JUDGMENT Kaushal Kishore, Member. - This is a plaintiff's second appeal against the judgment and decree dated January 24, 1979 by the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Division, Pauri, confirming the judgment and decree by the learned trial court dated December 31, 1977 in a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Both the courts below had agreed that the claim of the plaintiff was not established and the suit stood dismissed. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. 3. The facts of the case in brief are that Pirthu and Nakta sons of Deodatt were Maurusidars of the land in dispute and Kalu son of Kuktu was Khaikar. In 1944, Kalu gave this land to Darshan Singh as Sirtan on two conditions that (1) he would pay rent and (2) he would look after Kalu and his wife who were old. In 1947, Kalu died and Darshan Singh, the plaintiff-appellant continued to pay rent, now to Bauri the widow of Kalu. In 1957, Bauri decided to surrender the land to Maurusidars, executed exhibits 9 and 10 two documents to allow Darshan Singh to become Sirtan direct to the Maurusidars with effect from December 10, 1957. From July 1, 1969, Kumaon and Uttara-khand Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act was enforced, in 1972. Mst. Bauri died, on January 7, 1975, the S.D.O. approved under Section 194 of the Act the compromise between the Gaon Sabha and Darshan Singh who has continued in possession as Sirtan, but on remand on July 31, 1976, the S.D.O. declared the land belonging to the State under Section 194 of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. Thus aggrieved, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration but it was dismissed throughout, placing reliance on the order dated July 31, 1976. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the order dated July 31, 1976 under Section 194 of the act was only an executive action, no judicial order is required or provided under this section and no appeal against such order is provided and that it was wrongly relied upon. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the order dated July 31, 1976 under Section 194 of the act was only an executive action, no judicial order is required or provided under this section and no appeal against such order is provided and that it was wrongly relied upon. He further argued that under Section 10(1) a Sirtan becomes Asami on vesting and on completion of 12 years as Sirtan before vesting, he would have become Khaikar and so Bhumidhar after vesting and that only few months were left in completing 12 years as Sirtan and in view of the provision in Chapter IV Rule 32 of the Bhumi Sambandhi Adhikar Niyam prevailing before vesting, the khaikar rights of Dharshan Singh must be deemed to have matured. From the side of the State, the learned D.G.C.(R.) repelled the grounds taken and relied upon by the learned Commissioner. 5. I find that the learned Commissioner has not relied upon Exs. 9 and 10 because these documents are not registered. No law was shown in support of the view that these documents settling a Sirtan must be registered. The oral evidence of Pirthu confirmed the conferment of Sirtanship on Darshan Singh on behalf of both the maurusidars. While the learned trial court failed in proper interpretation of these two documents, the learned Commissioner did not accept at all these documents, being unregistered. It is settled law that no registration of a paper of settlement of tenancy is required, it can even be oral. Besides it is matter relating to Tehri Garhwal State Land Laws applicable in 1957 and they required no registration. Ex. 9 and 10 when combined can only be interpreted as appellant being made direct Sirtan of maurusidars, further affirmed by Pirthu maurusidar. 6. I am also of the view that undue reliance was placed on the order dated July 31, 1976, supposed to have been passed under Section 194 of the Act. This section does not find place in Schedule II (Section 331) to the Act is without jurisdiction as it does not envisage any judicial proceedings, decision or appeal. It is all about executive function of the L.M.C. subject to decision under Section 229-B of the Act in a regular suit if filed. In fact, both the orders dated January 7, 1975 and July 31, 1976 were executive and could not have any binding effect. It is all about executive function of the L.M.C. subject to decision under Section 229-B of the Act in a regular suit if filed. In fact, both the orders dated January 7, 1975 and July 31, 1976 were executive and could not have any binding effect. Obviously, reliance on the order was wrongly placed. Rather, for a proper decision, oral evidence and documentary evidence including the Exhibits and order dated January 7, 1975 should have been considered. The findings of the courts below being based on partial evidence, on documents not admissible as evidence and on mis-interpretation, are liable to be interfered with in this second appeal. 7. Lastly, the note to Rule 32 of the aforesaid Adhikar Niyam says that if a Sirtan is improperly dispossessed within the currency of such year in which he would have gained Khaikari rights, then such dis-possession will not bar his acquisition of Khaikari rights and the balance period of his dis-possession will be counted towards his period of possession. This provision has been missed by both the courts below and by its non-consideration, they failed to appreciate that inspite of vesting taking place on July 1, 1969, ending the Sirtanship, the bound to be extended to the end of his 12th possession of Darshan Singh as Sirtan was year of possession as Sirtan i.e. upto December 10, 1969 (by 5 months and 10 days) and Khaikar rights could not be denied to him. With his Khaikar rights matured before vesting, the appellant became Sirdar after vesting and he is entitled to a declaration of his Bhumidhari rights. 8. In view of the above, this appeal is allowed with costs throughout, the judgment and decree by the learned Commissioner dated January 24, 1979 is hereby set aside and the suit is decreed for Bhumidhari rights of the appellant on the land in dispute.