JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, C. J. 1. A learned single judge has referred this writ Petition for decision by a larger Bench because he found that there was a conflict of opinion between two Division Bench decisions of this Court on the question: Whether the expression 'first hearing' as defined in Explanation I to Order 15 Rule 5 CPC as amended by U.P. Act No. 57 of 1976 would include a date of hearing changed by the Court either suo motu or on the application of any of the parties? 2. The third Respondent in the writ Petition is a waqf. This waqf on March 9, 1971, filed a suit in the Civil Court against the Petitioners. S.N. Trivedi for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment from an accommodation. The Court issued summons. In the summons March 21, 1972, was fixed for filing a written statement and April 11, 1972 for framing of issue. After several dates on which the case was fixed, the Defendant filed his written statement on March 28, 1973. Meanwhile the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act No. 37 of 1972, came into force with effect from September 20, 1972. By this Act the jurisdiction to try suits for ejectment from an accommodation was transferred to the Small Causes Court. Accordingly the present suit was transferred to the Court of Small Causes. By the same Act, Rule 5 was added to Order 15 Code of Civil Procedure. This provided for striking off the defence if the rent is not paid at or before the first hearing. 3. On September 28, 1973, the Plaintiff landlord filed an application praying that the Court may strike out the defence under Order 15, Rule 5 CPC Thereupon the Defendant woke up, and a couple of days later, on October 1, 1973, he made an application for permission to deposit the rent for the period ending September 30, 1973. The Court allowed this application at the" Defendant's risk. The Court took up the application of the Plaintiff on October 19, 1973 and by a considered judgment of that date it held that the Defendant had not deposited the rent at or before the first hearing and it struck off the defence. The Defendant filed a revision which was, however, dismissed on September 28, 1976. The Defendant came to the High Court which on October 4, 1977, remanded the matter. The Defendant filed a revision which was, however, dismissed on September 28, 1976. The Defendant came to the High Court which on October 4, 1977, remanded the matter. After remand the Additional District Judge again dismissed the Defendant's revision on February 25, 1978. The Defendant felt aggrieved and has filed the present writ Petition. 4. Rule 5 added to Order 15 in 1972, in substance, provided that in a suit for ejectment and recovery of arrears of rent the Defendant shall at or before the first hearing of the suit deposit the entire amount of admitted rent or compensation and continue to deposit the same regularly every month. In default the Court was to strike off the defence unless further time was allowed. This rule specifically provided that it applies to suits whether instituted before or after the commencement of the U.P. Civil Laws (Amendment) Act of 1972. 5. This rule was applicable to suits, which were pending when the Amending Act of 1972 came into force. By this rule the Defendant was required to deposit the rent etc. at or before the first hearing of the suit, after the commencement of that Act. 6. This Court in several decisions held that the first hearing of the suit is when, after the framing of issues, the suit is posted for trial, that is, production of evidence. This view of this Court was approved by the Supreme Court in Ved Prakash Wadhwa v. Vishwa Mohan 1980 AWC 395 . 7. In the present case the arrears of rent etc. as required by Order 15 Rule 5 CPC was deposited by the Defendant in October 1973. By that time the issues had not, in fact, been framed nor was any date fixed for production of evidence. Hence according to the then accepted view of the phrase 'first hearing ' it is evident that the Defendant had deposited the money in good time, that is, before the first hearing of the suit. Nonetheless the defence was struck off on October 19, 1973, on the finding that the first hearing was the date fixed for framing of issues which was 4th April, 1973, or 20th July, 1973, which was fixed for disposal of the case. According to the finally accepted view this finding was erroneous. On October 19, 1973, the defence could not validly have been struck off. 8. According to the finally accepted view this finding was erroneous. On October 19, 1973, the defence could not validly have been struck off. 8. Order 15 Rule 5 CPC was repealed and re-enacted by the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 57 of 1976 which came into force on January 1, 1977. After its re-enactment Rule 5 did not provide that it will apply to suits filed before its coming into force. This is one indication that the Legislature did not intend Rule 5 to operate retrospectively. 9. To this rule an Explanation was added. It provide: Explanation. 1--The expression 'first hearing' means the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. According to this Explanation the expression 'first hearing' acquired entirely a different meaning and content. Till then the expression 'first hearing' had been interpreted by this Court, which was approved by the Supreme Court, to mean the date after settlement of issues, fixed for production of evidence. This interpretation was rejected by the Legislature. It by adding the Explanation placed an entirely different interpretation on that expression. It is hence difficult to accept the submission that the Explanation was declaratory of the law as it existed ever since the first introduction of Rule 5. The" Explanation nullified the interpretation placed by the Courts on the expression 'first hearing'. The definition of 'first hearing' introduced by the Explanation was an artificial one. It was contrary to the meaning of that expression in Order 10 Rule 1, Order 14 Rule 1(5) and Order 15 Rule 1 Code Of Civil Procedure. In respect of these provisions of the Code, the Supreme Court had in Wadhwa's case held that the first hearing of the suit could never be earlier than the date fixed for preliminary examination of parties and settlement of issues. 10. Further the Legislature did not merely add an Explanation to Rule 5, it completely repealed the pre-existing Rule 5 and re-enacted it by the Amending Act. For all those reasons we cannot accept the submission that the aforesaid Explanation was retrospective so as to apply to suits pending before the Explanation came into force. 11. The present suit was filed long before the Explanation came into force on 1st January, 1977. For all those reasons we cannot accept the submission that the aforesaid Explanation was retrospective so as to apply to suits pending before the Explanation came into force. 11. The present suit was filed long before the Explanation came into force on 1st January, 1977. The defence was struck off on 19th October, 1973, which was a date prior to the coming into force of the Explanation. The Explanation hence could not be utilised in the present case. According to the prevailing law, the Defendant had deposited the money before the first hearing. His defence could not validly be struck off. 12. The two decisions of Gaya Prasad v. Pramod Kumar Shukla 1980 LLJ 56 and Jagannath and Another Vs. Ram Chander Srivastava and Another, (1982) AWC 623 interpreted the expression 'first hearing' after the coming into force of the Explanation. The conflict, if any, in those decisions does not arise for consideration in the present case. Since the entire case has been referred and since the only question relates to interpretation of the expression. 'first hearing' we are satisfied that the Courts below were in error in striking off the defence. 13. In the result, the writ Petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside and the matter is sent back to the trial Court for proceeding with the hearing of the suit in accordance with law expeditiously. The Petitioner shall be entitled to costs throughout.