JUDGMENT Deoki Nandan, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal in a-suit for injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit, which is shown by the letters Ahmjkleb the plaint map, and for demolition of the constructions that had been raised by defendant 1 over a part of that land. In the alternative, possession was also sought, if it were found that the plaintiff had been dispossessed. The plaintiffs house is situate to the south of the line A B on the map and is shown by the letters A B C D. A part of the land in suit, J K L F, is said to be the Ahata of Mangroo Teli and, in effect, the land in suit is that shown by the letters A H G F E B. There was a well on this land towards the west. The plaintiff claimed that well had been constructed some 40 years before the suit, on which the name of his father was inscribed, and the plaintiffs fields nearby were irrigated from this well. The defendant's house was to the east of the plaintiffs house, and, in league with the second defendant, he started digging foundation at three places on the Sehan, and uprooted three cattle troughs of the plaintiff. 2. The defendants filed a joint written statement. They denied the plaint allegations and contended that plot 131 having an area of 2 bighas 4 biswas 3 biswansis, was abadi land and belonged to the Gaon Sabha. The old house of defendant 1 was on part of this plot to the south of the land in suit. The opening of that house was to the north, and the land to the north was his Sehan and, further north of the Sehan of defendant 1, some land was left for abadi purpose during consolidation operations, which vested in the Gaon Sabha. That land was also part of plot 151. Defendant 1, being in need of some land, he got the land in suit allotted by the Land Management Committee, vide its resolution dated the 22nd May, 1967, and possession was delivered to him for a consideration of Rs. 300/-. The land to the further north has been settled with Mangroo Teli, according to law, and the latter had constructed his ahata over it. 300/-. The land to the further north has been settled with Mangroo Teli, according to law, and the latter had constructed his ahata over it. There was a kachcha well between the sehan of the plaintiff and the first defendant, which divides the land, and there was an old well of the first defendant at the place where the new Kachcha wall had been constructed by the first defendant. The plaintiff was said to be a resident of another village who had recently come to this village. About the well, it was stated that it was on the land belonging to Mangroo Teli, which had now been left for extension of the village abadi and that the drain from the well had been constructed by the first defendant for taking water for constructing his wall. The allegation that the drain was used for irrigation of his land by the plaintiff was denied. The first defendant also claimed a one-half share in the well. Other technical pleas were also raised. The substantial issues, on which the parties went to trial, were issues 1 and 2; namely : - "1. Whether the plaintiff is owner and had been in possession of the disputed land as his Sahan Pesh Darwaza since the time of his ancestors?" 2. Whether the disputed land belonged to the Gram Sabha concerned. If so, has Gram Sabha any right to execute the patta of the land in suit in favour of the defendants? If so, its effect?" These two issues were taken up together by the lower appellate court for consideration. It held that the plaintiff is not the owner in possession of the land in suit as his Sehan Pesh Darwaza since the time of his ancestors, and that the land belonged to the Gaon Sabha, which had a right to execute a Patta in respect of it. Issue 3 raised the question whether any damage was caused to the plaintiff. On that, the trial court held that no damage was caused and dismissed the suit with costs. 3. On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court and held that the land in suit was the plaintiff s sehan, and, that being so, it must be deemed to have been settled with him under S. 9, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 3. On appeal, the lower appellate court reversed the findings of the trial court and held that the land in suit was the plaintiff s sehan, and, that being so, it must be deemed to have been settled with him under S. 9, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The lower appellate court further held that there was no evidence to show that the land had been reserved for abadi purposes by the consolidation t authorities, and, at any rate, once it was 1 found that the land had been settled with 1 the plaintiff under S. 9, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the consolidation authorities could not have earmarked the land for extension of abadi, and the Gaon Sabha could not be said to be entitled to settle that land with any one else. The land was already settled with the plaintiff. About the well also, the lower appellate court found that it belonged to the plaintiff. A commission had been issued by the trial court to an advocate who had surveyed the land and prepared a plan. The lower appellate court held that the land to the west of the land B X 1 X 2 was the plaintiffs sehan and decreed the suit in the terms that the defendants should remove the constructions and foundation situate to the west of the land X 2 X 1 B, as shown in the map 12-C, which was ordered to form part of its decree. The lower appellate court further restrained the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs possession over his Sehan land, shown by the letters AMJIJFXX 1 Bon the said map 12-C. 4. Mr. B. L. Yadav, learned counsel for the defendant-appellant, contended that a procedure has been prescribed by S. 122C(6), U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, read with R. 115-P of the Rules framed thereunder for cancellation of allotment of abadi sites made by Gaon Sabha, and sub-s. (7) of S. 122-C and sub-rule (5) of R. 115P make the orders of allotment final and they cannot be challenged before a civil court. A Full Bench decision of this Court in Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha, AIR 1977 All 360 : (1977 All LJ 310) was cited in support of this proposition. A Full Bench decision of this Court in Similesh Kumar v. Gaon Sabha, AIR 1977 All 360 : (1977 All LJ 310) was cited in support of this proposition. What is made final by sub-s. (7) of S. 122-C is the order of the Assistant Collector subject to the provisions of sub-s. (6), and the provisions of S. 333 of the Act, that is to say the Assistant Collector's order is subject to the order of the Collector under sub-s. (6) of S. 122-C and the order of the Collector is subject to the order of the Board of Revenue under S. 333, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and the orders so passed are final. Under sub-rule (5) of rule 115-P, it is the order of the Collector which is made final. In the present case, no application for cancellation of the allotment was ever made. The result is that there is no order of the Assistant Collector or the Collector or the Board of Revenue. Under the circumstances, these provisions do not operate to bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to go into the question whether the allotment of land made by the Gaon Sabha was incompetent and, therefore, non est in law. I may here observe that the Schedule II to the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act read with S. 331 thereof does not exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court in the matter of applications covered by S. 122-C or R. 115-P. The civil court could always see whether the land belonged to the plaintiff or not, and if it came to the finding that the land was settled with the plaintiff under S. 9, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, and did not, therefore, belong to the Gaon Sabha and was not open to allotment as an abadi site under S. 122-C, it could hold or declare the allotment to be invalid and ineffective in law and ignore it. So far as the Full Bench decision is concerned, the rule laid down there is that a lease or an allotment made by the Land Management Committee under the L. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act cannot be cancelled or set aside by the consolidation authorities. So far as the Full Bench decision is concerned, the rule laid down there is that a lease or an allotment made by the Land Management Committee under the L. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act cannot be cancelled or set aside by the consolidation authorities. That Full Bench referred to the similar provisions under S. 198, U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, in matters of allotment of agricultural land by the Gaon Sabha. Orders passed by the Collector are similarly made final under S. 198 (4) but subject to orders of the Board of Revenue under S. 333, U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. That case has however no application to the facts of the present case. The jurisdiction of a civil court is plenary unless excluded by some specific statutory' provision. On the other hand, consolidation authorities are tribunals of limited jurisdiction. 5. The next point urged by the learned counsel was that the trial court had found on an appraisal of the oral evidence on the record, that the land, which is in dispute, was not the plaintiffs sehan land, but belonged to the Gaon Sabha. Having looked into the reasons given by the trial court for its finding as also the reasons given by the lower appellate Court for its contrary finding, it is clear that the finding of the lower appellate court is not only correct, but also does not suffer from any jurisdictional error or error of law. Indeed, the whole approach of the trial Court was wrong. The finding of the lower appellate court is based on evidence and is final. The lower appellate court, having found that the land in dispute was settled with the plaintiff under S. 9, U. P. Zamindari. Abolition and Land Reforms Act, as the Sehan land appurtenant to his house, the Gaon Sabha was not competent to allot it to the first defendant and the suit has been rightly decreed by the lower appellate court. 6. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.