ORDER R.S. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order of the Dy Director of Consolidation dated 26-91974 dismissing the petitioners' revision. 2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that in the basic year khatauni on Khata No. 474 the names of both the contesting parties were recorded as tenure-holders over the land in dispute. An objection was filed by the petitioners claiming to be the sole- tenure-holders on the basis of the fact that the land in dispute originally belonged to their ancestor and they are in possession. The names of the contesting respondents (hereinafter referred to as the respondents) have been wrongly recorded in the revenue papers along with the petitioners which may be expunged. The case set up by the respondents was that the land in dispute was acquired by the ancestors and they are in possession according to their respective shares. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence in support of their respective case. 3. The Consolidation Officer accepted the objection of the petitioners and directed to expunge the names of the respondents. An appeal was filed by the respondents against the order of the Consolidation Officer which was allowed and the basic year khatauni entry was restored. The revision preferred by the petitioners against the order of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was dismissed. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid orders of the Dy. Director of Consolidation and that of the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) before this Court in writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. The relationship between the parties will be clear from the following pedigree which is not in dispute. 5. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the land in dispute was not acquired by the common ancestor of the parties but it was acquired by the ancestor of the petitioners alone. Therefore; they are alone tenure-holders of the land in dispute. Respondents' names have been wrongly recorded and they have got no concern with the same. 6. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in reply, that the land in dispute was acquired by the common ancestors of the parties and in any view of the case the names of the respondents are recorded along with the petitioners from 1334 Fasli up to the present date. 6. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents, in reply, that the land in dispute was acquired by the common ancestors of the parties and in any view of the case the names of the respondents are recorded along with the petitioners from 1334 Fasli up to the present date. Therefore, they were co-tenants and now co-tenure-holders along with the petitioners. 7. The main dispute between the parties is about the co-tenancy. According to the case of the petitioners they are the sole tenure-holders whereas according to the respondents they are the co-tenure-holders along with the petitioners. From the aforesaid pedigree it is clear that the petitioners are from the branch of Rajroop whereas the respondents are from the branch of Rattan. Both Rajroop and Rattan are the sons of Achambhit Rai. In order to consider whether the land in dispute was acquired by the common ancestor Achambhit Rai it is necessary to consider the khasra and khatauni entries filed on behalf of the parties. From khatauni of 1283 Fasli and Khasra of 1296 Fasli filed on behalf of the petitioners it is proved that the name of Rajroop, the ancestor of the petitioners, alone was recorded. After the death of Rajroop the name of his son Bahadur was recorded which is proved from Khasra 1309 Fasli. On the other hand in the khatauni of 1283 Fasli the names of Rattan and Arhat are recorded on the land other than the disputed land or the land which is not in dispute in this case. Khatauni of 1283 Fasli is a clear evidence to prove the fact that at back as from that year the ancestors of the petitioners were separately recorded and that the khatas were separately recorded in the names of the ancestors of the parties. There is no document to show that the disputed land was ever recorded in the name of Achambhit Rai, the common ancestor of the parties. This also cannot be argued that the name of Rajroop was recorded on the land in dispute in the representative capacity in view of the fact that Rattan, the ancestor of the respondents, was recorded on different khatas which are not in dispute. This also cannot be argued that the name of Rajroop was recorded on the land in dispute in the representative capacity in view of the fact that Rattan, the ancestor of the respondents, was recorded on different khatas which are not in dispute. According to the finding of the consolidation authorities based on documentary as well as the oral evidence, the land in dispute was not the acquisition of the common ancestors of the parties but it was the acquisition of the ancestor of the petitioners alone. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) as well as the Dv. Director of Consolidation have also not reversed this finding. Therefore, this fact is well established that the land in dispute was not the acquisition of the common ancestors of the parties but it was the acquisition of the ancestors of the petitioners alone. 8. Now it is to be considered whether on the basis of the entry from 1334 Fasli onwards the respondents can be declared to be co-tenure-holders. S. 33 of the U. P. Tenancy Act deals with the question of co- tenancy, the relevant portion of which is as follows : ' ...... Provided that no person shall be deemed to be a co-tenant notwithstanding that he may have shared in the cultivation of the holding, unless he was a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy, or has become such by succession or has been specifically recognised as such in writing by the landholder." 9. According to the above provision of S. 33 of the U. P. Tenancy Act one can be a co-tenant by three modes provided under S. 33, namely, (i) where he is a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy, (ii) he has become such by succession, and (iii) he has been specifically recognised as such in writing by the landholder. In this case the respondents could not be said to be co- tenant by succession as it has been found above that it was not the acquisition of the common ancestors of the parties. There is no case that the ancestors of the parties were admitted as co-tenants by the land- holder on the commencement of the tenancy. There is no case or proof in this case that the respondents were admitted by the petitioners and the land-holder in writing as co-tenant. There is no case that the ancestors of the parties were admitted as co-tenants by the land- holder on the commencement of the tenancy. There is no case or proof in this case that the respondents were admitted by the petitioners and the land-holder in writing as co-tenant. Therefore, the case of the co-tenancy set up by the respondents is not proved according to the provisions of the U. P. Tenancy Act. 10. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that S. 33, U. P. Tenancy Act is not exhaustive and the tenancy can be created by estoppel and acquiescence as well for which he referred the decisions reported in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy ( AIR 1957 SC 314 ), Bala Charan v. State of U. P. (1978 Rev Dec 51), Mulloo v. Jailo (1953 Rev Dec 5). Deo Narain Singh v. Aditya Prasad (1971 Rev Dec 463) : ( AIR 1971 All 415 ). and Chhedi Nonia v. Prasad Nonia (1958 Rev Dec 23). 11. In P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court have considered a case of adverse possession and in that connection it was observed as under "...... It is a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to constitute ouster". In that case there was no dispute about the tenancy at the commencement thereof but one co-tenant was claiming sole tenancy on the basis of adverse possession and it was held that he has to prove adverse possession by open assertion and hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment to the knowledge of the other. In Bala Charan v. State of U. P. (supra) it was held by this Court as follows : "... It is a settled principle of Hindu Law that there would be a presumption of jointness of the family, but there can be no presumption that a property standing in the name of a member of the Joint Hindu family is also a joint family property. A member of a joint Hindu family may acquire property out of his own earnings and may keep it separate, from the family. A member of a joint Hindu family may acquire property out of his own earnings and may keep it separate, from the family. If he blends it in the joint family property then the self acquired property by the member concerned will become joint family property and will cease to be his exclusive property. Any member of the joint Hindu family.may, therefore, while remaining a member of the, joint family acquire out of his own earnings property for his own benefit.". To prove that it was a joint family property it has to be shown that the family had as a result of the nucleus sufficient surplus income from which acquisition could be made. 12. These two decisions aforesaid are based on the principles of Hindu Law and those principles will be applicable to the tenancy which is transferable, for instance fixed rate tenancy and has been acquired by the earnings of the property or the nucleus of the joint family. Where the tenancy is not transferable and no money was spent in its acquisition, the principles of Hindu Law will not be applicable. In that case one can be co-tenant as provided in S. 33 of the U. P. Tenancy Act. S. 33 of the U. P. Tenancy Act has been held in some cases to be not exhaustive and it provides the methods of acquiring of co-tenancy rights. 13. One can be co-tenant also by acquiescence and estoppel. In Deo Narain Singh v. Aditya Prasad AIR 1971 All 415 (Para 11) (supra) it was held that "Under S. 33 of the U. P. Tenancy Act a person could be admitted as a co-tenant provided that he was a co-tenant from the commencement of the tenancy and provided that he was recognised as such in writing by the landlord. It is true that besides the above provision, a co-tenant could also be admitted by acquiescence and estoppel." In Chhedi Nonia v. Prasad Nonia (1958 Rev Dec 23) (supra) it has been held that one can be held to be co-tenant if besides the entry of co-tenancy possession and payment of rent is also proved. In Muloo v. Jailo (1953 Rev Dec 5) (supra) it has been held thus : "Co-tenancy must be proved in the ordinary way and not merely by the entries in the papers. In Muloo v. Jailo (1953 Rev Dec 5) (supra) it has been held thus : "Co-tenancy must be proved in the ordinary way and not merely by the entries in the papers. It must be known to have been created at the very inception and cannot be superimposed afterwards." While dealing with the patwari papers it has been held that the patwari paper entries are a piece of evidence of the facts recorded therein which can be accepted after testing like any other evidence and that Patwari paper entries of either short or long standing do not by themselves create any legal right or liabilities. 14. The only evidence on the basis of which the Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation have declared the respondents to be co- tenure-holders is the entry of Khasra and Khatauni of 1334 Fasli. Revenue entries are maintained by the Revenue Department. They can be proved to be correct or wrong according to the facts of each case. Therefore, the entries by itself could not be the proof of title. Tenancy can be proved according to provisions of law. Every entry can only be a piece of evidence regarding the title of any person. Therefore, in order to prove a case of co-tenancy it was necessary for the respondents to prove that besides entry in their favour they were also in possession and paying rent. According to the findings of the Consolidation Officer on the consideration of documentary as well as oral evidence, possession and payment of rent by the respondents has not been proved. The Settlement Officer (Consolidation) and the Deputy Director of Consolidation have not considered the oral evidence at all. Therefore, in the absence of any finding regarding possession and payment of rent by the contesting respondents, their orders are not liable to be maintained and deserve to be quashed. 15. In-view of the above discussions, I allow the writ petition, quash the order dated 26-9-74 passed by the Dy. Director of Consolidation and direct him to decide the case afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made above. However, I direct the parties to bear their own costs.