JUDGMENT A.N. Varma, J. - this petition is directed against an order passed by the learned XIth Additional District Judge, Kanpur allowing the appeal as well as the application filed by the respondent-landlords under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 2. The application was filed by the said respondent on the assertions that he bonafide required the disputed accommodation for meeting the additional needs of the members of his family who were residing in a portion of the same building. The family of the landlords consisted of himself, his wife, 22 year old widowed daughter and her son, three sons aged 42, 23 and 19 years and one unmarried grand daughter. The accommodation as present available with the landlord was grossly inadequate for the needs of the members of his family. the members of the family had grown in year and the adult members needed some privacy that was not possible under the existing circumstances. The tenant on the other hand would not suffer if the application is allowed. The portion which was in occupation of the tenant was best suited to the needs of the landlords.two elder sons of the landlords were shortly going to get married requiring separate accommodation by their respective families. 3. The application was contested by the petitioner. We asserted that he has only one room, a verandah, a courtyard and a bath room at his disposal in the disputed accommodation. He has no other place where he might shift. The need of the landlord was not genuine at all. He has much larger accommodation than he needs. The family of landlord does not observe purdah. A portion of the house which fell vacant in the year 1974-75 but instead of occupying it himself, the landlord rented it out to one Mohd. Ahmed on a rental of Rs. 45 per month. 4. The Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was not genuine and on the point of comparison of respective hardship likely to be caused to the two parties, the tenant had a better claim. The landlord was likely to suffer lesser hardship than the tenant. Aggrieved, by the aforesaid order, the landlord filed an application stating that the tenant had acquired in the year 1979 a plot in the name of his son and that a house had also been constructed thereon. The landlord was likely to suffer lesser hardship than the tenant. Aggrieved, by the aforesaid order, the landlord filed an application stating that the tenant had acquired in the year 1979 a plot in the name of his son and that a house had also been constructed thereon. In the view, the tenant already had come to acquire an alternative accommodation and in any case in view of the Explanation (i) to Section 21(1), the tenant had lost the right to contest the application of the landlord. 5. The appellate Court disagreed with the Prescribed Authority and held that having regard to the number of members in the family of the landlord and the extent of the accommodation available with it, it was obvious that the need of the landlord for additional accommodation was bonafide and pressing. the appellate Court further held that in view of the fact that the son of the tenant had come to acquire a house in the same city in vacant state the explanation (i) to Section 21(1) was clearly attracted. Consequently, the tenant did not have the right to oppose the application of the landlord. Even independently of the explanation on a comparison of respective hardship, it was clear that the landlord was bound to suffer greater hardship than the tenant. With these findings, the appeal of the landlord was allowed and so also his application under Section 21(1)(a). Aggrieved by this order, the tenant has come to this Court. 6. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the appellate Court has ignored the mandatory provisions of Rule 16(1)(c) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. It was urged that before the appellate Court could treat the accommodation acquired by the son of petitioner as an alternative accommodation, it was incumbent upon it to consider whether having regard to the number of members in the family of the tenant the one room accommodation acquired by the petitioner's son was sufficient. The appellate Court did not consider this aspect at all and thereby disregarded an important statutory provision. 7. I find no merit in the above contention. The appellate Court did not consider this aspect at all and thereby disregarded an important statutory provision. 7. I find no merit in the above contention. In the first place in view of the finding that the tenant's son who was indisputedly a member of the family of the tenant has come to acquire in vacant state a residential accommodation in the same city, the explanation (1) to Section 21(1) became clearly attracted. As a result, the tenant cannot be heard in opposition of the application of the landlord under Section 21(1). Rule 16(1)(c) would have been attracted only if there had been an occasion for comparing the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties, but in the present case and because of the applicability of the said explanation, Rule 16(1)(c) had no application. 8. In the second place even if Rule 16(1)(c) is held to apply to the fact of the present case, I am not satisfied that the Court below had ignored that rule. The appellate Court was fully aware of the number of members of the family of the tenant. It is undisputed that the present accommodation available with the petitioner in the building in question consists of only one room. It is also admitted that the son of the petitioner who has built the aforesaid house was residing with the petitioner as a member of his family before he built the aforesaid house in the same one room accommodation in the building under tenancy. From the mere fact that the appellate Court has not specifically referred to Rule 16(1)(c) this Court cannot conclude that the appellate Court was not aware of that provision. The approach of the appellate Court clearly confirms that it was aware of Rule 16(1)(c). What the appellate Court has concluded is that on a totality circumstances, in comparison to the hardship likely to be caused to the two parties, the tenant would suffer less than the landlord. In this view, I find no merit in this contention. 9. The second submission was that the appellate Court has not considered the bonafide requirements of the landlord in an objective way. He has given a finding in favour of the landlord without objectively examining whether the need of the landlord would not be satisfied by existing accommodation available with him. I am unable to accept the above contention. 9. The second submission was that the appellate Court has not considered the bonafide requirements of the landlord in an objective way. He has given a finding in favour of the landlord without objectively examining whether the need of the landlord would not be satisfied by existing accommodation available with him. I am unable to accept the above contention. It is incorrect that the appellate Court has disposed of the issue on his subjective satisfaction. The appellate Court has discussed the requirements of the family of the landlord. It has said that having regard to the fact that the children of the landlord have grown up and two of his elder sons are going to get married shortly, it is necessary that separate accommodation must be provided to the adult sons of the landlord who are going to get married. It has also considered the fact that the children of the landlord have grown up and two of his elder sons are going to get married shortly, it is necessary that separate accommodation must be provided to the adult sons who are going to get married. It has also considered the fact that the landlord has also to maintain his widowed daughter with a son. There is besides unmarried daughter and other grown up children. From a reading of the judgment of the appellate Court the conclusion is inescapable that the finding that the landlord bonafide required the disputed accommodation has not been arrived at on a more subjective satisfaction but on a careful consideration in an objective way of the evidence on the record. 10. The third submission was that in the counter-affidavit, it has been stated that the portion which was said to have been let out to Mohd. Ahmad in the year 1974-75 by the landlord fell vacant during the course of proceedings and that the same is now under the occupation of the daughter of the landlord's son and her husband. This fact, it was urged, could be taken into account by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. In my opinion, aforesaid circumstance cannot justify the issuance of a writ of certioraris. The appellate Court had recorded a clear finding that the said accommodation is entirely unsuited to the needs of the landlord's family.the learned counsel then contended that the same might be offered to the tenant. 11. In my opinion, aforesaid circumstance cannot justify the issuance of a writ of certioraris. The appellate Court had recorded a clear finding that the said accommodation is entirely unsuited to the needs of the landlord's family.the learned counsel then contended that the same might be offered to the tenant. This again cannot be considered here. The landlord has not stated that the said accommodation is vacant. The fact that in paragraph 17 of the counter-affidavit the landlord has stated that the same is only under a temporary occupation of the grand daughter and her husband of the landlord does not and cannot lead to the inference that the said accommodation is vacant and is available for being given to the tenant. The said accommodation is still occupied. 12. Lastly, the learned counsel also submitted that the appellate Court was wrong in thinking that if the needs of the landlord and the tenant are equally balanced the application of the landlord must necessarily be allowed. It is not necessary to dilate on this point as the appellate Court has independently of this opinion decided in favour of the landlord and has held that on a comparison of respective hardship, the landlord is likely to suffer more than the tenant. 13. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs. The enforcement of the order of eviction is, however, stayed for a period of three months from today provided that the petitioner shall handover vacant possession to the landlord within this period peacefully and shall not directly or indirectly induct any other person into the accommodation in dispute.