Hansaria, J.:- We have read the impugned judgment of the learned Assam Board of Revenue, hereinafter the Board, with deep distress intermingled with innate sense of shock, as, from what would be unfolded later, it would be clear that the Board's judgment has given a big blow to shake the very foundation of the system of administering justice in this country which has been built over assiduously by many generations of the people of India. The view of some persons that the threat to the viability of the system has not come as much from external sources as internal, is painfully projected by this case. The Board though manned by high executive officers is by all counts a tri­bunal subordinate to this Court and is even amenable to the power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even so, it has deemed it fit in its wisdom to defy and disre­gard and even question the justification of some of the directions given by a Bench of this Court presided over by the Hon'ble Chief Justice (Acting), as he then was, in Civil Rule No. 215/82 whereby the matter at hand was remanded to the Board for disposal. It may be stated that in the aforesaid Civil Rule the present petitioners themselves had approached this Court when their appeal had been dismissed by the Board; and this Court while setting aside the order of dismissal had remanded the matter for fresh disposal by the Board "in the light of the obser­vations made" in the judgment. 2. Before we illustrate the above mentioned aspect of the judgment, let it be put on record that the judgment of this Court in Civil Rule No. 215/82 has acquired the status of finality as a prayer for special leave against that judgment in Petition to Appeal (Civil) No. 11816 of 1982 was withdrawn by respondents I and 2 on 7.1.83 as appears from Memo No. 6585/82/Sec-IV-A dated 1.2.83 of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of India. Even if it were not withdrawn, the Board had no alternative under the law but to decide the matter on remand only in the light of the observations made by this Court, which it has not done at all, really, it has gone at tangent on many points with the observations of this Court. Even if it were not withdrawn, the Board had no alternative under the law but to decide the matter on remand only in the light of the observations made by this Court, which it has not done at all, really, it has gone at tangent on many points with the observations of this Court. Such an effort of a sub-ordinate Tribunal is fraught with grave danger to the administration of justice known to the people of this country, and has to be duly taken note of with grave concern by all. We would make another preliminary remark before coming to the brass-tack; and the same is that we are ourselves not sitting in review over the aforesaid judgment of this Court and as such it is not within our competence as well to examine the correctness or otherwise of what has been stated in the earlier Civil Rule. So all concerned have to abide by the decision rendered in the above Civil Rule; and what is within our ken and competence is only to see whether the Board has also done so or not. 3. That it has not done so is writ large on the face of the impugned judgment which has started by observing that "the form and contents of the judgment (meaning this Court's judgment) being what it is, we consider it necessary to make some general observations........."We do not know what is wrong in the form and content of the previous judgment, which has, with all respect, duly gone into the points urged, and has laid down after referring to a cumber of decisions of the apex Court as to what was extraneous or irrelevant which had gone into the consi­deration of the Board while disposing of the matter earlier. Let us now illustrate how the Board has thrown all judicial decorum and discipline to the winds in the impugned judgment. One of the points which was agitated before this Court earlier was reliance on a report of the Deputy Commissioner, Sibsagar while holding that the petitioners were benamdars or benami of somebody else. It would be apposite to quote that report which reads as below :- "Jorhat town country spirit shop No. 1 (with which shop we are concerned) is meant for joint lessee. It would be apposite to quote that report which reads as below :- "Jorhat town country spirit shop No. 1 (with which shop we are concerned) is meant for joint lessee. Just after the submission of the tender on 21.8.81 secret information was received to the effect that Shri Parag Saikia (one of the petitioners in the case) is in the private employment of a prominent businessman of Dibrugarh district who is also said to be a benamdar of important C. S. Shops and Shri Saikia resides in Gauhati for the greater part of the year enjoying all the perquisites of the employer. The secret information further indicates that the said benamdar of Dibrugarh district was trying to grab important shops of Jorhat Sub-Division through Parag Saikia. The matter was discussed in the Advisory Board which rejected the tender of the joint appellants. Having found that the Board has placed reliance on such a report, the allegations contained in which were stoutly denied by Parag Saikia, this Court held that as "this report does not mention in particular about the person who might be involved as a benamdar" such a report "should not have entered into the consideration of the Board". Further, the report was described as ipse dixit because it was taken to be a vague report. Now, see what the learned Chairman and one of the learned Members of the Board have said about the same report. They say "to us these parti­culars are sufficient to give due weight to the report. And we shall not ignore it just because an appellant submits to ignore it as ipse dixit report" (Para 7. 5). Of course, to be fair to the Board, let it be said that the Board thought it to contain suffi­cient particulars because, according to it, international smugglers are more widely publicized and more widely known than our international scientists and other luminaries. The Board further says "the important liquor mahaldars in a district are more widely known in the same manner than the eminent University professors residing at the same place. There are not many such big mahaldars". If it was so apparent, why was the name not made known to Parag to enable him to effectually meet the allega­tion? Is it not hitting a person below the belt? Is it not violation of principle of fair-play in action? There are not many such big mahaldars". If it was so apparent, why was the name not made known to Parag to enable him to effectually meet the allega­tion? Is it not hitting a person below the belt? Is it not violation of principle of fair-play in action? Be that as it may when the Court had directed the Board not to take the vague report into consideration, the Board had no other alternative but to follow the direction, which it has even flouted. 4. If the above is not enough to bring home what we have stated in the opening paragraph, let us give another example. In its first judgment, the Board had held that there was no indication if the relatives of the petitioners who had assured them necessary finance "were aware that the appellant would run the shop jointly with another person". This Court did not accept this view of the Board because it was known to' the intending financiers that the shops in question was a double lessee shop which shall have to be settled with some joint lessees. There­fore, the observations of the Board that the intending financiers would not have agreed to give finance if they would have known that the shop is to be taken in partnership, was regarded by this Court as "far-fetched and untenable". This observation has been characterised by the Board as "simply astounding", (para 7.11) Before making this observation, the Board must have realised its own limitations and must have shown due regard and respect to what has fallen from the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court. And now see the logic as to why it had regarded the aforesaid observations as simply astounding. The reason is that none of the financiers of Prafulla (to the petitioner) or for that matter, of Parag knew as to for which shop they were going to submit tender as they had simply said in their affidavits that Prafulla/Parag is submitting tenders for settlement of country spirit shops in the Jorhat Sub-Division. We do not know what led the Board to make this observation as in the affidavits filed by three of the persons who had assured finance to Prafulla, they had clearly stated that Prafulla was "a joint tenderer with his partner Shri Parag Saikia in respect of settlement of No. 1 Jorhat Country Spirit shop for the years 1981-84". We do not know what led the Board to make this observation as in the affidavits filed by three of the persons who had assured finance to Prafulla, they had clearly stated that Prafulla was "a joint tenderer with his partner Shri Parag Saikia in respect of settlement of No. 1 Jorhat Country Spirit shop for the years 1981-84". The affidavits are at pages 96, 99 and 102 of the Board's records. Though these were filed on 20.11.82, the Board at least could not have taken the aforesaid view in its judgment pronounced on 3.12.82. 5. Before concluding this unpleasant chapter, we cannot resist to point out that as this Court in one of its observations had said that the Board had "lost sight" of something, the Board had to retort that this Court itself had "totally lost sight" of some other thing (See para 6). We do not propose to further burden and defile this judgment with many such other remarks with which the Board's decision is almost replete. We leave this aspect presently by saying that if it is found that the Board persists in such an attitude (which is nothing short of contem­ptuous) this Court may have to take some unpleasant step to protect its dignity and also to uphold the majesty of law. We have been compelled to make these observations as it was found by this Court in Jayanta Kumar Das vs. Assam Board of Revenue, (1983) 1 GLR 318 that the Board had decided a case almost in the teeth of the decision rendered by a Special Bench of this Court which had led this Court to remind the Board about discipline in this branch of activity. Of course that judgment was rendered after the present decision of the Board. So, we only hope that in future the Board will not give any occasion to call upon it to justify its behaviour and remarks. In taking the particular stance which the Board has done, we think that it was perhaps provoked (though quite unjustifiably) feeling that there was bullying and brow-beating by this Court when it had rendered its first judgment. In taking the particular stance which the Board has done, we think that it was perhaps provoked (though quite unjustifiably) feeling that there was bullying and brow-beating by this Court when it had rendered its first judgment. This is apparent from what has been stated by the Board in para 4.4 of its judgment, where the Board has even said that the findings of fact given by it are always their own and they have to be their own, and "the system shuns subtlest command to arrive at any particular finding on any matter". The observations contained in the first judgment of this Court were looked "in this spirit". Now, let it be made absolutely clear that in Civil Rule 215/82, this Court had only discharged its constitutional obligation and has held some facts and reports as extraneous or irrelevant which it had thought to be so. After laying down this, it had left the Board absolutely unfettered to arrive at any decision it thought fit regarding the personal and the financial suitability of the tenderers on the basis of the mate­rials relevant to the case. As this Court had found that the financial suitability of the petitioners had not been examined by scrutinizing the genuineness of the pass books of the intending financiers and the Board had also not gone into the question of suitability of the respondents, it had sent back the case to decide on the touch-stone of personal test as well as on the score of financial soundness as to who among the tenderers were most suitable for the purpose. If some materials are regarded by higher courts as irrelevant or extraneous, and the matter is thereafter remanded to arrive at a just decision by ignoring the irrelevant and extraneous materials, the subordinate court should not, and cannot take, it as brow-beating or bullying. As observed in Jayanta Das (supra), a "subordinate court has to reconcile itself if its findings are set aside by a higher court". 5. As observed in Jayanta Das (supra), a "subordinate court has to reconcile itself if its findings are set aside by a higher court". 5. Let us now examine the meat of the matter without being influenced in anyway by the aforesaid conduct if the petitioners are entitled to preference under Rule 223 of the Assam Excise Rules, 1945, hereinafter the Rules, whereas the respondents 1 and 2 are not they have not been found suitable for settlement for these reasons (1) Parag, one of the petitioners is a benemidar (ii) the partnership in question is sham and (iii) the petitioners are not financially sound to run the shop. 6. Let us examine whether these findings of the Board are based on sound principles of law, and on relevent materials, while proceeding to examine the findings. Let it be said that we are conscious that we are not an appellate authority and the power of this Court is circumscribed. Even while examining the matter, first this Court had shown its awareness as to when a finding can be disturbed in a certiorari proceeding. Reference had then been made to Syed Yakub vs. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 ; Hindusthan Steel Limited vs. A. K. Roy, AIR 1970 SC 1401 ; Parry & Co. vs. P. C. Paul, AIR 1970 SC 1334 and Ramana vs. International Airport Authority, AIR 1979 SC 1928, apart from referring to some English decisions. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Mukund Boro vs. Bangshidhar, AIR 1980 SC 1524 has also been borne in mind. These judgments of the apex Court do not leave anything to doubt that a writ Court can not substitute its own view on a finding of fact by re-appreciating the materials on record but it can definitely set aside an order founded even on some factual conclusions if these are based on irrele­vant and extraneous materials which no reasonable person could have arrived at, or if the finding is grounded on total misconception of law. This apart, according to us, a finding arrived at by disre­garding the directions given by a superior/higher authority would be completely in excess of jurisdiction, and would speak of over-stepping of jurisdiction. 7. With this in mind the findings arrived at may be exa­mined. This apart, according to us, a finding arrived at by disre­garding the directions given by a superior/higher authority would be completely in excess of jurisdiction, and would speak of over-stepping of jurisdiction. 7. With this in mind the findings arrived at may be exa­mined. Petitioner Parag has been held as benamidar, because of (a) the aforesaid report of the Deputy Commissioner; (b) his lurking around courts in a number of litigations and (c) the two partners having tendered for in large number of shops. The first factor could not have been taken into considera­tion by the Board in view of the earlier decision asking it not to do so. Shri Bhattacharjee who appears for respondents 1 and 2 submits that apart from the aforesaid report, the learned Board had before it another report in the appeal filed by Parag for Meleng C. S. Shop which has been quoted in the impugned judg­ment in paragraph 7. 4. That report too speaks of Parag being in employment of a prominent businessman of Dibrugarh who secretly finances country spirit shops. It has further stated that the appellant (meaning Parag) lacks qualities of diligence perseverance etc. Thus, this report is no better than the one which has been noted by this Court earlier. If that report is vague, as was held to be, this does not fare better. This apart, there is another objection to the reliance on the report in Meleng appeal, inasmuch as, the petitioners were not confronted with the same and Parag was not allowed to have his say on this. Thus, of the three reasons given to hold Parag as benamidar, one is to be regarded as almost non-existent, because this Court had asked the Board not to consider the report of the Deputy Commissioner. 8. As to Parag's travels in the corridors of Courts and indulgence in "expensive litigation", let it be said that to be consistent in this regard, the learned Board must have allowed respondents 1 and 2 also, who had knocked the doors of even the supreme Court, to feel the touch of the noose of benami around their neck. But this is found missing. Tender for many shops by the petitioners (the third factor) had been considered by this Court earlier; and all that could reasonably be said about this venture is that the petitioner were keen to have one shop or the other. But this is found missing. Tender for many shops by the petitioners (the third factor) had been considered by this Court earlier; and all that could reasonably be said about this venture is that the petitioner were keen to have one shop or the other. It would be difficult to say anything beyond this. Thus, finding of benami having been arrived at on the basis of non-existent material and on varying yardstick cannot be accepted. Before coming to the second reason may we say that the acceptance of even Parag as an educated unemployed youth even by the learned Board makes its finding relating to his being even in private employment of a benamdar totally inconsistent. 9. The partnership has been regarded as sham mainly because Prafulla (petitioner No. 2) has been found to be a resident of Golaghat, and not of Jorhat. The finding relating to residence being one based on appreciation of materials on record, we would agree that sitting as a writ Court, we cannot interfere with the same. But question is: was it open to the Board to come to this finding of fictitiousness on this reason on the face of what was stated in Civil Rule 215/82 wherein it was observed, inter alia, that "even assuming that Prafulla is a permanent resident of Golaghat which is about 30 miles away, it may not be diffi­cult to do a partnership business at Jorhat". Let it be repeated that in the present proceeding we are not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the observations made in the afore­said Rule. As already pointed out, we have only to see whether the Board has acted in the light of the observations made therein. And to this, the answer has to be in the negative. Let it be put on record that though earlier the learned Board had thought that the age difference between the petitioners (7 years) would also stand in the way of "needed concord and compatibility" (see para 7.6) of its first judgment), the view taken this time is that "combination of youth and experience may provide an additional resource in a partnership business". But the "admission" of Parag that he had failed in a number of partnership business and desertion of his partner on one occasion led the Board to think that Prafulla could not have had "any special attraction" to join Parag in a partnership. According to Shri Das, learned Counsel for the petitioner, there was no such admission (Shri Bhattarcharjee is unable to controvert this submission); and the desertion on an earlier occasion when he himself was on his legs before the learned Board, was an act of treachery having been managed by the other side. Be that as it may, it is for Prafulla to decide whether Parag is a suitable person to enter into a partnership. He has been with Parag through the thick and thin of this fight. Further "special attraction" in a person is a purely subjective phenomenon. To someone, A may not have anything to appeal in him, whereas somebody else may lay down his life for A. These are all known and unexplained mysteries of human life. Thus, the first reason given for this finding was not available to the learned Board in this round; the second (admi­ssion of Parag regarding earlier failure) is non-existent, and the third (lack of special attraction in Parag) is the result of an exercise in imponderability. We cannot therefore sustain this finding. 10. The third and the final fact which weighed with the learned Board in rejecting the preferential claim of the petitio­ners is that they have not been able to muster necessary finance reasonably required to run the shop in question. Though the two petitioners had procured assistance from 8 persons and the total promised financial help came to about Rs. 74,000/- (as from the sum of Rs. 77,758.00, the cash in hand of Rs. 3,500/- was not relied upon), it has been stated in the impugned judgment that -'there will be a big shortage of the working capital". This view was taken specially because of Rule 346 as inserted, vide a notification dated 1.9.81. It appears that this rule along with Rule 296 was amended after the Special Bench decision of this Court on 1.4.80 in Rajkumar Dilip Narayan Singha vs. Assam Beard of Revenue, ILR 1980 Gauhati 99. This view was taken specially because of Rule 346 as inserted, vide a notification dated 1.9.81. It appears that this rule along with Rule 296 was amended after the Special Bench decision of this Court on 1.4.80 in Rajkumar Dilip Narayan Singha vs. Assam Beard of Revenue, ILR 1980 Gauhati 99. That Special Bench had gone into the important question as to whether fina­ncial soundness of an educated unemployed youth is essential for the purpose of getting settlement of an excise shop; if so how should it be judged and on what touch-stone? This Court had found that the sitting lessees very often inflated their stocks and put the unemployed youths in quandary while going to take over the possession of the shop. As it was felt that this tactics make the unemployed youth to look for resources beyond that which they had mentioned in their tenders, this Court had high-lighted this aspect in the aforesaid decision. It had felt that the stan­dard of five times the security deposit which had acquired some status and recognition while judging the financial sound­ness of a tenderer at the stage of consideration of the tender should be adhered to till the Board evolves some other formula. Indeed one of the learned Judges sitting in the Bench (Lahiri, J.) had even observed that the standard of five times should be brought down. 11. In this background, we note the changes brought about by the rule making authority in the aforesaid two rules. Rule 296 had earlier stated that every licencee shall meet the intoxi­cant demand of every customer and "shall not permit the stock of such intoxicant fall below a minimum fixed by the Collector. The Collector will fix the minimum with reference to the average daily consumption and the time required for replenishing stock from the nearest warehouse". Instead of the words "a minimum fixed by the Collector," the new rule says ''a minimum of 6 days' average consumption". Thus, the rule has now not left it to the Collector to fix the minimum, but has spelt out the minimum requirement itself. It is pertinent to note that this minimum takes care of the time needed for replenishing the stock from the nearest warehouse. It is, however, new Rule 346 which has led the learned Board to opine as above. It is pertinent to note that this minimum takes care of the time needed for replenishing the stock from the nearest warehouse. It is, however, new Rule 346 which has led the learned Board to opine as above. It would, there­fore, be apposite to read first the old rule 346 and then to quote the amended version. The old rule read as below :- ''346. Sale by one vendor to another vendor-A person who has been a licenced vendor may, on the expiration of his licence, and with the sanction of the Collector sell wholesale to another licenced vendor any intoxicant which he is authorised under the conditions of his licence to sell and of which he has been lawfully in possession : Provided that the intoxicant is fit for use and, in the case of country spirit, that it is within the limit of stren­gth fixed for retail sale. Provided further that, if the Collector considers that the intoxicant or any part thereof is unfit for use or has other wise deteriorated so as to be unsaleable he shall cause the same to be destroyed without any compensation being cla­imable by the former licenced vendor." Instead of this, we find new Rule 346 to read as below: ''346. Sale by one vendor to another vendor-A person who has been a licenced vendor may on expiration of his licence and with the sanction of the Collector, sell wholesale to succeeding vendor only intoxicant not exceeding 15 days' saleable stock over the prescribed minimum which he is authorised under the conditions of his licence to sell and of which he has been lawfully in possession. Provided that the Collector shall have the power to dispose of any stock of country spirit not taken over by the vendor. Provided further that, if the Collector consider that the intoxicant or any part thereof is unfit for use or has otherwise deteriorated so as to be unsaleable, he shall cause the same to be destroyed without any compensation being claimable by the former licenced vendor." Thus, a statutory limit has now been fixed beyond which a sitting lessee cannot sell his stock to the incoming licencee. This spart, Rule 346 is only an enabling provision; and leaves it to the discretion of the parties. This spart, Rule 346 is only an enabling provision; and leaves it to the discretion of the parties. What is more important to note is that the proviso which had been added, states that if any stock of country spirit is not taken over by the vendor, the Collector shall have the power to dispose of the same. Thus, there is nothing to" doubt that the rule making authority instead of making the provision of necessary finance more stringent, wanted to make it clear that a licencee shall have only to keep a minimum of 6 days' requirement and beyond that he cannot be compelled to purchase any stock of the existing liceccee. The learned Board has, however, calculated the necessary finance as if the tenderers must have had that much of amount which would be necessary to purchase a stock of 21 days' requirement. As the Superintendent of Excise had cerified that the daily consumption of the shop was around Rs. 4.000.00, the learned Board held that the minimum amount needed would be ''nowhere below Rs. 1 lakh", if apart from the requirement of 21 days' stock, security deposit of Rs. 6,000.00 and the cost of bottles etc. are taken note of. As against this, the submission of Shri Das is that even if the figute of Rs. 4,000-00 as given by the Superin­tendent of Excise is accepted, which according to him is not correct, as disputed by him before the learned Board, the neces­sary minimum fund should have been taken around Rs. 40.000/-which would include 6 days' minimum stock and the value of security deposit and bottles. Thus, there was no inadequancy of fund at all, according to the Counsel, because the learned Board has not doubted the source or availability of the finance assured by the petitioners which comes to much more than Rs. 40,000'00. 12. Apparently, the submission of Shri Das merits accep­tance because new Rule 346 has been totally misconceived by the learned Board. May we state that in the earlier judgment it has been pointed out that the amendment in Rule 346 has been made "keeping in view the scheme of the Act and the Rules so that listed persons under Rule 223(2) are not deprived of because of the insistence of purchasing the entire stock left by the out-going lessees". May we state that in the earlier judgment it has been pointed out that the amendment in Rule 346 has been made "keeping in view the scheme of the Act and the Rules so that listed persons under Rule 223(2) are not deprived of because of the insistence of purchasing the entire stock left by the out-going lessees". It would bear repetition to say that purchase of 15 days' stock, of which reference has been made in the amended Rule, is no compulsion on the incoming licences, but is his discretion, failing which the collector has been autho­rised to dispose of the stock. In the face of what has been stated in the aforesaid Special Bench decision, the approach and inter­pretation adopted by the learned Board cannot be upheld. 13. The result of the foregoing discussion is that the case of the petitioners was unjustifiably rejected by the learned Board. The important question now is as to what relief the petitioners can be provided in this proceeding. According to Shri Bhattacharjee what we could at best do is to send back the case on remand to the learned Board inasmuch as this Court sitting in this proceeding cannot give direction of a positive nature to settle the shop with the petitioners as that is a function of the settling authority which this Court is not. Reference has been made in this connection to Veerappa vs. Raman & Raman, AIR 1952 SC 192 ; Prem Sagar vs. S. V. Oil Co., AIR 1965 SC 111 and T. B. Singh vs. State, 1969 (3) SCC 489 . 14. We have applied our due mind to this important aspect of the case. The question which troubled us is whether the petitioners are to be left to run from pillar to post and post to pillar? or whether it is within the competence of this Court itself to get some relief if they deserve it? The desire to do complete justice to the parties led us to find out what are the constrictions on the part of this Court in this regard. Some recent decisions assured us that this Court has enough power to rise to the occasion "when the summons comes.... from a victim of injustice", as stated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes vs. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896 . Some recent decisions assured us that this Court has enough power to rise to the occasion "when the summons comes.... from a victim of injustice", as stated by Krishna Iyer, J. in Gujarat Steel Tubes vs. Its Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1980 SC 1896 . It has been observed in Para 146 that "this extra-ordinary reserve power is unsheathed to grant final relief without nece­ssary recourse to a remand. What the tribunal may, in its discretion, do the High Court too under Art. 226, can, if facts compel, do." In that case the High Court after setting aside the award of the arbitrator which had upheld the order of termination of service of the workman, had itself ordered for reinstatement of the workman instead of remanding the matter to the arbitrator. Objection was taken to this part of the order by contending that the High Court had no power to do this. The Supreme Court did not agree to it. 15. We may, with profit, refer to another decision of the Supreme Court in District Ragistrar vs. M. B. Koyya Kutty, AIR 1919 SC 1060. In that case, in its peculiar circumstances, the High Court had issued a positive direction requiring the Government to treat the respondent as eligible for promotion to Upper Division. A challenge was made to this direction. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the same, as the person concern had satisfied the curteria necessary for promotion. It has also been pointed out in Grindlays Bank Limited vs. I. T. O., AIR 1980 SC 656 that though ordinarily a High Court does not substitute its own order for the one quashed in a certiorari proceeding, nevertheless it has power to pass such further orders as the justice of the case demands. It was pointed out that while doing so "the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all sush orders as are necessary for doing complete justice be­tween the parties". It was pointed out that while doing so "the High Court draws on its inherent power to make all sush orders as are necessary for doing complete justice be­tween the parties". In his context, we may also refer to Basappa vs. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 and Dwarkanath vs. I. T. O., AIR 1966 SC 81 , wherein after referring to the wide language used in Article 226, which speaks of power to issue writs in the nature of certiorari etc, and also to issue directions and orders, it was observed that the High Court need not look back to the early history of these writs in English law, nor feel oppressed by the technicalities which surrounded these writs in England at one point of time. 16. Here is a case where even as per the finding of the learned Board the petitioners are entitled to .statutory preference under Rule 223(2) of the Rules, whereas the respondents 1 and 2 cannot claim this preference as one of them had exceeded the age of 35 years which would take their case out of this provision in view of the Note to the aforesaid Rule. (See para 5 of the juegment.) The petitioners have, however, been denied the settlement not because of any disqualification laid down in Rule 208(3). It can, therefore be held that they have passed the strict "personal test", which is one of the touch-stones on which suitability has to be determined. Their case has rather been rejected for the above-mentioned three reasons, none of which has stood the scrutiny of this Court even within the limited sphere available to it to examine the soundness of a finding of fact. In such a situation, we do not think if the case merits a second remand because in between the two con­testing pairs, the petitioners alone are entitled to statutory pre­ference. Had it been that respondents 1 and 2 were also within the category of preferential treatment, the matter would have been different as, in that case, the question of selection on the basis of comparative suitability would have arisen which this Court is not competent to decide. But the position is not that. Had it been that respondents 1 and 2 were also within the category of preferential treatment, the matter would have been different as, in that case, the question of selection on the basis of comparative suitability would have arisen which this Court is not competent to decide. But the position is not that. Therefore, we have not felt handi­capped for doing complete justice to 'give a direction to settle the shop with the petitioners, as this direction would be enfor­cement of a statutory obligation conferred on the settling autho­rity, and which direction, this Court is competent to give under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. While giving this direction we have not lost sight of the fact that in the petition as filed, it had not been prayed by the petitioners that a direction may be given to settle the shop with them, though such a submission was made by Shri Das. The absence of a specific prayer in this regard has not been deemed sufficient by us to deny this relief to do complete justice between the parties because of these pronouncements of this apex Court. It has been stated in Charanjit Lal vs. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41 that Article 32 has given very wide discretion in the matter of framing writs to suit the exigencies of particular cases and an application cannot be thrown out simply on the ground that the proper writ or direction has not been prayed for. We have no doubt that what has been stated about Article 32 in this regard applies proprio vigor to Article 226 as the language in so far as framing of writs is concerned is similar in the two Articles. In Satya Narayan vs. District Engineer AIR 1962 SC 1161 , appropriate relief was granted-because of the prayer for grant of "other relief" in the petition (see para 11). In the present case as well, the petitioner had prayed apart from quashing of the order "to pass further or other orders" as may be deemed fit and proper. In State of Harayana vs. Harayana Co­operative Transport Limited, AIR 1977 SC 237 , the mere circums­tance of the petitioner not asking for a writ of quo-warranto in so many words was not regarded as sufficient not to entertain that question, as facts necessary for challenging the appointment had been clearly stated in the petition. In State of Harayana vs. Harayana Co­operative Transport Limited, AIR 1977 SC 237 , the mere circums­tance of the petitioner not asking for a writ of quo-warranto in so many words was not regarded as sufficient not to entertain that question, as facts necessary for challenging the appointment had been clearly stated in the petition. It was stated that the petitioner had invited the Court to issue such other suitable writs, order or direction (apart from the writ of certiorari, which was thought inappropriate) as the Court deemed fit and proper. It was also observed that there was no magic in the use of a formula. B. R. Ramabhadriah vs. Secretary, AIR 1981 SC 1653 , saw the Supreme Court again stating that relief may be moulded to mete out justice and it should not be denied on purely tech­nical and narrow procedural grounds. 18. As, however, an allegation of benami has been made and as Rule 211 requires that benami transaction shall not be permitted, we make it clear that if on further enquiry being made it is found mat the petitioners are benamdars of anybody, it would be open to the settling authority to cancel the licence. Needless to say that the enquiry shall have to bi in accordance with the principles of natural justice. We also make another observation having been told that a petition by another pair of tenderers, namely Dayaram and Prabin Kumar, is pending before this Court and is the subject matter of Civil Rule 1163/82, that the order which had been passed by us would be subject to the decision in that Civil Rule in which the present petitioners have already been impleaded as respondents. 19. In the result, the petition is allowed, the impugaed judgment and order are set aside and respondent No. 5 is directed to settle the shop for the remaining period i. e. upto 31.3.84 with the petitioners subject to the observations made above. 20. Before parting we would like to say that the learned Board while stating in the penultimate para that though in its earlier examination it had found the appellants only unsuitable has observed that the further examination showed that "the appellant-partnership is one which cannot be touched with a pair of tongs for the settlement of any excise shops", this has been repeated in the order sheet. May we say that one does not expect such remarks in sober judicial pronouncements. This obser­vation and award of high cost really led Shri Das to contend that the learned Board had dismissed the appeal again out of vengeance, and the only fault of the petitioners, according to him, was that they had approached this Court earlier which led the learned Board to make even unpalatable remarks against the petitioners, and that too twice; and to add insult to injury it was thought that the present was the "rare occasion" to award cost, and to make it "exemplary" fixed the same at Rs.1000/-, as no case was felt to be "more appropriate than this" to do so.