JUDGMENT : G.F. Couto, J. 1. This First Civil Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 1st September, 1979 passed by the Presiding Officer of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Margao, whereby the application for compensation filed u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 by the Appellants herein had been dismissed. 2. The relevant facts are that the Appellants herein filed an application for compensation u/s 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 on the grounds that, on 15.3.76, at about 11.00 a.m. the truck No. GDT-3336 driven by the Respondent No. 1 from Davorlim to Margao, knocked down a child by name Norman Rodrigues and thereby caused his death. It is the case of the Petitioners/Appellants that the accident occurred, because Respondent No. 1 was driving the aforesaid truck in a rash and negligent manner and also at a fast speed on a crowded road. On these grounds, the Appellants claimed a compensation of Rs. 50,000/- since the child, their son, was a promising and exceedingly intelligent boy. 3. The case of the Respondent No. 1 has been that the accident was due to the fault of the unlucky boy, who, all of a sudden, came running on the road as he was being chased by a dog and in the process was knocked down by the truck driven by the Respondent No. 1. 4. The learned Presiding Officer of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, after considering the evidence adduced by the parties, arrived at a finding that the Appellants herein had not proved that the accident had occurred as a consequence of rash and negligent driving on the part of the Respondent No. 1 and therefore, dismissed the application. 5. It is the case of the Appellants that the learned Presiding Officer of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal has erred in the assessment of the evidence and has thus wrongly arrived at a finding that the accident was due to the fault of the deceased child. However, the evidence on record clearly shows that the accident was definitely due to the fault of the Respondent No. 1. And arguing before me, Mr. G. Fernandes, learned advocate appearing for the Appellants, invited my attention to the evidence on record, namely to the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Respondent No. 1. However, the evidence on record clearly shows that the accident was definitely due to the fault of the Respondent No. 1. And arguing before me, Mr. G. Fernandes, learned advocate appearing for the Appellants, invited my attention to the evidence on record, namely to the evidence of the witnesses examined on behalf of the Respondent No. 1. He submitted that the evidence of the aforesaid witnesses is unreliable and therefore, the story of the boy being chased by a dog is clearly imaginary and brought on record only to save the Respondent No. 1 from the consequences of his rash and negligent driving. In fact, the witness Piedade Vaz is not reliable at all, because he contradicts himself on material points in the examination-in-chief itself, for, at one stage, he clearly stated that he suddenly heard some noise at the rear side of the truck and after the vehicle had stopped, he saw a young boy fallen on the right hand side while the vehicle was proceeding from Davorlim to Margao, being a fact that he had not seen the said boy before that and then, almost immediately afterwards, stated that he had seen the boy being chased by a dog. These two statements are contradictory in terms and therefore, the statement of the witness cannot be relied upon. In so far as the witness Joao Dias, Mr. G. Fernandes invited my attention to the circumstance that the aforesaid witness stated in cross-examination that he was sitting on the left side of the truck and was facing the rear portion of the truck when the accident occurred. Therefore, since the accident occurred on the right side of the truck and since the witness was facing the rear portion of the said vehicle, it is manifest and clear that the said witness could not have seen the boy running on the right side of the road and being chased by a dog. Hence, the evidence of this witness also is not to be trusted. Hence, the evidence of this witness also is not to be trusted. Finally, the witness Mohan Raikar, who also came with the story of the boy being chased by a dog clearly did not state the truth, for while stating that he was present on the spot at the relevant time of the accident and though in cross-examination he admitted that he knows the Respondent No. 1 for the last about 10 years, nevertheless said that he did not see the driver of the truck, i.e., the Respondent No. 1 on the day the accident took place. Thus, it is also manifest that this witness cannot be relied upon. Then, Mr. Fernandes invited my attention to the evidence adduced by the Appellants herein in support of their case, namely, to the statements of the witnesses Shaik Salaudin Karol and Domnic Fernandes. The said Shaik Salaudin Karol has stated that he witnessed the accident which occurred at 11.30 a.m. He further said that the deceased boy was standing on the left side of the road when one is proceeding from Margao to Davorlim, near a house situated at the side of the road. The truck driven by the Respondent No. 1 came from Davorlim side at a very high speed and then, went towards the side of the boy, dashed against him and caused him to fall unconscious. After this, the vehicle proceeded towards Margao and halted at a distance of 10 to 15 metres, now on the left side of the road. Secondly, the witness Domnic Fernandes also stated that he had seen the accident from the balcony of the house of a Hindu family which is situated at the spot of the accident. He said that the deceased boy was standing at the entrance of a fencing of the house of the said Hindu family and that the vehicle driven by the Respondent No. 1 came from the side of Davorlim at a fast speed and dashed against the deceased who was knocked down. Thereafter the vehicle stopped at a distance of about 12 metres from the place of impact. He further stated that the aforesaid vehicle came to the place where he was standing and dashed against him. Mr. Thereafter the vehicle stopped at a distance of about 12 metres from the place of impact. He further stated that the aforesaid vehicle came to the place where he was standing and dashed against him. Mr. Fernandes, after inviting my attention to the aforesaid evidence of the witnesses for the Appellants, submitted that the said evidence has not been shaken in any manner in cross-examination and hence, it necessarily follows that the learned trial Judge was bound to arrive at a finding that actually the accident has occurred due to the rash and negligent driving on the part of the Respondent No. 1. 6. It was, however, contended by Mr. Bharne, learned advocate appearing for the Respondents, that the evidence of the witnesses for the Appellants is not satisfactory and the learned trial Presiding Officer was fully justified in not relying in their evidence. In fact and first of all, there are material contradictions between the statements of the witnesses Karol and Domnic, for while Karol stated that the truck dashed against the deceased boy on the front right side, Domnic said that it was the right middle side portion of the truck driven by the Respondent No. 1 that came into contact with the body of the deceased. The statement of this last witness is corroborated by the observations made by the panchas of the scene of the offence and is also in consonance with the story of the Respondents that the unfortunate child came running to the road and in the process dashed against the truck. 7. At the outset, it may be pointed out that it is clear from the impugned judgment that the learned Presiding Officer appears to have assessed the evidence on basis of some facts that are not at all in the evidence and has assumed that some facts were admitted, when actually there was no such admission. Besides, the approach of the learned Presiding Officer, while assessing the evidence, is manifestly wrong, for it is apparent from more than one passage that the learned Presiding Officer disbelieved the witnesses for the Petitioners/Appellants only because they were unable to explain why the Respondent No. I had done some particular acts. Obviously, the witnesses, not being mind readers, could not know what would have been the reasons for the Respondent No. 1 to act in a particular manner. Obviously, the witnesses, not being mind readers, could not know what would have been the reasons for the Respondent No. 1 to act in a particular manner. It may also be pointed out that the learned trial Judge, while disbelieving the evidence adduced by the Appellants, has not given any reason to justify as to why he did not accept that the Respondent No. 1 had taken the truck to the right side of the road and in the process, has hit the deceased boy. 8. Coming now to the evidence on record, I am of the considered opinion that the learned advocate for the Appellants is correct in his submission that the story of the boy being chased by a dog is imaginary and appears to have been brought out only for the purpose of favouring Respondent No. 1, the evidence led by the Respondents, being entirely unreliable. Indeed, Piedade Vaz stated that, on 15th March, 1976, in in the morning, he was travelling in the box of the truck driven by Respondent No. 1 and when the same vehicle reached near the St. Sebastian's Chapel at Aquem, he heard suddenly a noise by the rear side of the truck. On hearing such noise, he requested the Respondent No. 1 to stop and after the vehicle stopped, he saw a young boy fallen on the right hand side while one proceeds from Davorlim to Margao. He further stated that he had not seen before that, the said boy. He further stated that, at the relevant time, the truck was loaded with 150 laterite stones and was moving at a moderate speed. After stating so, the witness, all of a sudden, said that he had seen the boy being chased by a dog. In cross-examination, the witness, however, stated that, after hearing the noise of a bang, he reported that to the driver and asked him to stop on account of the bang only and he did not inform him that the boy had been knocked down by the vehicle. He also stated that after the truck was stopped, he saw the dog at the rear side of the truck and on the right hand side of the road, being a fact that he saw the dog only after the accident. He also stated that after the truck was stopped, he saw the dog at the rear side of the truck and on the right hand side of the road, being a fact that he saw the dog only after the accident. If this is the case, if the witness saw the deceased child fallen on the road after the truck was stopped, if he had not seen the boy prior to his being lying on the right side of the road and if he saw the dog only after the accident, one fails to understand when and how the witness saw the boy being chased by the dog. I say so, because admittedly, after being knocked down by the truck, the boy died on the spot and did not move. Hence, on account of this material contradiction, it is obvious that the evidence of the witness Piedade cannot be relied upon. Coming now to the witness Joao Dias, it is to be pointed out that, though the said witness came out with the same story that he saw the boy coming out from the right side of the road and running and being chased by a dog, he also stated in cross-examination that he was sitting in the box of the truck involved in the accident on its left side and that he was facing the rear portion of the vehicle. Admittedly, the accident occurred on the right side of the truck and the child was only five years old. Therefore, it is hard to believe that the witness, being seated on the left side of the vehicle and facing the rear portion of the same vehicle, could have seen the boy running and being chased by a dog. In fact, even according to the version of the Respondent No. 1, the boy must have been in front of the vehicle and on its right side. Thus, the witness Dias could not have seen what happened at the right side of the truck and at his back. In fact, even according to the version of the Respondent No. 1, the boy must have been in front of the vehicle and on its right side. Thus, the witness Dias could not have seen what happened at the right side of the truck and at his back. Finally, insofar as the witness Mohan Raikar is concerned, though he also comes out with the story of the boy being chased by the dog, it is surprising that, if he actually was on the spot at the time of the accident, he did not see at all the Respondent, who was well known to him for about 10 years, so well that even he knew that Respondent No. 1 is a businessman, an owner of a truck and that he is doing the business of transporting stones. In these circumstances, the evidence led by the Respondent No. 1 is far from reliable and is to be discarded summarily. 9. This does not, of course, mean that the Petitioners/Appellants had discharged their burden only because the story of the Respondent No. 1 is not acceptable. It becomes, therefore, necessary to see whether the evidence brought on record by the Appellants is sufficient to establish the rash and negligent driving on the part of the Respondent No. 1 as the cause for the accident. As already said, Appellants examined three witnesses. The first one is Appellant No. 1. His evidence, however, is of no consequence, since he did not witness the accident, the relevant witnesses being Shaik Karol and Domnic Fernandes. The said Shaik Karol stated that, on the day of the accident, he was proceeding from Margao to Davorlim and the vehicle involved in the accident was coming from Davorlim to Margao. The vehicle was a truck and the deceased boy was standing on the left hand side of the road as one proceeds from Margao to Davorlim, near a house situated by the side of the road. The vehicle, which was being driven at a very fast speed, went towards the side of the boy and thereafter, dashed against him. The boy fell down unconscious. The vehicle halted a little bit forward, i.e., at a distance of 10 to 15 metres from the place of accident and on the left side of the road i.e., on its proper side. The boy fell down unconscious. The vehicle halted a little bit forward, i.e., at a distance of 10 to 15 metres from the place of accident and on the left side of the road i.e., on its proper side. In cross-examination, the said witness stated that the truck dashed against the deceased boy on the front right side. Domnic Fernandes, in his turn, stated that he has witnessed the accident from the balcony of the house of a Hindu family. The deceased boy was standing at the entrance of a fencing of the house of the said Hindu family and that the vehicle driven by the Respondent No. 1 came from Davorlim side in a fast speed and dashed against the deceased boy, knocking him down. Thereafter, the vehicle stopped at a distance of about 13 metres from the place of the accident. The said truck had come to the side where the boy was standing and had dashed against him. He further stated, in cross-examination, that the boy was standing at the entrance of the fencing which is about five feet away from the main road. The truck was carrying stones. He denied that the deceased was running and being chased by a dog. He further stated that the boy was hit by the truck on its middle right side, i.e., in the middle right side of the body of the truck. The learned Presiding Officer did not believe the evidence of these two witnesses on account of only small discrepancies existing in their statements. However, if one considers the evidence as a whole, he has necessarily to arrive at a finding that the evidence of these two witnesses is reliable and is to some extent corroborated by the panchanama of the scene of offence. In fact, it flows from the panchanama that the accident occurred on the right side, at a distance of about 0.99 metres from the edge of the road and that there was a space of 2.65 metres at the left of the truck at the time of the accident. Further, the panchanama shows that brake marks to the extent of 10.61 metres were found and these frets clearly prove that the accident actually occurred on the right side of the road and that the speed of the vehicle was not so moderate as alleged by the Respondent No. 1 and his witnesses. Further, the panchanama shows that brake marks to the extent of 10.61 metres were found and these frets clearly prove that the accident actually occurred on the right side of the road and that the speed of the vehicle was not so moderate as alleged by the Respondent No. 1 and his witnesses. The panchanama further establishes that, though it is true that the road on the spot is not wide, nevertheless the Respondent No. 1 had enough space to drive his vehicle on his proper side of the road. Thus, by coming entirely to the right side so as to dash against the deceased boy who was standing at the entrance of the compound of a house, Respondent no 1 has definitely violated the rules of prudence which he was bound to obey while driving his vehicle. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses Karol and Domnic was not at all shaken and conclusively establishes that, at the time of the accident, the boy was standing at the entrance of the fencing of the house of one Hindu family residing therein. Besides from the evidence of the Respondent No. 1 himself, one can see that actually he came on the wrong side of the road at the time the accident occurred. Indeed, the Respondent No. 1 stated, at Exh. 20, that he was told that a boy had dashed against the rear portion of the truck and then he took the vehicle to the left side of the road and stopped it This statement of the Respondent does not appear to be true, for it is in clear contradiction with what was stated by the witness Piedade, who stated that he never informed the Respondent No. 1 that the boy had been knocked down. But Respondent No. 1 further stated that, after stopping the vehicle, he got down from it and then, he saw the boy fallen on the road on the right side of the road when one proceeds from Davorlim to Margao. In other words by admitting that the boy was lying on the right side of the road and that after the accident he took his vehicle to the left side, impliedly, Respondent No. 1 has admitted that he had taken the truck to the wrong side of the road and after knocking down the deceased boy, had returned to his proper side. Admittedly, there was no traffic at the time of the accident and therefore, the Respondent No. 1 had no excuse or sound reason to take his vehicle to the wrong side of the road in contravention to the rules of traffic. Thus, by doing so, Respondent No. 1 drove his vehicle in a rash or negligent manner and thereby caused the accident and the death of the unfortunate Norman. 10. In view of the above, I have no doubt in arriving at the finding that the learned presiding Officer of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal erred in the assessment of the evidence and wrongly held that the same evidence was not sufficient to establish the rash and negligent driving on the part of the Respondent No. 1. 11. The next point that arises is in respect of the quantum of compensation to be awarded. No evidence has been led by the parties for this purpose and as such, the Court has to determine it on basis of the facts that are before it, namely that the unfortunate child was only five years old at the time of the accident. One does not know whether the boy was a bright child and what he would have done in life. The only consideration, therefore, to be taken is the shock and the agony the Appellants must have felt with the loss of their son. The Learned Counsel for the Respondents, however, submitted that in the circumstances the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of C.K. Subramania Iyer and Others Vs. T. Kunhikuttan Nair and Others, , is to be borne in mind and considered. In the aforesaid case, the Supreme Court held that a compensation of Rs. 6,000/- was adequate in a case where the death of a boy of 8 years had occurred and the parents could not prove what would have been the monetary benefit they would have got in the event the child had survived. In the present case, as already stated, no evidence has been led by the parties in respect of the compensation to be awarded. In the present case, as already stated, no evidence has been led by the parties in respect of the compensation to be awarded. As such and since it cannot be denied that there was a reasonable probability of pecuniary advantage for the Appellants in the event the child had survived arid had become a grown-up person I feel that the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court is to be considered as a guidance and is to be followed. Therefore, considering that the child was 5 years old, I think that in this case also a compensation of Rs. 6,000/- will meet the ends of justice. 12. As a result, the impugned judgment is set aside and it is ordered that the Respondent pay, jointly and severally, the amount of Rs. 6,000/- to the Appellants with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of the petition till the actual payment. Costs by the Respondents.