JUDGMENT R.C. Deo Sharma, J. 1. THIS is a plaintiff's second appeal and arises in the following circumstances. The plaintiff-appellant Smt. Shaukat Jehan was married to the defendant respondent Zahid Ali in accordance with the Muslim Law applicable to the parties on 21-6-1969. She came to stay with her husband at Sitapur and on the very first day she came to know from the ladies that her husband was suffering from tuberculosis. The defendant was advised to have X-ray examination done. It was then confirmed that he was suffering from tuberculosis. The clothes and ornaments given in the dowry were also said to be in possession of the defendant-respondent. On 5-10-1971 she filed the suit giving rise to this appeal for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent on the ground that the respondent was on the date of the marriage as also on the date of the suit suffering from tuberculosis and this was injurious to her health and life and that the respondent had inspite of the demand failed to pay maintenance during the period of two years prior to the suit. 2. THE claim was resisted by the defendant-respondent on the ground that he did not suffer from tuberculosis and that the report if any obtained from the doctor was a manipulated one. He claimed to be a student of B.Sc. in the Aligarh Muslim University. According to him, the plaintiff's father wanted him to stay at his place as a Ghar Damad like his other sons-in-law. He denied that he had failed to maintain the plaintiff and contended that he had always been asking her to come to his house and also used to visit her place so much so that he had also filed a suit in the court of Munsif fur restitution of conjugal rights. The learned Munsif after a careful consideration of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record found that the defendant-respondent appeared to be suffering from tuberculosis or atleast he was genuinely suspected of being a patient of this disease, but in law this was net a valid ground for dissolution of marriage. He also found that the defendant-respondent never failed to maintain her, and on the contrary it was the plaintiff who either of her own or at the insistance of her father did not go to the defendant respondent's house to stay with him. He also found that the defendant-respondent never failed to maintain her, and on the contrary it was the plaintiff who either of her own or at the insistance of her father did not go to the defendant respondent's house to stay with him. It was also found as a fact that the defendant had been visiting the plaintiff's house. The defendant's contention that he had at times been paying necessary money even at the house of the plaintiff was also not disbelieved. The suit was accordingly dismissed. An appeal preferred by the plaintiff before the learned District Judge also met the same fate. Feeling aggrieved the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal and it has been contended that both the courts below having found as a fact that the defendant-respondent was suffering from tuberculosis it was a fit case in which a decree for dissolution of marriage should have been granted. Regarding the other ground, namely, of failing or neglecting to maintain her, it was contended that even though according to the finding of fact arrived at by the courts below the husband might not have neglected to maintain the wife but it had not been decided by the courts below as to whether the respondent had failed to provide maintenance to her for a period of two years prior to the filing of the suit. 3. LEARNED counsel for the parties have been heard at some length. The concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts bolow have not been seriously challenged and in fact it was contended that the finding of fact on the point of the defendant suffering from tuberculosis being in favour of the plaintiff should be accepted and a decree for dissolution of marriage should be passed on that basis. So far as the other plea regarding maintenance is concerned, it has also not been pressed and the only contention was that even though the husband might not have neglected to maintain her but has in any case failed to provide her maintenance. 4. TAKING the second point first, it will appear that there is a positive finding of fact supported by cogent reasons and which has not been challenged that the plaintiff never agreed to come and reside at the house of the defendant even though the husband visited the plaintiff's place several times and asked her to come and stay with him. TAKING the second point first, it will appear that there is a positive finding of fact supported by cogent reasons and which has not been challenged that the plaintiff never agreed to come and reside at the house of the defendant even though the husband visited the plaintiff's place several times and asked her to come and stay with him. In all probability, she had been avoiding to go to the defendant's house for the reason that she suspected the defendant to be suffering from tuberculosis or at the insistence of her father she decided to stay at her father's place till some arrangement to secure her future was made in order to meet the contingency of the possible death of the defendant due to tuberculosis. There are letters on record and admissions of the plaintiff herself when she appeared in the witness-box, indicating that her father desired the defendant's father to execute some doucment so that the defendants gets his appropriate share in the property and also assure by another document that in the event of the death of the defendant property would pass to the plaintiff. Thus the insistence was on making adequate provision as a security for the plaintiff's future. There is nothing to indicate that the defendant was avoiding to bring her to his house or to maintain her there. It has not been established that the plaintiff ever made a demand for payment of maintenance or that the same was refused by the defendant. Obviously therefore, the defendant neither neglected nor failed to provide her maintenance. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that at times when he visited her, he also used to pay some money to her. Main stress was laid by the appellant's learned counsel on the point that in view of the ailment of the defendant-respondent, a decree for dissolution should have been passed. He conceded that the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939, did not make a specific provision for dissolution of marriage in the event of the respondent suffering from tuberculosis. But his contention was that compelling a wife to live with a husband suffering from that disease should be treated as amounting to curelty within the meaning of clause (viii) of section 2 of the said Act. But his contention was that compelling a wife to live with a husband suffering from that disease should be treated as amounting to curelty within the meaning of clause (viii) of section 2 of the said Act. The only sub-clause applicable to the case was sub-clause (a) of clause (viii), It may be reproduced as below : "(viii) That the husband treats her with cruelty that is to say (a) habitually assaults her or makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct even if such conduct does not amount to physical ill-treatment." 5. LEARNED counsel argued that it was not necessary to prove cruelty as a ground for dissolution that there should be evidence of physical ill-treatment and it was sufficient if by the conduct or circumstances it may be inferred that the life of the plaintiff would be miserable or there would be danger to the life by coming in contact with the defendant. There can be no quarrel with this proposition of law that cruelty need not be proved by establishing physical assault like beating or otherwise maltreating and that even conduct and treatment which tend to injure the health of the wife or affect adversely the reasonable happiness of the married life or mental torture would also amount to cruelty, but to say that the living of a wife with a husband suffering from tuberculosis would amount to such cruelty or mental torture has no basis in law. Where any ailments were considered as adequate ground for granting dissolution of marriage, they have been specifically mentioned as grounds for dissolution in section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. Clauses (v) and (vi) of section 2 provide that if the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so or that the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from leprosy or a virulent veneral disease, then dissolution of marriage could be granted to the wife. No such provision has been made for any other Infectious disease either generally or for tuberculosis in particular. Moreover, sub-clause (a) quoted above speaks of cruelty of conduct already meted out and not of a possibility of such cruelty in future. No such provision has been made for any other Infectious disease either generally or for tuberculosis in particular. Moreover, sub-clause (a) quoted above speaks of cruelty of conduct already meted out and not of a possibility of such cruelty in future. Till the filing of the suit the plaintiff had not stayed at the defendant's house for more than a day or two and for that reason also it cannot be said that the husband makes her life miserable by cruelty of conduct within the meaning of the said sub-clause. After the enactment of the aforesaid Act, all the possible grounds on which dissolution of marriage could be sought have been incorporated exhaustively and it cannot be said that there is any other ground on which dissolution could be sought. The residuary clause which is clause (ix) of section 2 reads like this:- "(ix) On any other ground which is recognised as valid for the dissolution of marriages under Muslim law ". Under this residuary clause therefore, if there is a ground for dissolution which is recognised as valid under Muslim Law, that can be made the basis for an action for dissolution. It has been conceded that under the Muslim Law husband's suffering from tuberculosis is not a ground for dissolution of marriage and it is for this reason that the learned counsel attempted to bring the case within the ambit of ' cruelty ' as already mentioned earlier. 6. LEARNED counsel has placed reliance on certain decisions which may be referred to. In Pramilabala v. Rabindranath, AIR 1977 Orissa 132 it was undoubtedly laid down that cruelty in the legal sense need not necessarily be physical violence. A course of conduct or treatment which tends to undermine the health of the wife on that account or affects the reasonable happiness of her life, and ill-treatment both physical or mental, would constitute valid defences against a prayer for restitution of conjugal rights. That was a case governed by Hindu Law contained in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Giving the word " cruelty " the meaning assigned in that case, it cannot be said that a husband suffering from tuberculosis is a case of such mental cruelty as to entitle a wife for a decree for dissolution of marriage under the Muslim Law. Tuberculosis by and large is a disease which is curable. Giving the word " cruelty " the meaning assigned in that case, it cannot be said that a husband suffering from tuberculosis is a case of such mental cruelty as to entitle a wife for a decree for dissolution of marriage under the Muslim Law. Tuberculosis by and large is a disease which is curable. As a faithful wife it was rather her duty to look after the husband if he was suffering from this disease. Precautions are possible to avoid contracting the disease from another person. The fact that the parties were married in the year 1969 and even in 1983 the defendant-respondent is alive is enough indication of the fact that the disease is no more a fatal disease and is certainly curable. It was for this reason that the Legislature in its wisdom did not think it proper to include tuberculosis as a disease which could form the basis for dissolution of marriage. In Pramilabala's case referred to above, the wife's stay in the house of her husband was rendered almost impossible because of the ill-treatment meted out to her by her mother-in-law. The mother-in-law was not only herself ill-treating her but had also poisoned the ears of her son against his wife. Moreover, the husband was not even against his wife. Moreover, the husband was not even living in the house and the wife had to spend her time with her mother-in-law who had made her life miserable. The cruelty in that case was therefore, entirely of a different kind. Another case relied upon by the learned counsel was Balbir Kaur v. Dhir Dass, AIR 1979 Punjab and Haryana 162. In that case the. wife was refused medical treatment. She was turned out of the house the day she arrived there. False allegations were levelled against her. She was kept in illegal detention and all these acts cumulatively considered amounted to legal cruelty. 7. ANOTHER case relied upon was Bijoli Chaudhry v. Sukomal Chaudhry, AIR 1979 Calcutta 87. That again was a case of mental cruelty on account of the behaviour of the wife with the husband. False allegations were levelled against her. She was kept in illegal detention and all these acts cumulatively considered amounted to legal cruelty. 7. ANOTHER case relied upon was Bijoli Chaudhry v. Sukomal Chaudhry, AIR 1979 Calcutta 87. That again was a case of mental cruelty on account of the behaviour of the wife with the husband. However, on facts the matter could not be proved in that case but it has no application to the facts of the present case where we are considering whether the husband's suffering from a particular ailment will amount to such a mental or physical cruelty to the wife as could be legitimate ground for her to seek dissolution of the marriage. As already observed, neither the law as codified has recognised this as a valid ground for dissolution of marriage nor the Muslim Law applicable to the parties contains any provision to justify such a decree. Moreover, the disease is curable and as a faithful wife it was rather her duty to help her husband in receiving proper treatment and getting cured of the disease. 8. LEARNED counsel for the respondent argued that after the codification of the law the plaintiff could not secure dissolution of marriage on any other extraneous ground and he has relied upon the case of K. C. Moyin y. Nafessa, AIR 1973 Kerala 176. Although the facts in that case were different and the marriage was sought to be repudiated by the customary mode of Faskh but principle laid down was that in order to secure dissolution of the marriage one or more of the grounds mentioned in the aforesaid Act of 1939 had to be made out. In any view of the matter therefore, no case has been made out for a decree being passed and the findings of the courts below are perfectly valid. The appeal has, therefore, no force and is accordingly dismissed. In the particular circumstances of the case the parties shall bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed.