JUDGMENT N. D. Ojha, J. - These writ petitions are connected and are, as such being decided by a common judgment. Devi Lal who is respondent No. 2 in each of these two writ petitions is the landlord of a house. He is a washerman. The ground floor of this house has been in his possession and he has been using it for purposes of his vocation as a washerman His wife was employed in the Bhowali Sanatorium in the district of Nainital and in that connection she had been allowed residential accommodation. She along with respondent No. 2 and other members of her family had been residing in the accommodation so provided to her by the Bhowali Sanatorium. The second storey of the house owned by Devi Lal respondent No. 2 was let out to Ziaul Haq the petitioner in writ petition No. 8441 of 1481 and to Habihur Rahman, the petitioner in writ petition No. 634 of 1982. The accommodation in the tenancy of each of these two tenants comprised two rooms each apart from latrine, bathroom and kitchen. Two separate applications were made by respondent No 2, one against each of these two tenants for release of the accommodation in their tenancy under Section 21(l)(a) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Went and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that he needed the same bona file for his own residential purposes. His case was that his wife had retired from service on 30-6-199 and the authorities of the Bhowali Sanatorium were pressing her to vacate the residential accommodation occupied by her consequent upon her retirement from service. The case of respondent No. 2 further was that he had no other alternative accommodation and unless his applications for release were allowed he would be put to great hardship. 2. Each of the two tenants contested the claim of respondent No. 2 and by separate orders the Prescribed Authority dismissed the application made by respondent No. 2 under section 21 of the Act. Two appeals were filed by respondent No. 2 before the District Judge and both these appeals have been allowed by the Ist Additional District Judge, Nainital who has been arrayed as respondent No. 1 in each of these two writ petitions. Two appeals were filed by respondent No. 2 before the District Judge and both these appeals have been allowed by the Ist Additional District Judge, Nainital who has been arrayed as respondent No. 1 in each of these two writ petitions. Respondent No. 1 has held that the reed of respondent No. 2 for the accommodation in the tenancy of both the tenants was bona fide. He has also held that greater hardship would he caused to respondent No. 2 in the event of his application being dismissed than to the tenants on these applications being allowed. In regard to Habihur Rahman who is petitioner in writ petition No. 6344 of 1982 the Prescribed Authority as well as the Additional District Judge has held that his defence, was barred by Explanation (1) to Section 21 of the Act inasmuch as his wife had already constructed a three storeyed house at Bhowali itself and consequently he was not entitled to object to the claim of respondent No. 2. The Prescribed Authority had, even after recording a finding that the defence of Habihur Rahman was barred by Explanation (1) to Section 21 of the Act, dismissed the application for release on the finding that the need of respondent No. 2 was not bona fide. The Additional District Judge has agreed with the finding of the Prescribed Authority in regard to the defence of Habibur Rahman being barred by Explanation (1) to Section 21 of the Act but has reversed its finding on the question of the need of respondent No. 2 being bonafide. He has, as already pointed out above, held that the need of respondent No. 2 was bona fide. The tenants have filed these two connected writ petitions challenging the orders of the Additional District Judge allowing the two applications made by respondent No. 2 under Section 21 of the Act. 3. It has been urged by the counsel for the petitioners in these two writ petitions that the need of the landlord respondent was not bona fide and the Additional District Judge has erred in taking a contrary view. 4. Having considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners. I find it difficult to accept the same. 3. It has been urged by the counsel for the petitioners in these two writ petitions that the need of the landlord respondent was not bona fide and the Additional District Judge has erred in taking a contrary view. 4. Having considered the submissions made by the counsel for the petitioners. I find it difficult to accept the same. A perusal of the impugned orders indicates that the Additional District Judge has recorded a finding on this question on an appraisal of the evidence and on the face of it the said finding is it finding of fact. He has taken into consideration the circumstance, which is certainly of significance, that the wife of the landlord respondent who was in service in the Bhowali Sanatorium and had been provided with a residential accommodation where she was living with her husband and other members of the family, has retired from service and had been required by the authorities of the Bhowali Sanatorium to vacate the accommodation at her disposal. He has also taken this into consideration that except the house, a part of which was let out to the petitioners, the landlord respondent had no other alternative accommodation where he could reside with the members of his family. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 46 it was held that the finding about the bona fide need of the landlord was a finding of fact and could not be disturbed in a writ petition. 5. Counsel for the petitioners urged that the landlord respondent had already 3 rooms at his disposal in the ground floor of the house and that should have been held to be sufficient for his residential requirements. A similar submission was made before the Additional District Judge also and was repelled. It appears, as pointed out above that the accommodation in the ground floor of the house was in occupation of the landlord even at the time when he along with the members of his family was living in the residential accommodation allotted to his wife during her employment in the Bhowali Sanatorium. The accommodation in the ground floor was used by the petitioner for earning his livelihood as a washerman. The accommodation in the ground floor was used by the petitioner for earning his livelihood as a washerman. The Additional District Judge in this behalf has held that the entire accommodation at the disposal of the landlord in the ground floor was absolutely required for carrying on his dry cleaning business by the landlord respondent. He has pointed out, and in my opinion rightly, that the dry cleaning business necessarily requires sufficient accommodation for washing, pressing and storing the clothes. The Additional District Judge has also held that the landlord could not he compelled to use the accommodation in the ground floor of the house for residential purposes because he could not do so except at the rick of running his business of dry cleaning which was the only source of his livelihood. This finding is again a finding of fact based on appraisal of evidence and in view of this finding it cannot he said that the accommodation in the ground floor of the house at the disposal of the landlord respondent was such on the basis of which the application feu release deserved to be dismissed. 6. Coming to the question of comparative hardship, the case of each of the two petitioners may be considered separately. In so far as the case of Ziaul Haq is concerned, the Additional District Judge has pointed out that the tenant had alternative accommodation for storing fruits inasmuch as he had two other godowns in his tenancy and he had no pressing need of the disputed accommodation for that purpose. In regard to his need for the disputed accommodation for residential purposes, the Additional District Judge has held that he has his permanent residence at Rampur where he has got his own house and comes to Bhowali only in fruit season. He has further held that as compared to the residential difficulty of the tenant at Bhowali during the fruit season the misery and hardship of the landlord, who was a person of meagre means, was much more and that it would be easier for the tenant to search out some small accommodation for his residence at Bhowali during Print season than for the landlord to search out a suitable accommodation for himself who has to live with the members of his family permanently at Bhowali. 7. 7. In regard to the other tenant, Habibur Rahman as already seen above the Prescribed Authority and the Additional District Judge have both held that lie had already constructed at Bhowali itself a three storeyed building and consequently his defence was barred by Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act. His counsel has urged that the said building was not a residential building and as such Explanation (i) was not attracted. I shall consider this argument a little later. At this state it is sufficient to point out that in his written statement, a copy of whereof has been filed as Annexure 3 to his writ petition, Habibur Rahman in regard to the building constructed by him, has stated that the said building was a very a small one and contains only one residential set of two very small rooms. Even in the accommodation in question the tenant has only two rooms. On his own admission there is at least one residential set of two rooms in the three storeyed building constructed by him and as such for determining the question of hardship the existence of the said building is certainly an important circumstance. Once the need of the landlord has been found to he bona fide and the tenant is found to have constructed a three storeyed building in which there is a residential set containing almost similar accommodation to the accommodation which he is occupying as a tenant, it cannot be said that greater hardship would be caused to the tenant in the event of the application for release being allowed than the hardship likely to be caused to the landlord on the said application being dismissed. 8. Coming to the submission made by the counsel for the petitioner, Habibur Rahman that the three storeyed building constructed by him was not a residential building and as such Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act was not attracted, reference may again be made to paragraph 2 of his written statement already referred to above. At least the residential set of two rooms in the aforesaid building is certainly a residential building and in view of the construction of that residential set Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act was apparently applicable. At least the residential set of two rooms in the aforesaid building is certainly a residential building and in view of the construction of that residential set Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act was apparently applicable. That apart I am of opinion that the question as to whether Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act was applicable or not is on the fists of the instant case only academic. That Explanation provides that where the tenant or any member of his family who was normally residing with him or is wholly dependent on him has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state or has got vacated after acquisition a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area, no objection by the tenant against an application for release of a residential building shall be entertained. In other words it shuts out the defence of the tenant. In the instant case however, the tenant had not been shut out from contesting the application made by the landlord for release of the accommodation. On the other hand he was permitted to file written statement and to lead evidence in support of his case that the need of the landlord was not bona fide. The Prescribed Authority accepted his case but the Additional District Judge has repelled the contention raised by him in this behalf and it is in this view of the matter that I am of the opinion that the question as to whether Explanation (i) to Section 21 of the Act was applicable or not is only academic so far the facts of this case are concerned. It can however, not be denied that even if Explanation (i) was not attracted, the existence of the building having a residential set containing almost similar accommodation to the accommodation in question was certainly a crucial circumstance for deciding the question of comparative hardship. 9. At this place it may also be pointed out that the finding on the question of comparative hardship based on appraisal of evidence is also a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. At this place it may also be pointed out that the finding on the question of comparative hardship based on appraisal of evidence is also a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If authority were needed for this proposition reference may he made to Muni Lal and others v. Prescribed Authority and others, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29, it was then urged that while considering the application for release against Hahibur Rahman the circumstance that the application for release filed against Ziaul Haq had already been allowed by him, should have been taken into consideration by the Additional District Judge for determining the question as to whether the application for release against Habibur Rahman also deserves to be allowed or not. Counsel for the petitioner has as placed reliance on several decisions wherein it has been held that if during the pendency of an application for release against a particular tenant the landlord gets possession over some other building, this subsequent event has to be taken into consideration for deciding the question as to whether the need of the landlord, not withstanding his getting possession over the other accommodation, was still bona fide or not. Since the law on the point is well settled I do not consider it necessary to refer to the various decisions relied on by the counsel for the petitioner. 10. The question which however, falls for consideration in the instant case is as to whether because of the accommodation which the landlord respondent is likely to get in the event of the accommodation occupied by Ziaul Haq being vacated, his need would be satisfied and it would not he necessary to grant the application for release against the other tenant Habibur Rahman. the order allowing the application for release made against Ziaul Haq is under challenge in writ petition No. 8443 of 1981 as already pointed out above. It is not a case in which that order has become final and the landlord i.e. has got possession over the said accommodation. Here both the tenants have come up to this Court challenging the order of the Additional District Judge allowing the applications for release made against them. As such it while deciding these two writ petitions that the question raised by the counsel for the petitioner Habibur Rahman has to be considered. Here both the tenants have come up to this Court challenging the order of the Additional District Judge allowing the applications for release made against them. As such it while deciding these two writ petitions that the question raised by the counsel for the petitioner Habibur Rahman has to be considered. I am aware that normally the question as to whether what is the extent of the accommodation which would he sufficient to meet the need of the landlord is to be decided by the fact finding authorities and not by this Court in a writ petition. However, this is not an absolute rule and the proposition of law cannot be disputed that if the necessary material is already on the record and if the circumstances of a particular case require to do so, this Court is not precluded from considering the said question. In my opinion in the instant case the necessary material is already on the record and the circumstances are also such that it would not be in the ends of justice to prolong the litigation by remanding the case to the Additional District Judge for consideration of this question alone. The landlord respondent is a washer man and the Additional District Judge has found him to be a man of meagre resources. So far as the tenant Hahibur Rahman is concerned, he has already constructed a three storeyed building in the same locality which also contains a residential set as already pointed out above. The landlord respondent has his wife and two grown up daughters. He had also a brother and a brother's son, who was married. His brother and brother's son have both died. The brother's son has left a widow and three children as is apparent from the order of the Additional District Judge. It has further been held by the Additional District Judge that the widowed daughter-in-law of the landlord's deceased brother and her three children have been living with the landlord respondent and were solely dependent upon him. The brother's son has left a widow and three children as is apparent from the order of the Additional District Judge. It has further been held by the Additional District Judge that the widowed daughter-in-law of the landlord's deceased brother and her three children have been living with the landlord respondent and were solely dependent upon him. Relying on a decision of this Court in Smt. Kamla Ahuja v. Vlth Additional District Judge, Meerut and others, 1981 A.R.C. 371, the Additional District Judge has further held that even though the widowed daughter-in-law of the landlord-respondent's deceased brother and her three children may not come in the definition of the term 'family' as contained in the Act, but since they were staying with the landlord permanently the need of the landlord will be there to accommodate them also and while considering the need of the landlord the need of these persons had also to be considered. The accommodation in the ground floor of the house has already been found to be sufficient only for the requirements of the landlord to carry on his dry cleaning business which is the only source of his livelihood. The additional income which the landlord was getting in view of the employment of his wife in Bhowali Sanatorium is now not available to him on account of her retirement from service. Only two rooms are in the tenancy of Ziaul Haq likewise only two rooms are in the tenancy of Habibur Rahman, of course apart from the kitchen, latrine and bath-room. The question which falls for consideration, therefore, is whether these four rooms can he said to In more than absolutely necessary to meet the requirements of the landlord. The two grown up daughters of the landlord cannot certainly reside in the same room in which the landlord may reside with his wife. Likewise the widowed daughter-in-law of the landlord's brother also will need a separate room. In the release application' which was filed in the year 1979 and a copy of which has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition of Habihur Rahman the age of her three children were shown as 12, 8 and 7 years respectively. Now they would he aged about 16, 11 and 10 years respectively. They also will need at least one room even if all of them are required to live together. Now they would he aged about 16, 11 and 10 years respectively. They also will need at least one room even if all of them are required to live together. In this way four rooms would hardly be sufficient even for the purpose of being used a bed rooms. It is well known that bed rooms alone do not constitute requirement of a family. Some other accommodation is also needed for various other purposes. Since there are only four rooms in the tenancy of both the tenants taken together it cannot he said that the accommodation which is likely to cone in the landlords' possession as a result of the application for release against Ziaul Haq being allowed, the need of the landlord would be fulfilled and he would not be in need of the two rooms in the tenancy of Habibur Rahman. In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that on the material on record it is established that the need of the landlord respondent would not be met if the application for release against any one of the two tenants alone is allowed. 11. Counsel for the petitioner also urged that Ziaul Haq had made an offer to vacate one of the two rooms in his tenancy and this circumstances should have been taken into consideration by the Additional District Judge. Since I have already pointed out above that even all the four rooms which are in the tenancy of both the tenants taken together, would be hardly sufficient to meet the needs of the landlord respondent, the offer made by Ziaul liaq to vacate one of the two rooms in his tenancy has no relevance. 12. Lastly, counsel for the petitioners urged on the basis of certain authorities that an application for release could not be allowed simply because the landlord desired to occupy his own building. It could be allowed only if his need was found to be bona fide, Since this proposition of law admits of no doubt I do not consider it necessary to refer to those decisions. Suffice it to say, so far as the merits of this submission are concerned that in the instant case the Additional District Judge has, as seen above, recorded a finding of fact on an appraisal of evidence that the need of the landlord respondent was bona fide. 13. Suffice it to say, so far as the merits of this submission are concerned that in the instant case the Additional District Judge has, as seen above, recorded a finding of fact on an appraisal of evidence that the need of the landlord respondent was bona fide. 13. In the result, I find no merit in any of these two writ petitions. They are accordingly dismissed with costs. Each of the two petitioners however, is granted one month's time from today's date to vacate the accommodation in this tenancy.