JUDGMENT A. Banerji, J. 1. A learned single Judge was considering the scope of Section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, (Central Act 34 of 1948), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'. The contention on behalf of the appellant was that after the appeal had been admitted on the existence of a substantial question of law, the appellate court could hear the appeal on other questions as well, whether of fact or law. In support of this contention he cited two Division Bench decisions of this Court-Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Limited, AIR 1956 All. 491 and Smt. Shyama Devi v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1964 All. 427 . The learned single Judge was of the view that both these decisions needed re-consideration, as in his opinion, the scope of section 82 of the Act has not been correctly decided in the aforementioned two decisions of this Court. The learned single Judge chose to rely on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Shalimar Rope Works Limited v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, 75 CWN 1005 wherein it was held that the findings of fact arrived at by the Employees Insurance Court could not be considered by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 82 of the Act. The learned single Judge therefore referred the following question for decision by a Larger Bench :- " Whether after admission of an appeal under Section 82 of the Employees' State Insurance Act, the High Court can interfere with the findings of the Employees' Insurance Court on facts ?" 2. THE matter came up before a Division Bench consisting of Chief Justice and Mr. Justice A. N. Varma. THEir Lordships were of the view that since the Court has to consider the correctness of the decisions of two Division Benches, the matter should engage the attention of a Larger Bench. Consequently the case has come up before us. The principal question to be considered in this case is regarding scope of Section 82 of the Act. Section 82 of the Act reads as follows :- " 82. Appeal.-(1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. Consequently the case has come up before us. The principal question to be considered in this case is regarding scope of Section 82 of the Act. Section 82 of the Act reads as follows :- " 82. Appeal.-(1) Save as expressly provided in this section, no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court. (2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court if it involves substantial question of law. (3) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (4) The provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to appeals under this section. " 3. IT will be relevant to refer to a few provisions of Chapter VI of the Act in regard to Employees' Insurance Court. Section 74 of the Act deals with the constitution of Employees' Insurance Court. Section 75 deals with the matter to be decided by the said Court. Section 78 of the Act defines the power of the said Court. Sub-section (4) of Section 78 lays down ; " An order of the Employees' Insurance Court shall be enforceable as if it were a decree passed in a suit by a Civil Court." 4. SECTION 82 (1) of the Act specially provides that apart from what is provided by the section itself, 'no appeal shall lie from an order of an Employees' Insurance Court'. It is, therefore, obvious that except what is provided by this section, there is no other provision for any other appeal. SECTION 82 (2) of the Act reads : " An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of the Employees' Insurance Court if it involves substantial question of law." A plain reading of sub-section (2) of SECTION 82 of the Act leads to the conclusion that appeals not involving substantial question of law are clearly not maintainable. What is maintainable therefore is an appeal which involves a substantial question of law. In other words, the appeal would be maintainable provided it raises a substantial question of law. What is maintainable therefore is an appeal which involves a substantial question of law. In other words, the appeal would be maintainable provided it raises a substantial question of law. In this context what the words 'appeal' used in sub-section (2) conveys is the making of a request for redress of a grievance and the expression '' appeal lies to the High Court from an order of the Employees' Insurance Court" would mean that any person aggrieved by an order of the Employees' Insurance Court can approach the High Court in an appeal for providing redress to him against that order. Further, the expression "An appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of the Employees' Insurance Court if it involves substantial question of law", would, therefore, mean that an aggrieved party can approach the High Court for redress of his grievance regarding the decision of the Employees' Insurance Court in respect of a substantial question of law. Where the aggrieved party claims that a question of fact has been wrongly decided his appeal in that regard would clearly not involve any substantial question of law and such an appeal would, therefore, not be maintainable. It is obvious therefore that it is not open to the aggrieved party to, in an appeal under section 82 of the Act, rake up any question other than that in respect of a substantial question of law, for if he is allowed to do so, it would amount entertaining, an appeal in respect of matter not involving a substantial question of law. 5. LET us now consider the contentions put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant. He urged that a substantial question of law should arise to enable the High Court to admit the appeal, and once the appeal was admitted, it was open to the High Court to interfere with the order passed by the Employees' Insurance Court even on question which did not raise a substantial question of law. Learned counsel sought to rely on the decisions in the case of Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Limited and Smt. Shyama Devi v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (supra). Learned counsel sought to rely on the decisions in the case of Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Limited and Smt. Shyama Devi v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (supra). In the former case, a Division Bench of this Court was considering the meaning of the phrase 'substantial question of law' as contained in Section 7 (1) (a) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. The Division Bench held that the words 'substantial question of law' in the aforementioned Act could not be given the same meaning as in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court was of the view that an appeal was provided to the appellate court from a court of original jurisdiction, and if the contention of the learned counsel viz. that the appeal could be entertained and heard only on substantial question of law was accepted, it would mean that the Labour Appellate Tribunal would have no jurisdiction in a case in which the State Industrial Tribunal had arrived at an obviovsly wrong conclusion on a matter of law. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the intention of the Legislature was not as contended by the learned counsel. 6. IT would be relevant to mention here the provisions of Section 7 (1) Of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 : " Subject to the provisions of this section an appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of an Industrial Tribunal if- (a) the appeal involves any substantial question of law. (b) the award or decision is in respect of any of the following matters, namely; (List of eight matters is enumerated). This provision, in our opinion, provides for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal from any award or decision of the Industrial Tribunal where the appeal involves any substantial question of law. The Division Bench also held :- " The requirement of the sub-section is that the appeal "involves" a substantial question of law or that it is from an award or decision which is "in respect of" certain matters........." IT would, therefore, be evident that the appeal would lie in respect of two matters : one that the appeal involved any substantial question of law and secondly, if the award or decision was in respect of the eight matters enumerated. IT is, therefore, obvious that the appeal would lie where the appeal did not involve any substantial question of law but was one of the eight matters as enumerated in clause (b). Section 82 of the Act is different. It does not have any provision like clause (b) to Section 7 (1) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. Section 82 of the Act limited the appeal only where it involved a substantial question of law. Consequently, the decision in the case of Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co. Ltd., (supra) is clearly distinguishable. 7. REFERENCE may now be made to the subsequent decision in the case of Smt. Shyama Devi v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation (supra). This was a decision under the Act. In this case, it was argued by the learned counsel that it was open to the Court to summarily reject the appeal under Section 82 of the Act on the ground that it did not involve a substantial question of law. But, if the Court had not done so and admitted the appeal, it became open to the appellant at the hearing of the appeal to attack the finding on merits. In support thereof reliance was placed on the case of Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Limited (supra) and on the case Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, AIR 1942 FC 22. In the latter case, Chief Justice Gwyer observed that "once a certificate had been given by the High Court under Section 205 (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, that the case involved a substantial question of law the appellant was entitled with the leave of the Court, to raise any point in his defence." The Division Bench upheldt he contention of the appellant in that case that it was open to the appellant at the hearing of the appeal to challenge the findings recorded by the Judge, Employees' Insurance Court. 8. IN our opinion, the above Division Bench also does not correctly decide the scope of Section 82 of the Act. Firstly, it has relied on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Limited (supra). 8. IN our opinion, the above Division Bench also does not correctly decide the scope of Section 82 of the Act. Firstly, it has relied on the decision of the Division Bench in the case of Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Company Limited (supra). The distinction in respect of Section 7 (1) (b) has neither been referred nor noticed by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Shyama Devi v. The Employees' State INsurance Corporation (supra). Secondly, the provision of Sec. 205 of the Government of INdia Act, 1935 was different. It will be relevant to refer to Section 205 :- " 205-(1) An appeal shall lie to the Federal Court from any judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in British INdia, if the High Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Act or any Order in Council made there under, and it shall be the duty of every High Court in British INdia to consider in every case whether or not any such question is involved and of its own motion to give or to withhold a certificate accordingly. (2) Where such a certificate is given, any party in the case may appeal to the Federal Court on the ground that any such question as aforesaid has been wrongly decided, on any ground on which that party could have appealed without special leave to his Majesty in Council if no such certificate had been given, and, with the leave of the Federal Court, on any other ground, and no direct appeal shall lie to his Majesty in Council, either with or without special leave. " It may be noticed at once that while sub-section (1) required the High Court to certify that the case involved a substantial question of law, sub-section (2) provided that where such a certificate had been given any party in the case could appeal on any ground on which that party would have appealed without special leave to His Majesty in Council, and could also appeal where no such certificate had been given with the leave of the Federal Court, on any other ground. It is, therefore, evident that when the matter came before the Federal court, the appeal could be entertained in two circumstances : Firstly, on a certificate that the case involved substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act or any Order in Council made thereunder, and secondly, on any ground on which the party could have appealed without special leave to the Privy Council and on any other ground with the leave of the Federal Court. It is, therefore, evident that the Federal Court had power to enter into questions apart from the substantial question of law for which a certificate had been given. Further, the appeal would be heard on any other ground with the leave of the Federal Court. It is, therefore, evident that the provisions of the two Acts were not in pari materia and consequently reliance placed on the case of Niharehdu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor (supra) for interpreting the provisions of the Act in regard to the term 'substantial question of law' was not apt. 9. LEARNED counsel then argued that Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it now exists, provides entertainment of a second appeal on a substantial question of law, but sub-sec. (5) thereof makes a provision that the appeal can be heard only on the substantial question of law framed under sub-sec. (4). In other words, his contention was that a second appeal could be entertained and heard only when the High Court was satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law. The contention is that the position under the Act is different, for there is no such limitation provided in Sec. 82 of the Act and as such there was no bar in hearing the appeal on other questions apart from the substantial question of law. In our opinion, the argument is misconceived. Section 100 of the Code is very clear. A second appeal would lie if the High Court is satisfied that it involves a substantial question of law. At the time of admission the High Court will have to certify the same and frame the question. Section 100 of the Code also makes it clear that it is within the power of the Court hearing the second appeal to revoke the certificate once it finds that the substantial question of law so framed really does not arise. At the time of admission the High Court will have to certify the same and frame the question. Section 100 of the Code also makes it clear that it is within the power of the Court hearing the second appeal to revoke the certificate once it finds that the substantial question of law so framed really does not arise. The High Court in such a case would have no power to interfere with the judgment and decree of the court below. Thus, a second appeal would lie if it involved a substantial question of law, and the High Court would have jurisdiction to decide only the substantial question of law so arising. Similar is the position under Sec. 82 of the Act. The appeal would lie if it involves a substantial question of law and the appeal would have to be confined to the same. The mere fact that there is no provision like sub-Sec. (5) of Section 100 of the Code in Sec. 82 of the Act is of no consequence, The provision of Sec. 82 of the Act is clear and does not suffer from any ambiguity. 10. THE contention mat once the appeal is admitted on the basis of a substantial question of law being involved empowers the High Court to hear the appeal on all other points whether of fact or law is, in our opinion, entirely misconceived. THEre is noting in Sec. 82 of the Act which empowers the Court to interfere with the order of the Judge, Employees' Insurance Court on a question apart from the substantial question of law involved in the case. The language in Sec. 82 of the Act does not indicate that the appeal once admitted on a substantial question of law allows the appellant to raise all other questions whether of fact or law apart from the substantial question of law raised. It is well settled that while interpreting the Statute it is not permissible to read words into provisions which are not there. The Statute has to be read as a whole and the words used therein must be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. It is well settled that while interpreting the Statute it is not permissible to read words into provisions which are not there. The Statute has to be read as a whole and the words used therein must be given their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning. The general rule of construction is to look at the words, context, collocation and object of such words relating to such matter and then to interpret the meaning according to what would appear to be the meaning intended to be conveyed by the use of the word under the circumstances. See : Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1976 SC 997 . If the intention of the Legislature was that mere existence of a substantial question of law would entitle the court to hear the appeal on any other question also, it would have been so provided in the Act. In the absence of such a provision in the Act, it would not be permissible to interpret the existing provisions on the basis of what has been decided in other Enactments. It is well settled that a term used in one Act should not be interpreted with reference to use in another Act unless the two Acts are cognate. See S. Mohan Lal v. R. Kondish, AIR 1979 (?) 1132. And further unless the two Statutes are in pari materia interpretation of expression of one Act should normally be not accepted in another Act. See Muslim Wakfs Board v. Radha Kishan, AIR' 1979 SC 289. 11. THE provisions of Sec. 82 of the Act are limited in its scope. Section 82 (1), as noticed above, makes it clear that no appeal would lie against the decision of the Judge, Employees' Insurance Court except as provided in the section itself. Sub-section (2) of the said section provides for an appeal only in such a case where the case involves a substantial question of law. Various High Courts had occasion to consider this provision and reference may be made to the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Shalimar Rope Works Limited v. THE Employees State Insurance Corporation, (supra). In this case a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed : "On the other hand, in the statute before us, it is clear that the appeal itself is confined only to substantial question of law. In this case a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court observed : "On the other hand, in the statute before us, it is clear that the appeal itself is confined only to substantial question of law. It is, therefore, not possible in appeal under the said Act to traverse beyond the substantial questions of law, if any, involved in the appeal and apart from such questions, the appeal is incompetent. THE findings of fact, arrived at by the Insurance Court, accordingly, are outside the scope of this appeal and mere admission of the appeal under Order 41, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot enlarge the scope of the appeal so admitted." We agree with the learned single Judge, who made the reference, that the view taken in this Division Bench represents the correct appreciation of the scope of Section 82 of the Act. 12. SIMILAR view has been taken in the case of E. S. I. C. v. P. S. M. Company, AIR 1970 Delhi 182. In the case of The Parli Tile Works (P) Ltd. v. The Employees' Insurance Court, 1974 Lab I. C. 643 the Kerala High Court held that where the order did not involve any substantial question of law, the appeal was not maintainable under Sec. 82 of the Act. In the case of E.S.I. Corpn. v. Western Plastic Co., 1976 Lab I. C. 1369 the Calcutta High Court held that Section 82 of the Act is in pari materia with Section 100 of the Code, and even if the finding of the Court be an erroneous finding of fact based on mis-appreciation of evidence, it could not be said that any substantia! question of law was involved in the order of the Insurance Court. As seen above, various High Courts have had occasion to interpret Section 82 of the Act and they have held that the appeal is entertainable and maintainable only if the case involves substantial question of law. There is no substance in the proposition that after the appeal is admitted, the scope of Section 82 of the Act gets enlarged to consider the questions of fact also. Except the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union (supra) and Smt. Shyama Devi (supra). There is no substance in the proposition that after the appeal is admitted, the scope of Section 82 of the Act gets enlarged to consider the questions of fact also. Except the two Division Bench decisions of this Court, Upper Ganges Electric Employees Union (supra) and Smt. Shyama Devi (supra). We have already pointed out that the above two decisions do not lay down the correct law, and in any event 'they have placed reliance on provisions of law which are not in pari materia with the provisions of Sec. 82 of the Act. 13. REFERENCE has also been made to the case of Gouri Kinkar y. Radha Kishan Cotton Mills, AIR 1933 Cal. 220, but that was a case under Sec. 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. In that case, it was observed that if a substantial question of law arises the High Court is entitled to consider the case as a whole on points of fact as well as on points of law. With great respect, we are not able to accept this view, for a substantial question of law can never take in its ambit a substantial question of fact. What is exactly meant by 'substantial question of law' has been dealt with in the case of Sir Chunnilal V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. y. Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314 . It was observed there "The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 14. If the question is settled by the highest Court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law." 14. IN view of the above, we are in agreement with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the two Division Bench decisions do not decide the question of the scope of Sec. 82 of the Act correcty. We, therefore, answer the question referred to us in the negative. The answer will now be placed before the learned Single Judge. Question answered.