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1983 DIGILAW 85 (KER)

M. PADMAKUMAR v. STATE OF KERALA

1983-03-18

T.CHANDRASEKHARA MENON

body1983
Judgment :- 1. The scope and ambit of R.36 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 come up for consideration here. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: The petitioner who is a Circle Inspector of Police (Crime Detachment) Kozikode and formerly senior Law Instructor, Police Training School Trichur, was proceeded against departmentally for certain serious charges of misconduct. In the disciplinary proceedings that was conducted, the Enquiry Officer was the Principal, Police Training College. In his report the Enquiry Officer found that the petitioner was not guilty of the charges levelled against him. The Deputy Inspector General of Police in his proceedings, copy of which is marked as Ext. P2, after examining the P R minutes and the connected records exonerated the petitioner from the charges levelled against him, agreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer that the charges levelled against the petitioner are not proved beyond doubt.. The matter was taken up in revision suo mote by the Inspector General of Police under R.36 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958. In his order dated 20-6-1982, copy of which is marked as Ext. P3, he said that he disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held that the charges are true. Then he proceeds to state that the orders of the D.I.G. of Police are set aside and it is provisionally decided to award the punishment of compulsory retirement of the delinquent from service. The petitioner was asked to show cause why the provisional decision should not be confirmed. It was also stated that if his explanation was not received within the time limit, namely 15 days from the date of receipt of the show cause notice, the provisional decision would be confirmed without further notice. 3. The petitioner sent his explanation in the matter, copy of which is Ext. P4. Now the order Ext. P5 has been passed by which it is said that for a Police Officer of the delinquent's statute, the misbehaviour cannot be condoned and there is no extenuating circumstance warranting any leniency. Therefore, it is ordered that the petitioner would be reverted as a Sub Inspector of Police for a period of three years and any effect on future increments and pension if caused is intended. The petitioner has approached this court for quashing Exts. P3 and P5 orders. 4. Therefore, it is ordered that the petitioner would be reverted as a Sub Inspector of Police for a period of three years and any effect on future increments and pension if caused is intended. The petitioner has approached this court for quashing Exts. P3 and P5 orders. 4. R.36 of the Kerala Police Departmental Inquiries, Punishment and Appeal Rules, 1958 is as follows: "Rule 36. Review: The authority to which an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.15(1) lie may of its own motion or otherwise, call for the records of the case in a disciplinary proceeding, review any order passed in such a case and, after consultation with the Public Service Commission where such consultation is necessary, pass such orders as deemed fit, as if the member of the service has preferred an appeal against such order: Provided that no application for review shall be entertained after the expiry of a period of two months from the date of passing the order: Provided further that no action under this rule shall be initiated more than one year after the date of the order to be reviewed: Provided further that no penalty shall be enhanced unless opportunity is given to the person concerned to show cause why the penalty should not be enhanced, and if the enhancement is one to any of the.penalties specified in items 0),(k),(1) and (m) of R.16(1) in a case where no enquiry under R.6 read with R.8 has been held, the authority reviewing the order shall enhance the punishment only after holding an enquiry under these rules." That the Inspector General has got a power of review of any order that is passed in disciplinary proceedings in which an order imposing any of the penalties specified in R.15 (1) has been passed is apparent from the rule. But it is clear from the scheme of the rule that before any order is passed by him in review which would upset the order that is sought to be reviewed, it is incumbent that he should hear the person concerned Who would be adversely affected by such order. Apart from the scheme of the rule itself, the principles of natural justice require that. Apart from the scheme of the rule itself, the principles of natural justice require that. The last proviso to the rule makes it clear that no penalty shall be enhanced unless opportunity is given to the person concerned to show cause why the penalty should not be enhanced, and if the enhancement is one to any of the penalties specified in items 0),(k),(1) and (m) of R.16(1) in a case where no enquiry under R.6 read with R.8 has been held, the authority reviewing the order shall enhance the punishment only after holding an enquiry. 5. In this case before issuing show cause notice; the Inspector General has come to a definite conclusion (and that is not a provisional conclusion) that the charges against the petitioner have been proved. The order of the Deputy Inspector General of Police had exonerated the petitioner from the charges. Therefore, it was incumbent on the part of the Inspector General to have issued a notice to the petitioner if he was inclined to take an opposite view and hear what he has to say in the matter. In this view, I would set aside Exts. P3 and P5. Certainly this will not stand in the way of the Inspector General of Police in reviewing the case in accordance with law. O.P. is allowed as above. I make no order as to costs.