JUDGMENT R.C.D. Sharma, J. - This is a complainant's appeal by leave against the acquittal of the respondents for an offence under Sections 448/504/506, IPC recorded by the learned IV Additional Munsif Magistrate, Faizabad by his judgment and order dated April 30,1981. The facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly these:- The complainant appellant is a trustee of the Lala Hanuman Prasad Trust which owns a house No. 954 in Faizabad. One Ram Chandra Saran was a tenant in the house against whom a decree for ejectment was obtained by landlord. The decree was put under execution and through a Vakil Commissioner possession was obtained on 29th January 1980. It was alleged that trustee had gone out of station for a short period and when he returned on February 8, 1980 he was told that on a portion of the said premises forcible possession had been taken by the wife of the judgment-debtor and others who were arrayed as accused persons in the complaint and who are respondents in this appeal. A notice was accordingly given in accordance with Section 441 of the Indian Penal Code. When the respondents did not vacate the premises, the complaint giving rise to this appeal was filed. The contention of the respondents was that they had not vacated the premises and no offence whatsoever had accordingly been committed by them. It appears that in a portion of the said premises Ram Chandra Saran husband of Smt. Prabhawati Devi respondent No.4 was himself living while the remaining portion of the house was being used to run an educational institution. Evidence was adduced on behalf of the complainant and the Vakil-Commissioner was also examined Ganga Prasad Jaiswal the trustee as also Ram Chandra Verma who according to the landlord was inducted as a tenant after obtaining possession through the Vakil-Commissioner, had also been examined. The learned Magistrate, however, acquitted the respondents mainly on three grounds. He firstly held that the notice under Section 441, IPC said to have been given to the respondents had not been proved. Secondly, no receipt said to have been executed by the judgment-debtors wife about the removing of her possession from the premises in the presence of the Vakil-Commissioner had been produced or proved. He firstly held that the notice under Section 441, IPC said to have been given to the respondents had not been proved. Secondly, no receipt said to have been executed by the judgment-debtors wife about the removing of her possession from the premises in the presence of the Vakil-Commissioner had been produced or proved. Thirdly, in a writ petition filed by the judgment-debtor tenant, this Court had granted an interim stay in favour of the tenant as regards the execution by delivery of possession. On the application of the decree-holder to vacate the stay order, the Court did not choose to vacate the same and hence the judgment-debtor presumed to be continuing, in possession. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and have gone through the record. 2. So far as the second and third points are concerned, there is some merit in the contention of the appellant's learned counsel because the receipt said to have been executed by Smt. Prabhawati Devi wife of the judgment-debtor and handed over to the Vakil-Commissioner was before the Court and its certified copy is also in the record of this case, and consequently that part of the observation of the Court Where it was said that there was no evidence in the file or in the execution file which was summoned indicating that there was any receipt granted by the judgment- debtor's wife is contrary to facts. It would be a different matter if the receipt was not formally proved. But the original was before the Court and its certified copy is available in the record of this case as well. Regarding the third point also, it will appear that an interim stay order was granted by this Court on February 5, 1980 which stayed the delivery of possession by ejectment on the condition of depositing the decretal amount and damages for use and occupation, whereas according to the Vakil-Commissioner possession was already delivered on 29th January, 1980 which fact was not brought to the notice of the Court by the tenant judgment debtor. However, on a subsequent application filed by the decree-holder, this Court refused to vacate the stay order in April, 1980 after hearing both the parties. By implication, therefore, the judgment-debtor was presumed to be in possession. 3. However, on a subsequent application filed by the decree-holder, this Court refused to vacate the stay order in April, 1980 after hearing both the parties. By implication, therefore, the judgment-debtor was presumed to be in possession. 3. So far as the first point is concerned, it will appear that the notice given under Section 441, IPC was not formally proved and the finding of the Court; below on the point cannot be erroneous. All that was stated by Ganga Prasad Jaiswal in this connection was that a notice dated March 6, 1980 was given and a copy of the notice was filed on record. This was certainly not a formal proof of the notice. Neither it was read over to the witness so that he could have said that this was the notice nor his signatures or the signatures of the counsel giving the notice were proved. In fact the copy of the notice was not put to the witness at all. The document has therefore, not been exhibit- marked avid rightly so. For an offence under Section 448, IPC it was necessary that a notice as contemplated by Section 441, IPC as amended in its application to Uttar Pradesh was given and duly proved. That was not done. This is not a case where the trespass is said to have been committed with a view to commit any offence or cause annoyance etc. In the circumstances, the order of acquittal passed by the court below was justified. In an appeal against acquittal even if the finding recorded by the Court below can be upheld on any one single point which justifies acquittal, it would not matter if the findings on other points can be said to be suffering from any error a contrary view was also possible. In the circumstances, therefore, the order of acquittal has to be upheld. 4. The appeal is accordingly dismissed and the order of acquittal is upheld. The bail bonds if any furnished by the respondents shall stand discharged.