JUDGMENT B.D. Aggarwal, J. - By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioners have sought a writ of Certiorari quashing the order of the Prescribed Authority, Allahabad dated 1-5-1982 under section 21(1)(a) and the decision of the VII Additional District Judge, Allahabad dated 11-3-1983 under section 22 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent & Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter the U.P. Act, 1972). 2. The dispute relates to premises No. 16, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, Allahabad described also as the Barnett's Hotel. The respondent No. 3 is the landlord. On April 25, 1947 the premises was allotted jointly to the petitioner No. 1 and the respondent No. 4 by the City Magistrate, Allahabad under section 7(2) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. One G.H. Barnett had been running a hotel in this premises in partnership with his wife since about 1929 under the name and style of the Barnett and Co. The Stock-in-trade was sold by him on May 14, 1947 to the petitioner No. 1 and respondent no 4 who entered into partnership to run the Hotel. The respondent No. 4 retired from the partnership on April 1, 1975 except by retaining 1 % share from which too she withdrew on January 31, 1978. 3. The application giving rise to this petition was filed by the landlord respondent No. 3 on June 2, 1978 before the Prescribed Authority, Allahabad under section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act. 1972 seeking eviction of the petitioners from this premises on ground that the applicant requires the building himself to settle his only son Harish Tandon (now aged about 25 years) who has completed B.Com. Master of Business Administration course and is interested in running a Three Star Hotel in this building. The application was resisted for the petitioners who refuted that the landlord is in bona fide need of the building and contended also that the balance of the comparative hardship lies in their favor. 4. The Prescribed Authority has allowed the application and directed release being of the view that the landlord has genuine and bona fide need for the building and the comparative hardship resulting to him in the event of the denial would be greater. The findings were affirmed in appeal filed by the petitioners before the appellate authority under section 22 of the U.P. Act, 1972. The findings were affirmed in appeal filed by the petitioners before the appellate authority under section 22 of the U.P. Act, 1972. The respondent No. 4 did not put in contest to the application at any stage. 5. Sri K.M. Dayal, learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that the respondent landlord does not bona fide require this building to settle his son. The building, it is argued, in its present architectural state cannot be made use of as a Three Star Hotel. The son of the respondent has not acquired technical education to be able to run a Hotel and lie already looks to the business at the Kashi Ornament House along with his father. The landlord is possessed of other buildings too and he cannot have his choice in the matter of selection of site for a Hotel. The petitioners, it is further submitted, have had no intention to liquidate or part with their business in this Hotel for which they have acquired good-will and there is no other source to fall back upon. 6. Section 21(])(a) of the U.P. Act, 1972, so far as relevant, provides for the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy on ground that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling. The finding of the Prescribed Authority confirmed in appeal under section 22 by the appellate court in regard to the existence of banafide need of the landlord is upon facts and save upon exceptional and cogent grounds not open to the interference in the exercise of writ jurisdiction by this court. Upon scrutinising it is abundantly clear that no such ground is made out for the petitioners. 7. The expression "bona fide required" appearing in the context of section 21(a) has received judicial interpretation in various pronouncements. The assessment has to be objective depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. The word "required", it was pointed in Mattu Lai v. Radhey Lal AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596. signifies that were desire on the part of the landlord is not enough, but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely required non-residential accommodation for purposes of starting or continuing his own business. The word "required", it was pointed in Mattu Lai v. Radhey Lal AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596. signifies that were desire on the part of the landlord is not enough, but there should be an element of need and the landlord must show that he genuinely required non-residential accommodation for purposes of starting or continuing his own business. See also Ajit Prasad v. IV Addl. District Judge, Meerut 1979 A.R.C. 73. The need of the landlord does not, however, have to be shown as absolute. In Smt. Gindori Devi v. 11nd Addl. District Judge & others 1979 (U.P.) R.C.C. 599., at page 601 it was held:- It would suffice to mention that a person is said to need a premises bona,fide if he requires it honestly. Similarly, the wod "required" has also been interpreted in several cases, and the connotation of the said word shows that the landlord must need the premises. In order to succeed in such an application, it is not necessary that the landlord must be on the streets. The connotation of the word "need" or "requirement" should not be unnecessarily or artificially extended so as to give it a meaning that a landlord cannot get a premises released unless his requirement is absolute. No doubt, the question of need of a landlord is to be decided objectively and its decision should not be based on the apse dixit of a landlord, but that does not mean that he must stand on extreme need before he could succeed." In Javant Kumar v. Prescribed Authority 1979 (U.P.)R.C.C.132, it was reiterated that :- ""It is, however, not necessary that the landlord must stand in absolute need of the property. The requirement of law is that the need of a landlord must be honest and in good faith. It is not correct that a landlord cannot succeed unless he is found in an extreme need." 8. Mere desire or absolute need or necessity are both, it has been held, erroneous approaches in this behalf vide Janki Pd. v. 11nd Addl. District Judge 1980 (U.P.) R.C.C. 602. The word 'bona fide' means genuinely, sincerely i.e. in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. A Full Bench of this Court construed this to mean 'genuinely or in good faith' and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, Varanasi AIR 1976 Allahabad 328. District Judge 1980 (U.P.) R.C.C. 602. The word 'bona fide' means genuinely, sincerely i.e. in good faith in contradiction to mala fide. A Full Bench of this Court construed this to mean 'genuinely or in good faith' and conveying an idea of absence of any intent to deceive Chandra Kumar Sah v. District Judge, Varanasi AIR 1976 Allahabad 328. It will not be bona fide requirement of the landlord if release is sought for an ulterior purpose or fanciful whim, vide Dr. Sita Ram Gandhi v. District Judge, Meerut 1978 (2) R.C.J. 326., Smt. Kamul Ahuja v. VII Addl. District Judge, Meerut 1981 A.R.C. 371. 9. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan (1979) 1 S.C.C. 275., Section 11(1)(h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 that came up for interpretation read thus : ".........where the house or shop is reasonably required by the land- lord either for purpose of building or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or shop is held; Explanation-The Court in determining the reasonableness of requirement for purposes of building or rebuilding shall have regard to the comparative public benefit or disadvantage by extending or diminishing accommodation, and in determining reasonableness of requirement for occupation shall have regard to the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or the person for whose benefit the house or shop is held and of the tenant." 10. The house, in that case, was required for the personal residence or occupation of all the three plaintiffs who admittedly were the owners of the house. It was held that the fact that the plaintiffs wanted to occupy the property for running a hotel would not take their case out of the ambit of personal necessity. The meaning that their Lordships assigned to the words 'reasonable requirement' appearing in section l I(1)(h) is also of considerable significance for purposes of the instant case. It was laid : "Moreover, section 11(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other States in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word 'requirement, and pointed out that it merely can notes that there should be an element of need." 11. This interpretation of the Supreme Court has been widely followed by this Court in construing 'bona fide required' used in section 21(1)(a). M/s. Gur Narain Jagat Narain and Co. v. M/s. Motor and General Sales Ltd. 1980 A.L.J. 508., Smt. Kamal Ahuja, (supra) are some of them in point. 12. Viewed in the light of the above, the Court has in this case to consider whether the respondent landlord does genuinely intend running a Hotel in this. premises. Is his connection that his son would start a Hotel herein fake or mere pretext ? Has this been set up dishonestly or with an oblique motive ? And, secondly, whether for the purpose he does stand in need of this building being vacated ? This would, in my opinion, be the correct approach to be issued of 'bona fide required'. Although, as the petitioners' learned counsel argued, the order of allotment dated 25-4-1947 (Annexure 1 to this Writ Petition) does not specify the purpose thereof, it can hardly be doubted that this has been, as evidenced from the long user, predominantly non-residential. Barnett, the previous tenant was running a Hotel herein though also residing in part of the building. The allottee. namely, the respondent No. 4 did not reside in any part of this building at any point of time. Barnett, the previous tenant was running a Hotel herein though also residing in part of the building. The allottee. namely, the respondent No. 4 did not reside in any part of this building at any point of time. Ever since 1947, the petitioner No. 1 has had a Hotel in this premises though also occupying no insubstantial portion for residence of himself, his wife and an unmarried daughter (petitioner No. 3) Sri Dayal submitted that residence was necessary too for purposes of catering to services etc. in the Hotel. The nature of the accommodation is not converted into residential on this account, M/s. Govindram Sewarain v. Ilnd Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahar 1982 (U.P.) R.C.C. 22. 13. Now there is no dispute that Harsh Tandon (now aged nearly 25) the only son of the landlord-respondent has completed his study and secured the degree of B.Com. and the Master of Business Administration from the University of Allahabad. When the petition was filed he was a student in the course of Master of Business Administration which was completed in 1979. The landlord contends that he has to settle the son and the latter is keen to run a Hotel. For the petitioners it is urged that the son might join his father in the jewelery shop and even that he is already assisting the respondent therein. Both the landlord and Harsh Tandon put in their affidavits before the Prescribed Authority specifying that the latter had absolutely no inclination to deal in ornaments and it is incorrect that he has had any concern with that business. It is also made clear that the landlord is only a partner in the Kashi Ornament House having 25% share against which there is no effective rebuttal. In believing these affidavits, the authorities below cannot be said to have erred in law or to have indulged in perversity. Even if it were assumed for the sake of arguments that Harsh Tandon assists the father in that business such a stop gap arrangement in the absence of his being able immediately to start the Hotel is entirely of no consequence. Ghanshyam Das v. VIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Meerut 1982 (U.P.) R.C.C. 650. The petitioners do not dispute that the respondent has the requisite financial capacity to make heavy investment for running a Hotel. Ghanshyam Das v. VIth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Meerut 1982 (U.P.) R.C.C. 650. The petitioners do not dispute that the respondent has the requisite financial capacity to make heavy investment for running a Hotel. It was stated that the respondent or his son have had no previous experience but that does not prevent making a beginning with a new venture. 14. Shri Dayal, the learned counsel, submitted that the respondent has not produced accounts to show that the income that he used have in pre-1952 era has dwindled. The contention is that the respondents' earning is considerable still such as does not justify the son engaging himself in this kind of business. He cited the cases reported in 1981 A.R.C. 30: Ved Prakash v. IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Bulaadshahr etc. and Ms. Lulita Printers v. IVth Addl. District Judge, 1981 A.R.C. 649., in this connection. Both these cases stand on different footing. In Ved Prakash (supra) the landlord's case was that the source of his income was insufficient for him to earn his livelihood in the other too the conted Lion was that the income was not sufficient for reasonably living. The respondent in the instant case certainly does not plead that his son needs engagement in new business to make the two end meet. In substance his averments amount to this namely, that due to the abolition of zamindari, the Gold Control Act and the orders relating to this besides the restrictions placed under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, his earning is not on the scale as it was in pre 1952 days. The petitioners have disputed this as incorrect and maintained although without any source of personal knowledge that the respondents' earning has not suffered any set back. We night assume that to be so and also draw adverse against the respondent due to the accounts of income being not submitted. But then that does not meet the point. Despite the resources of his father and other sources of income of the family, the son is entitled to look for and engage himself in an undertaking. That would be perfectly legitimate. In M/s Deep Chand ,Vem Chand Jain & others v. The Prescribed Authority, A.D.M. (E), Saharanpur 1979 A.R.C. 479. But then that does not meet the point. Despite the resources of his father and other sources of income of the family, the son is entitled to look for and engage himself in an undertaking. That would be perfectly legitimate. In M/s Deep Chand ,Vem Chand Jain & others v. The Prescribed Authority, A.D.M. (E), Saharanpur 1979 A.R.C. 479. brother A.N. Verma, J. observed: ""I am not persuaded to accept the contention of Shri S.N. Kackkar, as a proposition, that if some members of the family of the landlords are found engaged in any business earning profits, the building under tenancy ought not be released for enabling the unemployed or unengaged members of the family to start business of their own in that building merely because the family as a circle or unit has some existing business engagement. In my view, each adult ought to be legitimately entitled to work for his own independent existence and substance. He is entitled to choose a vocation or profession suiting his individual' aptitude, education or qualification, capabilities and so forth. The need of such an unemployed member cannot, in my judgment, he dismissed by telling him that he must follow the line or profession of the other members of the family or try to get absorbed in the business already carried on by the family. Of course, such a need of the landlords will have to be balanced against the hardship likely to be caused to the tenants from the grant of the application." 15. I am in respectful agreement with this view. Subject, of course, to the question, of comparative hardship being considered that I will do later, the respondent is within his rights in seeking to augment his it come and in this there is no lack of bona fides. 16. It was next argued for the petitioners that the building in question does not conform to the standard of a Three Star Hotel and, further, that the landlord cannot maintain his choice for the premises to run the Hotel. The Barnett Hotel as at present is a Two Star Hotel the learned counsel does not dispute that it fulfills the requirements thereof. The Barnett Hotel as at present is a Two Star Hotel the learned counsel does not dispute that it fulfills the requirements thereof. I am referred to certain directives issued by the department of tourism and the report of the Advocate Commissioner dated 14-12-1979 (Annexure CA VI) submitted before the Prescribed Authority and it is argued on the basis thereof that the building as at present does not satisfy those norms. The contention does not advance the petitioners' case of the reasons, firstly, that it is within the means of the respondent to renovate and modernise the structure on being vacated so as to give it a new look with the norms of a Three Star Hotel as well fulfilled, and secondly, if that be on some unavoidable account impossible there is nothing that would inhibit the respondent or his son in running this even as a Two Star Hotel with all the required improvements made in it. The pleadings of the respondent as submitted on his behalf do not suggest that his son shall have in this building a Three Star Hotel right from the start or none at all. Indeed, we do not find anything inherently impracticable nor was any indicated in relation to this building being convertible of course with suitable investment to a Three Star Hotel. Section 19(4) (ii) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 referred to by Shri Dayal prohibits a person from altering or causing to be altered the use of excess vacant land. As a manifest, from section 2 (q) (ii) that defines' vacant land, this does not include any building which has been constructed before the appointed day. The fact, therefore, that about 5-6 years prior to the application for release the petitioner No. 1 surrendered some portion of vacant land behind this building to the landlord and the plan to raise construction thereon was not sanctioned by the Nagar Mahapalika does not lead to assumption that the existing building too may not be permitted to be renovated or altered. It was also mentioned in the course of arguments that the State Government has not thus for renewed the lease of Nazul land. It was also mentioned in the course of arguments that the State Government has not thus for renewed the lease of Nazul land. There is no suggestion that the matter stands shelved, the respondent has been holding over ultimately the premium/rental might be raised or even part of the vacant land required to be surrendered, but an apprehension that the building might be taken over or pulled is unfounded. 17. Learned counsel then urged that the respondent-landlord does not have an unfettered right to choose the premises to run the new business. He has cited in support the following observations appearing in M.M. Qasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma (1981) 3 S.C.C. 36 . ""When examining a case of personal requirement if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison dere of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the land lord's agreed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the court administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same." 18. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the court administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same." 18. Before the Prescribed Authority in the present case, in respondent submitted the list of immovable properties owned by him (Annexure 4 to the writ petition). None of these other properties is vacant or likely to fall vacant in foreseeable future. An analysis, as is evident from the averments in the affidavits on both sides and also found by the authorities below, reveals that none of them may reasonably be opted for running a Three Star or Two Star Hotel. Item No. 7 consists of shops in dilapidated condition in the distant area of Sulem Sarai, item No.6 comprises residential servant's quarters in thick residential area of Rani Mandi in the heart of the city, item No 4 comprises of shop in the Hewett Road and items Nos. 2 and 3 are also residential. All of these have been in occupation of various tenants having statutory protection the net rental is stated as being a small sum of Rs. 2,500/- p.m. only. Item No. 5 comprises of a building at Rani Mandi used for residence by the landlord and impart thereof is located the jewelery firm. In the rejoinder affidavit for the petitioners filed in this court on September 30. 1983 it is also narrated that the respondent has almost completed a new building in the Auckland Road. Learned counsel does not dispute that this too is in residential area with no hotel or a thing of that kind in the vicinity and there is no suggestion that the building is designed for use as a Hotel. In contra,t the building in dispute-16 M.G. Marg has the distinct advantage of being in the heart of the market area of the Civil Lines close to the Junction Railway Station, the High Court, the Head Post Office, the University and various other offices. Granting that the right of the landlord is not unfettered as the Supreme Court has laid, the landlord in this case has no other reasonable or feasible choice before him. 19. Granting that the right of the landlord is not unfettered as the Supreme Court has laid, the landlord in this case has no other reasonable or feasible choice before him. 19. Proviso (iv) to section 21(1) of the U.P. Act, 1972 reads:- ""Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such factors as may be prescribed." 20. The explanation is not relevant for our purposes. The factors relevant to a building let out for purposes of any business are prescribed in Rule 16(2)(a) to (d) framed under this Act. Sub-clause (d) says that where a son has, after the building was originally let out, completed his technical education and is not employed in Government service, and wants to engage in self-employment his need shall be given due consideration. Harsh Tandon was not born when the lease in this case was created. Learned counsel has assailed the certificate dated 29-3-1983 from the Managing Director, Hotel Clark, Varanasi to the effect that the respondent's son received training for the period of April to September 81 on ground that there is no affidavit from the said Managing Director himself. Harsh Tandon has filed his own affidavits which have been accepted by the lower authorities. But this apart, the degree of the Master of Business Administration that he admittedly holds is itself of relevance and, serves consideration in the context of sub-clause (d). 21. It is contended that having regard to the length of the period during which the tenancy has continued, the furnishings and fixtures which have accumulated, the absence of alternative accommodation available to the petitioners and also that the other petitioners are dependent on petitioner No. 1 there could be little justification as contemplated in Rule 16(2)(a) and (i) to direct eviction in this case. On giving careful thought to this aspect of the matter and making a probe into the material placed on the record, I am unable to agree. The theory raised in the course of arguments for the petitioners referring to dependence on the petitioner No. 1 lacks substance. On giving careful thought to this aspect of the matter and making a probe into the material placed on the record, I am unable to agree. The theory raised in the course of arguments for the petitioners referring to dependence on the petitioner No. 1 lacks substance. Of the two tenants admitted to this premises namely, the petitioner and the respondent no 4 the latter has relinquished completely her interest in the partnership with the petitioner No. 1 and is not opposed to giving up the tenancy as well. She severed her ties from the business on 31-1-1978, earlier since 1-4-1975 she had ceased except to the nominal extent of 1 % only. The petitioner No. 1 is thus the sole surviving tenant none of the other petitioners is a tenant in the premises. Petitioners No. 5,6,7 are the adult sons of the petitioner No. 1 the petitioner No. 8 is the wife of another son of the petitioner No. 1. Petitioner No. 4 is also daughter-in-law of the petitioner No. 1. None of these petitioners 4 to 8 resides with the petitioner No. 1. They have different addresses as specified in the writ petition. The sons are of the age group of 55 to 60 years. The petitioner No. 1 himself is nearing 83 years. His wife, the petitioner No. 2 and an unmarried daughter, the petitioner No. 3 aged about 60 years reside with him. It is urged that the petitioners Nos. 2 to 8 are partners with the, petitioner No. 1 in the Hotel business. The partnership deed dated 11-2-I6 tiled for the petitioners before the appellate court, though not without considerable reluctance, reveals that the shave of appellant No. 1 the tenant in the business is confined to 8% only. Shri S.P. Gupta, the respondents' learned counsel emphases not without force, therefore, that vis-a-vis the landlords, the interest of the surviving tenant in the business carried on in this premises-the predominant purpose for which it has been held under tenancy is cut down by as much as 92%. Another noteworthy feature of the case is that this partnership of the family is a recent creation. Upon the respondent no. 4 the other tenant ceasing to retain interest since 1975 the petitioners have thought of this device in the hope to perpetuate the tenancy in the garb thereof. Another noteworthy feature of the case is that this partnership of the family is a recent creation. Upon the respondent no. 4 the other tenant ceasing to retain interest since 1975 the petitioners have thought of this device in the hope to perpetuate the tenancy in the garb thereof. The application for eviction was moved shortly afterwords on June 2, 1978 as mentioned above. In para 19 thereof (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) it was stated : ""That almost all the members of the family of opposite party No. 1, are, settled in lift; and they are not dependent on Hotel business." In reply, as appearing from para 19 of written statement (Annexure 3)the assertion was : ""That para 19 of the petition is not admitted as it stands. The family members of the opposite party No. 1 are partners in the said hotel business and are getting profits whatsoever came to their share and thus they augment their income to meet their expenses in these hard order days." This is also their contention in para 61 of the counter affidavit filed before the Prescribed Authority (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) 22. The significant fact is that on the petitioner's own showing the sons of the petitioner No. 1 have had their independent avocations. It is not their case that prior to 1975-78 they had concern with the partnership business of running the Hotel. It is not said that the husband of the petitioner No. 8 is unsettled. The contention is that being of the age group of 55 to 60 the petitioners Nos. 5,6,7 have since retired from service and are not in the position to run a new Hotel. The comparative hardship that concerns the landlord is not of the partners as such but of the tenant and his family that may be said to cover the petitioner No. 1, his wife and the unmarried daughter only. The respondents' learned counsel rightly submitted that it has not been the case of the petitioners that the petitioners Nos. 4 to 8 have been dependents upon the petitioner No. 1 as members of the family. The aforesaid proviso to section 21 (1) does not certainly require consideration of the hardship to persons whom the tenant may choose to induct as his partners in the business. 23. 4 to 8 have been dependents upon the petitioner No. 1 as members of the family. The aforesaid proviso to section 21 (1) does not certainly require consideration of the hardship to persons whom the tenant may choose to induct as his partners in the business. 23. Sri Dayal laid stress also upon the goodwill and submitted that the Hotel is of long standing. He cited M/s. S.C. Cumbatta & Co. (Pr.) Ltd. Bombay, 16 that the refers to considerations relevant to goodwill in general. Mere length of the period for which the Hotel has run is not decisive. In para 51 of the counter affidavit before the Prescribed Authority (Annexurc to the writ petition). the petitioners admit that their "hotel business has suffered immensely due to competitive hotels coming up in the Civil Lines as well as in the city and further more now the "Bar" was stopped, the business has considerably dwindled. "I have referred above already to the advancing age and the resultant incapacity of the petitioner No. 1 as reflected also in his retaining interest to the minimal extent of 8% only in the loss and profits. For the' respondent it has also been contended that the petitioner No. 1 has been looking forward to disposing of the business upon suitable terms. In proof thereof, reliance is put on the letter dated 15-4-1978 which the petitioner No. 1 wrote to the landlord vide annexure 13: ""Further to the favor of your call on April 13, 1978. I have been deeply considering your proposals. But to give a concrete shape to the same it is necessary to have your views on the following points (1) What is your scheme to join the partnership. In what way do you think the scheme can be implemented? As you know we are keenly interested in running and improving the business in spite of the false rumors that we, intend to dispose it of. Your cooperation in improving the establishment would be highly valued. (2) Incidentally, we would like to know what is your offer of taking over our business Please specify the amount tenable us to give the matter our consideration. You may also suggest other alternative, if any, that you may be having in mind. 24. Your cooperation in improving the establishment would be highly valued. (2) Incidentally, we would like to know what is your offer of taking over our business Please specify the amount tenable us to give the matter our consideration. You may also suggest other alternative, if any, that you may be having in mind. 24. Though not decisive this too is relevant in the context of sub-clause (a) and (c) of Rule 16(2) the application whereof necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Sub-clause (d) is not rendered nugatory by Sub-clause (a) or (c) vide Smt. Chandrawati v. VIth Additional District Judge, Saharanpur 1978 A.R.C. 418. In deciding this aspect of the matter, held the Supreme Court in Mt. Bega Begum (supra)," each party has to prove its relative advantages or disadvantages and the entire onus cannot be thrown on the plaintiffs to prove that lesser disadvantages will be suffered by the dependents and that they were remediable." Sri Dayal made a feeble attempt to distinguish that case urging that in section 11(1)(h) of the Jammu & Kashmir Rent Control Act there is the word "Explanation" while section 21(1) of the U.P. Act, 1972 uses the expression "Proviso" and that as a general rule as observed in Shah Bhojraj of Kuverji Oil Mills & Ginning Factory AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1596. and the Commissioner of Income-tax, etc. v. The Indo-Mercantile Bank Ltd AIR 1959 Supreme Court 713. a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment while an Explanation elucidates what is contained in the main provision. I am not impressed with this contention. Suffice it may be said that in the context of the relevant provisions the distinction attempted is without a difference. It is not the nomenclature or the label put upon it but the substance that matters. The proviso to section 21(1) as also the explanation to section 11(l)(h) of the other Act (quoted above) require as mandatory regard being had to the advantages or disadvantages on either side in the event of the application being allowed or otherwise. To put this, is other words, therefore, there is no difference in substance due to the provision in our Act being designated as a 'proviso' instead of an 'explanation'. The provision is in 'part materia' and that has also been the consistent view of this Court. To put this, is other words, therefore, there is no difference in substance due to the provision in our Act being designated as a 'proviso' instead of an 'explanation'. The provision is in 'part materia' and that has also been the consistent view of this Court. (see : Sanwal Das Banka v. III Addl. District Judge, Faizabad 1982(1) A.R.C. 24., Radhey Shyam v. IV Addl. District Judge, Bulandshahr 1980 A.R.C. 594., In M/s. General Tobacco Co. v. Chandra Prakash an unreported decision of the Supreme Court of 1969, which has been followed in Bega Begum (supra) and again in Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant N. Patel (1974) 1 S.C.C. 661 ., it was held that each party must adduce evidence to show what hardship could be caused to him by the granting or refusal of the decree and that the tenant must also adduce evidence to the effect that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him. The view taken Bega Begum (supra) has been followed in Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti (1980)1 S.C.C. 290 . The Court is entitled also to take into account the fact that the tenant has neither alleged, nor proved to have made effort to have an alternative accommodation. (Now Ilahi v. Third Addl. District Judge, Saharanpur 1983 A.R.C. 783.' Sanwal Das Banka (supra). Moreover, the non-availability of alternative accommodation to the tenant is in itself not the adequate ground to reject the landlord's application vide Kantil Khan v. III Addl. District Judge. Bareilly 1982 (1) A.R.C. 783. In Suraj Prasad Sharma v. II Addl. District Judge, Mirza pur 1983 Alld. C.J. 432. brother M.N. Shukla, J. observed : ""It is a common place fact that invariably when an application under section 21 of the Act is allowed, the tenant has to quit and this involves discomfort but if this alone were sufficient to non suit the landlord, no application for release could ever be allowed. Judging comparative hardships' is a matter of deeper import and it would be a lopsided order which dismisses a landlord's application for release merely with the plaintiffs dinous observation that the tenant would "thrown on the street". The physical dispossession of the tenant is the necessary concomitant of every release application of the landlord which is allowed. However, well-founded the application may be an element of inconvenience or discomfort is inherent in the very process of vacating an accommodation. The physical dispossession of the tenant is the necessary concomitant of every release application of the landlord which is allowed. However, well-founded the application may be an element of inconvenience or discomfort is inherent in the very process of vacating an accommodation. A release application cannot be thrown out merely with the bald observation the tenant would suffer greater hardship." 25. In Radhey Sit rum v. IV Additional District Judge, Bulandshahr the appellate court held that the landlord should himself take one of the shops pointed out by him on rent as the landlord's son had to start a business so that he could make the beginning anywhere without any prejudice, the tenants had a goodwill in respect of the shop in dispute having been carrying on business there in for nearly forty years. Learned Single Judge considered as weighing the scales far too much against a landlords and it was observed that "if the view taken by the District Judge is accepted, the landlord intending to start a business can never expect to get his shop. For his claim could always be defeated by a sitting tenant on the short ground that the landlord has to make a start while the tenant has already been in the business for a longer time." 26. It was also submitted by the petitioners' counsel that if dislodged from the premises, the furnishing and fixures installed by the tenant at his expense might be ruined. This need not detain us, for, as the appellate authority also observes, if no alternative accommodation is available those paraphernalia might be disposed of. That does not prevent the landlord from seeking eviction on bonafrde requirement being established. To the rejoinder affidavit filed on 30th September, 1983, the petitioners have appended a chart (Annexure R.A,I.) on the basis whereof reference is made to the income of the petitioner No. I during 1971-72 to 1974-75 and the petitioners thereafter from 1975-76 to 1977-78. The respondent did not have the opportunity to meet this as no such material was placed before the Prescribed Authority, or, the appellate court and, further, as explained above, the loss of income to the partners would not be covered under the proviso to section 21 (1). 27. The respondent did not have the opportunity to meet this as no such material was placed before the Prescribed Authority, or, the appellate court and, further, as explained above, the loss of income to the partners would not be covered under the proviso to section 21 (1). 27. Having regard to the discussion made above, the application under section 21(1) (a) was rightly allowed since the respondent No. 3 bona fide requires the building and the balance of comparative hardship was not found to lie in she petitioners' favor. 28. The writ petitioner, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs. The petitioners shall have six months' time to vacate.