JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, J. - Finding a conflict between two Division Benches reported in Postal Seals Industrial Cooperative Society Limited, Aligarh v. Labour Court II, Lucknow 1971 (I) LLJ 327 and Krishna Mohan Singh v. Raton Steel Limited, Lohta Varanasi 1973 (26) Indian Factories and Labour Reports 418, the present reference has been made to the Full Bench. 2. The facts of the case needing to be stated for deciding the controversy lie in a narrow campus. The Petitioner was a registered firm carrying on the business of manufacturing metal utensils at Mirzapur. According to the Petitioner, it had a small workshop where nine persons were employed. Respondent No. 1, which is Bartan Nirmata Mazdoor Sabha, raised a demand for payment of bonus to the workmen for the year 1970-71. As the Petitioner firm did not agree to the payment of bonus on the ground that since it was not a factory, having in its employment less than twenty persons, there was no liability of payment of bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act. 3. The State Government being satisfied that a dispute existed between the Petitioner and Respondent No. 1, made a reference of the dispute referred to above to the Industrial Tribunal (I), Allahabad. The case was registered as Adjudication Case No. 65 of 1973. 4. On receipt of notice from the Industrial Tribunal, both the parties filed their written statements and rejoinders. The Petitioner firm, as stated above, asserted that it was not a factory and as the workmen employed were less than twenty, the Payment of Bonus Act did not apply to it. The Respondent No. 1 controverted the facts stated in the written statement of the Petitioner firm. 5. The Industrial Tribunal fixed 13th October, 1973, for hearing of the case. On the said date, the Petitioner's authorised representative could not appear on account of his illness. A request for adjournment made on behalf of the Petitioner firm was refused, and the Tribunal proceeded to hear the case exparte, and on that very date it passed an award. Thereupon, the Petitioner firm filed an application under Rule 16(2) duly supported by an affidavit on October 18, 1973, for setting aside the ex parte order and the award. A request for adjournment made on behalf of the Petitioner firm was refused, and the Tribunal proceeded to hear the case exparte, and on that very date it passed an award. Thereupon, the Petitioner firm filed an application under Rule 16(2) duly supported by an affidavit on October 18, 1973, for setting aside the ex parte order and the award. Through a letter dated October 20,1973, the Petitioner was informed that on 19th October, 1973, the application for setting aside the award had been rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to recall the same. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed the present writ in this Court. 6. On the ground on which the application for setting aside the ex parte order and the award could be made, the only question that arises for decision in this writ petition is whether the Tribunal committed an error in rejecting the application on the ground that it had no power to recall the same. For the view taken, the Tribunal had relied on the decision of this Court in Krishna Mohan Singh v. Ratan Steel Limited, Lohta, Varanasi (supra). 7. Since it may be useful to refer to some of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and the Rules framed thereunder for deciding the point referred to this Full Bench, we may make a very brief reference to the seme. Section 4K of the Act empowers the State Government to make a reference of any dispute between the workman and the employer for decision to a Labour Court or Tribunal, where the State Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists between them. Section 5C deals with procedure and powers of Labour Courts and Tribunals. Sub-section (3) of Section 5C provides that every Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the CPC in respect of matters enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e). Clause (e) of Sub-section (3) of Section 5C provides that the Tribunal shall follow the rules as may be framed, in respect of matters other than those covered, by Clauses (a) to (d). Clause (e) of Sub-section (3) of Section 5C provides that the Tribunal shall follow the rules as may be framed, in respect of matters other than those covered, by Clauses (a) to (d). Section 6 empowers the Tribunal or a Labour Court to which a matter is referred for adjudication by the State Government to decide the same by means of giving an award which is required to be submitted to the State Government afterwards. Under Sub-section (3), every award given by a Tribunal is to be published in such manner as the State Government may think fit within a period, of thirty cays from the date of .its-receipt. Sub-section (4) of Section 6 empowers the State Government to remit, the award for reconsideration. Under Sub-section (5), an award, published under Sub-section (3) would be final and is not liable to be questioned in any Court. Sub-section (6), however, confers power on the Labour Court or the Tribunal to correct clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the award or errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. Section 6A provides that an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication u/s 6. Section 6D deals with commencement and conclusion of proceedings. With regard to the conclusion, it provides that proceedings commenced before it on the reference of a dispute to adjudication shall be deemed to have concluded on the date on which the award becomes enforceable u/s 6A. In the Rules, the provisions, which are required to be referred, to, are Rules 16 and 21. As we have to interpret Rule 16 for deciding the reference made to the Full Bench, we quote the same: 16. Labour Court or Tribunal or Arbitrator may proceed ex-parte (1) If on the date fixed or on any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, any party to the proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal or an Arbitrator, is absent, though duly served with summons or having the notice of the date of hearing, the Labour Court or Tribunal or the Arbitrator as the case may be, may proceed with the case in his absence and pass such order as it may deem fit and proper. (2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator may set aside the order, passed against the party in his absence, if within ten days of such order the party applies in writing for setting aside such order and. shows sufficient cause for his absence. The Labour Court, Tribunal or an Arbitrator may require the party to file an affidavit, stating the cause of absence. As many copies of the application and. affidavit, if any, shall be filed by the party concerned, as there arc persons on the opposite side. Notice of the application shall be given to the opposite parties before setting aside the order. 8. Rule 21 lays down that in addition to the powers conferred by the Act, Labour Courts and Tribunals shall have the same powers as vested in a Civil Court under the CPC when trying a suit in respect of matters given in Clauses (a) to (c). 9. The case of the other side appears to be that since there is no specific provisions either in the Act or the Rules empowering a Labour Court or Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award, therefore, the application made by the Petitioner firm was not maintainable. In reality, the case of the other side was that the application made for recalling or setting aside the award was one for review and as for a review a specific provision is required, the application had been rightly rejected. 10. The scheme of the Act is to decide a dispute referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication after hearing the parties. But, in case on the date fixed any party to the proceedings before the Labour Court or Tribunal is absent, the Tribunal is empowered to proceed with the case in his absence and pass such order as it may think fit under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 16, Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 confers power on the Tribunal to set aside an order passed against a party in his absence if within ten days of such order the party applies for setting aside such order and shows sufficient cause for his absence. The view taken by this Court in Krishna Mohan Singh v. Paten Steel Limited, Lohta, Varanasi (supra) is that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 does not empower the Labour Court or Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award. The view taken by this Court in Krishna Mohan Singh v. Paten Steel Limited, Lohta, Varanasi (supra) is that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 does not empower the Labour Court or Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award. It was further found that under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16, what can be set aside is "order" and "award". There is a difference between an order and award, according to the view, taken in this case. 11. This does not appear to be a correct view. Under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16, it may be correct that the word used is "order", but once an order is set aside the necessary consequence is that the award given in pursuance of the decision of the Labour Court or Tribunal to proceed ex-parte would automatically fall down. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 16 is an enabling provision and, therefore, if sufficient cause has been shown by a party against whom the case has proceeded ex parte, the party would become entitled to be heard. If it becomes entitled to be heard, it necessarily follows that if any award has been given against him, that is liable to be set aside. It often happens that a Tribunal or Labour Court may make an order of proceeding with the case ex parte and thereafter on that very day it may give the award. On the view taken in the above case, Rule 16(2) would become nugatory. 12. It may be correct that the Act does not confer any power on the Labour Court or Tribunal to set aside an award once it has been finally made, but the Rules have to be read along with the Act. If read together, no power to recall an award given ex parte would be found lacking. 13. In Postal Seals Industrial Co-operative Society Limited, Aligarh v. Labour Court II, Lucknow(supra), after several adjournments, January 19, 1968, was fixed for hearing of the case and on that date the employers' representative refused to lead evidence. The Labour Court recorded the evidence of the workmen' and after hearing the arguments, gave the award on January 20, 1968. The question in this case was whether the Labour Court committed an error in not adjourning the case and further in making an ex-parte award. The Petitioner of that case had already filed a writ petition in the High Court. The question in this case was whether the Labour Court committed an error in not adjourning the case and further in making an ex-parte award. The Petitioner of that case had already filed a writ petition in the High Court. In that writ petition, the Petitioner added a relief for quashing the award. A Division Bench of this Court held that although the Labour Court may have sent the award to the State Government, but it still had the power to set aside the ex-parte order and recall the award if the Labour Court is satisfied that the party was absent for sufficient cause. 14. Recently, the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and Others, AIR 1981 SC 606 , had the occasion to consider a similar controversy arising out of a dispute referred to under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central), which is in pari materia with the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After analysing the provisions of the Act, the. Supreme Court observed: The proceedings with regard to a reference u/s 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of thirty days from the publication of the award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto that date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with the reference in dispute. That stage is not reached till the award becomes enforceable u/s 17A. 15. In the instant case, the Tribunal gave the ex-parte award on 13th October, 1973. Before the expiry of ten days, an application for setting aside the order and the award was made by the Petitioner on 18th October, 1973. The award had not been and could not be published. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the application for setting aside the order and the award. On that date the Tribunal had not been rendered functus officio. It committed an error in holding that since the award had been sent to the Government, it ceased to have jurisdiction to recall the same. 16. Rule 16(1), under which the Tribunal has the power to proceed ex-parte, should be read as containing within itself the power to set aside the order also. It committed an error in holding that since the award had been sent to the Government, it ceased to have jurisdiction to recall the same. 16. Rule 16(1), under which the Tribunal has the power to proceed ex-parte, should be read as containing within itself the power to set aside the order also. In this regard, the Supreme Court observed in the case noted above: The power to proceed ex-parte under Rule 22 carries with it the power to enquire whether or not there was sufficient cause for the absence of a party at the hearing. 17. As held by the Supreme Court in a matter like the present, every Tribunal should be deemed in law to be endowed with such ancillary or incidental power as may enable it to discharge its functions effectively for the purpose of achieving the object of its creation. 18. We are, therefore, of opinion that Krishna Mohan Singh v. Ratan Steel Limited, Lohta, Varanasi (supra) does not lay down the correct law. We, accordingly, overrule the same. 19. The ex-parte award dated 13th October, 1973, was published by the State Government in the U.P. Gazette dated 19-1-1974 under Notification No. 7611-(ST)/XXXVII-1018(ST)-72, dated 17-12-1973. In the view of our finding that the Industrial Tribunal had jurisdiction to set aside the ex-parte order dated 13th October, 1973, and it committed patent error in rejecting the Petitioner's application for recalling the order, the award is liable to be quashed. 20. In the circumstances, we allow the petition and quash the order dated 19th October, 1973, as well as the award as published in the U.P. Gazette on 17-12-1973. The Industrial Tribunal is directed to hear and decide the Petitioner's application dated 18th October, 1973, in accordance with law. The parties shall bear their own costs.