HARI LAL AGRAWAL, J. 1. These writ applications have been filed by the defendants of Title suits against whom the Kolhan Superintendent of Chaibasa, respondent No. If has passed an order of ad interim injunction restraining from transferring the plaintiffs in the suits, to another colliery of the petitioner company, namely, West Hokaro Colliery from Noamundi. The petitioners have come to this Court only against the interim order without agitating the matters before respondent no. 1 himself where the injunction matter has yet to be finally heard and the question that has been pressed before this Court could well be agitated in the first instance at that stage itself. Since the petitioners have succeeded in obtaining a rule and a question of Jurisdiction is involved raising some Constitutional question also. I propose to decide the same on merits instead of sending the petitioners back to the. Authority as 1 had thought at one stage of the hearing. 2. The suits had been filed before the Kolhan Superintendent under the provisions of the Wilkinson's Rules which were framed, for administration of Civil Justice within the Jurisdiction of the Agents of the Governor General under regulation 13 of 1833, and rule 1 of that Rule which has fallen for Our consideration reads as follows:- 1. "Civil suits of the value of 300 and under the sum whether for personal or real property shall be cognizable by the Munsif or the native chiefs or others, who may hereafter be entrusted with the powers of Munsif with exception of suits in which the defendants, Cutchary servants of Europeans or Americans are parties and with exception also of lands held exempt from the payment of Revenue provided the claim include the whole amount of demand arising from the cause of action and be not for damages on account of alleged personal injuries or for personal damages of whatever nature." By a subsequent notification dated 16/8/1983 issued by the State Government in exercise of the authority under Paragraph 5 (1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution of India it was provided that..." the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1951, ('11 of 1951) shall not apply to the Sadar Subdivision of the district of Singhbhum except the areas comprised within the Chaibassa and Chakradharpur Municipalities. The question as to whether the Wilkinson's Rules ceased to continue in force on account of repeal of Act 12 of 1976, was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the cases of Dulichand Khirwal V. The State of Bihar and others and it was held that the Rules continued to remain in force and, therefore, we shall have to proceed on the basis that the Wilkinson's Rules do operate over the area where the parties reside or carryon their business. 3. Before coming to the discussion of the main question, I may very briefly indicate the facts on which the suits have been constituted the petitioner company has a Pelletising Plant at Noamundi under its Mines Division which according to the Plaintiffs, is a complete and distinct administrative unit. The Mines Division of the Company consists of several units which are all iron or mines at Noamundi and other places. The West Bokaro Colliery, a property of defendant No. 1, according to the plaintiffs, is not within its Mines Division as it forms part of the Colliery Division. The plaintiffs were appointed in the Pelletising Plant of the Mines Division, and according to their case, they were liable to be transferred only within the Mines Division of defendant No. 1, but the defendant petitioners by their different office orders ('Annexure 3' in all the applications) transferred them from Noamundi to West Bokaro Colliery and accordingly they instituted the respective suits in the court of the Kolhan Superintendent at Chaibassa (respondent No. 1 in all the cases) challenging the orders of their transfer on various grounds, with a prayer of injunction restraining the petitioners from transferring them, in which as already said earlier, the interim order of injunction was passed. 4. The petitioners straight way came to this Court raising some questions, inter alia, the question as to whether the suits relating to service matter, more particularly of transfer, cognizance could be taken by the Kolhan Superintendent under the scheme of rule 1 of the Wilkinson's Rules mentioned above. 5. The main thrust of the argument to Mr. K.D. Chatterji, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, was that the contractual obligations of the petitioners, in any view of the matter, could not be held to be a property. They could at best be a right but not Property. 5. The main thrust of the argument to Mr. K.D. Chatterji, appearing on behalf of the petitioners, was that the contractual obligations of the petitioners, in any view of the matter, could not be held to be a property. They could at best be a right but not Property. Learned counsel referred to the Simond's Law of Jurisprudence whereas distinction between the law of property and law of obligation has been made. In my view, the question raised in this application does not necessitate going into those niceties as the whole question can be answered with reference to an interpretation of the key words in rule 1 of the Rules, “personal or real property.” So far as the expression ‘real property' is concerned, it does not create any difficulty as it is obviously referable to tangible immoveable properties. The area of controversy, however, is only with respect to the interpretation of the expression 'personal property'. It also has to be kept in mind that when Mr. Wilkinson, as Governor General's Agent had framed these Rules for administration of Civil Justice in the Kolhan areas, the concept of administrative or industrial law was unknown in general and in the areas falling under the Kolhan Superintendent in particular. Reference was, however. made to various cases of this Court as well as of Supreme Court, Such as Dr. S. Dutt V. University of Delhi and Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corporation, Lucknow V. Chandra Kiran Tyagi to show that the expression "property" must be given a wider meaning inasmuch as the 'office of Shebait' is Hindu idol', 'a hat', 'a provident fund money' and 'equity of redemption etc. were held to be properties within the meaing of Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act. But the argument has lost sight of the fact that all those properties were included in the term 'property' by using the term in the objective sense of a complete thing being the Subject matter of ownership or other rights. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo and others V. The State of Bombay and others, has held that a mere Contractual right is not a right of property under Article 19(i)(f) of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo and others V. The State of Bombay and others, has held that a mere Contractual right is not a right of property under Article 19(i)(f) of the Constitution of India. Similarly, in the case of Saghir Ahmad and another V. State of U.P. and others, the right to use a public highway for the purpose of trade, for example, plying transport services, was again held to be not a property right. Then again in the Case of Smt. Ujjam Bai V. State of Uttar Pradesh and another it was held that a mere right to collect revenue was not a property. These cases may be of some assistance for forming an opinion in this matter. The dispute involved in theses cases is not even the plaintiffs right to hold any post in a service. Even assuming for the sake of argument that that could be said to be their personal property by stretching the meaning of the expression, which does not appear to be possible to lay down, the right to remain posted only at a particular place and not to be transferred therefrom to any other place would be a still weaker and precarious right, which cannot be said to be any personal property right having even a semblance of ownership, a necessary incidence of personal property withing the meaning of rule I, entitling the plaintiff to institute any legal proceeding within the framework of the Wilkinson's Rules. I would derive support from the second line of case referred to earlier. These Rules were intended to empower the local authority, namely, the Kolhan Superintendent, to decide certain common type of disputes of a limited nature then arising in the community within his jurisdiction. To illustrate the ambit and scope of the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Kolhan Superintendent with respect to the 'personal properties', I may further refer to the nature and type of claim such as claim for debts or money Or matters relating to moveable properties, or the like. To illustrate the ambit and scope of the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Kolhan Superintendent with respect to the 'personal properties', I may further refer to the nature and type of claim such as claim for debts or money Or matters relating to moveable properties, or the like. I, therefore, feel inclined to take the view that the suits in question being for a declaration that the petitioners have got no right to transfer the plaintiffs respondents from One division to another, having regard to the terms of the plaintiffs appointment, can by no stretch of imagination be brought within the mischief of rule I of the Wilkinson's Rules. The suits, therefore, being wholly without jurisdiction the respondent no. 1 was not competent to pass the interim order of injunction. 6. I would accordingly allow these applications and quash the order of injunction contained in Annexure 3 in all the applications, but in the circumstances, I shall make no order as to costs. Applications allowed.