JUDGMENT V.N. Khare, J. - By means of this petition, the petitioners who were monthly rated casual labour working in the Transhipment Shed and Parcel office, Central Railway, Jhansi under the Senior Divisional Commercial Superintendent, Jhansi, Challenge the orders terminating their services. Prior to the filing of this petition, the Union sponsored the cause of 160 monthly rates casual labour including the petitioner before the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Agra. Before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, the respondents No.1 and 2 agreed to take back those monthly rated casual labour who had put in continuous service of 800 days and for the rest who have rendered less than 800 days of continuous service and more than one year's service were offered work on daily wages basis besides payment of retrenchment compensation. The petitioners claim that they never authorised their representative to enter into any such compromise. 2. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the orders terminating the services of the petitioners are in fact orders of retrenchment and since pre-conditions for valid retrenchment had not been complied with, the orders of termination are bad. 3. We are not inclined to undertake the exercise for finding out as to whether the order of termination is retrenchment as this matter stands concluded by decisions of Supreme Court in the cases of State Bank of India v. N. Sundra Money, (1) The Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding officer Labour Court, Orissa. (2) Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (3) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji, (4) and L. Robert Disouza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway, (5). (2) Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala (3) Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji, (4) and L. Robert Disouza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway, (5). In these cases the Supreme Court repeatedly held that if the termination of services of a workman is brought to an end for any reasons whatsoever, it would be retrenchment except if the case falls within any of the excepted categories i.e. (i) termination by way of punishment inflicted pursuant to the disciplinary action, (ii) voluntary retirement of workmen, (iii) retirement of workmen on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and workman concerned contains a stipulation n that behalf and (iv) termination of service of a workman on the ground of ill health and once the case does not come in any of the categories termination of service would be retrenchment within the meaning of the expression under section 2 (00) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. Section 2(s) of the Act defines workman. The claim of the petitioners that they were workmen and as such they are entitled to retrenchment compensation under section 25-F of the Act has not been denied in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. The respondents Nos. 1 and 2 have taken the stand tip:! in view of the agreement, the pet: loners were not entitled to protection under section 25-F of the Act. On the basis of the aforesaid stand, we find that the petitioners are workmen within the meaning of section 2(s) of the Act. 5. In the present case the petitioners were initially employed as casual labourers in the year 1977 and subsequently in the year 1978 they were appointed as monthly rated casual labourers in the grade of Rs. 196-232. Thus each of the petitioners have put in more than one year's of continuous service. Section 25-F of the Act provides that no workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under that establishment shall be retrenched by the employer until the conditions set out therein are satisfied. Since the petitioners have rendered continuous service for a period of over one year and their terminations do not fall within any excepted categories as noticed earlier, the termination of their services would constitute retrenchment. Since the petitioners have rendered continuous service for a period of over one year and their terminations do not fall within any excepted categories as noticed earlier, the termination of their services would constitute retrenchment. Since the pre-condition for valid retrenchment having not been complied with, the orders terminating the services of the petitioners are illegal. 6. We are, therefore, satisfied that the orders terminating the services of the petitioners are illegal. We allow the writ petition and set aside the orders passed by the respondent terminating the services of the petitioners. There will be no order as to costs.