JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed against the order passed by the learned District Judge, Churu dated September 17, 1982 allowing the appeal preferred by the plaintiff against the rejection of his plaint by the Munsif, Churu. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for ejectment and for recovery of arrears of rent against the defendant-tenant. It was alleged in the plaint that the premises were let out to the defendant-tenant on March 26, 1977 for a period of 11 months and thereafter the tenancy was renewed on March 28, 1978 and March 24, 1979 and the rent of the premises agreed to between the parties was Rs. 120/- per month. The defendant deposited the arrears of rent claimed by the plaintiff and filed an application on October 15, 1980 stating that the suit was not maintainable because of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The defendant's case that the premises were let out on March 24, 1979 to the defendant and the suit for eviction was filed on May 12, 1980 an as the premises in dispute were let out for commercial and business purposes, the suit filed by the plaintiff was not maintainable having filed before the expiry of five years. A reply was filed to this application by the plaintiff stating that the shop was originally let out to the defendant in February, 1975 and as such five years have elapsed since the tenancy of the defendant initially began. The trial Court should have directed the defendant-tenant to file his written-statement and an issue should have been framed in respect of his question as to when the tenancy of the defendant initially began and whether the suit was not maintainable because of the provisions of Section 14(3) of the Act. Instead of doing so, the trial Court proceeded to decide the suit merely on the basis of the application of the defendant dated October 15, 1980 and the affidavits and documents filed by the parties and held that the affidavits filed by the plaintiff were false and could not be believed. Instead of doing so, the trial Court proceeded to decide the suit merely on the basis of the application of the defendant dated October 15, 1980 and the affidavits and documents filed by the parties and held that the affidavits filed by the plaintiff were false and could not be believed. Although the plaintiff raised an objection before the trial Court that the defendant should be directed to file the written-statement and that the disposal of the suit on the basis of the application dated October 15, 1980 was premature, yet the trial Court proceeded to hold that the plaintiff's suit was not maintainable. Not only that the trial Court also directed that notice be issued to the plaintiff and Gomaram, who had filed affidavits on October 30, 1980, to show-cause why they should not be prosecuted under Section 193 I.P.C. 3. The plaintiff filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, who observed that besides filing the affidavits the plaintiff had also moved an application for amendment of the plaint on October 30, 1980 praying for insertion of an averment in the plaint that the premises were let out to the defendant initially in February, 1975 and that without directing the defendant to file his written-statement and framing an issue in respect of the question relating to the maintainability of the suit, the trial Court should not have proceeded to reject the plaint. 4. The application for amendment of the plaint filed by the plaintiff on October 30, 1980 ought to have been disposed of first by the trial Court before he proceeded to reject the plaint by his order dated October 31, 1980. When there was an apparent conflict between the respective stands taken by the two parties, about the date of initial tenancy, the proper course to adopt, in such circumstances was to ask the defendant to file his written-statement and frame a preliminary issue about the question of initial starting of the tenancy of the defendant, which was essentially a question of fact. Both parties then should have been allowed to produce such evidence, both documentary as well as oral, relating to the preliminary issue, as they might have desired. Thereafter, it should have proceeded to decide the issue on the basis of the material which may have been produced by both the parties. 5. Both parties then should have been allowed to produce such evidence, both documentary as well as oral, relating to the preliminary issue, as they might have desired. Thereafter, it should have proceeded to decide the issue on the basis of the material which may have been produced by both the parties. 5. The manner in which the trial Court proceeded to eject the plaint in present case does not appear to be in accordance with law. On October 30, 1980 the plaintiff filed his reply to the application of the defendant dated October 15, 1980 and he also filed an application for amendment of the plaint. On October 31, 1981 the defendant produced certain documents and the Court on that very day, after hearing the arguments on the application, rejected the plaint after holding that the suit was not maintainable under Section 14(3) of the Act. The procedure followed by the trial Court was not proper. When an application for amendment of the plaint was moved by the plaintiff, the trial Court should have first called upon the defendant to file a reply to the application for amendment and then after hearing arguments of the learned counsel, the trial Court should have disposed of the application for amendment of the plaint. There can be no doubt that the application filed by the plaintiff for amending the plaint would have a vital effect on the question of maintainability of the suit and that was why it was necessary for the trial Court to dispose of the application for amendment of the plaint before preceding to decide the question of maintainability of the suit. Moreover, the documents, which were produced by the defendant on October 31, 1980 should have been allowed to the explained by the plaintiff or in case he desired to produce any further documents in rebuttal thereof, the plaintiff should have been allowed to produce such documents to rebut the evidence led by the defendant. As a matter of fact the defendant should have produced the documents which he desired to produce in support of his application on October 15, 1980 so as to allow the plaintiff reasonable time to rebut such evidence. As a matter of fact the defendant should have produced the documents which he desired to produce in support of his application on October 15, 1980 so as to allow the plaintiff reasonable time to rebut such evidence. As the defendant produced documents in support in his case dated 31 October, 1980 it was highly unjust that the plaintiff was not allowed an opportunity to explain the documents or affidavits by producing evidence in refutal thereof. The plaintiff might be able to explain the documents produced on behalf of the defendant. The manner in which the trial Court has produced in the suit was rather slip-shod. A party cannot be ousted from the Court in the manner in which the suit was disposed of in present case. The first appellate Court was justified in observing that the trial Court did not follow the proper procedure and the order passed by the trial Court was rightly set aside. The learned District Judge also laid down the procedure which should be followed by the trial Court after remand and I am in agreement with the procedure suggested by the first appellate Court. 6. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellate Court should not have set aside that part of the order of the trial Court, directing the issuance of notice to the plaintiff and Gomaram for prosecution under Section 193 I.P.C. In my view, the stage was too premature to decide either the suit or to issue notice about prosecution. As the first appellate Court has set-aside the order rejecting the plaint, then it is obvious that the order direction issuance of Notice to show cause, in respect of prosecution under Section 193 I.P.C., was also set aside. It is only after the evidence is led by the parties and in case it is held by the trial Court that the affidavits were false that question of prosecution under Section 193 I.P.C. can arise. 7. There the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff has filed an application in the trial Court seeking permission to withdraw the suit, with liberty to file a fresh suit. If that is so, the application under Order 23, Rule 1(3) C.P.C. will have to be decided by the trial Court before taking any other steps or proceedings in the case. If that is so, the application under Order 23, Rule 1(3) C.P.C. will have to be decided by the trial Court before taking any other steps or proceedings in the case. If the Court grants permission to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit, then no other proceedings are required to be taken. But in case permission is not granted to the plaintiff to withdraw the suit, then the trial Court shall proceed in the manner indicated by the learned District Judge in his order dated September 17, 1982. 8. In the result, the order passed by the learned District Judge is up held and subject to the observation made above, the appeal is dismissed. The parties are left to bear their costs of this appeal.Petition dismissed. *******