JUDGMENT 1. THIS is an application under Order 47 rule 1 of the code of Civil Procedure for review bf the order passed on April 19, 1982 in C. R. No. 2353 of 1981. In order to appreciate the points urged in this application it is necessary to state I brief the facts and circumstances under which the said C. R. No. 2353 of 1981 came to be tiled and the order made thereon. 2. THE opposite parties filed a suit for eviction against the present petitioners from the suit premises which the petitioners held as monthly tenants at a rental of Rs. 350/-payable according to English calendar. One amongst the grounds for eviction was default in the payment of rent. After the filing of the suit the defendant petitioners came up with an application under Sec. 17 (2) read with Sec. 17 (2a) of the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act which was disposed of by an order dated March 6, 1978. By the said order the petitioners were found to be in arrears to the tune of Rs. 3850/- and they were directed to deposit the said arrears together with interest thereon at the statutory rate by 5 instalments. Subsequently in May 1979 an application under Sec. 17 (3) was filed by the opposite parties on the allegation that the petitioners were not complying with the provisions of Sec. 17 (1) and 17 (2) road with Sec. (2a) of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act. Sometime after the filing of this application the defendants filed an application under Sec. 151 of the Code for condo nation of delay in the matter of deposit of the rents for July and September, 1979. This application was rejected. Finally, the application under Sec. 17 (3)came to be heard on 29.11.80. The application was allowed exparte and the defence against delivery of possession was struck out. Thereafter the defendants filed an application under Sec. 151 of the Code for restoration of the application under Sec. 17 (3) on the grounds stated in the said application. The application under Sec. 151 of the Code was heard on evidence. The learned Judge disbelieved the plea of the defendants as made out in the said application and rejected the same by his order dated May 26, 1981. The application under Sec. 151 of the Code was heard on evidence. The learned Judge disbelieved the plea of the defendants as made out in the said application and rejected the same by his order dated May 26, 1981. Being aggrieved at the order and the order dated November 29, 1980, the petitioners filed a revisional application which was registered as C. R. 2353 of 1981 and obtained a Rule. This Rule was disposed of by the order now sought to be reviewed by the present application. In disposing of the Rule this Court held that the grounds made out by the petitioners for restoration could not be substantiated and that there was no reason for their failure to attend the hearing of the application under Sec. 17 (3)on 29. 1180. Upon such a view the Rule was discharged. Hence the present application. 3. MR. Ghose appearing on behalf of the petitioners in the first place contends that the initial order dated March 6, 1978 by which the application under Sec. 17 (2)read with 17 (2a) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act was disposed of was an invalid order and therefore could not be the foundation of an order under Sec. 17 (3)of the said Act. Secondly it was contended that the application under Sec. 17 (3) having been filed on 17. 5. 79,the learned judge in the court below was wrong in taking into consideration defaults or lapses, if any, in regard to a period subsequent thereto. Finally it is contended that in view of the fact that the petitioners have complied with the orders and there are in fact no defaults in the matter of deposit of rent, the court may take a lenient view of the matter and recall the earlier order passed on the application under Sec. 17 (3)of the Act. 4. MR. Bagchi in refuting the contention of Mr. Ghose argues that the defendants having taken the full it advantage of the order dated March 6, 1978, cannot now be permitted to complain that the order was not valid and proper. He also contended that the application under Sec. 17 (3) was not disposed of upon a finding that the order made on the application under Sec. 17 (2) and (2a) had been violated. He also contended that the application under Sec. 17 (3) was not disposed of upon a finding that the order made on the application under Sec. 17 (2) and (2a) had been violated. In the circumstances it was argued that the petitioners are estopped from contending that the order dated March 6, T978 was not a valid or proper order. Mr. Ghose in the first place referred to a decision in the case of Fakruddin Latuwala Vs. B. Kanodia reported in 83 CWN 325. In this decision it was held that in disposing of an application under Sec. 17 (2a) it was the duty of the court to determine the amount of the arrears calculated upto the end of the month previous to which the order under Sec. 17 (2a) was made. Since that was not done or, in other words, since some of the arrears prior to the date of the order was not taken into consideration in passing the order under Sec. 17 (2), a subsequent application under Sec. 17 (3) could not be entertained for failure to comply with such an order. In the instant case before me there is no question that the order dated march 6, 1978 was defective in that regard. 5. THE next case relied on by Mr. Ghose, pulin Kumar Chowdhury Vs. Sachindra mohan Bose, reported in 1978 (1) CLJ 645 is also beside the point. There an order under Sec. 17 (2a) was found to be defective on two counts, viz., that in calculating the arrears the entire period upto the date of the order was not taken into consideration and that the amount of the interest was not also calculated by the court which the court was statutorily required to do. The decision lays down that only after a valid order under Sec. 17 (2a) is made and there is a breach of the said order, the question of striking out the defence against delivery of possession under Sec, 17 (3), can arise. That obviously was a case where the application under Sec. 17 (3) was founded on the allegation of non-compliance with the order made under Sec. 17 (2a) of the Act. Mr. Ghose also referred to the case of Dr. D. V. Mukherjee Vs. J. N. Bhaduri reported in 69 CWN 199. That obviously was a case where the application under Sec. 17 (3) was founded on the allegation of non-compliance with the order made under Sec. 17 (2a) of the Act. Mr. Ghose also referred to the case of Dr. D. V. Mukherjee Vs. J. N. Bhaduri reported in 69 CWN 199. The principle decided in the said case is that the court while disposing of an application under Sec. 17 (2) is required to specify the amount found due and payable together with interest. In view of those decisions Mr. Ghose argued in the first place that the order dated March 6, 1978 was not a valid order. He was, however, fair enough to concede that by making such submission he does not want the parties to be relegated to a position prior to March 6, 1978. It is true that in the order dated March 6, 1978 the learned Munsif had determined the amount of the arrears but did not calculate the quantum of interest. He merely stated that the arrears determined by him together with interest at the statutory rate should he paid in 5 Instalments. There was obviously a technical error insofar as the interest was not calculated. But that, in my view, lis not of much moment in the facts of this case, It is our common experience that often the parties agree to the payment o1 a lump sum by way of interest even though it may not strictly conform to the statutory rate. Such agreed amount of interest relating to the arrears does not render the order bad because the amount of interest is not at the statutory rate. In the instant case, even though the amount was not calculated by the learned Munsif, the defendants knew what was the amount payable by them by way of interest and they have in fact deposited a sum of Rs. 690/- by way of interest. The plaintiff did not question the correctness of the amount so deposited by way of interest. The instalments have all been cleared and in time. Therefore, there can be no question of re-opening the order dated March 6, 1978, for nobody was misled by the said order and both parties had accepted the position that Rs. 690/-was the interest payable. The plaintiff did not question the correctness of the amount so deposited by way of interest. The instalments have all been cleared and in time. Therefore, there can be no question of re-opening the order dated March 6, 1978, for nobody was misled by the said order and both parties had accepted the position that Rs. 690/-was the interest payable. The defendants having also conceded that position and not having moved against that order and also having taken the advantage of depositing the arrears by easy instalments, cannot now at this stage be permitted to contend that the order was invalid. 6. THE next branch of submission made by Mr. Ghose is that the application under Sec. 17 (3) having been filed in May 1979 the learned Judge went wrong in taking into account defaults subsequent thereto. Incidentally it may be mentioned that although mr. Ghose did not press for re-opening the order dated March 6, 1978, he nonetheless contended that the violation of that order could not be a ground for striking out the defence. I have already indicated that in the application under Sec. 17 (3) the plaintiff-opposite parties made out a case that the defendants had violated the provisions of Sec. 17 (1) and 17 (2a) of the Act. There was indeed no violation of the order dated March 6, 1978 and the order under sec. 17 (3) was not based upon any violation of that order. Therefore the contention of Mr. Ghose in that regard also is without substance. But his further contention is that the application under Sec. 17 (3) having been filed in May, 1979, the learned Munsif could not take into account defaults subsequent thereto and thus allow the application under Sec. 17 (3). It is true that by his order dated 19.11.80 the learned Munsif has taken into consideration defaults in the deposits of rents for the months of July and September, 1979 and failure to deposit rents for the months of February and November, 1979. Mr. Ghose submitted that in fact the rent for February 1979 was deposited on 16. 3. 79 and with regard to November, 1979 it was conceded that it had not been deposited at least on the date the order was made With regard to the other two months, viz, the belated deposits in respect of July and September 1979, Mr. Mr. Ghose submitted that in fact the rent for February 1979 was deposited on 16. 3. 79 and with regard to November, 1979 it was conceded that it had not been deposited at least on the date the order was made With regard to the other two months, viz, the belated deposits in respect of July and September 1979, Mr. Ghose submitted that they were subsequent to the date of the application and could not therefore be considered. I am unable to accept this contention, for, in my view, Sec. 17 (3) requires the court to see if the tenant has failed to deposit or pay any amount referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) within the time specified therein or within such extended time as may be allowed under Clause (a) of sub-section (2a) or fails to deposit or pay any instalment permitted under clause (b)of sub-section (2a) within the time fixed therefore. If the tenant fails to deposit or pay any such amount, the court shall order the defence against delivery of possession to be struck out. In my view while passing an Older under Sec. 17 (3) the court is required to take into consideration all deposits up to the date of the order. It cannot be limited to the deposits made prior to the date of the application and the court cannot shut its eyes in respect of the defaults made thereafter and before the order is actually passed. To hold so would mean as if the cause of action for an application under sec. 17 (3) is limited to the date of the application, but Sec. 17 (3) does not in terms require any application at all to be filed even though the usual practice is for the landlord to file an application under Sec. 17 (3 ). But that does not mean that the court must hot take into account the defaults or lapses, if any, subsequent to the date of the application. The court was competent to take them into account and then consider whether or not the defence against delivery of possession should be struck out. In the instant case even conceding that the deposit for February, 1979 was made within time as contended, there is no denying the fact that the rent for November was not deposited on the date bf the order. In the instant case even conceding that the deposit for February, 1979 was made within time as contended, there is no denying the fact that the rent for November was not deposited on the date bf the order. It was also apparent on the record itself that the rent for July and September 1979 were not deposited in time for which an application under Sec. 151 of the Code was filed by the petitioners for condonation of the delay. That application was rejected by an order dated October 6, 1980. Therefore, with regard to the defaults for those two months and the non-deposit for the month of November, 1979 there can be no controversy. It is also significant that the petitioners did not move against the order rejecting their application under Sec. 151 of the Code so that the order refusing the prayer to condone the delay became final. The contention of Mr. Ghose that the learned Judge was wrong in taking into consideration these defaults or that these were errors apparent on the face off the record, cannot be supported for the reasons already stated. 7. THE decision reported in AIR 1949 federal Court 106 (Hari Sankar vs Anath nath) was referred to by Mr. Ghose in support of his contention that the failure of the court to consider that the initial order dated March 6, 1978 was an invalid order is an error apparent on the fact of the record does not really seem to support the contention. The facts of that case were entirely different. 8. THE other decision in the case of bimal Kumar vs. Badal Chandra Dutta reported in 1975 (1)CLJ 71 relied on by Mr. Ghose is also beside the point. This relates to a case of discovery of new and important matter. It further lays down that where order 47 rule 1 does not apply the court may rectify the court's own error in exercise of inherent powers of the court, In the instant case there is no question of rectification of any error. The only error complained of is the failure of the court to calculate the interest while making the initial order. But for reasons already discussed that is a closed chapter and there is no question of re-opening the same or rectifying that order. The only error complained of is the failure of the court to calculate the interest while making the initial order. But for reasons already discussed that is a closed chapter and there is no question of re-opening the same or rectifying that order. In the application for review it is stated in paragraph 13 that since the order dated march 6, 1978 was not a valid order, the court below had no jurisdiction to pass any order under Sec. 17 (3) of the Act and that this position not being within the knowledge of the petitioners at the relevant time but having come to their knowledge subsequent thereto, is a matter subsequently discovered and furnishes a ground for review. I am unable to treat this as amounting to discovery of a new or important matter which could not be in the knowledge of the petitioners with due diligence. Finally Mr. Ghose argued upon a reference to the case of Benoy Krishna vs. Surajbali AIR 1963 Cal, 100 that where a suit has been dismissed for non-appearance of the plaintiff or an ex-parte decree has been passed for non-appearance of the defendant, an application for review or an order to set aside the dismissal or to set aside the ex pane decree is maintainable. This is so provided the case could be brought within the scope and ambit of Order 47 rule 1 of the Code. The circumstances under which the observations referred to above were made, were entirely different. In the present case before; me no such cirmstances exists. Here it has been categorically found that the defendants had failed to appear at the hearing of the application under Sec. 17 (3) and that the grounds set up for their failure were unfounded. Nothing has been shown to me that in arriving at that finding there was any error apparent on the face of, the record or any ground analogous thereto. 9. HAVING thus considered the application in all its aspects I find no merit in the same. The application, accordingly, fails and is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed a. K. R.