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1983 DIGILAW 77 (ALL)

Bhagwan Singh v. State of U. P.

1983-01-24

V.N.MISRA

body1983
JUDGMENT V.N. Misra, J. - This is an application in revision by Bhagwan Singh, Smt. Gaini Devi, Smt. Yashoda Devi and Smt. Jawa Devi against the judgment and order dated February 12, 1982 of T.P. Mittal. Sessions Judge, Tehri Garhwal, in Criminal Revision No. 39 of 1981, by means of which he set aside the order of the learned Magitsrate discharging the applicants. 2. T heard this revision on August 2, 1982 and decided it. Since, however, the learned counsel for the applicant could not come to argue this revision, he made an application that the order passed against him be recalled. I heard him and recalled the order and the revision has again been placed before me for hearing. 3. The first point raised by the learned counsel for the applicant was that this revision against an order of Sessions Judge by a private person was not maintainable and he also cited Thakur Ram and others v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 911, in support of his contention. In that case it was held that in a case, which proceeds on police report, private party has no locus standi. Criminal law should not be used as an instrument of wrecking private vengeance by an aggrieved party against the person who, according to that party, had caused injury to it. Barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State which is the custodian of the social interests of the community at large and so it is for the State to take all the steps necessary for banging the person who has acted against the social interest of the community to book. There can be no denial that in cases initiated on a police report it is the State, who is the aggrieved party and a complainant has no locus standi to come to Court. But an order like the one under consideration in this revision was clearly perverse and rightly set aside by the learned Sessions Judge. 4. A perusal of the trial court's judgment shows that merely because of two discrepancies the learned Magistrate discharged the applicants under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and found the charge against them to be groundless. 4. A perusal of the trial court's judgment shows that merely because of two discrepancies the learned Magistrate discharged the applicants under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and found the charge against them to be groundless. These discrepancies were that in the first information report it was stated that when Diwan Singh reached the place of Marpit, his father Bhopal Singh had become unconscious, but this was not stated in his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 5. The other discrepancy was that in the first information report it was not stated that Bhopal Singh told his son that Rs. 1.500 which he was carrying, were snatched away, but he stated so, under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in his statement. It was not for the learned Magistrate to scrutinize evidence with such meticulous care and these two discrepancies could also be explained by Diwan Singh if he was examined. The learned Magistrate in his order stated that he saw the evidence placed before him, but this sort of general assertion was meaningless. He did not discuss the evidence of Bhopal Singh injured or of Bachan Singh, who were the "two main witnesses, who saw the occurrence. Then he did not consider the injury report of Bhopal Singh, which indicated that he received six injuries. If he received six injuries, then only the statement of Bhopal Singh was sufficient to frame a charge against the applicants and they could not be discharged under Section 239 Criminal Procedure Code by him. The order of the learned Sessions Judge, setting aside the order of the Magistrate and remanding the case back to him for trial according to law was, therefore, proper and I see no reason to interfere with it. 6. This revision fails and is hereby dismissed. Stay order dated March 29, 1981 passed by this Court is hereby vacated.