OZA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution alleging that the petitioner is the father of respondent No. 3 who has been detained under order of District Magistrate, Dewas, dated 3-11-1982 under section 3 (2) of National Security Act, 1980. ( 2 ) THE petitioner has challenged this order of detention on the ground that the grounds of detention which were furnished to the respondent No. 3 on the same day i. e. 3-11-1982 pertain to private quarrels which may be problems of law and order but could not be said to be acts prejudicial to maintenance of public order and, therefore, the order is contrary to law. It was also contended that even if some of the grounds are such which embarrass the problems of maintenance of public order still as the learned District Magistrate was satisfied in the light of all the grounds which have been mentioned it is not possible to find out what grounds impressed the District Magistrate more and, therefore, also the order of detention is not justified in law. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner, by reference to the list of incidents which have been enumerated along with the grounds, it was contended that items 1, 2 and 3 do not pertain to maintenance of public order at all as it only refers to some private disputes. It was further contended that similarly, there are other incidents mentioned which also refer to only private incidents. ( 4 ) IT was contended that if some of the grounds furnished are such which go beyond the scope of public order then the order itself is vitiated. Learned counsel placed reliance on decisions reported in Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar, Pushker Mukharjee v. State of West Bengal, Kishori Mohan Bara v. The State of West Bengal, Dwarka Pd. Sahu v. The State of Bihar and Smt. Vimla Dewan v. The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. Learned counsel placed reliance on decisions reported in Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar, Pushker Mukharjee v. State of West Bengal, Kishori Mohan Bara v. The State of West Bengal, Dwarka Pd. Sahu v. The State of Bihar and Smt. Vimla Dewan v. The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi. ( 5 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the State, on the other hand, contended that in the order of detention which is supported by the grounds, the grounds have been mentioned in the first part and they are four and after the four grounds, there is a list of incidents and in the fourth paragraph of the incidents, there are a number of incidents alleged on 19th March, 1982 which have been further enumerated as I to 14. Thereafter, other incidents have been mentioned. It was, therefore, contended that so far as the ground are concerned, they all pertain to maintenance of public order although in support of these grounds a list of incidents is attached. It is no doubt true that some of the incidents are such which relate to the private matters but looking to all the incidents in the sequence in which they have been mentioned, it appears that the activities of the person were such which were prejudicial to maintenance of public order. It was, therefore, contended that only because some solitary incint refers to a private trouble only it could not be said that the grounds are not such which will attract public order and, therefore, could be said to be bad in law. It was, therefore, contended that all the four grounds mentioned by the District Magistrate are such which attract the maintenance of the public order. ( 6 ) IT was also contended that the District Magistrate was satisfied as a cumulative effect of all the incidents mentioned alongwith the grounds and, therefore, even if some of these incidents are such which do not come within the scope of maintenance of public order, the detention could not be held to be invalid. ( 6 ) IT was also contended that the District Magistrate was satisfied as a cumulative effect of all the incidents mentioned alongwith the grounds and, therefore, even if some of these incidents are such which do not come within the scope of maintenance of public order, the detention could not be held to be invalid. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that even in the four grounds which have been mentioned, the fourth ground only refers to interest shown by the detenu in the students politics of the college as it was alleged that the detenu attempted to support a particular group of a panel in the elections in the college but that is a legitimate right of a citizen and that could not be said to be a ground for detaining the respondent No. 3. It was also contended that in the incidents referable to these grounds which have been mentioned as items No. 6, 7, 8 and 9, there is nothing to indicate that any act is attributable to the detenu which would attract breach or apprehension of breach of public order and, therefore, even on the contention of the learned counsel for the State, ground No. 4 itself is such which is not in accordance with law and, therefore, the order of detention could not be maintained. ( 8 ) THE distinction between law and order situation and maintenance of public order has been considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in a number of decisions. In Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar (supra) their Lordships dealt with this question in these words: It is common place that words in a statutory provision take their meaning from context in the present case is the emergent situation created by external aggression. It would therefore, be legitimate to hold that by maintenance of public order what was meant was prevention of disorder of a grave nature, a disorder which the authorities thought was necessary to prevent in view of the emergent situation. It is conceivable that the expression maintenance of law and order occurring in the detention order may not have been used in the sense of prevention of disorder of a grave nature. The expression may mean prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance only. It is conceivable that the expression maintenance of law and order occurring in the detention order may not have been used in the sense of prevention of disorder of a grave nature. The expression may mean prevention of disorder of comparatively lesser gravity and of local significance only. To take an illustration, if people indulging in the Hindu religious fastivity of Holi become rowdy, prevention of that disturbance may be called the maintenance of law and order. Such maintenance of law and order was obviously not in the contemplation of the Rules. And in this decision it was also observed that if there is even a doubt as to whether the acts purport to affect law and order and not public order, the order could not be maintained. It was observed: It was said that this was too technical a view of the matter, there was no charm in the words used. I am not persuaded by this argument. The question is of substance. If a man can be deprived of his liberty under a rule by the simple process of the making of a certain order, he can only be so deprived if the order is in terms of the rule. Strict compliance with the letter of the rule is the essence of the matter. We are dealing with a statute which drastically interfere with the personal liberty of people, we are dealing with an order behind the face of which a court is prevented from going. I am not complaining of that. Circumstances may make it necessary. But it would be legitimate to require in such cases strict observation of the rules. If there is any doubt whether the rules have been strictly observed, that doubt must be received in favor of the detenu. It is certainly more than doubtful whether law and order means the same as public order. I am not impressed by the argument that the reference in the detention order No. R. 30 (1) (b) shows that by law and order what was meant was public order. That is a most mischievous way of approaching the question. If that were right, a reference to the rule in the order might equally justify all other errors in it. Indeed it might with almost equal justification than be said that a reference to the rule and an order of detention would be enough. That is a most mischievous way of approaching the question. If that were right, a reference to the rule in the order might equally justify all other errors in it. Indeed it might with almost equal justification than be said that a reference to the rule and an order of detention would be enough. That being so, the only course open to us is to hold that the rules have not been strictly observed. If for the purpose of justifying the detention such compliance by itself is enough a non-compliance must have a contrary effect. ( 9 ) IF there are some grounds valid and some grounds not falling within the ambit of Maintenance of Public Order still the order could not be maintained and placing reliance on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in Shibban Lal Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh, it was observed: - In Shibban Lal Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh (supra), it was held that such an order would be a bad order the reason being that it could not be said in what manner and to what extent the valid and invalid grounds operated on the mind of the authority concerned and contributed to the creation of his subjective satisfaction which formed the basis of the order. The order, has, therefore, to be held illegal though it mentioned a ground on which a legal order of detention could have been based. ( 10 ) THE same has been the view expressed by their Lordships in the decision reported in Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, wherein their Lordships have further clarified the distinction between law and order and public order. It is observed: - It means therefore, that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The Franch distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The Franch distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order Justice Ramaswami in writ petition No. 179 of 1968 (S. C.) draw a line of demarcation between the serious and aggravated forms of breaches of public order which affect the community or endanger the public interest at large from breaches of peace which do not affect the public at large. ( 11 ) IN Kishori Mohan Bora v. The State of West Bengal (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering detention under Maintenance of Internal Security Act where identical language was used and their Lordships considered the distinction between law and order and public order in these words:. the expression public order in section 3 (1) of the Preventive Detention Act,. 1950 did not take in every infraction of law and that every disturbance of law and order leading to disorder would not be sufficient to invoke the extraordinary power under such a detention law, unless the act in question was such an endangered or was likely to endanger public order. The true test is not the kind but the potentiality of the act in question. One act may affect only individuals while the other, though of a similar kind, may have such an impact that it would disturb the even tempo of the life of the community. This view has been consistently taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. In Smt. Bimla Dewan v. The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, while considering this question, their Lordships placing reliance on Ram Manohar Lohia v. The State of Bihar (supra), and Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, observed: Before considering the other instances it is necessary to note that Hidayatullah, C. J. has observed in Arun Ghosh v. State of Bengal (supra ). It is this: - Take the case of assault on girls. A guest at a hotel may kiss or make advances to half a dozen chamber maids. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fraces with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. He may annoy them and also the management but he does not cause disturbance of public order. He may even have a fraces with the friends of one of the girls but even then it would be a case of breach of law and order only. Take another case of a man who molests woman in lonely places. As a result of his activities girls going to colleges and schools are in constant danger and fear. Woman going for their ordinary business are afraid of being way laid and assaulted. The activity of this man in its essential quality is not different from the act of the other man but in its potentiality and in its affect upon the public tranquility there is a vast difference. The act of the man who molests the girls in lonely places causes a disturbance in the even tempo of living which is the first requirement of public order. He disturbs the society and the community. His act makes all the woman apprehensive of their honour and he can be said to be causing disturbance of public order and not merely committing individual actions which may be taken note of by the criminal prosecution agencies. In this decision also their Lordships took the view that if some of the grounds are such which do not justify the action under this Act then the order itself will be invalid and it was of observed: - Instances Nos. 1 to 22, 24 and 28 relate to criminal case, in all of which the detenu has been found to be not guilty and acquitted. Instance No. 23 relates to a case in which the detenu has been discharged. Instance No. 28 relates to a blue film of naked picture for public circulation/exhibition alleged to have been recovered on 23/24-6-79 by the police from the Kamal restaurant ofthe detenu. Since all these instances relate to cases in which the detenu has been found to be not guilty and acquitted none of these instances can legitimately be taken into consideration for detaining the detenu under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. Mr. Since all these instances relate to cases in which the detenu has been found to be not guilty and acquitted none of these instances can legitimately be taken into consideration for detaining the detenu under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. Mr. Ram Jethmalani, Senior Advocate who appeared for the petitioner in this case submitted that in the National Security Act there is no provision like sections SA in COPEPOSA (Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act) and, therefore, if one of the grounds is bad the order of detention has to be quashed in its entirety and that as the detaining authority has based the order of detention on grounds Nos. 1 to 24 and 28 also, the order of detention is unsustainable. The learned counsel for the respondent did not submit anything to controvert that submission of Mr. Ram Jethmalani. We are of the opinion that since the detaining authority would naturally have been influenced by these elusion that the detenu requires to be detained under the provisions of it he Act, the entire order of detention is ( 12 ) IN this view of the matter if the grounds mentioned in this petition are considered and only the grounds are considered as contended by learned, counsel for the State, ground No. 4 reads: - vki Nk= ugh gksrs gq, Hkh LFkkuh; dkyst dh Nk=uhfr esalfdz; Hkkx ysdj ,d xqv fo ksk dk opzlo cuk;s j[kus dh psvk esa yksxksa dks vakrafdr dj Nk=ksa ds oxz esa fo}sk isnk dj Nk= vlarksk o Nk=ksa ds oxz esa ruko mriuu dj uxj dh yksd O;olfkk dks [krjk isnk djus esa layxujgrs gs A It is apparent that as alleged in this ground, the respondent No. 3 has been taking interest in the college elections and is helping a particular group or a penal to get elected. The instances in support of this have been instances of 17th and 20th of July, 1982. The two instances are very vague in nature. One states that along with the members of the Diamond Penal Sunil Dharu and others asked the students to vote for that panel and also threatened and the other incident is that some one named Tata who was arrested, some students went to the Police Station and protested against that arrest and this detenu also, associated with them. One states that along with the members of the Diamond Penal Sunil Dharu and others asked the students to vote for that panel and also threatened and the other incident is that some one named Tata who was arrested, some students went to the Police Station and protested against that arrest and this detenu also, associated with them. These two instances coupled with the ground which has been quoted above, clearly indicated that the only grievance appears to be is that the detenu who is not a student associated with the particular group of students called Dimond Patel and attempted to help it to win the election and also protested above the illegal detention arrest of any person. In none of these acts, it could be alleged that there is anything win affect or prejudice the maintenance of public order. ( 13 ) SIMILARLY, in the list of instances the incidents of 8-9-1980, 9-5-81 and 2-7-81 are clearly instances relating to private trouble and there is nothing on the basis of which it could be said that these acts ill any manner, affect or prejudice the maintenance of public order. It was contended by the led counsel for the State that the incidents of 19-3-82 which have been enumerated do attract the disturbance of public order. Even if this contention is accepted, it could not be said as to what weighed with the District Magistrate which resulted m his subjective satisfaction to pass the impugned order as observed by their Lord ships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Bimla Dewan v. The Lieutenant Governor of Delhi (supra ). If some of the grounds are such which are not relevant, the order itself will be bad as it is not possible to find out, out of all the grounds, which might have weighed with the District Magistrate in order to live at a subjective satisfaction to pass the impugned order. It is, therefore, plain that this order is passed on grounds some, of which clearly do not fall with the ambit of maintenance of public order and, therefore, are absolutely Irrelevant and in view of this therefore, the order of detention could not be maintained. ( 14 ) THE petition is, therefore, allowed. The order passed by the District Magistrate, Dewas dt. 3- 11-82, detaining the respondent No. 3 under section 3 (2) of National Security Act, 1980 is set aside. ( 14 ) THE petition is, therefore, allowed. The order passed by the District Magistrate, Dewas dt. 3- 11-82, detaining the respondent No. 3 under section 3 (2) of National Security Act, 1980 is set aside. The respondent No. 3 is in custody. He shall be set at liberty forthwith if not detained under any other lawful order. Petition allowed. .