanction of the State Government will be required. So Section 54 gives jurisdiction to a Civil Court in connection with anything done under the Act of 1968. In the present suit it has been alleged that the statutory provisions of the Assam Services (Discipline aid Appeal) Rules have not been complied with in the proceeding against the plaintiff. It is also the plaint case that the plaintiff was not given any hearing before passing the impugned order of dismissal. In this respect the principles of natural justice have been disregarded completely. It is a settled principle of law that non-compliance with the principles of natural justice in a case like the present one tantamounts to violation of a law. In other words, the plaintiff's case is that in dismissing him the authority acted in a malafide manner. The jurisdiction of a Court has to be determined in view of the pleadings of the plaint and not in view of the defence pleadings. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to Secretary of State vs. Mask & Co. AIR 1940 PC 105 wherein it has been laid down : "The exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed OF clearly implied. Even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been-complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in con­formity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." The terms of sub-section (3) of Section 40 of the Act of 1968 do not exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court nor is there any necessary implication that the provisions exclude the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Moreover, as has been said before, the provisions of Section 54 of the Act of 1968 are clear enough to give jurisdiction to the Civil Court. Moreover, as has been said before, the provisions of Section 54 of the Act of 1968 are clear enough to give jurisdiction to the Civil Court. Learned counsel for the appellant also referred to Dbulabhai vs. State of M.P., AIR 1969 SC 78 in which it was held that where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals, the Civil Courts, jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit and that such provision however does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. It was also held in that case that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is all embracing except to the extent it is excluded by an express provision of law or by clear intendment arising from such law, and that this is the purport of Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code. 6. In view of the discussion made above, I hold that the learned first appellate Court was in error in dismissing the appeal on tae grounds aforesaid. It is a fit case for remand. 7. The result is that the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned first appellate Court are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the learned first appellate Court for decision of the appeal on merits.