JUDGMENT : R.C. Patnaik, J. - This is a Defendants' second against a decree granted by the Additional Subordinate Cuttack reversing the dismissal of the suit by the Munsif. 2. The suit was one for a declaration that the termination of the service of the Plaintiff was illegal and for a declaration that he was continuing in service and was entitled to all claims and benefits treating his service as continuing and other reliefs. The Plaintiff averred that he was appointed temporarily as a Primary Investigator in the Bureau Statistics and Economics on 31-10-1958. Some months after his joining the post, he was affected by Hearnia. He applied for leave for undergoing surgical operation. His prayer, however, was not granted and he was directed to appear before the Assistant Surgeon, Cuttack, for examination. In August, 1959, he was asked by the Director of Bureau of Statistics and Economics if he had taken any steps for undergoing surgical operation as advised by the Assistant Surgeon. The reply of the Plaintiff was that at no point of time he had been intimated that he was to undergo any operation. He further intimated that he was regularly attending office despite his ailment. He under went the operation thereafter and on 7-10-1959 submitted his joining report. On 3-11-1959, he was served with an order intimating him that his services had been terminated with effect from 1-9-1959. His contention was that the order of termination was punitive in character and violated Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and principles of natural justice. In appeal, the order of termination was modified by Government the termination was to take effect from 3-11-1959, i.e., the date of service of the order and not from 1-9-1959. 3. The plea of the Defendants-Appellants in gist was that the Plaintiff had been appointed on temporary basis. He had no right to the post. The termination was without any stigma and was a termination simpliciter in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment. It was further pleaded that the suit instituted on 19-12-1973 when the cause of action arose on 3-11-1959 was barred by limitation. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the order of termination was not bad and the suit was barred by limitation. It was further pleaded that the suit instituted on 19-12-1973 when the cause of action arose on 3-11-1959 was barred by limitation. 4. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that the order of termination was not bad and the suit was barred by limitation. In appeal a decree was granted to the Plaintiff on the findings that the termination on account of over-staying leave was a termination from service for misconduct and was a punishment and was violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, and the suit was not barred by limitation. 5. Mr. R.K. Patra, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the Appellants, urged that the order of termination as per exhibit-8 was a termination simpliciter in accordance with the terms and conditions of the appointment as per Exhibit. 4. No stigma was attributed. The order was not a punishment and, therefore, did not violate the principles of natural justice or Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Secondly, objection was raised by him to the manner the suit had been framed. It was contended that though the Plaintiff sought a declaration that the termination of his service was illegal, no consequent ion relief was claimed. A declaratory relief was not available to be granted when consequential relief was available and was not asked for. Thirdly, he urged that in view of the subsequent event, namely, the death of the original Plaintiff and substitution of his legal representatives in his place, the main relief was no longer available and in the absence of any claim for any consequential relief, the entire suit was liable to be dismissed. 6. To meet the aforesaid challenge to the maintainability of the suit, the learned Counsel for the Respondents filed an application under Order 7, Rule 7 of the CPC making a prayer for moulding the relief according to the facts and circumstances of the case and stating that the Respondents were ready and willing to pay the court-fee if monetary entitlement of the deceased Plaintiff was determined by the court. 7. Mr. Rath, learned Counsel for the Respondents, urged that the termination was not a termination simpliciter but was on account of alleged misconduct which could be gleaned by lifting the veil and probing deeper. 8. Objection as to the frame of the suit may be considered first. 7. Mr. Rath, learned Counsel for the Respondents, urged that the termination was not a termination simpliciter but was on account of alleged misconduct which could be gleaned by lifting the veil and probing deeper. 8. Objection as to the frame of the suit may be considered first. The original Plaintiff, though he was entitled to consequential relief did not specifically ask for it. The reliefs were couched as under: (a) That upon a finding that the termination of service of the Plaintiff to be continuing in service and is entitled to get all claims and benefits according to law treating his service to be continuing. (b) That any other relief or reliefs to which the Plaintiff will be found entitled under law and equity be also given and the costs of the suit be also given. The Plaintiff valued his suit at Rs. 100/- and paid the fixed court-fee prescribed for declaratory relief. No claim was made in respect of a definite sum as the Plaintiffs entitlement. Had such relief been claimed the suit would have been valued differently and the court-fee would have been payable also on the sums so claimed. That is to say, court-fee would have been paid on the consequential relief claimed If with a view to avoiding payment of court-fee reliefs were couched in the manner done, objection was available to be raised by the Defendants to the frame of the suit. Now that the original Plaintiff is dead, the first relief is not available to the legal representatives. Their present plea for modulating the relief by determining the sum payable and determination of their liability as regards court-fee is not sustainable. As a matter of fact, there is no material on the basis whereof such a determination is possible. Such an aspect was not present to the mind of the Plaintiff. So, the monetary relief now claimed was not pleaded specifically nor was any evidence adduced. I am fortified in my view by a decision of the Patna High Court in Banta Singh Vs. National Coal Development Corporation and Another. There, besides the declaration, the relief sought was: "That the Plaintiff be paid his salary from the date of suspension to the date of the re-instatement". It was held by Mohapatra, J.: ...He did not ask for any sum of money to be decreed to him. National Coal Development Corporation and Another. There, besides the declaration, the relief sought was: "That the Plaintiff be paid his salary from the date of suspension to the date of the re-instatement". It was held by Mohapatra, J.: ...He did not ask for any sum of money to be decreed to him. Even if we take the word 'salary' used in his relief portion in the sense of compensation it cannot be said that he asked for any definite sum of money by that way. But a suit for a mere declaration without asking for the other relief to which the Plaintiff is entitled as a consequence thereto is not maintainable under the provision of Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act (Section 34 of Act 47 of 1963).... He had valued his suit at Rs. 960/- for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction but he had not asked for a decree for relief either by way of salary or compensation Unfortunately he did not ask for it.... Mr. Rath relief upon Paul Chand Bishan Dass and Others Vs. Kalu Ram Lachhman Dass and Others. This is a case where the Plaintiff had brought a suit for recovery of Rs. 576/- as arrears of rent and compensation for use. The lower appellate court found that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and dismissed the suit holding that the Plaintiff was not entitled to the amount as arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation could not be awarded in the alternative. The High Court reversed the decision holding that no doubt there was no prayer for award of damages of account of use and occupation of the premises but the court could mould the relief and pass a decree for damages for use and occupation. This case has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Plaintiff there had claimed a specific amount, though as rent. The High Court granted him a decree for the said amount as damages for use and occupation when it was found that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. 9. In this present case, the Plaintiff did not value die monetary relief at all. The suit was a declaratory one, pure and simple, though a relief had been claimed, albeit vaguely, for such amount as the Plaintiff might be entitled. 9. In this present case, the Plaintiff did not value die monetary relief at all. The suit was a declaratory one, pure and simple, though a relief had been claimed, albeit vaguely, for such amount as the Plaintiff might be entitled. I have already said that no evidence was adduced claiming any specific amount. I, therefore, uphold the objection of the learned Additional Government Advocate the maintainability of the suit. 10. Coming to the first point urged by the learned Counsel for the Appellants it is seen that the order of termination as per Ext. 8 is an innocuous order. No stigma is cast. It does not indicate that the order was by way of punishment. The order of appointment, Ext. 4 goes to indicate that the appointment of the original Plaintiff was of temporary character. He had no right to the post. The decision of this Court in Jaladhar Sha v. The Chief Conservator of Forests (K.L.) and Ors. O.J.C. No. 795 of 1977-Dd. on 8-1-1982, is applicable, being on all fours. An earlier decision in Jugal Kishore Mangaraj Vs. State of Orissa and Others was relied upon therein, In Jugal Kishore Mangaraj Vs. State of Orissa and Others, it was held that the applicant's delinquency in absenting himself from duty without appropriate leave was a motive and not foundation for the order of termination. In Jaladhar Sha's case O.J.C No. 795 of 1977-Dd. on 8-1-1982 it was held that the absence of the Petitioner without appropriate leave was a motive and not foundation. The contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that the order was a termination simpliciter and was not punitive in character finds favour with me and I reverse the decision of the lower appellate court, set aside the decree granted by it and restore the dismissal of the suit. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed. In the facti and circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed