ORDER R.M. Sahai, J. - Two principal questions of law arise for consideration in this tenant's petition, one whether deposit made u/s 17 of Small Cause Courts Act for setting aside ex parte decree could be taken into account for relieving the tenant from liability of .eviction under sub-sec. (4) of S. 20 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and whether deposits made prior to the date of first hearing, within meaning of aforesaid sub-section, could be deemed to have discharged the tenant of its obligation only if an application was made to that effect on or before such date. 2. In 1970 the shop, in dispute, was purchased by opposite party. She sent a notice in March, 1971 enhancing the rent from Rs. 18/- to Rs. 27/-. It was not agreed to by petitioner. Therefore his tenancy was' terminated by notice sent in July, 1971. But no suit was filed. In 1973 another notice terminating tenancy was sent, and rent as enhanced by notice sent in 1971 was demanded. On failure to pay suit for arrears' of rent and eviction was filed. It was contested. Petitioner claimed that he was tenant for last thirty years, and had paid agreed rent till October 1972. There were no arrears against him. As there was no default his tenancy could not be terminated. The Judge Small Causes Court accepted claim of petitioner that rent of the shop was Rs. 18/- only. But he decreed the suit as petitioner was in arrears since 6th July, 1970. He did not grant immunity from eviction under sub-section (4) of Section 20 as petitioner had deposited Rs. 1204.75 only against Rs. 1302.75. In revision the finding on rate of rent was affirmed. As regards deposit it was found that petitioner had deposited Rs. 450/- by 19th February, 1975 under section 30 of the Act, Rs. 162/- on 19th April, 1971 u/s 7C of Act III of 1947, Rs. 736.75 on 19th October, 1974 u/s 17 of S. C. C. Act for setting aside of ex parte decree. Thus sum of Rs. 1,308.75 was in deposit before 19th February, 1975, the first date of hearing, whereas Rs. 1343.20 only including arrears of rent, cost and interest as required under sub-section (4) of Section 20 should have been deposited to avail of immunity from eviction. Thus sum of Rs. 1,308.75 was in deposit before 19th February, 1975, the first date of hearing, whereas Rs. 1343.20 only including arrears of rent, cost and interest as required under sub-section (4) of Section 20 should have been deposited to avail of immunity from eviction. The revising authority, however, did not grant benefit of it to petitioner as petitioner did not move any application on or before 19th February, 1975 for treating the deposit u/s 17 of S. C. C. Act as deposit under sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act. In fact an application was made on 24th February, 1975 but according to revising authority it did not contain any unconditional offer. 3. Section 20 of the Act bars any suit for eviction of a tenant except on grounds specified in clauses (a) to (g) of sub-section (2). The mildest and of course commonest is clause (a) which permits filing of suit, if the tenant is in arrears of rent for not less than four months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month from the date of service upon him of a notice of demand. Even after this failure and filing of suit for eviction the Legislature deemed it proper to provide yet another opportunity to tenant to save himself from eviction by paying or tendering to landlord or depositing with Court entire arrears of rent, interest and cost of the suit. Sub-section (4) manifests Legislature's anxiety to save the tenant from ejectment. By very nature of the objective sought to be achieved by this sub- section it has to be construed liberally. Sub-section (4) manifests Legislature's anxiety to save the tenant from ejectment. By very nature of the objective sought to be achieved by this sub- section it has to be construed liberally. In order to appreciate its scope it is extracted below : "In any suit for eviction on the ground mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2), if at the first hearing of the suit the tenant unconditionally pays or (tenders to the landlord or deposits in Court), the entire amount of rent and damages for use and occupation of the building due from him (such damages for use and occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent) together with interest thereon at the rate of 9 per cent p.a. and the landlord's costs of suit in respect thereof after deducting therefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-section (1) of Section 30, the Court may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction on that ground : Provided that nothing in this sub-section, shall apply in relation to a tenant who or any member of whose family has built or has otherwise acquired in a vacant state, or has got vacated after acquisition, any residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area. Explanation-For the purposes of this sub-section - (a) the expression "first hearing" means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant. (b) the expression "cost of the suit" includes one half of the amount of counsel's fee taxable for a contested suit". Before a tenant can claim immunity from ejectment he is required to comply with conditions mentioned in it. Expression first date of hearing has been clarified by Explanation added to the sub-section in 1976. But it is not retrospective. Therefore, in a case initiated prior to it has to be understood as explained by Division Bench in Basudeo Sahai v. Brij Mohan Lal, 1979 (UP) RCC 218 : 1979 All LJ 484. Expression first date of hearing has been clarified by Explanation added to the sub-section in 1976. But it is not retrospective. Therefore, in a case initiated prior to it has to be understood as explained by Division Bench in Basudeo Sahai v. Brij Mohan Lal, 1979 (UP) RCC 218 : 1979 All LJ 484. Although Courts below found 19th April, 1975 to be the first date of hearing and no dispute appears to have been raised either before revising authority or even in the counter- affidavit filed in this Court, yet the learned counsel attempted to support the order by claiming that the date mentioned in the summons for appearance sometime before October, 1974 may be taken as the first date of hearing. This effort was made obviously because sum of Rs. 736.75 was deposited on 19th October, 1974. And if it was after first date of hearing then petitioner was not entitled to benefit of this sub-section. It is not possible to accept this argument. Both the courts below have proceeded on assumption that 19th February, 1975 was the first date of hearing. Whether 19th February, 1975 or any date prior to it was the first date of hearing is primarily a question of fact. It having been not raised cannot be permitted to be raised while supporting the order specially, when no foundation for it was laid even in the counter-affidavit. From the orders it, appears that although summons were issued for 1974 but nothing was done or at least the Court did not apply its mind prior to 19th February, 1975. 4. Unconditional payment or deposit by the tenant of arears, interest and cost is the other requirement. The sub-section does not provide the manner of deposit. Nor does it require filing of an application. In fact it could not because unconditional governs not only deposit in Court but also to tendering of amount or payment to landlord. Whether deposit or payment was unconditional, therefore, shall depend on facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot depend on filing or non filing of application. In a case where deposit is made in Court what is of prime importance is if the amount as required has been deposited before first date of hearing. If it has been then it does not become conditional merely because no application had been filed. It cannot depend on filing or non filing of application. In a case where deposit is made in Court what is of prime importance is if the amount as required has been deposited before first date of hearing. If it has been then it does not become conditional merely because no application had been filed. Nor any oral or written request by way of application filed after first date of hearing can be ignored as it was not made on or first date of hearing. If deposit is made with no string attached to it then it can be clarified, if necessary by subsequent application which should relate back to the relevant time that is first date of hearing. Moreover, if deposit as required is made then the last part of the section that is relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction comes into operation automatically. Although word is `may' but in the context in which it has been used and the purpose it seeks to achieve it has to be read as `shall'. Decree for eviction in a suit filed u/s 20(2)(a) of the Act where the tenant has deposited the arears, interest, and cost of the suit at the first date of hearing shall be illegal. Therefore it is the duty of Court under this sub-section to see if deposit made with it after deducting deposit u/s 30 of the Act is sufficient to relieve the tenant from his liability of eviction or not. It is not the making of application but deposit as contemplated at the first date of hearing which is material. 5. So far as facts of the case are concerned the Courts below appear to have commuted manifest arror of law in refusing to extend the benefit of sub-section (4) of Section 20 to petitioner either because no application was filed or the one filed did not indicate that deposit was unconditional. It has already been seen that no application is necessary. Manifestation of unconditional deposit could be written or oral either by tenant of his own or at the instance of the Court. In the application filed on 24th April, 1975 it was mentioned, `arrears of rent have been deposited to date in the Court of City Munsif, Meerut under section 30 admitted by the plaintiffs also. Manifestation of unconditional deposit could be written or oral either by tenant of his own or at the instance of the Court. In the application filed on 24th April, 1975 it was mentioned, `arrears of rent have been deposited to date in the Court of City Munsif, Meerut under section 30 admitted by the plaintiffs also. Now the disputed rent along with costs of the suit have also been deposited in Court of Judge, Small Causes by the defendants. If the Court also comes to the conclusion that defendant had not paid the disputed arrears of rent to the plaintiff then for the purposes of default benefit of Section 20(4) be given to the defendant as he has already deposited the disputed rent again plus costs of the suit. Otherwise so extra deposited rent be returned to the defendant. It clearly mentioned about the deposit of rent and cost of the suit etc. Benefit was claimed u/s 20(4). Refund was claimed of excess. This could not be construed as rendering deposit conditional. Nor the prayer that if Court finds that petitioner had not paid rent it may be taken as deposit u/s 20(4). What is required to be deposited is the arrears of rent, interest and cost. If it had been paid and petitioner by way of abundant caution deposited the amount again claiming that if it was found that he was in arrears the amount deposited may be adjusted, it could not be held to be conditional deposit. 6. Now comes the most crucial controversy namely, if deposit of Rs. 736.75 made u/s 17 of SCC Act could be treated as deposit u/s 20(4) the suit was decreed ex parte. Petitioner applied for setting aside of ex parte decree u/s 17 of Small Cause Courts Act, and deposited Rs. 736.75 the entire decretal amount, the condition precedent for moving the application. The decree was set aside and order decreeing suit ex parte was recalled. Although under law the amount could have been withdrawn by petitioner but he did not do so and it continued to remain in deposit with Court at the first date of hearing. What would be nature of this deposit? It could not continue to be deposit u/s 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. Although under law the amount could have been withdrawn by petitioner but he did not do so and it continued to remain in deposit with Court at the first date of hearing. What would be nature of this deposit? It could not continue to be deposit u/s 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. At the same time it cannot be disputed that it comprised of arrears of rent found due till then, cost of suit etc. What is urged is that once decree was set aside ownership reverted to petitioner. It did not vest in Court. Nor could the opposite party appropriate it under sub-section (6) of the Act. And that being one of the incidents of deposit under sub-section (4) the deposit under S. 17 could not be taken into account. The argument proceeds on misapprehension. The amount deposited by tenant for setting aside of ex parte decree is in custody of Court. It continues to be so even after the application was allowed and the decree was set aside. Even in respect of deposit under sub-section (4) the landlord does not get any right. The amount becomes available and it can be withdrawn by landlord only after filing of `application. Therefore, there is no charm or magic whether deposit was made in one capacity or the other so long it is deposited with Court before first date of hearing. If from circumstances it appears the tenant in order to save himself from misery of eviction was bona fide depositing or had deposited and complied with stringent and harsh conditions provided in sub-section (4) then he should not be denied the benefit on one or the other pretext by finding loopholes due to mistake in not making the application or not withdrawing the deposit u/s 17 and then redepositing it under sub-section (4). The word deposit should not be construed in pedantic manner. It should be understood and interpreted so as to advance the object of the provision. The amount deposited u/s 17 exhausted its purpose once ex parte decree was set aside and it became deposit with Court. 7. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for opposite party on Prem Pal Gupta v. Baboo Ram Garg, (1978) (1) Ren. CJ 446 and it was urged that the amount deposited u/s 17 does not become ipso-facto available for purposes of sub-section (4). 7. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for opposite party on Prem Pal Gupta v. Baboo Ram Garg, (1978) (1) Ren. CJ 446 and it was urged that the amount deposited u/s 17 does not become ipso-facto available for purposes of sub-section (4). In that case no application was made for treating the deposit under section 17 of Small Cause Courts Act as deposit under sub-section (4). In this case, however, the petitioner moved an application on 24th May, 1975 stating that now he had deposited cost of suit etc. Although it was not said that deposit u/s 17 may be treated as deposit under sub-section (4) but apart from deposit u/s 7C of Act III of 1947 and Section 30 of the Act the only other deposit was u/s 17. The averment in the application that cost etc. had now been deposited could not refer to any other deposit except the deposit which had been made u/s 17. Claiming of benefit under sub-section (4) for deposit made before Judge Small Cause Court left no room for doubt that petitioner had prayed that earlier deposit may be treated as deposit for purposes of granting immunity from eviction. The application may be vague or there may be some technical flaw. Yet there being no misgiving about its content and petitioner's anxiety to save himself from eviction he could not be refused relief because of bad drafting of the application for which petitioner may not have been responsible. 8. It was argued that deposit was not sufficient for benefit u/s 20(4). Reliance has been placed on details of deposit given in an application filed on behalf of opposite party before revising authority. From the uncertified copy produced by the learned counsel the deposit of Rs. 736.75 u/s 17 of Small Cause Courts Act and Rs. 162/- on 19th April, 1971 u/s 7C stand proved. In respect of deposit u/s 30 the figure given in the chart indicates that only Rs. 180/- was deposited. Revising authority has not given any breakup. It would be expedient, therefore, to direct revising authority to examine this aspect. 9. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. The order of Revising Authority is quashed. He shall, however, decide the revision afresh in light of observation made above after deciding question if deposit was sufficient or not. Parties shall bear their own costs.