JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - Respondents 3 to 7 are the landlords of an accommodation which was let out to the petitioner and he has been using it for non-residential purposes. An application was made by respondents 3 to 7 for release of the aforesaid accommodation under section 21(l)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Lettings, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) on the ground that they needed it bona fide for their own use. It oppears that the landlord-respondents live in the upper portion of the house of which the accommodation in the tenancy of the petitioner is a part. The accommodation at their disposal is a bed room drawing cum dining room, box room kitchen, bath room and latrine. It further appears that on the ground floor on one side of the stair case leading to the upper portion, there is a small room of the landlord-respondents approximately 5' x 5' and on the other side of the staircase there is some accommodation which is being used by the landlord-respondents for carrying on their cloth business. According to them, the family of the landlord-respondents considered of Prem Chand, his wife Smt. Meena Wati, his son Janendra Kumar and a married daughter who from time to time comes and resides with her parents. Their further case was that Smt. Meena Wati was suffering from overweight, hypertension and high blood pressure and had been medically advised to reside on the ground floor. It was also their case that Janendra Kumar was of marriageable age and on being married will require a separate portion for being used by him for residential purposes. lie also had passed out from law college and needed an accommodation for being used as his chamber inasmuch as he wanted to start practising law. 2. The application for release was contested by the petitioner. It was, however, allowed by the prescribed Authority who found the need of the landlord. respondents to be bona fide for the purposes stated by them in the application for the release. On question of comparative hardship also the Prescribed Authority found in favour of the landlord respondents. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority before the District Judge which has been dismissed. respondents to be bona fide for the purposes stated by them in the application for the release. On question of comparative hardship also the Prescribed Authority found in favour of the landlord respondents. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the order of the Prescribed Authority before the District Judge which has been dismissed. The district Judge has affirmed the findings of the Prescribed Authority on all the points except in regard to the need of Smt Meena Wati for having an accommodation on the ground floor on the ground of her illness. It is these two orders passed by the Prescribed Authority and the District Judge which are sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 3. It has been urged by counsel for the petitioner that the landlord- respondents have two rooms in the ground floor apart from the shop in which they are carrying on their cloth business and even though this fact was established from the inspection note made by the District Judge himself, a copy whereof has been filed as annexure-7 to the writ petition, the District Judge while passing the impugned order ignored his own inspection note. 4. Having gone through the inspection note of the District Judge and the impugned order passed by him I find no substance in this submission. In this connection it may also be pointed out that the fact that the two room a referred to by counsel for the petitioner on the ground floor apart from the shop were in their possession does not appear to have been supressed by the landlord-respondents in their release application as is apparent from the statement of case contained in the order of the Prescribed Authority. Their come was that one room was aproximately 5' X 5' and could not be used either for residential purposes or for purposes of a chamber of an Advocate. In regard to the other room their case was that it formed part of their business premises. In this Court too this fact has been specifically stated in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit which also refere to the inspection made by the District Judge. In regard to the other room their case was that it formed part of their business premises. In this Court too this fact has been specifically stated in paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit which also refere to the inspection made by the District Judge. It has been stated in the said paragraph that one room which measures 5' X 4 is hardly a room where a person can live and I was being utilised by the landlords for purpose of storage of waste materials and that the other room is a business premises and was released for that purpose by an order passed on 7.2.1973 in earlier proceedings under section 21 of the Act. A copy of the order passed on 7.2.1973 on the earlier application under section 21 of the Act has also been filed as annexure-4 to the counter affidavit. The reply to paragraph 8 of the rejoinder affidavit. The fact that the other room is a business premises and was released for that purpose in earlier proceedings under section 21 of the Act by order dated 7.2.1973, has not been specifically denied in the rejoinder affidavit. The only averment which has been made in this behalf is that so far as the assertions relating to the order dated 7th February, 1973 were concerned they were matters of record and needed no reply. 5. In his inspection note the District Judge has stated : "The disputed premises are in the shape of a godown having an iron shutter over it. On one side of the same is a small room in the possession of the landlord. It is so small that it can hardly be used for residential purposes. In fact it was found to be in use of storing waste. On the other side of the disputed premises is the stair-case of the landlord leading to the first floor where he and his family reside. Further beyond in the room of the landlord adjoining to which is his shop opening on the main road." The inspection note of the District Judge is dated 3.8.1981 and the impugned order is dated 21.8.1981. Further beyond in the room of the landlord adjoining to which is his shop opening on the main road." The inspection note of the District Judge is dated 3.8.1981 and the impugned order is dated 21.8.1981. In paragraph 8 of the writ petition it has been stated that when the arguments were started before him the District Judge found it necessary to make a spot inspection and consequently he made a spot inspection of the building in dispute on 2.8.1981 and that a certified copy of the inspection note of the District Judge was being filed as annexure-7. It thus appears that the inspection was made by the District Judge himself after the arguments had actually started and it cannot be said that the District Judge was obivious of the fact that he had made an inspection when he passed the impugned order a few days later. Even otherwise it is not right to say that the District Judge has ignored the facts emanating from his inspection note. While giving facts of the case the District Judge has very specifically stated that the ground floor has a small room measuring approximately 5'x5' which is used as a store room while on the other side of the godown there is stair-case leading to the first floor and business premises of the owners where they carry on cloth business. This is precisely what was found by the District Judge at the time of spot inspection. It is in these circumstances that I am of opinion that the District Judge has not ignored the inspection note prepared by him while passing the impugned order. 6. In so far as the finding recorded by the Prescribed Authority as well as the District Judge that the need of the landlord-respondents was bona fide us concerned suffice it to say that the said finding is based on oppraisal of evidence produced by the parties and is essentially a finding of fact and does not suffer from any such error which may justify interference under article 226 of the Constitution. That the finding on this point is a finding of fact is a proposition of law which admits of no doubt in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radha lal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596. and Indian Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 46. 7. That the finding on this point is a finding of fact is a proposition of law which admits of no doubt in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mattulal v. Radha lal, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1596. and Indian Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 46. 7. Coming to the question of comparative hardship it has been held by the District Judge that additional accommodation was needed for Janendra Kumar who was of marriageable age and was likely to be married in the near future and also for his chamber as an Advocate and if the application for release was not allowed, the landlord-respondents were likely to suffer great hardship. He has further held that if on the contrary the application for release was allowed, the petitioner was not likely to suffer equivalent hardship. In this connection he has pointed cut that the disputed premises were being used by the petitioner for storing drums, cutting stamping and packing soap cakes and that the actual manufacturing process and other jobs were being carried on by the petitioner in another building held by him at 37 Peepal Mandi, Dehradun. The District Judge had further found that the drums could be stored in open with a canvass over them. Stamping, cutting and packing can be done in the same premises where the manufacturing process of shop was being carried on by the petitioner. In view of these facts be has agreed with the finding of the Prescribed Authority that greater hardship would be caused to the landlord respondents in the event of the release application being dismissed than the hardship likely to be caused to the petitioner on the said application being allowed. This finding again is essentially a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed under Article 226 of the Constitution. If authority were needed for this proposition. reference maybe made to P.B. Desai v. C.M. Patel, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 1059. and Munilal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29. 8. Counsel for the petitioner then raised a technical objection. It was urged by him that since the accommodation in question was being used by the petitioner for business purposes, i t could not be released for residential purposes. and Munilal v. Prescribed Authority, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 29. 8. Counsel for the petitioner then raised a technical objection. It was urged by him that since the accommodation in question was being used by the petitioner for business purposes, i t could not be released for residential purposes. A similar argument had been made before the District Judge and was repelled on the ground that no law had been referred in support of the aforesaid submission. 1 he view taken by the District Judge in this behalf is apparently correct inasmuch as no prohibition either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder has been brought to my notice to the effect that an accommodation occupied for business purposes could not be released for residential purposes. Even though clause (ii) of the 3rd proviso to section 21(l) of the Act is to the effect that no application under clause (a) of section 21(l) of the Act shall be entertained in the case of a residential building for occupation for business purposes, there is no provision that no application for release of a building for residential purposes shall lie in respect of a building held by a tenant for business purposes. 9. Counsel for the petitioner then urged that the District Judge has not taken into consideration the mandatory requirement of Rule 16(2) of the Rules framed under the Act. I find it 'difficult to accept this submission also. A perusal of the order of the District Judge indicates that Rule 16(2) was invobed before him to support a submission that the petitioner had acquired a goodwill in the accommodation in question. This submission was considered and repelled and in any opinion for good reasons. 10. Counsel for the petitioner also urged that the District Judge had failed to consider the mandatory requirement of Rule 16(l)(d) of the Rules framed under the Act which is to the effect that where the tenants needs would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under tenancy and the landlords needs would be served by releasing the other part the Prescribed Authority shall release only the latter part of the building. Such a submission does not appear to have been made before the District Judge but since the requirement of the Rule aforesaid is mandatory it is open to the petitioner to raise this plea before this Court a writ petition. Having considered the submission made by counsel for the petitioner in this behalf I, however, find it difficult to accept it. In paragraph 24 of the written statement filed by the petitioner before the Prescribed Authority in reply to the application made by the landlord respondents for release of the accommodation in question the extent of the accommodation at the disposal of the petitioner has been given. It constitutes just a room measuring about 8' x 12' and an open verandah, which of course, he has been using, as has been found by the District Judge, as a godown. Counsel for the petitioner on being enquired in this behalf failed to give any satisfactory reply as to what portion of this single room and the open verandah could be released in favour of the landlord-respondents so that their need for having a residential room for Janendra Kumar who was going to be shortly married and for having a chamber which he needed in order to practise law, could be served as contemplated by Rule 16(l)(d). To me it appears that it was for this reason that this argument was not even pressed before the District Judge. I find no substance in this submission either. 11. Lastly it was urged that in view of the mandatory requirements contained in the second proviso to section 21(l) of the Act it was incumbent upon the Prescribed Authority and on his failure to do so upon the District Judge to have allowed compensation to the petitioner while granting the application for release inasmuch as the accommodation in question was being held by the petitioner for non-residential purposes. The rent of the accommodation in question is admittedly Rs. 45/- per month as indicated in paragraph 24 of the written statement referred to above. The maximum compensation which can be allowed under the aforesaid proviso is the amount representing two years rent. Counsel for the landlord-respondents has made a statement before me that the landlord respondents would deposit before the Prescribed Authority within a month from today's date a sum of Rs. The maximum compensation which can be allowed under the aforesaid proviso is the amount representing two years rent. Counsel for the landlord-respondents has made a statement before me that the landlord respondents would deposit before the Prescribed Authority within a month from today's date a sum of Rs. 1080/- representing the maximum compensation which is payable to the petitioner in pursuance of the aforesaid proviso and the said sum may be paid over to the petitioner. In view of this offer the impugned orders cannot be quashed on this ground either. 12. In the result I find no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. It is, however, made clear that the Prescribed Authority shall not execute the order of release till the sum of Rs. 1,080/- representing two years rent of the accommodation in question has been deposited by the landlord-respondents before it for being paid over to the petitioner as compensation in lieu of the application for release being allowed. The petitioner is granted one month's time to vacate the accommodation in question. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.