ORDER M.P. Mehrotra, J. - This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of the proceedings under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. 2. The facts, in brief, are these:- The petitioner was treated as the tenure-holder and the notice under S. 10(2) of the Act was issued to him. He filed his objections and they were decided by the Prescribed Authority by his order dated 9-9-82, a true copy of which is annex. 2 to the affidavit. Thereafter, the Prescribed authority discharged the notice tinder S. 10(2) of the Act holding that there was no surplus land in the hand of the petitioner. Thereafter, an appeal was filed by the State of U.P. and the same was allowed and the case was remanded for a fresh decision with certain directions. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has now come up in the instant petition and in support thereof, I have heard Sri T. S. Dabas, Learned counsel for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner emphasised that the ceiling proceedings should have taken place against the petitioner's father. Sri Gaya Prasad, who was alive on 8th June, 1973. It is not clear whether Gaya Prasad had land in excess of the ceiling limit on 8th June, 1973. However, irrespective whether Gaya Prasad had land in excess of the ceiling limit or not, or, whether any proceedings should have been taken against him under the Ceiling Act, the liability of the petitioner to be proceeded against under the Ceiling law arose under S. 29 of the Act when by inheritance he got land from his aforesaid father and along with the land held, by him in his own right and the land held by his wife, it was found that the petitioner held land in excess of the ceiling area. Therefore, the contention of Sri Dabas is untenable. The fact that no proceedings were taken against the petitioners father is not relevant in considering the validity of the proceedings under S. 29 of the Act. 4. Learned counsel then contended that the transfer deeds which were made by the petitioner in 1976 should have been examined and the land transferred by the said transfer deeds should not have been included in the total area of the petitioner. In my view, this contention is again not tenable. 4. Learned counsel then contended that the transfer deeds which were made by the petitioner in 1976 should have been examined and the land transferred by the said transfer deeds should not have been included in the total area of the petitioner. In my view, this contention is again not tenable. Reading S. 29 and S. 30 together, it seems to me that under S. 29 the relevant date for determining the ceiling area and the surplus land will be the date on which the petitioner inherited the land from his father and came to hold more than the ceiling area applicable to him. The petitioner has stated in his supplementary affidavit that his father died in June, 1975. However, in the appellate court's judgment it has been stated that Gaya Prasad died sometime prior to August, 1974. However, so far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the said difference is not material because admittedly, the sale deeds were executed according to the material on record sometime in 1976. These sale deeds were found to be disregarded as the ceiling area and the surplus land was to be declared as on the date of inheritance of the land by the petitioner which event took place either in 1974 or 1975. 5. Lastly, Sri Dabas contended that the family of the petitioner consisted of 6 members and. therefore. the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of two hectares of additional land under S. 5 (3) of the Act. The appellate court has clearly shown that three of the minor children were not even in existence on the relevant date, i.e., the date on which the petitioner came to hold surplus land under S. 29. i.e. on the date of the death of his father, Gaya Prasad. This is a pure finding of fact and no interference is called for. 6. This petition accordingly fails and is dismissed in limine.