JUDGMENT : P. Subramonian Poti, J. We are concerned with the further action to be taken in the matter now that we have found the third respondent guilty of contempt under S.12 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. He is found to have wilfully disobeyed the order of this Court to give telephone reconnection to a subscriber forthwith. We rejected his offer to tender apology in court as we found it hollow. Subsequent events have shown that the offer was rightly not accepted by the court. He then offered to apologise in public and the court accepted the offer. Some controversy seems to have arisen as to the propriety of the Court adopting such a course. We have no doubt that in a case of this nature it would be appropriate for a contemner to offer a public apology and the court to accept it. But that must be done of his own free will. The contemner seems to have had second thoughts over his offer later. In fact he felt that the publicity of the matter and “the humiliation” to which himself “and the entire wing of the employees similarly situated will be put to in the matter of tendering apology” was never in his contemplation at that time. We naturally permitted him to withdraw the offer to tender apology in public. Consequently the question of further action to be taken has arisen for our consideration. 2. This court had occasion to consider the object of imposing punishment on the contemner in Vincent & Ors. v. Gopala Kurup, 1982 KLT 151 . Dealing with the offer of apology in this court this court observed thus: “......once the case falls within the scope of contempt the punishment has to be deterrent unless it be that the same object is otherwise served, perhaps better served, by the strong sentiment, expressed in words of censure by the court or by the acceptance of an apology, sincerely offered to Court.” 3. We must remember that the court has a duty of protecting public interest in the administration of justice. Punishing a contemner is not any act of retribution, but is only an attempt to uphold the majesty of law by protecting the public interest. We must remember that the court has a duty of protecting public interest in the administration of justice. Punishing a contemner is not any act of retribution, but is only an attempt to uphold the majesty of law by protecting the public interest. In this context it may be appropriate to quote the words of Chinnappa Reddi J in the decision in Advocate General, State of Bihar v. Madhya Pradesh Khair Industries, AIR 1980 SC 946 to 949: “But, on the other hand, it may be necessary to punish as a contempt, a course of conduct which abuses and makes a mockery of the judicial process and which thus extends its pernicious influence beyond the parties to the action and affects the interest of the public in the administration of justice. The public have an interest, an abiding and a real interest, and a vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice, because, unless justice is so administered, there is the peril of all rights and liberties perishing. The court has the duty of protecting the interest of the public in the due administration of justice and, so, it is entrusted with the power to commit for contempt of court, not in order to protect the dignity of the court against insult or injury as the expression “contempt of Court” may seem to suggest, but, to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of Justice shall not be prevented, prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. “It is a mode of vindicating the majesty of law, in its active manifestation against obstruction and outrage.” The law should not be seen to sit by limply while those who defy it go free, and those who seek its protection lose hope.” (Emphasis supplied) 4. It will be of interest in this context to refer to Thomas ‘Martin’s case which arose as early as in 1747. One Thomas Martin sent a bank-note for £20 to the Lord Chancellor making reference to certain proposed Chancery proceedings. Upon this Lord Hardwicke L. C. ordered him to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt. Pardon was sought by the offender. He held the public office as Mayor of Great Yarmouth. The court refrained from committing him not merely because he sought pardon. Upon this Lord Hardwicke L. C. ordered him to show cause why he should not be committed for contempt. Pardon was sought by the offender. He held the public office as Mayor of Great Yarmouth. The court refrained from committing him not merely because he sought pardon. He expressed his willingness to have the bank-note sent by him to the Lord Chancellor to be appropriated to a public cause, to be sent by the Registrar to the Warden of the Fleet for the relief of poor prisoners. This is an early instance where a Court recognised the relevance of public interest in dealing with a contemner. The case is reported in Revised Reports Vol. 34 Page 177 and is referred to at page 21 of R. E. Megarry’s “Miscellany-at-Law, A Diversion for Lawyers and others.” 5. We shall very briefly advert here once again to the nature of the contempt committed in this case. The order of this court was passed on 28-1-1983. It was passed after hearing counsel for the respondents. The order directed re-connection of the telephone forthwith. In view of the peremptory nature of the order it ought to have been complied with immediately. There is no explanation as to why despite counsel having appeared the party had to wait for a copy of the order to be served on him to act as directed. The party is said to have made representation to the 3rd respondent even prior to the service of the copy of the order that such order had been passed. At any rate copy of the order was handed over on 4-2-1983. Even then no action was taken thereon. On 10-2-1983 the petitioner in the Original Petition moved the contempt petition to take action against the 3rd respondent. Even before the issue of the notice we directed notice of the petition to be given to respondents’ counsel. Notice was given and it is thereafter that notice on the contempt petition was ordered by this court. It is after such notice was ordered that on 13-2-1983 the telephone re-connection was given. If there was some circumstance which stood in the way of re-connection being given forthwith it was for the 3rd respondent to explain. In fact one would expect explanation for every day of the delay. There is none. It is after such notice was ordered that on 13-2-1983 the telephone re-connection was given. If there was some circumstance which stood in the way of re-connection being given forthwith it was for the 3rd respondent to explain. In fact one would expect explanation for every day of the delay. There is none. Even when he appeared before us he had no further explanation to offer though we gave him an opportunity. There is a case for the petitioner that third respondent openly challenged the order of the High Court. We are not going into that question. Suffice to say that we were satisfied that an order which required to be complied with immediately on its receipt was not complied with and the disobedience of the order was wilful. That was what we found in our Judgment dated 18th February, 1983. 6. Civil contempt just as criminal contempt is punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both. But in the case of civil contempt the court, if it does not consider that there are circumstances which call for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment, will normally impose a sentence of fine only. But if a court considers that fine will not meet the ends of justice and sentence of imprisonment is necessary, it shall, instead of sentencing the contemner for simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. At one time it was understood that detaining a prisoner in civil prison when he has committed civil contempt is to compel him to comply with the order and therefore where an order has already been complied with there is no scope for using the coercive machinery of imprisonment against the contemner. Evidently it is the observation of Lindley L. J. in Seaward v. Paterson, 1897 (1) Ch. 545 that apparently justified such a stand. Lindley L. J. said in that case thus: “.........the party who is bound by the injunction is proceeded against (for contempt) for the purpose of enforcing the order of the Court for the benefit of the person who got it.” 7. In this context we may refer to an interesting passage in the decision in Jennison v. Baker, 1972 (1) A.E.R. 997 at page 1004. In this context we may refer to an interesting passage in the decision in Jennison v. Baker, 1972 (1) A.E.R. 997 at page 1004. That reads thus: “Let us suppose that an elderly spinster plaintiff had a cat to which she was so attached, that, to her, its value was beyond price. The defendant who hated the plaintiff and her cat injured the cat and threatened to kill it. The plaintiff brought an action in the county court claiming damages and an injunction to restrain the defendant from killing or injuring the cat. The plaintiff applied for, and was granted, an interim injunction. In granting that injunction, the county court Judge said to the defendant ‘I am ordering you not to kill or injure the plaintiff’s cat. Remember, if you disobey this order I shall enforce it against you by sending you to prison’. ‘Without the built in sanction the order would be useless as a remedy. With it, however, in 99 cases out of 100, the order would afford the plaintiff a ‘full and ample’ remedy. Nevertheless, the particular defendant in the case I have supposed, in contumacious disregard of the order, brutally kills the cat before the plaintiff’s eyes. The plaintiff then applies for an order of attachment. The judge says to the defendant ‘I warned you that I should enforce my order by sending you to prison if you disregarded it. I now commit you to prison.’ Could the defendant plausibly reply ‘Look at what Lindley L. J. said in 1897. You have no power to enforce the order in this way, unless you can first bring the cat back to life; and this is impossible’. I think that Lindley L. J. would have been surprised and perturbed had it been suggested to him that what he said in Seaward’s case would be successfully used in support of such an argument”. 8. While the purpose of punishment for contempt is, to a great extent, deterrence which is meant to uphold the prestige of the court and consequently the interest of the public in the proper judicial administration in this country, we alert ourselves on every occasion we have to deal with a case that we must exercise considerable judicial restraint. Whether a sentence of fine alone would be sufficient or whether we should impose a term in the civil prison must be decided quite objectively. Whether a sentence of fine alone would be sufficient or whether we should impose a term in the civil prison must be decided quite objectively. More so in this case because the withdrawal of the offer of a public apology should not in any way influence in the matter of sentence or create any bias on our part on that account. We heard the 3rd respondent in person as to the sentence. He had nothing to say. His counsel Sri P.C. Chacko wanted us to deal with his client sympathetically. Counsel urged that the circumstances of the case do not at any rate warrant a sentence of imprisonment as there are no special reasons to consider the case as warranting heavy punishment. He also pointed out that the wide publicity the offer of public apology received was sufficient humiliation for the petitioner and therefore we should consider the contemner as sufficiently punished. We are not persuaded to agree. We must remember that just as the concept of public apology aroused considerable interest in the public mind the withdrawal of the offer of public apology by the third respondent purportedly on account of the humiliation for himself and his associates evidently Junior Engineers as a class seem to have made common cause with him received similar public attention. In the circumstances any course which this Court takes in the matter of sentencing the contemner should leave no room for the public to doubt the efficacy of our sentencing process. We find no reason for any sympathetic or compassionate treatment. The contemner must get his due. All the same we think a sentence of fine would meet the ends of justice. Hence we impose a fine of Rs. 1000/- on the 3rd respondent. In default of payment of fine he will be detained in civil prison for a period of 15 days. Time for payment upto 14-3-1983.