If the impugned order of dismissal of the case is allowed to sustain, the defendant tenant shall be thrown out in the street evicted from his house which would cause irresparable injury to him. There is no second opinion as to the effect of the order, but the bone of contention is whether this Court can, in exercise of its constricted jurisdiction conferred under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code for short "the Code" interfere with the decision. Naturally, the question is what is the contour of the powers of this Court under section 115 of 'the Code'. Undoubtedly, the section confers certain powers to the High Court, may be, to a limited extent. The prime object is to do justice within the limits of the restric­tions and limitations contained therein. A revision is competent when a decision has been rendered by any court subordinate to the High Court. A decision has been rendered by the subordinate Court which has rejected an application under Order 9, Rule 9 of "the Code" for setting aside the order of dismissal in Misc. case No. 7 of 1977 arising out of T.C. No.17 of 1970 instituted by the Opposite party against the petitioner. Admittedly, the Court of the first instence had jurisdiction vested in it by law to dispose of the application under Order 9, Rule 9 of the Code. The crucial question in whether this Court can interfere with an order on examination of the record of the case that the order is had because the Court did not proceed in accordance with the essential requirements of the law which it was meant to administer. If the impugned order is not "a real decision" but "purported decision", or the findings are based on. no evidence or in admissible evidence, or the finding is "patenly wrong" so much so that no person instructed in law could have reached the conclusion, and inconsequence thereof there has been a failure of justice, in my opinion, this Court can interfere. They fall within the purview of Section 115 of "the Code" as they amount to exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity resulting in a failure of justice and also fall within the purview of "failure to exercise jurisdiction" vested in the subordinate Court. They fall within the purview of Section 115 of "the Code" as they amount to exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity resulting in a failure of justice and also fall within the purview of "failure to exercise jurisdiction" vested in the subordinate Court. Apart from these, there may be special or ponderable causes for interference which may be applicable in appropriate case and on suitable occasions to up­hold the cause of justice. 2. The petitioner claimed that he was suffering from bacillary dysentry since November 25, 1977 night and had to be treated by a registered medical practitioner of Tinsukia Civil Hospital who advised him rest. Dr. Duara who had treated him, was examined in Court and confirmed the averments of the petitioner. It may be relevant to extract the deposition of Dir. Duara, which reads. "On 26.11.77 I was Health Officer I, of Tinsukia Civil Hospital. On that day, I examined Ambika Moral at Civil Hospital for treatment of acute bacillary Dysentry. I prescribed medicine. Then he was discharged. I advised him for treatment for one week. Ext. 1 is the certi­ficate and Ext. 1(1) is my signature." It was thus proved that the petitioner had to go to Civil Hospital for treatment, he was treated by the Health Officer No. 1, Tirsukia Civil Hospital who advised him to take one week's rest. The date fixed for hearing of the case was on November 27, 1977 on which date the petitioner was ill and under treatment. 3. The crucial question for determination which came up before the court below was whether on November 26, 1977 the petitioner was ill as claimed by him and as such could not attend the Court. At this stage it is necessary to say that Tinsukia is about 30 KM away from Dibrugarh where the case was being tried. 3. The crucial question for determination which came up before the court below was whether on November 26, 1977 the petitioner was ill as claimed by him and as such could not attend the Court. At this stage it is necessary to say that Tinsukia is about 30 KM away from Dibrugarh where the case was being tried. The following circumstances were considered relevant by the learned Judge to turn down the prayer for restora­tion of the case (i) that the defendant had earlier defaulted to appear in Court, in times : (ii) though the doctor had categori­cally stated that he had examined the petitioner, there was shortfall in the examination because the patient was not "clini­cally and pathologically examined", (iii) the doctor had stated in his evidence that he had advised the petitioner for treatment for about a weak, but the petitioner in his application stated that the doctor had advised him "complete rest" for 7 days; and (iv) that the petitioner should have informed the court or his lawyer by a telegram about his illness which he did not send. 4. It has been rightly conceded that the previous alleged conduct of the petitioner's absence in Court was irrelevant consi­deration to decide whether he was actually ill on November 27, 1977. When the doctor himself stated that he treated the petitioner on the 27th November, 1977, and that he was suffer­ing from bacillary dysentry aid more so when the distance from Tinsukia to Dibrugarh was about 30 KM, the question as to whether on previous occasion the petitioner had defaulted in attending Court was an irrelevant consideration. The relevant consideration was whether he was ill on the 27th, so much so that he could not attend the Court on that date, and, as to whether it was a sufficient cause. Therefore, skipping over, let me proceed to consider the second paint namely the effect of non-examination of the patient, clinically or pathologically. The proved fact is that a responsible medical man deposed in court that the petitioner was ill. Failure to examine the patient clini­cally or pathologically did not destroy or minimise the effect of the strong testimony of the doctor. Until the learned Judge could disbelieve the evidence of the doctor, he should mot have rejected the claim of the petitioner that he was ill. Failure to examine the patient clini­cally or pathologically did not destroy or minimise the effect of the strong testimony of the doctor. Until the learned Judge could disbelieve the evidence of the doctor, he should mot have rejected the claim of the petitioner that he was ill. The third ground for turning down the prayer under Order 9 Rule 9 at the Code" appears to be faint and wavering. The doctor said that he had advised the patient to take one week's rest and, the patient, the petitioner herein stated in his application that the doctor advised him to take one week's rest. Dr. Duara confirmed that he had advised seven days' rest. When the patient was in fact suffering from bacillary dysentry as diagonised by the doctor and when the doctor advised him rest for 7 days, it means com­plete rest or the rest of the nature. The last ground is that the petitioner should have informed the Court or his lawyer by sending a telegram which the petitioner did not. November 27 was the date fixed for hearing and the petitioner went to the hospital on the date for treatment. Suppose, he had omitted to perform this duty of informing the Court, did it mean that he was not ill? If he was ill his conduct in not sending the telegram could not make him hale and hearty, When a patient was treated for bacillary dysentry and the doctor advised him to take rest, it was too much to expect from an ailing person to attend the Court at Dibrugarh covering a distance of about 30KM on the same day, or to take steps to despatch telegram which could have reached the Court after the disposal of the case or, in the usual course of transmission in our Postal Depart­ment would have taken a couple of days. Be that as it may, none of these facts destroy the effect of proof that the petitioner was suffering from bacillary dysentry on the 27th November, 1977. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this was a sufficient cause. Be that as it may, none of these facts destroy the effect of proof that the petitioner was suffering from bacillary dysentry on the 27th November, 1977. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, this was a sufficient cause. In the result, I have no hesitation in reach­ing the conclusion that the finding of the learned Judge that the petition had failed to satisfy that he was prevented by any sufficient cause "from appearing in Court when the case was called for hearing" is not "a decision", at best it can be said to be "a purported decision". The findings reached by the learned Judge was based on surmises and conjecture and against the evidence of a responsible medical man. Without imputing any­thing to the learned Judge it can be said that no reasonable person f in the face of the evidence could have reached the conclusion that there was no sufficient cause which prevented the petitioner to appear in Court on the date of hearing. These errors, 33 I have noted, are apparent on the face of the record, the decision "a purported decision" and not "a real decision". 5. it is pertinent to observe that under these circumstances instead of dismissing the case, it was desirable to burden the party with cost for delaying the trial. In consequence of the dismissal of the case, the petitioner has obtained a lease for a long period to stay in the suit premises. The suit would have been finally disposed of had the learned Judge allowed the petition burdening him with costs. 6. To dispense appropriate justice and for speedy disposal of the cases, I feel that the members of the noble medical pro­fession can assist the Court. When such a patient approaches them it is necessary to ascertain whether the medical certificate is required in connection with any case. If so, the members of the noble profession must record very clearly whether it is possible for the patient to attend Court on the date of hearing of the suit/case. When such a policy is adopted it would assist speedy disposal of the cases. If so, the members of the noble profession must record very clearly whether it is possible for the patient to attend Court on the date of hearing of the suit/case. When such a policy is adopted it would assist speedy disposal of the cases. If a positive assertion is made in the certificate as to the inability of the patient to attend court on the date of hearing of the case, the court should either allow adjournment or restore a case dismissed for default relying solely on such firm certificates, issued by the doctors. I hope and trust that in future some procedure should be evolved by the members of the medical profession to assist the Court to dispense speedy justice. 7. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the impugned order must be set aside, which I hereby do, and direct the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh to dispose of the connected Misc. case forthwith. The disposal of the main suit has been prolonged for a number of years. As a measure of abundant caution, the learned Judge should fix a date of hearing of the suit de die in diem. The learned Judge may also inform the learned lawyers of both the parties to obtain prior instructions, enabling them to conduct the case/suit, even in the absence of the parties. In any case, the learned Judge shall take up the Misc. Case, first, dispose it forthwith. If the application for restoration is allowed, learned Judge shall take up the Title Suit with despatch and shall make endeavour to dispose of the same within a period of three months from the restoration of the suit. While accepting the petition and setting aside the impugned order passed in Misc. Case 43/77, I award a token cost of Rs. 300/-against the petitioner for the delay caused.