This application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and/or Article 227 of the Constitution impugns the order dated 2.2.1982 of the Sessions Judge Manipur in his Criminal Revision Case No. 59 of 1981 wherein he pointed out that the learned S.D.M. did not record the statements of the witnesses and consequently did not give opportunity for cross-examination of those witnesses and therefore the evidence was not legal evidence and yet he did not consider it necessary to remand the case and dismissed the revision petition. 2. In the land dispute Criminal Misc. Case No. 1 of 1980 a proceeding under section 145 Cr. P.C. was drawn up; parties were directed to submit their written statements documents and affidavits and were summoned to appear before the Court on 16.4.81 and on that day the parties and witnesses were heard and documents examined. The report of the O/C of Jessami Police Station was also considered and the disputed land was declared to be in possession of the first party (opposite party before this Court) untill competent Court otherwise decided. The petitioner (second party) moved the Sessions Judge in Criminal Revision Case No. 59 of 1981 challenging the impugned order mainly on the ground that the learned S.D.M. did not comply with the mandatory provision of section 145 Cr. P.C. firstly because he did not pass any preliminary order in the proceeding; secondly he proceeded to enquire without the written statements of the parties; and thirdly he proceeded to pass the impugned order without receiving any legal evidence. The learned Sessions lodge correctly analysed the provisions of section 145 Cr. P.C. and rejected the first two submissions holding that the prelimi­nary order was passed on 26.2.1981; and that first party filed his written statement on 13.3.1981 while the second party did not file any written statement but filed a cross-objection on 16.4.1981. On the third submission namely non-receipt of legal evidence the learned Sessions Judge observed: "In the order dated 16.4.1981 the learned S.D.M. has dismissed the statements of the parties and the evidence of some witnesses. But to my utter surprise I do not find any statement of these witnesses in file. It appears that all what the learned S.D.M. did was to take statements of the witnesses verbally and that he did not record their statements. But to my utter surprise I do not find any statement of these witnesses in file. It appears that all what the learned S.D.M. did was to take statements of the witnesses verbally and that he did not record their statements. Since he did not record the statements of the witnesses the parties were not given opportunity for cross-examination of those witnesses and therefore the evidence on the basis of which he gave his finding was not a legal evidence as rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Because the evidence as stated in clause (4) of section 145 means a legal evidence. Therefore I do not find any acceptable ground to support the said procedure by the learned S.D.M. Hence third contention of the learned counsel carries sufficient weight." The learned Sessions Judge observing that the second party in his cross-objection did not deny the contention of the first party that he was in actual physical possession of the disputed land since the death of his forefathers till date and had admitted that the first party was in possession of the disputed land during the relevant period dismissed the petition and consequently the Magistrate's order was allowed to stand. 3. Mr. Th. Priyananda Singh learned counsel for the peti­tioner submits inter alia that the learned Sessions Judge having himself observed that the learned Magistrate did not follow the procedure prescribed by law the impugned judgment before him ought to have been set aside and should not have been upheld. This submission appears to have some force inasmuch as the learned Sessions Judge after observing the illegality of the procedure adopted by the learned Magistrate himself proceeded to decide the question of possession without those evidence on record. Had the statement of witnesses been recorded and sub­jected to cross-examination if is difficult to say what would have been the position. Be that as it may the sustaining of the impugned order is under attack. 4. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1. submits inter alia that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution under the facts and circumstances of the case is not competent. He relies on a decision of this Court since reported in 1979 Crl. L.J.I498 (Md. Ataur Rahaman vs. Nityananda Das). 4. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1. submits inter alia that a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution under the facts and circumstances of the case is not competent. He relies on a decision of this Court since reported in 1979 Crl. L.J.I498 (Md. Ataur Rahaman vs. Nityananda Das). In that case the question for consideration was whether when an application in revision by a party before the Sessions Judge fails the same party entitled to make an application under Article 227 of the Constitution-challenging the impugned order of the Magistrate Relying on the decision of Jagir Singh vs. Ranbir Singh reported in AIR 1979 S.C. 381 it has been observed that the power under Article 227 is a dis­cretionary power; and that the power of judicial superintendence under Article 227 could only be exercised sparingly to keep subordi­nate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Where the statute banned the exercise of revisional powers by the High Court it would indeed require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution since the power of superinten­dence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It has accor­dingly been held that the party who files a revision under section 397 Cr.P.C. but fails cannot move the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as was laid down in AIR 1979 S.C. 381 (supra). In view of the above position in law the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in this case must be rejected. 5. While supporting the impugned order on the question of the illegality of the procedure counsel refers to an order of the same date that is 16.4.1981 passed in the same proceeding by the learned S.D.M. which according to counsel is really the final order. The order impugned in the application according to him was the order passed on the order sheet and was not the real final order. In this order it appears some reference is made to the witnesses. It is however not clear how both these orders both containing schedules of the disputed land happened to be made on the same date. Even in this order no reference is made to recorded evidence of the witnesses. In this order it appears some reference is made to the witnesses. It is however not clear how both these orders both containing schedules of the disputed land happened to be made on the same date. Even in this order no reference is made to recorded evidence of the witnesses. The procedural defect pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge cannot be said to have been removed by this order of the same date. Mr. Singh submits that despite this procedural irregularity this being merely a proceeding under section 145 Cr. P.C. it cannot be said to be such a case where interference under section 482 Cr. P.C. would be justified and he relies on Jagir Singh vs. Ranbir Singh AIR 1979 SC 381 (supra) wherein it has been held that the object of section 397 (3) is to prevent a multiple exercise of revisional powers and to secure early finality to orders and that any person aggrieved by an order of an inferior criminal Court is given the option to approach either the Sessions Judge or the High Court and once he exercises the option he is precluded from invoking the revisional jurisdiction of the other authority. The language of section 397 (3) is clear and peremptory and does not admit of any other interpretation. Second criminal revision is therefore barred under section 397(3). 6. In Madhu Limaye vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47 the following three principles were stated to be noticed in relation to the exercise of inherent power of the High Court : (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party ; (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; and (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi AIR 1983 SC 67 dealing with the power under section 482 vis-vis section 397 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure it has been observed that section 482 of the present Code is the ad verbatim copy of section 561-A of the old Code and it has a different parameter and is a provision independent of section 397 (2). While section 397 (2) applies to the exercise of revisional powers of the High Court section 482 regulates the inherent powers of the Court to pass orders necessary in order to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. This provision confers a separate and independent power on the High Court alone to pass orders ex-debito justitiae in cases where grave and substantial injustice as been done or where the process of the Court has been seri­ously abused. It is not merely a revisional power meant to be exercised against the orders passed by the subordinate Courts. It was under this section that in the old Code the High Courts used to quash the proceedings or expunge uncalled for remarks against witnesses or other persons or subordinate Courts. "Thus the scope ambit ambit and range of section 561-A (which is now section 482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present Code under the provisions of Section 397. It may be that in some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent powers under section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. Further the power being an extraordinary one it has to be exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind there will be no incon­sistency between sections 482 and 397 (2) of the present Code". 7. Mr. Th. Priyananda Singh in reply relies on Sorbeswar Milli vs. Meghraj Malla and others reported in 1982 Crl. Further the power being an extraordinary one it has to be exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind there will be no incon­sistency between sections 482 and 397 (2) of the present Code". 7. Mr. Th. Priyananda Singh in reply relies on Sorbeswar Milli vs. Meghraj Malla and others reported in 1982 Crl. L. J. NOC 50 (Gauhati) wherein Hon'ble Lahiri J. observed that where the Judge held that the proceeding before the Magistrate was null and void and at the same time rejected the revision appli­cation thereby upholding the order of the Magistrate the findings were incongruous and inconsistent and that when an order is void or is not a decision or it is required to secure the ends of justice interference is permissible under section 482. 8. Mr. A. Nilamani Singh submits that the instant case was decided in a remote hill station and the learned Magistrate perhaps did not have assistance of experienced counsel. It is true that these circumstances have to be borne in mind; but even so when the learned Magistrate has not recorded the evidence of witnesses at all and finding is given as to possession it may even be regarded as abuse of the process of the Court. 9. The objects behind successive amendments to section 145 Cr. P.C. are known. When the Code was amended in 1955 important changes were made with the object of curtailing the proceedings. Before 1955 the parties were only required to put in written statements of their claims as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute and it was for the Magis­trate to record at the inquiry all such evidence oral and docu­mentary as may be produced by the parties. After the amendment of 1955 the parties were required to put in such documents or to adduce by putting in affidavits the evidence of such persons as they relied upon in support of their claims and the Magis­trate was normally expected to complete the inquiry and reach a conclusion on the basis of these documents and affidavits. The first proviso to sub-section (4) gave him a discretion to summon and examine any person whose affidavits had been put in by a party. The Law Commission on this point observed : "The revised procedure does not appear to have worked satisfactorily in practice. The first proviso to sub-section (4) gave him a discretion to summon and examine any person whose affidavits had been put in by a party. The Law Commission on this point observed : "The revised procedure does not appear to have worked satisfactorily in practice. It is said that stereotyped affida­vits prepared by lawyers on the same lines as the written statements are put in by both sides and these do not help the Magistrate very much in reaching a sound decision. Examination of witnesses under the first proviso cannot in most cases be avoided and consequently there is no saving of the Court's time. The main object of the amend­ment which is to get the inquiry completed rapidly has not been achieved. On principle also it is bitter that the Magistrate is required to decide the important fact of possession or the basis of oral evidence given before him and tested by cross-examination in the presence of the parties. We therefore recommend that the procedure as it existed before 1955 should be restored". 10. The above observation of the Law Commission empha­sised the recording of oral evidence given before the Magistrate and tested by cross-examination in presence of the parties. Cross examination is a very efficacious weapon in the present adversary system. In view of the facts that in the instant case the evidence of the witnesses were not recorded and consequently were not tested by cross-examination the learned Magistrate's finding as to posse­ssion on the basis of such unrecorded evidence connot be said to be in accordance with law. Law also does not envisage the passing of two different orders in the nature of final order on the same date. The petitioner has on other expeditious alter­native remedy. Under these circumstances it is considered to be a fit case where the impugned final orders as to possession should not be allowed to stand. The learned Sessions Judge's finding as to possession of the first party on the basis of the statements alone is incongruous to his observation as to illegality of the procedure adopted. Such cases are also few and far bet­ween. It is therefore a fit case where interference under section 482 Cr. P. C. is justified. The impugned orders are accordingly set aside and the section 145 Cr. P. C. proceeding in Criminal Misc. Such cases are also few and far bet­ween. It is therefore a fit case where interference under section 482 Cr. P. C. is justified. The impugned orders are accordingly set aside and the section 145 Cr. P. C. proceeding in Criminal Misc. Case No 1 of 1980 is remanded to the learned S. D. M. Ukhrul (Manipur) for making the inquiry on the basis of the written statements already filed giving the parties opportunity to adduce oral evidence which should be recorded and tested by cross-examination according to law. Since this is an old dis­pute the proceedings may be decided within 3 months from the receipt of the records. The petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. Send down the records forthwith.