JUDGMENT 1. - Judicial holocaust by butchering, ransacking, smashing and murdering real, social and substantial justice under the wheels of hyper-technicalities, and enacting "Merchant of Venice" of 16th Century in space age of 'public interest litigation' and social justice, can best be illustrated by the instant case. 2. Mr. Kasliwal's insistence for confirming such judgment making the courts of justice 'de jure', courts of injustice 'de facto', has left me aghast and wondering whether Nammodripad's contempt punishment, though the last word being of Apex Court under Article 141, requires posthumous post mortem, at the hands of 'jurists' not -judges'. 3. Would the "laws" cheers of lacs on justice to be tolerated over tears of few on Injustice as per technicalities ? 4. While at National level, debate is going on, for reforms or revolution in judicial system, the courts are refusing to take notice of the need to permit justice to have edge over technical law. Law is laughing at the pitiable condition of justice shading tears, being made subservient to hair splitting of laws technicalities. 5. Would The Merchant of Venice' be permitted to be enacted in this age of 'Social justice' and 'substantial justice' ? Would the learned counsel play the role of 'Portia' ? 6. In this revision petition, Shri R.C. Kasliwal, the learned counsel for the non-petitioner, wants a pound of' flesh without a drop of blood. The story of drammer under the caption of 'The Merchant of Venice' written by the Shakespear is being repeated. The tragedy and irony of fate is "Not a drop of blood" although scene is enacted to held the demand of 'Pound of flesh' Shakespear's theme was intended to defeat "Pound of flesh" demand of Shylock the greedy heartless Jew money lender. 7. The entire amount, relating to 'strom over per cup' is 50 paisa out of Rs. 1673.75 paisa, which was determined as arreared of rent alongwith costs and interest under Section 13 sub-clause (3) of the Rajasthan Permises Control and Eviction Act. 8. The non-payment of 50 paise within prescribed time and that too by 'bona fide mistake' has resulted in striking of the defence of tenant against eviction from the premises and thus making him helpless and defence less. 8. The non-payment of 50 paise within prescribed time and that too by 'bona fide mistake' has resulted in striking of the defence of tenant against eviction from the premises and thus making him helpless and defence less. The landlord insists that neither non-payment can be ignored nor time can be extended, and eviction without defence is a must, because law is blind, and if it ceases to be blind, it ceases to be 'law'. 9. If Shakespeare would have been alive, he would have been delightend at Macauley making him immortal, even in India, as what he enacted as a 'court scene' in a drama has come out to be true in this court, after more than 450 years.Let me recapitulate what Portia pleaded in scene I of the Merchant of Venice in the Shakespeares classics ;- "I pray thee pursue sentence, Portia, A pound of that same merchant's flesh is thine. The court awards it and the law both give it. hylock, Most rightful judge ! Portia, And you must cut this flesh from off his breast. The law allows it and the court awards it. Shylock, Most learned judge ! A sentence ! Come, prepare, Portia. Tarry a little; there is something else. This bond doth give thee here no jot of blood; The words expressly are 'a pound of flesh'. Take then they bond, take thou they pound of flesh; But, in cutting it, if thou doest shed One drop of Christian blood, thy lands and goods Are, by the lass of Venice, confiscate Unto the state of Venice". "He shall have nothing but the penalty. Gratino, O. Jew ! an upright judge, O learned judge ! Portia, Therefore, prepare the to cut oil the flesh. Shed thou no blood, not cut thou less nor more But just a pound of flesh: if thou tak'st more Or less than a just pound- he it but so much As makes it light or heavy in the substance, Or the division of the twentieth part Of one poor scruple: nay, if the scale do turn But in the estimation of a hair Thou diest, and all thy goods are confiscate". P. 247 Shylock, "I pray you, give me leave to go from hence: I am not well: send the deed after me And I will sign it." 10. The tenant deposited Rs. P. 247 Shylock, "I pray you, give me leave to go from hence: I am not well: send the deed after me And I will sign it." 10. The tenant deposited Rs. 1.673 25 paise because his counsel instead of 75 paise' heard only 25 paise'. The affidavit of the counsel on this point has not been contradicted but the helplessness is that law makes no provision for protecting the tenant against such undisputed bona fide mistakes. Therefore, the prayer was that defence should be struck off. Both the lower courts accepted the above preposition of law submitted on behalf of the landlord plaintiff and struck off the defence. 11. At the time of arguments today, I suggested to Shri Kasliwal, the learned Advocate for the landlord-non-petitioner to agree for condonation of such a bona fide mistake regarding insignificant amount of 50 new paisa' as the tenant should normally be not deprived of his defence. However, Shri Kasliwal, showed his reluctance because according to him, the law is well settled that nothing can be done to protect the tenant in such a manner. 12. According to this traditional school of law, Law is blind, whether it is landlord or tenant, rich or poor, bourgeois or proletariat, master or servant, creditor or insolvent, exploiter or exploited, industrialists, or workmen, feudal or landless tiller, King or beggar and finally Have or Have-nots. Technicalities, yes, why not if it results in a walk-over or a century, without balling. 13. Shri Kasliwal relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Bishan Paul, Appellant v. Motu Ram, respondent (AIR 1965 SC 1995) , Ganpat Ladha, appellant v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde (AIR 1978 SC 1955) , and claimed that Article 141 Apex Court has accepted the technical but legal school of law. 14. Mrs Gyanwati Dhakar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, placed reliance upon the judgment of this court in Amna Khatum v. Zahir Hussain ( AIR 1981 Pat. 1 ) . Anand Prakash v. Bharat Bhushan (AIR 1981 P & H 269) , Jagannath v. Jodharam, 1980 RLW 42 . 15. I am only surprised that such a prolonged legal debate and citation of various Apex Court' decisions are warranted on an obvious bona fide mistake of undisputed and that too for 50 paisa out of the amount of Rs. 1,673.75 paise. 16. 15. I am only surprised that such a prolonged legal debate and citation of various Apex Court' decisions are warranted on an obvious bona fide mistake of undisputed and that too for 50 paisa out of the amount of Rs. 1,673.75 paise. 16. The first appellate court's judgment confirming trial courts order and lengthy arguments here are very tragic reflection on law and functioning of law courts, which after all exists for 'justice' and not for gimmics of law. 17. The unfortunate aspect of our existing jurisprudence based on Anglo-Sexon jurisprudence is best illustrated by the present case, which should be an eye opener for legislators, judges and jurists. 18. The 50 paise only has not been deposited, out of the above mentioned amount of Rs. 1673.75, p. on account of the mistake of the hearing of counsel, should have been sufficient for ignoring this insignificant lapse. According to the theme of' justice' and more 'social justice', it cannot be called a lapse, even by telescopic examination of the meaning and implications of the connotation, 'default'. 19. In Jagannath v. Jodharam (supra), I have emphasised the above aspect in paras 16 & 18.wherein the following observations were made:- "This legislation in the urban areas is analogous to the Rajasthan Protection of Tenants Ordinance, wherein protection was provided to cultivators of agriculture fields in villages The problem of getting a roof over the head, is problem of serious magnitude. The housing problem and the fast changing notions of social economic philosophy, in this country, gave rise to various rent control legislation. Hon'ble justice lyer in B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan (1975 S.C. vol. I.p. 166) has described it as problem of shocking scarcity of a roof to rest'. Lakhs of down trodden, poor labourers, workmen, stretch their bones on footpaths, pavement of Chopati & Kalbadevi in Bombay. Bada Bazar and Dharamtala in Calcutta, Chandni Chow and Cannaught Circus of Delhi, Panchbati and Mirza Ismail Road of Jaipur and Sojati Gate of jodhpur, whether it is chilling cold of December or scorching heat of June, after working for the whole day like chattels and struggling for two square meals. (para 16) "The Rent Control Legislation's are therefore, beneficial legislation to protect tenants from being thrown on roads, merely on the wagers, whims, fancy and greed of landlords. (para 16) "The Rent Control Legislation's are therefore, beneficial legislation to protect tenants from being thrown on roads, merely on the wagers, whims, fancy and greed of landlords. Such being the beneficial nature of legislation aimed for 'social justice' the interpretation and construction of such statute should also be beneficial & liberal in favour of tenants, of course without doing any violation to the statute. It is alto on account of this, that I have taken the view that section 10 of General Clauses Act would apply for counting the period of payment of rent in compliance of provisions of S. 13 (3) and (4) of the Act. (para 18)." 20. The authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in (6) Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram and others ( AIR 1983 SC 57 ) . squarely covers the controversy so far as the present case is concerned. In that case, the entire amount was deposited by decree holder, within time in a suit for preemption, but it was less by 25 paise. The decree holder could not convince the entire hierarchy of courts that the mistake of non-payment of 25 paise should be condoned. 21. It is again a serious reflection on our jurisprudence that for non- payment of 25 paise' the Litigation reached the apex court, which must have costed if not more, about 5,000'-to each of the parties. Even, the High Court refused to condone the lapse. 'Law & justice' were crushed under the wheels of technicalities in various courts. It was never realised that the law has been enacted by the people for doing justice and not for enacting 'The Merchant of Venice'. 22. The Apex court ultimately exploded the myth, snubbed the technical school of law, deprecated the craze for technicalities and granted relief under article 136 of the Constitution. Is it not misfortune of serious magnitude that from 1967 to 1983 the litigants had to run from one to other court only due to technical blind interpretation of law and it must have consumed sufficient precious time of all the courts and litigants. 23. Shri Kasliwal even before this court stated that the provision of S 13 (5) & (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act is mandatory and, therefore, there is no escape but to strike oil the defence. This is similar argument as was done in the above case. 23. Shri Kasliwal even before this court stated that the provision of S 13 (5) & (6) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act is mandatory and, therefore, there is no escape but to strike oil the defence. This is similar argument as was done in the above case. There, the decree holder deposited an amount of Rs. 1,836.00 instead of Rs. 1,836.25 paise. The bona fide mistake became a matter of long drawn battles at the bar, before the various courts from 1967 to 1983. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, was not entertained and rejected holding that, they are helpless because O. 20 Rule 14(1)(b) is mandatory. The Apex court in the first paragraph of decision came out heavily against the above technical view of giving undue importance to technicalities of law at the cost of justice and observed as under:- "In this appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution, the appellant is the victim of Court's craze for technicalities of law at the cost of justice. This Court exercises its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution to meet the ends of justice or to remove miscarriage of justice or to remove miscarriage of justice perpetrated in a case." (para 1) 24. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of all the three courts and condoned the non-payment of 25 paise and declared the decree excutable, in spite of the following wordings of 0 20 Rule 14(1) (b)- "Decree in pre-emption suit-(1) where the Court decrees a claim to pre-emption in respect of a particular sale of property and the purchase money has not been paid into Court, the decree shall- (a) specify a day on or before which the purchase money shall be so paid, and, (b) direct that on payment into Court of such purchase money together with the costs (if any) decreed against the plaintiff on or before the day referred to in clause (a), the defendant shall deliver possession of the property to the plaintiff', whose title thereto shall be deemed to have accrued from the date of such payment, but that if the purchase money and the costs (if any) are not so paid, the suit shall be dismissed ,with costs". 25. 25. I am therefore, of the opinion that the technicalities must be deprecated in all forms and they must be completely overruled when they adversely affect and undermine substantial justice. We are living in an age when new dimensions and new horizons have spread in jurisprudence, over-riding the traditional technicalities of Anglo-saxon jurisprudence. The doctrine of locus-standi has been liberalised in (7) S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149 . The 'adversary system' has been given goodbye substantially in Ashiad case Viz'(8) People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India ( AIR 1982 SC 1473 ) . The Social welfare legislation and particularly, the legislation which have been enacted for memancipating the unprivileged underdogs, downtrodden who cannot stand in competition to the privileged, affluent litigants have become order of the day. Yet the pity is that still the hang-over' from the old technical school of law is continuing wasting precious time of all the courts, resulting in deprivations of ,social justice' to Lacs of litigants who are anxiously waiting for getting relief from these courts. 26. It was in this context that I observed in Manzoor Ali v. R.T.A. ( AIR 1979 Raj. 98 : Law Morality & Politics, p. 115) as under : "The High Court should not be required to enter into controversies of academic interest although they may certainly be very useful and of great interest to the profession and students of law in Universities. They would be injurious and detrimental to other litigants who are waiting in queue for a decade and are impatient to get justice from High court". "Are we to convert ,he sacred and pivot temples of justice into 'legal gymnastic clubs', 'legal debating societies' of even luxserious or even which centres of law?. They would be injurious and detrimental to other litigants who are waiting in queue for a decade and are impatient to get justice from High court". "Are we to convert ,he sacred and pivot temples of justice into 'legal gymnastic clubs', 'legal debating societies' of even luxserious or even which centres of law?. Are we to wait and watch helplessly the gimmics of talented logic and brilliant fiats of oratory of those fortunes few, who can afraid to have luxury of academic litigation at the cost of those thousand; of litigants who are either waiting in Jail cells for last 5 or 6 years to get their guilt or innocence decided or those thousands of civil servants or industrial workmen, petty shopkeepers, farmers whose fundamental rights have been invaded by unscrupulous employer or state functionaries and who want to have 'justice according to law' at least if not real justice or social justice, but who are not getting their turn of hearing due to heavy cause list and arrears of cases". 27. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jogdhayan v. Baburam (supra) is one of the classical exposition of abuse of technicalities at the cost of justice. One cannot imagine what tremendous, strain expenses and time consuming litigation it becomes when after a decree which, itself, might have taken more than a decade normally, another two decades were spent from 1967 to 1983 on the frivolous and vexatious of non-payment of 25 paise' in an amount of Rs. 1836/-. 28. In the instant case, the learned counsel for the landlord respondent was not only not prepared to accept this obvious situation in the interest of justice and save the time of all concerned but insisted on citing reading of a dozen precedents, in order to make an impossible unsuccessful effort to persuade this court to deprive the tenant from defence for non-payment of 50 paise. I am convinced that it would not be in the interest of justice to discuss all the cases cited by Shri Kasliwal, because all said and done, law exists for Justice and so also, the Courts are doing justice and nothing is more important, precious than interpreting the law in such a manner that it assists in doing justice. 29. The technical rules of law can never be allowed to over-ride justice. 29. The technical rules of law can never be allowed to over-ride justice. Justice would be casuality in this present case, if I deprive the tenant to defend the case for non-payment of 50 paise' out of Rs. 1673.75, merely on account of mistake of hearing 25 paise' instead of 75 paise'. Such a decision would be not only against the cardinal principles of justice, but would result in shaking people's faith in courts justice. Then, there would be some relevance in the charge already made by many important social workers and justices including eminent Justice Krishna Iyer, in the jurists meet at Mount Abu, that Indian courts are administering injustice and not justice and the Courts have become all instrument of administering injustice, I. for one, would not accept the charge and that is why I have mentioned it only for emphasising the view which I am taking in the instant case, about the powers of court to protect the tenant from eviction, by permitting to defend the case and not depriving him to defend it, merely for non-payment to 50 paise' on account of bona fide mistake. 30. It is true that this court is bound by precedents and moreso, when the precedents are of the Apex court, as then, this court has no option but to follow them under Article 141 of the Constitution. Fortunately, for the petitioner the decision of three judges of Supreme Court, Shri D.A., Desai, Shri Baharul Islam and Shri V Balarishna Eradi JJ. in Jogdhayan v. Baburam and others (supra) relieves me from this predicament, because it, in terms, condemns the craze for technicalities of law at the cost of justice and expressly, mentions that, the courts have got powers for meeting ends of justice and to remove miscarriage of justice perpetuated in a case. 31. I am of the opinion that the present one is a case of that species where in the craze of technicalities the two lower courts have broken the justice on the wheels of technicalities. I must remove this miscarriage of justice perpetuated on the tenant-petitioner by accepting this revision petition. 31. I am of the opinion that the present one is a case of that species where in the craze of technicalities the two lower courts have broken the justice on the wheels of technicalities. I must remove this miscarriage of justice perpetuated on the tenant-petitioner by accepting this revision petition. In view of the clear mandate of Jogdhayan's case (supra) and it being of the Apex court, and this being the latest exposition of the law not obliged to follow the earlier precedents, though the also never go to the extent of which Shri Kasliwal wants me to go. 32. The net result of the above discussion is that, the petitioner-defendant-tenant is not guilty of any default under S. 13(4) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. A bona fide non-payment of 50 paise' cannot result in the finding that, he has committed any wilful default deliberately so as to warrant extreme penalty and suffering of bearing condemned without hearing. 33. The revision petition is, therefore, accepted, as indicated above. Before parting with this judgment, I must point out that the presents, case and so also Jogdliayin's case (supra) illustrates how 25 paise' or 50 paise' controversy results in prolonged 'battles at the bar' which costs Rs. 2,500 or 5,000/-and consumes precious time of much more value, in courts which are having backlogs of cases of sixties normally and thirties exceptionally. The Anglo-saxon jurisprudence there fore, requires second thought and complete over haul, if not scrapping. Bhagwati, Desai and lyer JJ, has vigorously pleaded for its scrapping, lock, stock and barrel but Tulzapurkar J., Tarkunde, Retired Judge and now Senior Advocate and Tope Retired Principal of law College have pleaded for scrapping the revolutionary theme of lyer-Bhagwati. They want to have a change under moderate caption of ' Law Reforms". Seervai has come out heavily against lyer style and thus suggested Tulzapurkar Tope school in his famous commentary on Constitution. The controversy has been highlighted by justice Tarkunde in the following words '-Should our Judicial system be changed ? "V.M. Tarkunde, Times of India, dated 28-11-82, p.4: "To say that our judiciary is "the vestige of British imperialism and needs to be reorganised" as was done once by the previous Union Law Minister, is to indulge, in an emotive appeal out of a sense of false patriotism. "V.M. Tarkunde, Times of India, dated 28-11-82, p.4: "To say that our judiciary is "the vestige of British imperialism and needs to be reorganised" as was done once by the previous Union Law Minister, is to indulge, in an emotive appeal out of a sense of false patriotism. A sitting judge of the Supreme Court has, in a recent case, made an unwanted and unwarranted judicial pronouncement, denouncing the court as 'cancer ridden. And he has gone on to observe : "The justice delivery system of this country is utterly alien to the genius of this country. This is a smuggled system from across the shores imposed upon us by the empire-builders for their own political motives and during the foreign rule a class came into existence which has enormously benefited by the justice delivery system to the detriment of the teeming milions and, therefore, they have become protagonists of the system." Such a diatribe against the system and styling it as "a smuggled system" and as having been "imposed on us" clearly amounts to an insult to our founding fathers, who realising the sterling merits of the system, openly and freely adopted it in our constitution. With a crusader's zeal, the same learned judge has gone on record elsewhere to suggest the scrapping of the Procedure Codes and Evidence Act or something to that effect. In other words, destroy the very instruments with which to work the system. No further comment is necessary but all I ask is; should be not quit the system if he holds these views sincerely and honestly ?" 34. I would not venture to burn my fingers by entering into serious dimensions of this controversy. In my humble opinion, whether you call it Revolution or Reforms, the basic necessity of some radical changes in law procedure to snub technicalities, delay, cost, cumbersome procedure and in criminal jurisprudence for watering down" benefit of doubt" etc., is voiced by all above jurists, irrespective of the uncalled for adjectives, which are used for them, and the uncharitable demand which is being made by one school against the other "to quit" instead of a joint demand which both the schools, should make "to do or die" for achieving real, substantial speedy "social justice". 35. 35. The present case should be an eye opener to all for the compelling necessity of Judicial Reforms or Revolution" for avoiding this avoidable heavy cost, delay any injustice. It is of course a billion dollar question as to what extent the courts can go by "interpretation" in the absence of "legislation" ? 36. It is indeed a pity that precious time of this Court has been taken on such frivolous debate on account of too technical hair splitting views which were taken by lower courts and which were vigorously insisted by Shri Kasliwal in this Court. I, therefore, direct that the respondent-landlord should pay cost to the petitioner defendant of all the three courts. The order of both the lower court is striking of the defence of tenant is set aside It is further directed thus the petitioner-defendant would be allowed to defend this case as tenant in this eviction suit on all grounds. *******