Dr. T.N. Singh, J.:- The opposite party before us in this revision filed Title Suit No. 27 of 1969 in the court of Assistant District Judge No. 1, Gauhati, against his brother Mulakraj Anand ( since deceased ) for recovery, of arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 18,000/- and for his ejectment from the suit premises com­prising some houses and lands appurtenant thereto. The defen­dant Mulakraj filed written statement but on the date fixed for preemptory hearing both parties filed a joint petition stating that they had compromised their disputes. Accordingly, the suit was decreed on 10.1.70 in terms of the compromise petition. And, when the defendant filed to vacate the premises on 30.4.70 in terms of the compromise decree, the opposite party levied execution on 26.9.72. On the death of Mulakraj during the pendency of the proceeding, his heirs were substituted on 20.2.76 who are the petitioners before us in this revision. 2. On 19.7.76 the petitioners, as the heirs of the original judgment-debtor filed an objection under section 47 C. P.C. contending that the compromise decree was invalid and inexcutable. Among the several grounds taken in the objection it was inter alia contended that it was not possible to postulate from the compromise agreement that the learned court was satisfied about the statutory grounds on which the decreeholder could lawfully seek ejectment of the judgment-debtor under the exis­ting law (The Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act). It is this ground which was pressed vigorousy before the Executing Court which, however, rejected the contention and dismissed the objection by its order passed on 13.12.78 in Misc. Case No. 58/78. Against this order the judgment-debtor went in appeal to the District Judge, Kamrup Gauhati, who by his order passed on 16.12.78 in Misc. Appeal No.20/78 dismissed the same in limine holding the impugned order to be not appealable. 3. In this revision validity of both these orders are challenged. Firstly, it is contended before us by Mr. S. K. Sen and Mr. V. K. Dewan, the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Astt. District Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting the objection in that he ought to have held the decree to be inexecutable. In this revision validity of both these orders are challenged. Firstly, it is contended before us by Mr. S. K. Sen and Mr. V. K. Dewan, the learned counsel for the petitioners that the learned Astt. District Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in rejecting the objection in that he ought to have held the decree to be inexecutable. Next it is contended that in any event the learned District Judge failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by refusing to entertain the appeal and to decide the same on merits on an erroneous view of the law that the appeal was not maintainable. 4. We may take the first point first and analyse the case law cited at the Bar to identify the tests applicable to the executability of the decree in the instant case. Petitioner's counsel placed great reliance on certain observations made in Ferozi lal vs. Man Mai, AIR 1970 SC 794 : "-when the court had proceeded solely on the basis of the compromise arrived at between the parties without being satisfied about the statutory grounds under which such a decree for ejetment could be passed, the decree so passed would be inexecutable". But it was also observed therein that "the court was not called upon at any stage to apply its rained to the question." The law on the point was expanded, explained and stated more elaborately in successive decisions of their Lordships to which a reference is therefore necessary. In K. K. Chart vs. R. M. Seshadri ( AIR 1973 SC 1311 ) it was observed as follows: "The true position appears to be that an order of eviction based on consent of the parties is not necessarily void if the jurisdictional fact viz. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order. Satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. the existence of one or more of the conditions mentioned in section 10 were shown to have existed when the court made the order. Satisfaction of the court, which is no doubt a pre-requisite for the order of eviction, need not be by the manifestation borne out by a judicial finding. If at some stage the court was called upon to apply its mind to the question and there was sufficient material before it, before the parties being invited it to pass an order in terms of their agreement; it is possible to postulate that the court was satisfied about the grounds on which the order of eviction was based. [Emphasis added] It was further observed that the specific claim of the land­lord as well as the fact of the tenant withdrawing his defence amounted to the tenant admitting that the landlord has made out his case about bonafide requirement of the premises for his own occupation. What was required was, when deciding the point on the facts of each case, to find out whether there was any material to justify an inference that an admission, express of implied, has been made by the tenant about the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds. This was laid down in that case as a solid test. 5. The decision in Nagindas vs. Dalpatram ( AIR 1974 SC 471 ) reiterates the position that a consent decree for possession passed by the court is not necessarily a nullity if there existed any admission in the compromise of fundamental facts that constitute any statutory ground for eviction. In this case the legal principle was restated in emphatic terms: "All that it (the Executing Court) has to see is whe­ther there was some materials on the basis of which the Rent Court could have as distinguished from must have been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction." [Emphasis is their Lordships] 6. In this case the legal principle was restated in emphatic terms: "All that it (the Executing Court) has to see is whe­ther there was some materials on the basis of which the Rent Court could have as distinguished from must have been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction." [Emphasis is their Lordships] 6. What material, besides express or implied admission in the compromise petition, may validly form the basis of satisfa­ction of the court came to be considered in Roshan Lal vs. Madan Lal ( AIR 1975 SC 2130 ) in the following terms: "The terms (of the compromise) must indicate either on its face or in the background of other material in the case that the tenant expressly or impliedly is agreeing to surfer a decree for eviction because the landlord, in the circumstances, is entitled to have a decree under the law." Their Lordships in that case referred to the plaint and found that the statutory ground of bonafide requirement was made out which albeit was found by reference to the written statement to have been denied. Although there was an admission in the compromise petition that the shop premises was required by the plaintiffs for their own business it was challenged as unclear, insufficient and equivocal but the court held that "in the back­ground of the pleadings of the parties" a case for eviction was made out and that the compromise decree was valid and executable. The concept of "background material" was further examined in Naibahu vs. Lala Ram Narayan ( AIR 1978 SC 22 ) and it was held that "the court is to be satisfied about the compliance with the statutory requirement on the totality of facts of a particular case bearing in mind the entire circumstances from the stage of pleadings up to the stage when the compro­mise is effected." 7. What appears to us to emerge clear from these prin­ciples is that the scope of the inquiry by the Executing Court has to be limited. It cannot probe into the decision making process of the court passing the decree as it cannot go behind the decree. It can only see whether the court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to do so and there was no violation of any positive legal mandate in this respect. It cannot probe into the decision making process of the court passing the decree as it cannot go behind the decree. It can only see whether the court which passed the decree had jurisdiction to do so and there was no violation of any positive legal mandate in this respect. For that the Exec­uting Court must consider, when the validity of such a consent decree is challenged, the entire facts and circumstances of the case to arrive at the conclusion as to whether the challenge could be sustained on the material on record before it. Nece­ssarily, therefore, the inquiry by the Executing Court has to be directed not to the fact of satisfaction of the Court passing the decree of existence of statutory ground for eviction but to the fact of the existence itself of such ground. 8. We may now refer to the background materials which were available to the court passing the decree in the instant case and also to the executing court to ascertain if the materials disclosed any statutory ground for eviction to enable it to sustain the validity and executability of the decree. It was averred in the plaint that the house and the land described in the Schedule belonged to the plaintiff which he allowed the defen­dant to occupy lat a monthly rent of Rs. 500/- As the defen­dant failed to pay the rent he became a defaulter and the suit was therefore, instituted for his ejectment and also for reali­sation of the arrear rent for the 3 years preceding the suit. In the written statement the defendant-Mulakraj denied the title of the plaintiff and asserted that the suit premises was the joint property of the brothers. Thus, the defendant disputed the relationship of landlord and tenant and also, for that matter plaintiff's claim of arrears of rent. It appears from the compro­mise petition that plaintiff's claim on both these counts was admitted by the defendant as indicated categorically by sub-clau­ses (A), (B) and (C) of clause 1. Thourgh sub-clause (D) envi­saged payment by the plaintiff of a sum of Rs. 11,000 to the defendant it was to be paid on vacant possession of the suit premises being given on 30.4.70. In sub-clause (F) the position was further clarified. Thourgh sub-clause (D) envi­saged payment by the plaintiff of a sum of Rs. 11,000 to the defendant it was to be paid on vacant possession of the suit premises being given on 30.4.70. In sub-clause (F) the position was further clarified. Clause 1 and the important sub-clauses (A), (B) an (F) bear extraction: “1.That the parties to the suit, have compromised their disputes on the terms and conditions stated hereunder: (A) That the plaintiff in the suit has waived his claims over the rent which he claimed in the aforesaid case. The defendant No. 1 (Maindefendant) is allowed to remain in the suit land up to 30.4.1970. The plaintiff shall claim no rent, up to the 30th day of April, 1970. (B) That the main defendant shall give vacant posse­ssion of the suit land to the plaintiff on the 30th April, 1970. (F) That the parties, in the suit shall have no further claim whatsoever against each other so far the suit land is concerned. That in case the main defendant fails to give vacant possession of the land as stated above, the defen­dant No. 1 shall not be entitled to get the amount of Rs. 11,000/- and the said amount shall be taken back by the plaintiff. The plaintiff in such event shall also be entitled to recover the khas and vacant possession by execu­tion of the decree." [Emphasis added] 9. In the objection under section 47, which is the founda­tion of the judgment-debtor's challenge, it is reiterated that the claim in the suit were compromised and the judgment debtor agreed to give vacant possession of the suit premises, to the decree-holder. The allegation, per se, that the decree-holder did not pay the stipulated amount to the defendant does not derogate from this position. Because, it is also averred in the same objection that the judgment-debtor was allowed "to stay in the suit premises on fresh terms of monthly rent". Indeed, this also amounted an implied reiteration of the plaintiff's claim manifested by the compromise petition. It is apparent, there­fore, that the background material in this case sufficiently dis­closes existence of one of the grounds mentioned in section5(1)(e) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act which permits decree being passed for eviction from any house in respect of which the rent lawfully due is not paid. 10. It is apparent, there­fore, that the background material in this case sufficiently dis­closes existence of one of the grounds mentioned in section5(1)(e) of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act which permits decree being passed for eviction from any house in respect of which the rent lawfully due is not paid. 10. We do not think that any importance can be attached to the condition about payment of Rs. 11,000/- by the decree-holder in this context because it was not made a condition precedent for the defendant's vacating the premises. Because, it has to be noted that not only the claim for arrear rent was given up but also for further rent, until 30.4.70. Conclu­sion is inescapable, therefore, that the defendant accepted the position that rent was payable for the premises and that he was in arrear. 11. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to accept the conten­tion of Mr. V. K. Dewan that clause 1(A) has to be ignored for the purpose of arriving at this finding as, according to him it merely states plaintiff's waiver of his right to the rent claimed in the suit. That may be so but the court has to see the legal effect of this fact in the totality of the circumstances of the case. 12. According to us, the position that defendant (judgment-debtor) was a defaulter in the totality of the facts and circums­tances of the case has been well established in this case. Thus from the terms and the tenor of the compromise petition read as a whole against the background of the pleadings and also the objection of the judgment-debtor adverted to earlier, there cannot be any doubt that the finding of the Executing Court is unassailable. The court has categorically held that the defendant having withdrawn his defence by the compromise and having agreed to vacate the suit premises as asked for by the plaintiff it amounted to conceding the claim of the plaintiff and the compromise was, therefore, not in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act. We do not find any reason to disturb this finding in this revision and we accordingly hold that the decree is executable and that it is not void. Indeed, the learned Assistant District Judge has arrived at the finding after considering the materials on record including the terms of the compromise petition. 13. We do not find any reason to disturb this finding in this revision and we accordingly hold that the decree is executable and that it is not void. Indeed, the learned Assistant District Judge has arrived at the finding after considering the materials on record including the terms of the compromise petition. 13. As to the submission of Mr. S. K. Sen that it does not appear from the order itself by which the consent decree was passed that the learned court had considered the existence of statutory pounds for passing the order, it may simply be stated that such a requirement is not warranted in view of the law laid down by the apex court in the decisions discussed above-What is required is existence of the ground which need not necessarily be spelt out in express terms in the order itself and as already observed by us earlier this objection is not for the Exe­cuting Court to adjudicate. Mr. Sen, however, relied on a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 86 C.W.N. 739 (Sushil Sur vs. Sadhana Bakshi). This case is patently distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the court found on a consideration of the terms of compromise that the statutory ground of default was not established because of the use in the compromise petition of the words "if any" in relation to payment of arrear rent. It is true that there are some observations in that case to the effect that mere recording in the order by the court that it had heard the advocates before recording the compromise by itself was not sufficient to justify the inference that the court had applied its mind as to the existence of statutory requirement. With due respect we find ourselves unable to agree with this observation in view of what has been held in express terms by the apex court in K. K. Chart and Nagindas (supra), as discussed above. 14. Mr. Sen has relied on another decision reported in AIR 1982 Bom. 532 (K. M. Shah vs. S. M. Kankaria) but we find that although these points were raised in that case the decision therein rested on another point. In that case the decree, the executability of which was challenged, was obtained in a second suit after the judgment-debtor failed to vacate the premises in terms of the compromise. 532 (K. M. Shah vs. S. M. Kankaria) but we find that although these points were raised in that case the decision therein rested on another point. In that case the decree, the executability of which was challenged, was obtained in a second suit after the judgment-debtor failed to vacate the premises in terms of the compromise. The court was not concerned with the executability of the compromise decree but of the later decree. It was held that the decree obtained in the second suit was inexecutable because the judgment-debtor had become the statutory tenant in terms of the compromise and the conditions requisite for passing the decree for his eviction were absent. 15. We may now deal with the second contention raised on behalf of the judgement-debtors, the petitioners before us. It is urged that the learned District Judge ought to have enter­tained the appeal and decided the same on merit. It is con­tended that the C. P. C. Amendment Act, 1976 which came into force on 1.2.77 did not take away the right to appeal against an order passed in the execution proceeding which vested in the petitioner on the date on which the suit was instituted, namely, on 19.12.69, inasmuch as an appeal is a mere continuance of the suit. 16. in our view this contention does not merit serious con­sideration as a strong judicial consensus has already built up on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Amen­ding Act by which the same plea taken before several High Courts has been negatived on weighty reasons to which we shall soon advert. In one or two decisions a discordant note has however been struck which also we propose to deal with, but first we may refer to the relevant changes in law brought about in this regard by the Amending Act. (1) In section 2 (2), namely, in the definition of the word "decree", the words and figures "section 47 or" are deleted by section 3 of the Act. (2) Sub-section 2 of section 47 which enabled the court to treat the proceeding there under as a suit or a suit as a procee­ding under that section, is deleted. (3) A new section 99A has been inserted which is in the following terms: "99A. (2) Sub-section 2 of section 47 which enabled the court to treat the proceeding there under as a suit or a suit as a procee­ding under that section, is deleted. (3) A new section 99A has been inserted which is in the following terms: "99A. Without prejudice to the generality of the pro­visions of section 99, no order under section 47 shall be reversed or substantially varied, on account of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceeding relating to such order, unless such error, defect or irregularity has preju­dicially 'affected the decision of the case". (4) The relevant provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 97 of the Act as to repeal and savings may also be quoted: "(2) (a) the amendment made to clause (2) of section 2 of the principal Act by section 3 of this Act shall not affect any appeal against the determination of any such question as is referred to in section 47 and every such appeal shall be dealt with as if the said section 3 had not come into force". "(3) Save as otherwise provided in sub-section (2), the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply to every suit, proceeding, appeal or application, pending at the commencement of this Act or instituted or filed after such commencement, notwithstanding the fact that the right, or cause of action, in pursuance of which such suit, proceeding, appeal or application is instituted or filed, had been acquired or had accrued before such commencement". 17. In our opinion section 97 (3) provides a complete answer to the contention raised as it lays down in clear and specific terms that any right or cause of action accrued before the commencement of the Act shall not be saved whether in respect of any suit or proceeding of appeal or application except to the extent indicated in sub-section 2 (a) which in clear terms saves only the right to prosecute or file any appeal against the determination of any question as is referred to in section 47 which had accrued on the date of commencement of the Act. This follows from the language of sub-section (2) (a). The word "appeal" is not qualified by the term "pending" as is the case with some other clauses of the sub-section. This follows from the language of sub-section (2) (a). The word "appeal" is not qualified by the term "pending" as is the case with some other clauses of the sub-section. This indicates that the saving contemplated by this clause is not limited merely to pen­ding appeals. What is saved is really indicated by two key expressions, namely, "determination of any such question as is referred to in section 47" and "as if the said section 3 had not come into force". The ambit and purport of clause (a) of sub­section (2) therefore covers the rights accrued under unamended section 2 (2) of the principal Act. Thus, if an objection under section 47 was disposed of and "determination of any question" there under had taken place, the order had become appealable and the remedy available at the commencement of the amending, Act became "such appeal" which was saved by the deeming provision "as if the said section 3 had not come into force". Indeed, the right accrued under the unamended section 2 (2) to file appeal is also saved by virtue of section 6 (c) of the General Clauses Act to which a reference is made in the sub-section (2) itself but the legislative intendment being clear aid thereof need not be invoked in the case of clause (a) of the sub-section. In this case the petitioner filed the appeal after 1.2.77. It was not pending on that date as to be available for prosecution. Further, in this case the right to file appeal could accrue only on 13.12.78 which was preempted by the amendment of section 2(2) on 1.2.77. 18. However, reliance has been placed on the decisions reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 (Garikapati vs. Subbiah Choudhury) and AIR 1975 SC 1843 (Jose Da Costa vs. Bascora) in support of the contention that the right to appeal is a substantive right and that there is a presumption in law that such right being a vested right retrospective operation of any enactment is not to be inferred so as to interfere with such right. What is note­worthy, however, is that the golden rule of construction envis­aged in Garikapati itself postulates that although the right to appeal accrues to the litigant with the commencement of the .Us and subsists during the life of the Us, the right can be taken away by a subsequent enactment if it so provides either expressly or by necessary intendment. This position was reiterated in Jose Da Costa. Therefore, in each case a reference to the provision of the amending Act is not only imperative and in­evitable but truly provides the golden key to the application of the golden rule. Indeed, in Garikapati a reference to "surrounding circumstances" also, attending the legislative interference, was held to be legitimate. 19. We have already observed that section 97(3) of the amending Act expressly extinguishes vested rights but the effect of the other provisions of the Act may also be noted. The plain intendement of the amendment of section 2(2) is to make section 96 inapplicable by operation of which appeals lay against orders passed under section 47. The deletion of sub-section (2) of section 47 is also significant in that it had provided for other avenues of appeal albeit in a different manner. The legislative effort apparently was directed at barring all avenues of appeal from decisions in execution proceedings otherwise it could have, after erasing the deeming provisions of section 2(2), expressly provided for appeals in such cases by amending section 104 and Order 43, Rule 1 and positing therein the right expre­ssly by indicating the extent and content of the right. It is clear that the legislature really intended to ensure that the decree-holder should be able to enjoy the fruit of the decree obtained after protracted and expensive litigation which proli­ferations in the execution proceedings threatened to deny him. It was for this reason that section 99A was also inserted to discourage interference in pending appeals which were saved and also in revision. In the report of the Joint Committee of the Parliament can be traced the soul of this legislative intent which is distilled above. 20. It was for this reason that section 99A was also inserted to discourage interference in pending appeals which were saved and also in revision. In the report of the Joint Committee of the Parliament can be traced the soul of this legislative intent which is distilled above. 20. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Pratap Narain vs. Ram Narain ( AIR 1980 All 42 ) has gleaned hand­somely the purport of the amendment from the Joint Commi­ttee's and also from the law Commission's report which was aptly considered to give insight into the "surrounding circumstances" which was aptly considered to gain insight into the "surrounding circumstances" of the amendment. It was further held in that case that an execution application is not a continuance of the suit and that section 97 (2) (a) merely saved the pending appeals and the right to file appeals in cases where orders were passed (on objection filed under section 47) before 1.2.77. As to the second part it was held that such an order became a decree by virtue of old section 2(2) and therefore the amend­ment of the section could not change its character. This we find to be in accord with the view we have already expressed above on the interpretation of section 97(3) of the amending Act. We may incidently mention in this connection that a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court (also cited before the Full Bench) has taken a similar, but a little constricted, view, by holding that merely pending appeals are saved by virtue of sec­tion 97(2) (a) (see AIR 1978 Raj. 127 Mohan Das vs. Kamala Devi). This view has been adopted in AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 262 (Ram Nivas vs. Mithanlal). The Allahabad Full Bench view has however been quoted with approval by Kerala, Gujrat and Orissa High Courts (See AIR 1981 Kerala 18, AIR 1982 Guj. 324 , AIR 1982 Orissa 9). There is 'also an earlier decision of this Court on this point reported in AIR 1980 Gau. 3 (Tapan Chandra vs. Dulal Chandra) and it must also be noted in this connection that this had a precursor in Kerala Full Bench decision ( AIR 1978 Ker. 201 , Aid. Khan vs. State Bank). Similar views were expressed in these cases also. 3 (Tapan Chandra vs. Dulal Chandra) and it must also be noted in this connection that this had a precursor in Kerala Full Bench decision ( AIR 1978 Ker. 201 , Aid. Khan vs. State Bank). Similar views were expressed in these cases also. Our learned brother Lahiri, J. vocally expressed the legislative intent and rightly' observed that the prima object of the amending Act was to shorten unnecessary and prolonged execution proceedings to enable the decree holders to enjoy the fruitage of their litiga­tion as expeditiousty as possible. 20. The two decisions in which a different view is expressed may now be looked into. In AIR 1979 Pat. 308 (Parshova Properties vs. A. K. Bose) the effect of the amendment though not negated was nevertheless restricted by excluding from its operation a particular class of cases. The decision does not deal with either the aspect of vested rights or with the scope and extent of section 97 of the amen ling Act and for that matter it quoted but bye passed the Rajasthan and Kerala decisions (AIR 1978 Raj. 127 and AIR 1978 Ker. 201 ). We do not feel inclined to express any opinion on the aspect of the matter dealt with in this case which does not have much relevance for the point at issue. However, the decision in Chuluram vs. Bhagatram (AIR 1980 M. P. 16) has a more direct bearing on the issue before us. It was observed in that case that although the object of the amend­ment was to reduce the number of appeals it was not intended to take away vested right of appeal in a pending execution proceeding. With due respect, for the reasons already discussed above we are unable to agree with this view. It is to be noted however, that in this case no notice is taken of the effect of the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 97 of the amending Act. Indeed, no reference at all is made to it and it appears that for these reasons perhaps the court did not hold that the vested right was expressly taken away thereby. 21. Mr. Indeed, no reference at all is made to it and it appears that for these reasons perhaps the court did not hold that the vested right was expressly taken away thereby. 21. Mr. Das appearing for the opposite party draws our attention to section 99A C. P. C. and submits that an interference with the order of the Executing Court is not called for no error, defect or irregularity in the proceeding affecting the merit of the decision could be pointed out by the petitioner. Be that as it may, in our opinion, an interference with the order in revision is also not called for in the instant case in view of the proviso to section 115 C.P C as there will be no failure of justice if the impugned orders are allowed to stand. 22. In the result, we hold both the impugned orders to be legal and valid and not suffering from jurisdictional incompetence. The application is thus dismissed and the rule is discharged. The stay order is vacated. In the circumstances of the case, however, we leave the parties to bear their own costs in this court. 23. A word about delay in delivery of this judgment may not be out of place. This has happened due to the fact that one of us (Dr. Singh, J.) had to be away for about two weeks until 26th April and thereafter also for a few days.