JUDGMENT K. C. Agrawal, J. 1. FINDING a conflict between the two Division Bench decisions of this Court reported in Sayed Abdullah v. Ahmad, AIR 1929 Allahabad 817 and Goverdhan v. Raghubir Singh, AIR 1930 Allahabad 101, a learned Single Judge has made the present reference. 2. THE necessary facts divorced from the details for deciding the reference are these; One Smt. Bismillah Begum was the owner of the house in dispute to the extent of one-fifth share. She transferred her share in the house to Mohammad Yasin under a registered sale deed. On that very date, Mohammad Yasin executed an agreement to reconvey under a registered instrument. Smt. Bismillah Begam assigned the right of repurchase to Zakir Husain on July 8, 1969, by means of registered deed. THEreafter, a dispute arose between Smt. Bismillah Begam, the heirs and legal representatives of Mohammad Yasin, who had purchased one-fifth share from her, and Zakir Husain, the purchaser of the right of re-conveyance. THEse details are not necessary to be stated. It would suffice to mention that on attachment of the right to repurchase being made, Zakir Husain filed an objection under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure and thereafter, on its dismissal, Suit No. 254 of 1970, purporting to be under Order XXI Rule 63 CPC was filed. Through this suit, he claimed declaration that he was entitled to repurchase one-fifth share in the house, which had been sold by Smt. Bismillah Begam in favour of Mohammad Yasin who had executed an agreement agreeing to reconvey the same. He asserted that by virtue of the purchase made by him from Smt. Bismillah Begam of the right of re-conveyance, he had entered into her shoes. THE suit was contested on the ground that the right to repurchase was personal and this could not be assigned by Smt. Bismillah Begam. The trial court dismissed the suit but, in appeal, the learned Additional Civil Judge set aside the decree of the trial court and decreed the suit on the finding that the plaintiff Zakir Husain was entitled to a declaration that he had the right of repurchase conveyed to him on July 8, 1969, by Smt. Bismillah Begum. 3. AGGRIEVED by this judgment, Second Appeal No. 978 of 1975 has been preferred in this court. The connected Second Appeal No. 247 of 1976 is between the same parties. 3. AGGRIEVED by this judgment, Second Appeal No. 978 of 1975 has been preferred in this court. The connected Second Appeal No. 247 of 1976 is between the same parties. As the point of reference does not call for reciting the facts of that case, we consider it unnecessary to mention the same. 4. THE question, which was argued before the learned Single Judge and was also pressed before us, was that the right to repurchase in favour of Smt. Bismillah Begam executed by the agreement dated July 18, 1966, being personal could not be assigned by her to Zakir Husain, the plaintiff-respondent. It is indisputable that an agreement to sell an immovable property is property. A contract of sale does not create any interest in or charge on the property agreed to be sold. It gives rise to a right to enforce specific performance not only against the vendor but also against a transferee from the vendor with notice of the contract. The word "Property" embraces everything which is or may be the subject of ownership, whether a legal ownership, or whether beneficial or private ownership or to which the right to property may legally attach. The word "property" in common parlance takes within its ambit rights, interests and also obligations. It does not only mean the thing possessed, that is, the physical corporial thing, but also rights in the physical corporial thing which are created and sanctioned by law. Salmond on Jurisprudence, 12th Edition, has observed, thus at page 411 : "In its widest sense, the property included of a person's legal right of whatever description." In Bhairon Prasad v. Tara Devi, 1979 AWC 730 , a Full Bench of this Court held that an agreement to sell is a property. 5. THERE is, however, a distinction between a contract of sale of immovable property and a contract of re-sale or re-conveyance of immovable property. An agreement to re-convey property, after the vendor has transferred it by sale to the vendee is in the nature of a concession and, as such, has to be exercised according to the strict requirements of the agreement of re-conveyance. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. An agreement to re-convey property, after the vendor has transferred it by sale to the vendee is in the nature of a concession and, as such, has to be exercised according to the strict requirements of the agreement of re-conveyance. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 14, paragraph 1151, reads as follows : 'Where under a contract, conveyance or will a beneficial right is to arise upon the parties by the beneficiary of some act in a stated manner, or at a stated time, the act must be performed accordingly in order to obtain the enjoyment of the right, and in the absence of fraud, accident or surprise, equity will not relieve against a breach of the terms." 6. THESE observations had been approved by the Supreme Court in Simrathmull v. Nanjalingiah, AIR 1963 Supreme Court 1182. In Shanmugam Pillai v. Annalkhshmi Ammal, AIR 1950 Federal Court 38, the Federal Court also held that the option given under a deed of re-conveyance is in the nature of a concession or privilege. Apart from the distinction pointed out above, the principle with regard to the assignability applicable to the two types of agreements is the same. In the absence of a contrary intention, expressed or implied, the agreements in both the events are enforceable by and against the parties and their legal representatives including assignees and transferees-See Ram Baran Prasad v. Ram Mohit Hazra, AIR 1967 SC 744 . 7. BEFORE dealing with other authorities on the controversy in question, we may make reference to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. "Previous to the Specific Relief Act, 1963, section 23 clause (b) of the Specific Relief Act contained the provision to the following effect : "23. Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the specific performance of a contract may be obtained by- (a) (b) the representative in interest, or the principal of any party there to, Provided that where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a material ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be assigned, his representative in interest or his principal shall not be entitled to specific performance of the contract, unless his part thereof has already been performed." 8. SECTION 15 of the new Act provides for the specific performance of a contract. SECTION 15 of the new Act provides for the specific performance of a contract. Under this section, unless the contract itself provides that the agreement to sell shall not be assigned, or the terms of the contract laid down conciliations which may indicate that the contract has to be personally performed by the parties to it, an agreement to sell a property is assignable. Assignment is a transfer of interest or title usually expressed in writing whereby contracting parties covenant for the msleves and their assign's so that upon the happening of certain events the assigns may stand in the shoes of original covenantees. Thus, no one can sue upon a contract unless he be either an original party or the lawful transferee or assignee of an original party. If a contract of re-sale or re-conveyance of immovable property is capable of being enforced by or at the instance of a person who is a party to it, there appears to be no reason why a person who obtains the right under it should be deprived of its benefits. The right to have a property carries with it the right to transfer. A transfer without, conferring upon the transferee the rights which the transferor had would be meaningless and useless. Therefore, a contract in the absence of a contrary intention, expressed or implied, will be enforceable by or against the parties and their heirs and legal representatives including their assigns and transferees. 9. IN Chinna Munnuswami Nayudu v. Sagalaguna Naudu, AIR 1926 Madras 699, an assign of a contract for re-conveyance of an immovable property sued for its specific performance. The Division Bench held that a right under an executory contract to exercise an option at a certain future date to obtain a re-conveyance of immovable property was assignable. This decision was affirmed by the Privy Council in Sagalaguna Naudu v. Chinna Munnuswami Nayudu, AIR 1928 Privy Council 174. 10. IN Vishweshwar Narsabhatta Gaddada v. Deurgappa Irappa Bhatkar, AIR 1940 Bombay 339, the court held that both under the -common law and under section 23 (b) an option to repurchase the property sold is prima facie assignable unless it may be so worded so as to show that it was to be personal to the grantee and not assignable. 10. IN Vishweshwar Narsabhatta Gaddada v. Deurgappa Irappa Bhatkar, AIR 1940 Bombay 339, the court held that both under the -common law and under section 23 (b) an option to repurchase the property sold is prima facie assignable unless it may be so worded so as to show that it was to be personal to the grantee and not assignable. This view is supported by a number of decisions, namely, the cases of Ali Mistri v. Kayam Ali, AIR 1955 Calcutta 621, Rashid Ali v. Darparam Namasudra, AIR 1954 Assam 95 and Bipin Behari v. Masrab Ali, AIR 1961 Assam 173. IN all of these cases, the view taken was that a transferee of contract for reconveyance can enforce the contract in the absence of any condition to the contrary. In Umar Noor Mohammad v. Dayal Saran Darbari, 1968 ALJ 725 and P. N. Kapoor v. S. N. Anad, 1970 AWR 298, the same view had been taken. These decisions were approved by a Full Bench of our Court in Bhairon Prasad v. Tara Devi (supra). With regard to P. N. Kapoor's case, the Full Bench observed : "Having heard learned ' counsel for the parties we are clearly of the view that the decision of this Court in P. N. Kapoor's case (supra) is perfectly sound." 11. A similar view was taken by the Madras High Court in Sinnakaruppa Gounder v. M. Karuppuswami Gounder, AIR 1965 Madras 506. This Division Bench decision was also referred to by the Supreme Court in Khardah Company Limited v. Raymon and Company (India) Pvt. Limited, AIR 1962 SC 1810 . In this case, the Supreme Court held that rights under a contract are assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature or rights are by their very nature incapable of being assigned. 12. FROM what we have said above, it follows that in cases of agreements of sale and re-conveyance or resale of immovable property where a personal right has been conferred, the persons obtaining rights under them would alone be entitled to enforce the same. But, where the rights conferred are not personal, the same would be capable of being transferred or assigned and also attached in execution of the decree. But, where the rights conferred are not personal, the same would be capable of being transferred or assigned and also attached in execution of the decree. In a contract of the nature aforesaid, the right can be said to be for personal benefit if it was intended to be utilised by that person for his exclusive purposes. Coming to the two decisions, the conflict of which occasioned the present reference, we find that in Saiyad Abdullah v. Ahmad, AIR 1929 Allahabad page 817, the agreement of sale did not contain any clause, expressly or impliedly, that the agreement would be enforceable by the parties themselves and not by their legal representatives or assigns and transferees, hence the court held that the contract was capable of being assigned and could be enforced by the legal representative. In coming to this conclusion, the Court had relied on a decision of a Madras High Court in Chinna Munnuswami Nayudu v. Sagalaguna Naudu (supra). This decision had been approved by the Privy Council in appeal. 13. THE controversy, however, in Govardham v. Raghubir Singh (supra) was different. In that case, the right created by an agreement was found to be personal. After construing the agreement, the Division Bench held :- "If the latter had only a personal interest, which he could not assign, Badri and Baldeo can in no sense be regarded as his representatives so as to be entitled to obtain specific performance under Section 23 (b), Specific Relief Act." 14. THE view of the Division Bench was that as the agreement was personal in nature, it could not be alienated to other than the male lineal descendants of the vendor, who alone were entitled to get the benefit of the same. We are therefore, of the opinion that there is no conflict between the two decisions. The controversies raised in the two cases were different. The decisions given in those cases are correct and none of them can be overruled. It is a cardinal rule that the observations of Judges and the law as stated by them must be read. in relation to the issue which they had to try and their remarks cannot safely be applied to questions which could not have been in the Judge's mind at that time. 15. LET the papers of the two cases be returned to the Single Jude with the answer given above.