JUDGMENT N.D. Ojha, J. - The petitioner is the landlord of an accommodation which was let out to respondent No. 3 Chhotey Lal. A suit was instituted by the petitioner for ejectment of respondent No. 3 and for arrears of rent etc. The case of the petitioner, inter alia, was that the respondent No. 3 had demolished a wall of accommodation in his tenancy and had also raised the level of the courtyard and consequently the level of one of the adjacent rooms had become lower than the court-yard with the result that rain water now flows inside the adjacent 6 rooms causing damage to it. His case further was that after demolishing the wall as aforesaid the respondent No. 3 constructed another wall at different place in the courtyard whereby he reduced the wid of the courtyard and after construction of the courtyard was now only about three feet wide. It was also the case of the petitioner that the respondent No. 3 had constructed a chabutra on a portion of the accommodation in question on its other side towards the road and sublet it to one Sheo Narain. Ejectment was sought also on the ground that even though the accommodation in question had let out to the respondent No. 3 for residential purpose, he had also set up a small shop for the selling tea and snacks. According to the petitioner clauses (b), (d) and (e) of Section 20(2) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as Act) were attracted and the respondent No. 3 was liable to be evicted. The suit was contested by the respondent No. 3 but was decreed by the Judge, Small Causes accepting the case of the petitioner. Against the decree passed by the Judge, Small Causes a revision was filed by the respondent No. 3 before District Judge under Section 25, Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. It was transferred to the Ist Additional District Judge, Banda respondent No. 1, who allowed it on 12th February, 1980. It is this order passed by the respondent No. 1 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was transferred to the Ist Additional District Judge, Banda respondent No. 1, who allowed it on 12th February, 1980. It is this order passed by the respondent No. 1 which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition. 2. It was argued by the counsel for the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 does not appear to have applied his mind at all to the requirements of the Act or even to the reasons recorded by the Judge Small Causes in support of his findings of the various issues raised before him. 3. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that the impugned order cannot be sustained except in so far that it holds that the respondent No. 3 has not used the accommodation in question for any purpose inconsistent with the purpose of, for which it was let out. As seen above the case of the petitioner in this behalf was that even though the accommodation in question had been let out for residential purpose the respondent No. 3 had opened a small shop therein for selling tea and snacks. It is settled law that in such cases it is the dominant purpose for which the accommodation in question is being used, has to be looked into. In Ram Prasad v. Rabindra Kumar Tiwari, 1981 ARC 161, also a building had been let out for residential purpose but a portion of the building was being used by the tenant in connection with a tea stall. On the view that it was dominant use of the building that has to be taken into consideration, it was held that the user was not for a purpose other than for which the building was let out. In view of that decision the finding of the Additional District Judge on this point cannot be said to suffer from such error with justify interference in a writ petition. 4. However, in regard to the findings recorded by the Judge, Small Causes that the provisions of clauses (b), (c) and (e) of Section 20(2) of the Act were also attracted to the facts of the present case I am of opinion that the Additional District Judge has not applied his mind either to the relevant evidence produced in this behalf or the legal position as enunciated in various decisions of his Court. First, such of the findings which had been recorded not be reversed by the Additional District Judge in a revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act except in the circumstances and in the manner provided for in this behalf by a Division Bench of this Court in Laxmi Kishan and another v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1981 ARC 545 (D.B.). In regard to clause (b) of Section 20(2) of the Act, namely, that the tenant has wilfully caused or permitted to be caused substantial damage to the building the Judge Small Causes had held that on account of various acts committed by the respondent No. 3 including the demolition of a wall the provisions of the said clause were attracted. He had further passed a decree for the recovery of Rs. 500/- as damages. The Additional District Judge has reversed even that decree without giving any cogent reason for disagreeing with the view taken by the Judge, Small Causes in this behalf. Likewise as regards the question that the respondent No. 3 had made constructions or structural alternations in the building as were likely to demolish its value or utility or to disfigure, the Additional District Judge has committed a manifest error of law in reversing the findings of the Judge, Small Causes without adverting to the legal position in this behalf. 5. In regard to clause (c) of Section 20(2) of the Act it may be pointed out that it is settled law that the use of the word "or" towards the end of this clause at two places, namely, before the word "utility" and the words disfigure it" makes it clear that the requirements of Section 20(2)(c) of the Act will b fulfilled even if the cse is brought under any of the three categories mentioned therein, namely, (1) diminishing the value of the accommodation, (2 diminishing its utility, and (3) disfiguring it. In the instant case, the respondent No. 3 had demolished a wall and constructed another wall at a different place in the courtyard with the result that the width of the courtyard was reduced to about 3 feet only. He had further raised the level of the courtyard with the result that the water flowed inside an adjoining room whose level had become lower than the level of the courtyard after its being raised which was causing damage to the said room. He had further raised the level of the courtyard with the result that the water flowed inside an adjoining room whose level had become lower than the level of the courtyard after its being raised which was causing damage to the said room. The petitioner's case further was that on account of the width of the courtyard being reduced to about 3 feet its utility as a courtyard had completely disappeared. The Additional District Judge has not applied his mind to these aspects of the matter also. So is the case with the finding of the Judge Small Causes on the question of sub-letting also. The Additional District Judge has brushed aside that finding in a cursory manner by saying that since the chabutra said to have been let out by the respondent No. 3 to Sheo Narain was alleged to be on the roadside it could not be said that any portion of the building had been sub-let. As seen above, the case of the petitioner was that the Chabutra had been raised over a portion of the accommodation in question and had been sub-let. This fact that portion happened to be on the road side per se could not be a ground for reversing the finding of the Judge, Small Causes on the issue of subletting. It is in view of the foregoing discussion that I am of opinion that the impugned order passed by the Additional District Judge cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. 6. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order dated 12th February, 1984, passed by the respondent No. 1 is quashed and he is directed to decided the revision filed by the respondent No. 3 afresh in accordance with law keeping in mind the observation made above. Since the suit was instituted in year 1975 the revision shall be decided expeditiously. The parties shall, however, bear their own costs.