ORDER S.D. Agarwala, J. - This is an application made by Dr. R. C. Gupta Head of the Orthopaedic department of Medical College, Allahabad for being impleaded as one of the respondents in the writ petition. 2. The writ petition has been filed by Dr. Ved Prakash and only Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad has been impleaded as respondent No. 1, and Dr. Sachin Swarup as respondent No.2. The prayer made in the writ petition is for issue of a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the college to admit the petitioner in M. S. (Orthopaedic) Course in Motilal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad, commencing from January, 1982 and further for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the admission of Dr. Sechin Swarup in M. S. (Orthopaedic) course of the College. A division Bench of this court by an order dated 27th January, 1982 admitted the writ petition and directed the respondent No. 1 to admit the petitioner in M. S. (Orthopaedic) course of the College. 3. Thereafter Contempt Petition No. 373 of 1982 was filed by the petitioner Dr. Ved Prakash in this court against Dr. R. C. Gupta, Head of Orthopaedic Department Motilal Nehru Medical College Allahabad and the Principal, Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahahad. On this contempt petition Hon'ble Gopinath J. by an order dated 6-12-1982 passed the following order: "Issue notice". 4. In this petition allegations have been made against Dr. R. C. Gupta that he has not complied with the orders passed by this Court in the writ petition and as such he has committed contempt of this Court. 5. Dr. R. C. Gupta has filed a counter affidavit in the contempt petition and has denied the allegations made in the petition and his case is that he had already complied with the order of this Court. 6. Besides filing a reply in the contempt petition Dr. R. C. Gupta also moved an application in the present petition for vacating the ex parte stay order dated 27th January, 1982 as well as for impleading him as one of the respondents in the writ petition. 7. Both the applications for impleadment and for vacating the stay order came up for hearing before me. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised an objection that unless the application for impleadment made by Dr. 7. Both the applications for impleadment and for vacating the stay order came up for hearing before me. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has raised an objection that unless the application for impleadment made by Dr. R. C. Gupta is allowed by this Court, he cannot be heard on the stay application for vacating the stay order dated 27th January 1982 passed by this Court. 8. In the circumstances before the question of vacating the stay order can be considered by this Court, it is necessary to consider the application of Dr. R. C. Gupta for being impleaded as a party to this petition. 9. I have heard Sri Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner and Sri R. P. Goyal, learned counsel appearing for Dr. R. C. Gupta. 10. Shri R. P. Goyal, learned counsel for the applicant has contended that the applicant is a necessary party to the petition and in any case a proper party. His case is that the order rejecting the application for admission of the petitioner was passed by the Research Degree Committee consisting of Vice Chancellor, Dean of Faculty of Medicine of Allahabad University and the Head of the Department of Orthopaedics of the college. Only Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad had been made a party to the petition and in fact, according to him, the Research Degree committee should have been made party to the petition, as it was Research Degree Committee who had rejected the application for admission of the petitioner. It was further urged that since the contempt petition has been moved against the applicant Dr. R. C. Gupta who is member of the Research Degree Committee, it is necessary in the interest of Justice that he may be impleaded as a party to the petition and be heard in opposition. 11. Shri Shansi Swarup Bhatnagar, however, at the outset has raised a preliminary objection that since Dr. R. C. Gupta is in contempt of this court, he cannot be heard unless he has purged the said contempt. It is consequently necessary to first consider the preliminary objection raised by Sri Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar. 12. As I have already stated above, this court on 6th December, 1982 had passed an order `issue notice' on the contempt petition. R. C. Gupta is in contempt of this court, he cannot be heard unless he has purged the said contempt. It is consequently necessary to first consider the preliminary objection raised by Sri Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar. 12. As I have already stated above, this court on 6th December, 1982 had passed an order `issue notice' on the contempt petition. The question which therefore arises for consideration is as to whether merely by issue of notice in the contempt petition against the applicant this court will not hear the applicant in a proceeding which gave rise to the contempt petition unless the contempt petition is disposed of by this Court. The general rule that a party in contempt cannot be heard in the same cause until he has purged his contempt has been well stated in paragraph 106 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. 9 as follows : "106. Position of party in contempt. The general rule is that a party in contempt, that is a party against whom an order for committal has been made, cannot be heard or take proceedings in the same cause until he has purged his contempt; nor while he is in contempt can be heard to appeal from any order made in the cause; but this is subject to exceptions. Thus a party in contempt may apply to purge the contempt, he may appeal with a view to setting aside the order in which his contempt is founded, and in some cases he may be entitled to defend himself when some application is subsequently made against him. A plaintiff in contempt has been allowed to prosecute his action when the defendant had not applied to stay the proceedings. Even in cases where the rule is prima facie applicable, the court appears to retain a discretion whether or not to hear the party in contempt, and may in its discretion refuse to hear a party only on those occasions when his contempt impedes the course of justice and there is no other effective way of enforcing his obedience." 13. It will be observed from this general rule that 'party in contempt' is that party against whom an order for committal has been made. The meaning to be assigned to the word `committal' is not what is understood under the Criminal Procedure Code as applicable to this Country. It will be observed from this general rule that 'party in contempt' is that party against whom an order for committal has been made. The meaning to be assigned to the word `committal' is not what is understood under the Criminal Procedure Code as applicable to this Country. The word `committal' has been further explained in paragraph 101 of the same Volume of Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, as follows : "101. Committal. The power to order committal for civil contempt is a power to be exercised with very great care. The court will not order committal where the contempt is of a minor or technical nature. The order for committal for a civil contempt may be for a fixed period or for an unspecified term. The length of term, if fixed, should be commensurate with the seriousness of the contempt and should not be too long. Where the order of committal is suspended and the contemner is subsequently in breach of the terms of the suspension, the court has a discretion whether to order the imprisonment of the contemner." 14. The word 'committal' under English law is used where a person has been held to be guilty of contempt and a sentence has been passed against the said person. It consequently follows that once a court holds a person to be guilty of contempt then alone a party is said to be in contempt. This is further clear from the passage `committal - how executed' from Annual Practice, 1952 Edition, applicable to the English Courts, which is as follows : "Committal - how executed - If the person committed is actually present in Court he may be there and then arrested by the tipstaff on a memorandum of the Registrar sitting in Court; or, in the absence of the tipstaff, the Court may appoint one of the ushers to act. The prisoner is taken to the prison appointed for the purpose. The order is subsequently drawn up and a copy sent to the keeper of the prison. If the person committed is not in Court, the order for committal must be drawn up and completed. The prisoner is taken to the prison appointed for the purpose. The order is subsequently drawn up and a copy sent to the keeper of the prison. If the person committed is not in Court, the order for committal must be drawn up and completed. It is then handed to the solicitor for the party applying, and may be executed by being handed to the tipstaff, who, having obtained a warrant signed by the Lord Chancellor, is empowered to find the prisoner and bring him to the prison named in the order, or prescribed by statutory authority. Where the person committed cannot be arrested by the tipstaff, a Judge of the High Court may, under his sign-manual, and upon the application of the party prosecuting the order, issue a bench warrant directed to the tipstaff, "and all constables and other peace officers whom it may concern." The application is made on affidavit by the tipstaff. From, App. H., No. 12 A, p. 2651." 15. The abovementioned general rule was examined by Lord Denning in Hadkinson v. Hadkinson. (1952) 2 All ER 567. He has examined the historical aspect of the rule and further explained as to what is the exact content of the rule. He opined as follows : "I am of opinion that the fact that a party to a cause has disobeyed an order of the court is not of itself a bar to his being heard, but if 'his disobedience is such that, so long as it continues, it impedes the course of justice in the cause, by making it more difficult for the court to ascertain the truth or to enforce the orders which it may make, then the court may in its discretion refuse to hear him until the impediment is removed for good reason is shown why it should not be removed." 16. From this observation of Lord Denning it is also obvious that a party who is debarred from being heard, must have disobeyed the order of the court. There must be some finding by a court that the person has disobeyed the order of the court. In the absence of such a finding it cannot be held that the party is in contempt though the petition for contempt may have been filed in court and is pending. 17. There must be some finding by a court that the person has disobeyed the order of the court. In the absence of such a finding it cannot be held that the party is in contempt though the petition for contempt may have been filed in court and is pending. 17. This question also came up for consideration before the Full Bench of Himachal Pradesh in Om Prakash v. The Board of School Education, AIR 1975 Him Pra 57, presided over by Hon'ble R. S. Pathak C.J. as he then was. After considering the case of Hadkinson v. Hadkinson (supra), His Lordship after analysing the entire law held as follows: "It is evident from the cases cited by Denning L.J. that the rule was applied in cases of contempt in procedure only. It was applied in cases where a party had disobeyed an order of the Court and in order to secure obedience to that order the right of the party to be heard in a proceeding arising out of the same cause was denied to him until he had purged himself of his contempt. The origin and evolution of the rule, and the nature of the need for it, point strongly to the conclusion that it was intended solely for those cases where contempt was committed by disobedience of the Court's order, that is to say, in cases of contempt in procedure. It was not adopted as a punitive measure, the object was entirely to secure obedience to the Court's order. For that reason, the rule .would be irrelevant in a case of criminal contempt." 18. The Rule laid down by, Hon'ble R.S. Pathak, C. J. supports my opinion. 19. Section 19 (2) (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is also a pointer to the legislative intent that question of purging contempt arises only when there is a decision against a party which needs to be stayed by an appellate court. 20. The mere fact that the notice has been issued in the contempt petition and it is pending, in my opinion does not amount to holding a party guilty of contempt nor by the mere issue of a notice it can be held that the party has disobeyed the order of the Court. 20. The mere fact that the notice has been issued in the contempt petition and it is pending, in my opinion does not amount to holding a party guilty of contempt nor by the mere issue of a notice it can be held that the party has disobeyed the order of the Court. There has to be a categorical finding recorded by a court against a party and then alone that person can be held to be in contempt. Even if a party is held to be guilty of contempt of court then too it is the discretion of court to hear a party or not depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 21. In Purushotam Dass Goel v. Hon'ble Mr. Justice B. S. Dhillon, AIR 1978 SC 1014 Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 held that an appeal shall lie as a matter of right from any order or decision of a Bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt but no appeal will lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in a proceeding - for contempt. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the order merely issuing a notice without anything further does not decide anything against the alleged contemnor and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under Sec. 19 of the Act. The ratio of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that the order of the High Court merely 'issuing notice' cannot amount to an order passed against a contemner entitling him to appeal against that order. This principle is fully applicable in the instant case also. The order of this Court issuing notice only on the contempt application cannot possibly be held to be an order against the person against whom contempt petition has been moved and as such his rights cannot possibly be affected by such an order. Since the mere issue of notice does not amount to an order against the contemner in my opinion it cannot be held that such a person is in contempt of the court. 22. Since the mere issue of notice does not amount to an order against the contemner in my opinion it cannot be held that such a person is in contempt of the court. 22. Since the person against whom only a notice is issued cannot be held to be a person in contempt, in my opinion the general rule that the party in contempt cannot be heard unless the contempt is purged would not be applicable to a case where only a notice has been issued on the contempt application. The right of a person to be heard is a fundamental right of great consequence and it cannot be taken away by a court merely by the fact that on the contempt petition a notice has been issued and no finding has been recorded holding a person to be guilty of contempt. 23. Counsel for both the parties cited authorities before me but none of the authorities have a bearing on the question as to whether by mere issue of notice on the contempt application a person shall be deemed to be held in contempt. The only authority which has some bearing on the question and which has been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner is an unreported decision of this Court dated 9-10-1979 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6324 of 1973, Shri Prayag Das v. B. K. Srivastava by a Division Bench of this court. In that case after examining the facts of the case the Bench in a detailed order recorded a finding after examining the contents of the petition that the allegations made in the petition would manifestly scandalise the court's functioning in this country and the language used in the petition was patently intemperate and vituperative, and as such a case of contempt, prima facie, is made out against the petitioner- in that case. The finding recorded was in the following terms : "It is clear from the averments in the petition particularly in paragraphs 4,5 and 18 and annexures 'D', 'F', 'G' and 'K' that the petitioner made allegations which were not only irrelevant to the reliefs sought in the petition but would manifestly scandalise the courts functioning in this country. The language used in the petition and the annexures is patently intemperate and vituperative. The language used in the petition and the annexures is patently intemperate and vituperative. Thus, a prima facie case is made out against the petitioner and we 'suo motu' direct that a notice be issued to Sri Prayag Das, Advocate, Bulahdshahr to show-cause why he should not be punished for contempt of court." 24. The petitioner was personally present, he was given an opportunity to explain, he refused to give an explanation but stated that he would put in his defence only when a formal show-cause notice is issued to him. It was because of the above finding that the Bench further held that until the petitioner purged himself for contempt he has no right to be heard on merits. There is a clear finding of contempt having been committed by the petitioner and as such the petitioner was held to be in contempt and the petitioner was not heard unless he had purged his contempt. 25. The facts of this case are entirely different. Here only notice has been issued on the contempt petition. There is no finding that the applicant is guilty of contempt of court. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that the applicant Dr. R. C. Gupta cannot be held to be in contempt and as such a hearing to him cannot be denied. It is open to him to move the application for vacating the ex parte order passed by this Court. 26. In order to consider the question by this Court, whether Dr. R. C. Gupta is a necessary and proper party to the petition, it is necessary to examine a few provisions of the U. P. State Universities Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act and the Statutes framed thereunder as well as the Ordinances. 27. Section 2(6) of the Act defines 'constituent college'. It means an institution maintained by the University or by the State Government and named as such by the Statutes. Statute 12.01 provides that Moti Lal Nehru Medical College Allahabad maintained by the State Government shall be the constituent college of the University. It is, therefore.. tear that Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad is an institution which is maintained by the State Government. Since it is an institution, it can sue and be sued in its name. 28. Faculties of the Universities are constituted under Section 27 of the Act. It is, therefore.. tear that Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad is an institution which is maintained by the State Government. Since it is an institution, it can sue and be sued in its name. 28. Faculties of the Universities are constituted under Section 27 of the Act. Section 27 (4) of the Act provides that there shall be a Dean of each Faculty who shall be chosen from amongst the Professors by rotation in order of seniority and shall hold office for three years. A proviso has been added to sub-clause(4) as follows: "Provided that in the case of a Medical, Engineering, Ayurvedic or Fine Arts College, the principal of such college shall be the ex officio Dean of Medical, Engineering, Ayurvedic or Fine Arts Faculty, as the case may be." 29. By statute 7.01 the Faculty of Medicine has been created in note (2) appended to Statute 7.01, it has been further provided that Moti Lal Nehru Medical College, Allahabad shall constitute the Faculty of Medicine. It is therefore, clear that so far as Moti Lal Nehru Medical College is concerned, this by itself is Faculty of Medicine at Allahabad University and the Principal of the Medical College is the Dean of Faculty of Medicine. This is the special provision in relation to Medical College, Allahabad, as there is no other Medical College which comes under the jurisdiction of the Allahabad University. 30. The Ordinances applicable to the Faculty of Medicine provide that M. D. and M. S. Examinations will be held twice in the year ordinarily in November and April. Ordinance 4(a) provides that the application for the registration of the subjects of the thesis will be submitted through the Head of the Department concerned to the Dean not later than December 15 every year. It further provides that the application shall be approved by the Research Degree Committee consisting of the Vice- Chancellor, the Dean, the Head of the department concerned and shall subsequently be reported to the Faculty of Medicine. From this Ordinance it is clear that if a candidate wants to apply for registration for M. S. Course, he has to make an application to the Dean who is the principal of the College through the Head of the Department concerned. From this Ordinance it is clear that if a candidate wants to apply for registration for M. S. Course, he has to make an application to the Dean who is the principal of the College through the Head of the Department concerned. The application has to be approved by the Research Degree Committee and the decision of the Research Degree Committee has to be reported to the Faculty of Medicine. Since the application has to be made by the candidate to the Dean of Faculty of Medicine, it is the Dean who has to intimate to the candidate whether the application has been accepted or not. The Research Degree Committee is only an approving authority. The approval has to be reported to the Faculty of Medicine. The college as I have already held above is an institution which can sue and be sued. All the authorities, Officers of the college, the committees and its members who function in the said college cannot be held to be necessary parties to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Once the college is made a party to a petition, all authorities, officers, committees and their members are impliedly represented through the college which is a necessary party to a petition. In the circumstances, in my opinion, it cannot be said that in every petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India it is necessary for a petitioner to implead either the Dean to whom the application is made, the Head of the Department through whom the application is submitted and the Research Degree committee which is the approving authority. Consequently the Research Degree Committee is not a necessary party to the petition. 31. In case, however, the allegations of mala fide have been made in the petition against any particular authority, officer or members of a Committee of the College, then of Course, the said authority, officer, and member of a committee would be a proper party, if the petitioner presses those allegations for the purposes of seeking relief from the court. 32. In case, however, the allegations of mala fide have been made in the petition against any particular authority, officer or members of a Committee of the College, then of Course, the said authority, officer, and member of a committee would be a proper party, if the petitioner presses those allegations for the purposes of seeking relief from the court. 32. In Udit Narain Singh v. Board of Revenue, AIR 1963 SC 786 , it has been laid down that a necessary party is one without whom no, order can be made effectively, a proper party is one in whose absence effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on the question involved in the proceeding. 33. Applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, since the college is a party to the petition, effective order can be passed against the college without the Research Degree Committee being made party to the petition. As such the Research Degree Committee is not a necessary party to the petition. In the absence of the Research Degree Committee the college can effectively, defend the petition filed against it and all the questions involved in the petition can also be decided : as such also it cannot be held that the Research Degree Committee is a proper party to the petition. I have already indicated above that in case, however, allegations of mala fide had been made against the Research Degree Committee then the Research Degree Committee would have been a proper party to the petition. So far as the present case is concerned, the Research Degree Committee has made no application before this court for being impleaded as a party to this petition. The question, therefore, is purely academic. 34. So far as Dr. R. C. Gupta is concerned, since the proceedings for contempt have been initiated against Dr. R. C. Gupta. Dr. R. C. Gupta is entitled to be made a party to the petition and he is also entitled to move an application for vacating the ex parte order passed by this Hon'ble Court. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated before me that he has been instructed by the petitioner that he wants to withdraw his petition for contempt filed against Dr. R. C. Gupta. 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner has stated before me that he has been instructed by the petitioner that he wants to withdraw his petition for contempt filed against Dr. R. C. Gupta. If the petition for contempt is withdrawn by the petitioner as stated by the petitioner and the court dealing with the contempt petition permits the petitioner to withdraw the contempt petition, then it is not necessary in the interest of justice to implead Dr. R. C. Gupta as a party to the petition. So far as merits of the petition are concerned, if as Head of the Department Dr. R. C. Gupta wants to bring forth certain facts to the notice of this Court, he can always do so through the college as the college in which he is Head of the Department is already a party to the petition. 36. In the result, the application of Dr. R.C. Gupta for being impleaded as one of the respondents is allowed. In case, however, contempt application against Dr. R. C. Gupta is withdrawn by the petitioner and the court dealing with the contempt petition permits the contempt application to be withdrawn, then the application of Dr. R. C. Gupta for being made a party to the petition shall stand rejected.