JUDGMENT K. N. Singh, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner has claimed relief for the issue of a mandamus to the respondents directing them to make payment of pension and other pensionary benefits including gratuity, family pension and dearness allowance in accordance with the latest Government orders. 2. The petitioner joined service in the High Court in 1936 as Upper division Assistant, After working in the office in various capacities he was promoted to the Post of Assistant Registrar of the Court in 1960 and in 1962 he was promoted to the post of Deputy' Registrar. After rendering 41 years of service the petitioner on attaining the age of superannuation retired from service as Deputy Registrar in the afternoon of March 31, 1977. On his retirement the petitioner was accorded pension of Rs. 557/- per mensem with Rs. 20/- as dearness allowance in accordance with the provisions of the U. P. Liberalised Pension Rules, 1961, read with the Government order dated June 2, 1965. The petitioner was paid a sum of Rs. 19,575/- as death cum retirement gratuity under the U.P. Retirement Benefit Rules, 1961. Under the new Family Pension Scheme, 1965, an amount of Rs. 150/- was sanctioned as family pension. The State Government by its order dated September 7, 1979, changed the formula for calculation of pension as a result of which an enhanced amount of pension became payable to those Government servant, who retired from service on or after March 31, 1979. The Government further provided additional dearness allowance which was included in pay for the purpose of calculating pension and death cum retirement gratuity. By another Government order dated 10-5-1978 the amount of death cum retirement gratuity was revised which laid down that the pensionary benefits being in the nature of social security scheme the Government was of the opinion that there should be no deduction from the amount of gratuity determined in accordance with the rules. By this order the amount of family pension was revised and increased and the maximum ceiling limit was raised to Rs. 250/-. 3. By this order the amount of family pension was revised and increased and the maximum ceiling limit was raised to Rs. 250/-. 3. According to the modified rules and the Government orders the petitioner became entitled to higher amount of pension, dearness allowance, gratuity and his family also became entitled to a higher amount of family pension, but none of these benefits are available to the petitioner or his family as the Government order dated 7-9-1979 specifically states that the benefit of revised scale of pension is applicable to those Government servants who retired on or after 31st March, 1979. Similarly, the benefit of increased amount of death cute retirement gratuity and the family pension are available to those who retired from service with effect from January 1, 1978. Similarly, the benefit of enhanced amount of family pension is available to the family members of the Government servants who retired from service on or after 1-1-1978. In view of the directions contained in the revised rules and orders the petitioner is being denied the benefit of the higher emoluments. 4. There is considerable difference in the amount of pension, gratuity and family pension calculated in accordance with the rules and the Government orders prevailing at the time of the petitioner's retirement and those in accordance with the revised orders. These are as under: Old Rules and Orders Revised Rules and Orders 1. Pension Rs. 557 Rs. 658 2. D. A. Rs. 24/- Rs. 147 3. Gratuity Rs. 19,575/- Rs. 22,725 4. Family Pension Rs. 150/- Rs. 250/- The State Government by its order dated 25th June, 1979, prescribed formula for calculation of pension and death cum retirement gratuity. Revised Family Pension Rules were enforced with effect from July 1, 1979. By Government order dated November 20, 1980, the State Government directed that dearness and additional dearness allowance he merged in the pay for the purposes of calculating the pension cum retirement gratuity. These. benefits are available to those only who retired from service on or after July 1, 1979. The petitioner having retired before July 1, 1979, is again denied the benefit of revised orders. 5. The petitioner, who appeared in person, submitted that in denying the revised scale of pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity and family pension to the petitioner the State Government has practised discrimination. The petitioner having retired before July 1, 1979, is again denied the benefit of revised orders. 5. The petitioner, who appeared in person, submitted that in denying the revised scale of pension, death-cum-retirement gratuity and family pension to the petitioner the State Government has practised discrimination. He urged that the State Government has created two classes of pensioners, those who retired on or before 31st March, 1979, or 'n other specified dates as mentioned in the Government orders and those who retired from service thereafter. The classification made by the Government on the basis of date of retirement has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved and as such the same is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 6. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it is asserted that no discrimination has been made, those pensioners who retired from service on or before the specified date formed one class and those who retired thereafter formed a different class. The pension, gratuity and family pension and other pensionary benefits are accorded to the retired Government servants in accordance with the Government orders which were in force on the dale of their retirement. The classification is reasonable and it does not suffer from the vice of discrimination. 7. Article 14 secures equality. By this Article the State is enjoined to ensure equality to citizens in all respects. Article 14 forbids class legislation, but it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation provided the classification is founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes per sons or things which are grouped together from those left out of the group and the differentia has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. It is imperative that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act, rule or order under consideration. See Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578 , Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538 and Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, AIR 1981 SC 1829 . The Supreme Court again in Re Special Courts Bill, AIR 1979 SC 478 , reaffirmed these principles and it held that the principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. The Supreme Court again in Re Special Courts Bill, AIR 1979 SC 478 , reaffirmed these principles and it held that the principle underlying the guarantee of Article 14 is that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. Equal laws would have to be applied to all in the same situation and there should be no discrimination between one person and another if as regards the subject matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. If the law is sought to be justified on the basis of classification, it must pass two conditions; namely, that the classification is founded on intelligible differentia and, secondly, that the differentia has rational relation with the object sought to be achieved. 8. The above principles were laid down while considering the validity of a law made by legislature, but those principles apply with full force to executive orders also. The State is enjoined by Article 14 to ensure equality not only in legislative matters but also in executive side. An executive order must also withstand the test of equality as enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution. In D. S. Nakara v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 130 (Para 16) the Supreme Court held: "Legislative and executive action may accordingly be sustained if it satisfies the twin tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle correlated to the object sought to be achieved. The Slate, therefore, would have to affirmatively satisfy the Court that the twin tests have been satisfied It can only he satisfied if the State establishes not only the rational principle on which classification is founded but correlates it to the objects sought to be achieved." 9. The question arises whether the classification of pensioners as made by the State Government on the basis of their retirement before or after the specified dates is reasonable and whether it has any nexus with the object sought to be achieved. While considering this question it is necessary to keep in mind the object underlying the grant of pension. In Deoki Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1409 it was held that pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet-will and pleasure of the Government, on the other hand the right to pension is valuable right vested in the Government servant. In Deoki Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1971 SC 1409 it was held that pension is not a bounty payable on the sweet-will and pleasure of the Government, on the other hand the right to pension is valuable right vested in the Government servant. It is property under Article 31 and also under Article 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution. In State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh, AIR 1976 SC 667 it was held that pension is not only compensation for loyal services rendered in the past but it has a broader significance in that it is a measure of socio-economic justice which inheres economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental powers is ebbing corresponding to aging process and therefore one is required to fall back on savings. In D. S. Nakara's case (1983 Lab IC 1) the Supreme Court further explained that pension payable to an employee is earned by rendering long and efficient service and therefore it can be said to be a deferred portion of the compensation for service rendered. It is now well settled that pension is in the nature of compensation payable to the Government servant on his retirement for the services rendered by him. There is no dispute that calculation and payment of pension is regulated by statutory rules which confer a legal right on the petitioner to receive pension. Its payment or the amount which is to be paid is not left to the sweet will or whim of the Government. All Government servants on their retirement must be treated alike in matters relating to pensionary benefits. 10. The submissions raised in the present petition on behalf of the petitioner as well as on behalf of the State were considered by the Supreme Court in D. S. Nakara's case (1983 Lab IC 1). Having discussed the matter at length the Supreme Court held that all pensioners irrespective of the (late of retirement form one class and it is not open to the State to discriminate between the pensioners or classify them on the basis of specified dates in the rules and Government orders according to revised benefits to the pensioners. Having discussed the matter at length the Supreme Court held that all pensioners irrespective of the (late of retirement form one class and it is not open to the State to discriminate between the pensioners or classify them on the basis of specified dates in the rules and Government orders according to revised benefits to the pensioners. The Supreme Court observed (Para 42): "If it appears to be undisputable, as it does to us that the pensioners for the purpose of pension benefits form a class, would its upward revision permit a homogenous class to he divided by arbitrarily fixing an eligibility criteria unrelated to purpose of revision, and would such classification he founded on some rational principle? The classification has to be based, as is well settled, on some rational principle and the rational principle must have nexus to the objects sought to be achieved. We have set out the objects underlying the payment of pension. If the State considered it necessary to liberalise the pension scheme, we find no rational principle behind it for granting these benefits only to those who retired subsequent to that dale simultaneously denying the same to those who retired prior to that date. If the liberalisation was considered necessary for augmenting social security in old age to Government servants then those who retired earlier cannot be worse off than those who retire later. Therefore, this division which classified pensioners into two classes is not based on any rational principle and if the rational principle is the one of dividing pensioners with a view to giving something more to persons otherwise equally placed, it would be discriminatory. To illustrate, take two persons, one retired just a day prior and another a day just succeeding the specified date. Both were in the same pay bracket, the average emolument was the same and both had put in equal number of years of service. How does a fortuitous circumstance of retiring a day earlier or a day later will permit totally unequal treatment in the matter of pension. One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rupees 8,100/- p. a. and average emolument to he worked out on 36 months' salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs. 12,000/- p. a. and average emoluments will be computed on the basis of last ten months' average. One retiring a day earlier will have to be subject to ceiling of Rupees 8,100/- p. a. and average emolument to he worked out on 36 months' salary while the other will have a ceiling of Rs. 12,000/- p. a. and average emoluments will be computed on the basis of last ten months' average. The artificial division stares into face and is unrelated to any principle and whatever principle, if there he any. has absolutely no nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by liberalising the pension scheme. In fact that arbitrary division has not only no nexus to the liberalised pension scheme but it is counter productive and runs counter to the whole gamut or pension scheme. The equal treatment guaranteed in Article 14 i.s wholly violated inasmuch as the pension rules being statutory in character, since the specified date, the rules accord differential and discriminatory treatment to equals in the matter of computation of pension. A 48 hours' difference in matter of retirement would have a traumatic effect. Division is thus both arbitrary and unprincipled. Therefore, the classification does not stand the test of Article 14." Proceeding further the Supreme Court held that there was no nexus in making the classification amongst the pensioners on the basis of the specified (late in the Government orders according liberalised benefits to the pensioners. A pensioner who retired prior to 31st March, 1979, and the other who retired after 31st March, 1979, stand in the same position for the purpose of maintaining their family and meeting the cost of living. The impugned Government orders expressly mention that the State Government with a view to grant social security to the pensioners has liberalised the pension scheme. If that be so, how that object is advanced in refusing to accord those benefits to those who retired prior to the specified dates? The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in D. S. Nakara's case (1983 Lab IC 1) are clearly applicable to the instant case. 11. In Bidhubhushan Malik v. Union of India AIR 1983 All 209 the eligibility to liberalised pension for retired Judges and Chief Justice of High Courts at enhanced rates made applicable to Judges who retired on or after 1st October. 1974, was held to be unconstitutional as the division was unsupportable being devoid of any rational principle. 11. In Bidhubhushan Malik v. Union of India AIR 1983 All 209 the eligibility to liberalised pension for retired Judges and Chief Justice of High Courts at enhanced rates made applicable to Judges who retired on or after 1st October. 1974, was held to be unconstitutional as the division was unsupportable being devoid of any rational principle. The Court held that the object being to give something more as additional pensionary benefits to persons otherwise equally placed the line drawn at the same. date was clearly discriminatory. It further held that the pensionary benefits must be extended to all covered by the pensionary scheme without regard to the question whether a Judge or Chief Justice retired before or after 1st October, 1974, the date specified in the order. 12. In view of the above discussion, the direction as contained in the State Government's order dated September 7, 1979, that the pensionary benefits as contained in that order would be applicable to only those Government servants who may have retired from service on or after March, 31, 1979, as well as the direction estimated in the Government order dated 10th May, 1978 that the benefits conferred on the pensioners under that order would be available to those who retired from service on or after January 1, 1978, are discriminatory. 13. We accordingly allow the petition and quash the aforesaid directions which refer to the eligibility of pensioners for availing the benefit of revised liberalised pensionary benefits. We further declare that notwithstanding the aforesaid directions of the State Government the revised pensionary benefits in the aforesaid two Government orders are applicable and available to the petitioner and all other Government servants who may have retired before March 31, 1979, or January 1, 1978. The respondents are directed to accord these benefits as contained in the Government order dated 7th September, 1979 and 10th May, 1978, to the petitioner. 14. There will be no order as to costs.